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BOOK THE ELEVENTH. 
CHAPTER V. 
D O B ~ G I  the siege of Rodrigo, an expedition sz~ling fkom 
G r u ñ a  under Porlier seized md dismsntkl Santona and 
otlier points on the coast. Mal& coming down from tlie Oallicim 
mountains, also menaced Astorga j and part of liia m y ,  unrier 
Toboiido Gil, occupied Puebla de Senabria t o  act in conceri 
with Silveira. Mnlii's rnovements wme anopposed by Keller- 
man antt Sems  during tlio aicg.0 of Rdrigo, becniise tlie fimi 
bcing at Bafios was too diritant, and the Elitter's tmops wers 
too widely spread ; but when the fortress feIl, the eighth mrps 
repassed the Tomes to gnther provisiona, whicL ensablcd 
Serras to concentrate and drim LIabi back t o  the hills. 
Tobodo Gil tlien removed liis atores from Puebla de Senabrin, 
snd drew closer to Silveira in expedation of an atta&; but  
Bemas put a Swiss bnttalion m<l sixty dragwona into Puebla 
nnd fcll back to Zarnora, the eighth COTS returncd t o  tlie 
Agueda, and thcsc wcrc the onIy Spanish cfforta t o  draw off 
any of the bes iepr~  from Rodrigo, nnd give the Jbglisk gene& 
nn opportnnity o€ succouring it.. 
Meanwhile Bonnet having defeatcd the Asturians at Sale4 
entered Castropol on the frontier of Gallicia, bnt retumed 
to Oviedo on hearjng of tlie expedition to Santona; the 
B p a W s  then re -embailied for Coruña and Ihe project of a 
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lager rarrnament, tcl be directed against Santander itoelf, a a s  
adopted ; for the snccess of this sindl enterprise had elated tlie 
rallies, and Mahi boasted, tliat iif arrns and ammuliitioii wertt 
snpplied by England he would clear the plitins of Leon w s  far 
ari the EsIe river: his prikpoanls were acceded to, nnd sir 
Borne Popfiam wns apioinkd to  mperintend a grcat navnE 
expedikion 6g.ainst the Asturirsn and Biscay coasts. 
fiynier nom pnssed fhe Tws. He hacl collected boats a t  
B m  de Aiwneta in June, expecting to be j o b d  by tha 
French column from Andalusis; but lieniing it was attacked 
by Mendizabd at h s  Santos the 33nl of tliat rnonth marclied 
to ita auccour. Lac~l's expedition to the Ronde h d  just tlien 
d m  Morticr from Scville, tEie French on tho Odicl llar2 
feillcn back to tlie Tinto, und Cupoas was foraging aboiit tlie 
former river. Reynier thought tlie crisis formidable, antl 
instead of returning to the T a p a  sought t o  surprise Imas; 
failing in tliat he puahed across tlic Morena apiinst Ballesteros, 
who was at Campo Frio and only  ved himself by a hasg  
fiigl~t into Portugal. Laq, r~ns before snid, rvas uoon hcnteii 
from the Ronda, 3lorticr returncd to EScBilIe, Hiiclva rand 
for p ~ s l a g  tlie T a p s  at Alcortete, where hii botrtrr remdnerl, 
the Spaniards having neglected the opportunity for destrojha 
thm. 
' Ta a y e r  his movement from Hill, tlien at Campo 
Ir* Mayor, RBynicr placsd B rear-giiard on tlie Snlor, 11, p 881. 
and Kellerrnan carne from Blifios ta Coria tn  bwe 
the Portupese on the Elga. On the 10th the piusa9 waz 
effected by the main body ; on the 1 Gtli by the rmr-guarrl, ivhicli 
thus escaped Hill and Romana, who being united aud dvnuc- 
ing tu p t h e r  the bm-esf, for victualling Badajos and tlie otlier 
fortresses, had deaigned to figlit. Wnier'a mavement f0rc~d 
Hill t o  mulra a pamllel march by ViEh Vellin, whicli only 
rquired tl~irty-six hourrr, nnd meonwhile 'CYellinpton had 
assembted at Tl~omar, under general Leith, a reserve of eight 
thousñnd Portnqese, and two thousand 13ritish troops fust 
mived fmm England. When Repier reaclied Coria he 
detaclied troops by Perales u p n  aliugal, biit recalled them 
on fiiiding Hill mas cloee at hand, aud the twa gen~rals thcn 
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h e d  each othcr. Hill, reinforced by the Portngueae craaalry 
under general Fane, encamped sixteen thousnnd men witli 
eighteen p u s  at 8hmede8, having the Sobreira Formosa close 
behind; l i i  advanced guad was in Cutello Branco, hia horse- 
rnen on the P o n d ;  and a Portugueae bri,&e o£ infrtntry waa 
detached to Furidao to mver tlie Estrada Nova and commu- 
nicate with Guarda: general Leith immdately adopted tlie 
line of tlie Zexere, jn supporh of Rill, and t l ~ u a  twenty-six 
thonsand replam, aided by the militiq were between Reynier 
~ n t l  Lisbon. That general mnde a demonstrittion on the side 
of Salvatierra but ww repulsed by some Portupese camlr~. 
and then dividing his forcea between Penamracor and Z m a  
Mayor, establislied a mal1 prjt on the left bank of the Tsps  
near the mouth of the Bio del Monte, and by continua1 move- 
ment renderd it doubtful whether he m a n t  to repasa the 
Tagnq t o  advance upon k z e d a s ,  or tu join hlassena. Mean- 
while Rallestrroa returned to Arncena, d Itomiana sent Imna 
h Xerefi de 10s Cavalleros, ODonnel to Sruxillo, and Carlos 
d'Esp&a ta surprise Roynier's post an tlie %o del Monte; 
yet he won remlled tliese detachmenta because Mortier wns 
preparing t o  re-entcr Eatredura .  Snch waa the &ate of 
nffnim in Aiigust, whpn Mmscnn, n~sirrured of Reynier's aid, 
inve9titad Almeida, which producd Craufiird's action on tlic 
Coti, diiring \vhich Loison, tbinking the govenior a nativeT 
pmsed him t o  desert tlie English, 'that d e  people w h w  
object mas to enslave Portugal.' 
Wellingkn's situat.ion was ernbamssing. Ciudad Rodrign 
furnkhed t l~e French with a place of m s ,  tliq mi@ dis- 
regard Aimeida, and tlieir t ady  investment, viewed in cm- 
junction witli tliegreat mligaziues cullecting tlt Ciudad Eudrigo, 
infimted aa intenkiuu of so doiiig. Ney'a curps und tlie 
reservc covnlry were indecd aronnd Alrncidn, but by tcle- 
gmphic intcrcoume with tlie plncc, i t wm known the invest- 
ment ww not real, and that the he=& of the coliimiis pofnwd 
tomrtltr Celorico. Loison's advanced guad enterd PinheE 
the day after Craufurd3s action, rtelrnier's troops were divided 
between Zarza Mayar md Penamacor, anrl baving boats near 
Alcantara on the Tapa, ~nenaced qunlly the line of tliat rivcr 
and tlie line of €he Zozem : it wae as lilrely Aiasscria would julu 
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Regnier, ~is tlint Rcynier would jain Masqenrt. A letter con- 
taining Napoleon's orden for Reynier te invade by tlie line of 
Abrantes, wkle Mortier entered the Alemtejo anrl IInssena 
actd by the valley of tlie hfondep, wm intercepted; but 
Rcynier wns by the Fiame letter p h c d  under Mnssenn's coin- 
mrrnd, Morticr mas not in a condition to move against the 
Alemtejo, and no certnin notion of the enemy's intention could 
be formed. Junot, Serras and Kellerman 7vere betwmn t,he 
Tormes and tlie Esla, and rnighh break into the nortliern pro- 
trincea of Portugal, wliilc Ney and Eeynier heId tEie allies in 
check; anrl this mi thc surmt coursc, hccauae the hlrlring of 
Oporto would htive fttrnirrhed many resourcm, stricken the 
natives witli terror, dispcrscd the northern militia, opened tbe 
p e x t  coastrroad to Gsbon, nnd enabled Massena to a~~oid $1 
tlie dificult eountry alicut tlie Mondego. Tlie Englisli general 
must then have retired Ziefore the second nnd sixtli corps, 
nnlcss hc nttnclrcd Ncy; nn unpromising mcasurc, bcem~iiisc of 
the cnemy's strciigtli in liomc; in fine, Mmcna, thoiigh dila- 
toy ,  had one hundmd and sixteen thonssnd mcn nnd the 
initial power: t11e Englisli general was forced t o  await his 
mouements. 
Tbe wtctud position of the alliee was too extended and tao 
forrvnrd, yct to rctire at once mould btal-e fieemed tiniid ; hence 
Wellington rcmitincd quict during the 2Stli, 26th, nnd 37th 
of Sulg, altliough the eneniy's post3 were thickeiiing on the 
Pinhd river. The 28th, tlie Biitiñh cavalry atlvanced to 
Frexadas, tlie infantry witlidrem lieliind tlie llondego, Cde 
only rcmttiriing at Guarda, Cra~ifucd occupied Celuriw, tlie 
othcr di'i'i~ions mcrc nt Pcnlinncoñ, Carnpicliinn, nnrl Fornos, 
tlie Port.tiguese rr dhy's mnrcli behrnd. Tlic niclr wcrc sent 
daily to the mar, tlie line of retreat lrcpt free from encum- 
brnnce, tlie army ready for action. In this state the enemy 
made a demonstration towards St. ;Toa de Pcsquci-a, and ddeeated 
mme rnilitia at Fosboa on the Douro, nfter wliich ha retired 
across tlie Con, and thc communicntion .mith Almcida was 
ap in  open. A dctnchmcnt of Bqnierk horse, cncoiint~md at 
Ataltiya near Punclao, wns beaten by the Portupese cavalry 
and ordenanp, with B los# of fifty killed or taken, nnd the 
Ftend rvitlidrew from Pen'ennmwor. 
On tlie side of Gdlicia, KelIerman entered Castro Cotltrijo, 
and ~iaart of Sem' ttoops, d ~ a n c i n g  towords Monterey, or- 
dcred provisions for ten thousand men ou the rnad to Bm 
gnnza. Silveira immediatdy rnarclred against Puebla do 
genabría, drove off the Prwcli cnvalry and inrestRd the Swiss 
iin the 7th. They capitulated on tlie 10th a t  tlie moment 
when Serras, who had RO cnrelcssIy left tliem ti~cm, wns com- 
ing tu therr relief: five hundrctl men nnd an engle wcrc thua 
cíaptured. Silveira in his foolisli pride would thm baw @ven 
battle to the Frencli, and when Beresford, drcading miscliief, 
sent him imperative orders to  retrertt, he obeyed in so slovenly 
s. mmncr ras to sbnndon his r e a r - p r d  under J. Rilson, who 
nevertheless w e d  it in circurnstances of such trying diffi- 
culty tliat he received the public tliauka of tlie maralial. This 
dvantage in tlie nortlt w t ~  littlanced by a disnster in Estrerna- 
durn. The Spanish genernls, nevcr much disposed to m~pect 
ITellington's counsela, were now discontenhd by the fa11 af 
Ciudad Itodrip. Hc had presscd upoa Romana tbe policy of 
avoiding battles, bad ohtdned Campo Mnyor for liim SS a 
place of arm~, wwith lenve t o  retire tbere when over-miitclied by 
the encrny, and he had aliown him tliat Rilt's departure 
grcatly augmented the neceasity of caution. Romana, despising 
this courisel, joined Dallesteros,and their united farces amounted 
to eighteen thousand infantrp and two thousand ca\+alry, beeides 
pmtitlas. Wellington foreseebg tlien they would oEer battle, 
be defeatd, and tlius lay open tlio Alemtejo, ardered Hill Lo 
send Madden's Portupese mvalry in al1 hmts ta tlieir succour, 
and that oficer renched Campo 3Iayor tlie 14tIr, but he waa 
too late ; lbmnn'a sn-guard, under Mendmabel, h d  been 
deferited at Bcnvcnidct by Morticr on the 1 ltli, mth th loss of 
s k  Iiundred men, and waa going to surrcndcr whcn C~rmra 
ooming np with thc Spnni~h cavalv diaengnged it, The whole 
thcn retreated a c w s  tlie Norma to  Monte Melin and Fregenal, 
pursned by tlie French, who slew or toolt four hundred : the 
nexb day Mortier entered Zafra and Romana retired ta Almen- 
dmlejos. This check shook the defence of Portugal to jts 
mntri?. There was notliing to prevent Mortier penetrating to 
the lower Tagus, and tliuri drawing 1Vellington from Beira, 
befortt the nieasures for laxing waste the country were ripc for 
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execution, But a counter-check of a lilze nature srrested Mor- 
tier. Lmy, sailing f r m  C d i z  nnder the convoy of captain 
Cocl~hurn of t11e Rritkh navy, Janded tliree tboiianntl mcn nncnr 
Moguer, and drove the diike of Aremberg towsards Seville 
d i l e  Capon~ drove general TCemondupon Zulamea; theFrench 
indeed rallied and forced Lacy to re-embark, but on the first 
nlarm Mortier i i m ~  recalled to the Morena, and Romana once 
niore oocupied Zafra.. T l h  a%ir at Moguer was contemptible 
In itseff, yet the cheelr it p v e  t o  Morticr's prozLcsg nnd x vcrg 
tumid despatch from ceiptain Cockburn p v e  it a momenby 
celebrity. 
Mnssens had been waiting for Mortier's m-operation, and on 
the rlq tlie latter entered &fra the sixtli cor~is formally in- 
vested Almeida. Wellington immwliately bxnuglit up the Por- 
ttlpEqe niiny to Celorico, Govm, Jfcllio, antl Trancoso, while 
the British troops occrrpl~d Pirilicl, Freixdas, and Guarda In 
these positions, expecting a vigorous defence frum Almeida, 
he hoped to dclay tlle encmy fur two rnontlis, when the rainy 
smson would give him farther advaiitws in deface of the 
muntry. His originnl intontio3 liad been to  keep the light 
division alwap on t110 Cahefa Negro, n rugged hill overhang- 
ing tho bnclga of thc Con, expecting thits tu Ireep opcn hia 
communicaticin with the fortress, or to make tlie French inrest 
the place mith their whole army. Craufurd'~ rashess mai~ed 
tliis plan; and bis despondency after the action on the 24th, 
renrlered it irnprudent to renew tlie project. Yet Massena's 
tardinesfi and tlie small force with wliich he finally invested the 
pllioe, lcd Wellington iwin to  think of nssembling sccrctly a 
Erarge and chosen body o f  men behind the Cabeqa Negro, aith 
the view o£ suddenly forcing tlie bridge and the fords md 
t$king the Freoch Iiattering train; but mbile revolwinp this 
great stroke in his mind a terrible disaster broke liismeasures. 
This fortress was garrisoned by fovr tlionsnnd Portupese 
regul~rs and militia nnder the EngIish colonel CDX. B1tEioiig.h 
regulnrly constructed with six bnctions, ravelins, an excellent 
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ditch and mvcrod way, it WM cxtrcmely defective. The mm- 
parte were too higli for the glacia, and from some near ground 
the bottorn of tlic ditch ~niglit be seen. An d d  sqnare castle, 
built on rt mound in tfie centre of tlie town, contnined thre8 
bomb proofs, the doore of which were not aeeure, rand with tlie 
exception of some damp casernritee in one Sastion, there was 
uo ollier inegatine for the poder .  
On tlie lstli, aouad was broke uuder cover of a fdse 
ott~iclt, md in the morning of the SGth, sixtj-five picces of 
rirtillcl, opcning at once, set  many houses in flamcs, which 
the prrison was u n d e  te extinguiab. The counte~fire was 
Iiowever briskly maintnined and very littIe milibry dxmage 
mas sustained. Towards eveuing the cannonde slackened, 
liut just after dark tbe ground suddenly trembled, the cxistle 
Iiursting into a tliousantl piecm gave vent to a wlumn of 
smolte tlnd fire, and with a prodigious noim tlie wliole town 
surik into a shapeless ruin l Treason or accident liad mrtsed 
tlio magasines tu exlilude, md tlie devmtation was incredible. 
Tlie mrnparts were tireaclled, tlis guag tiirown b t o  the ditch, 
five liundred people were stnick dend on the instant, and onIy six 
Iiousrss wcre left Ptandin,~: the stonea thrown out hurt forty of 
thc hfsh-gm in thc trenchca, and the sumiving garrison, 
ag\iast at tlie Iiorrid commotion, disreprded al1 exhortations 
to rrilly. Chx fearing the enemy would take the opportunity 
to storm tlie rampsrts, beab to ttrms, and mnning t o  the malls, 
n?tli the hclp of an nrtillery officer, fired off the fe157 grins tliat 
remained. No attack was made, biit tLe French shells fe31 
tIiicl<\v al1 tlie niglik, and in tlie morniag of tke 27% twt, 
officers appenreri at the gatea, liearing a letkx frrirn Mnsaena 
with an offci of tcrms. Furthcr resistmco was impossiblc, 
but tlic govcrnor, thinking if bo muld imposo on tho cncmy 
for two rleys the ~ r m y  might siiccour him, w88 in the act of 
rejecting the ail'er, when a mntiny> oopenly fomented by the 
lieutenant-governor Bernardo da Costa, privateiy by Sosef 
Rareiros the chief of the art i l le~ ,  who had corresponded 
secretly with tlie Prench, broke out, She other oiitil-e ofñctq 
disturlied by fear or swayed by the influence of those two, 
were more williiig to Sollow thil to oppose tklieir dislionourabla 
proceedinp, ami Costa expresseci hia resolution to hoist B e  
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white flag. Cox, nnnuppoiorted exoept by the IZntish cnptnin 
Rewit, and seeing no remedy of  force, endenvoiiml to pro- 
crastinate; be wm ignormt O€ Qnreiros' proceedings, antn<l sent 
bim with counter-proposala to t.he Frencli camp. bu t tlie traitor 
irnrnediatdy informed Mwssena 01 tlie triie atate o€ tlie gar- 
nson nnd never returneti; tlie place tlien enpituIut.ed; the 
rniIitia to return t o  their homcs, thc rcplrars to reinain pri- 
soners of war. 
Vhile the treaty Teas pending, artd even oifter the sipature 
o£ the articleq in the niglit of tlie 27th, tlie Frencli bom- 
barded the place. This act equnlly unjustifialile and s h n p ,  
bmusc Binswna's aidde-csmp, colonel Pelet, wna nctually 
witlnn the mlls when thc Rring commenccd, ww excused on 
Ale p u n d  of an error in tlie transrnission of 
JntiRwtlon 
of cuioner orden; get it Iasted during tEe mliole ni&, and 
COK. 
~ O X  agserta tliat the tema of tlie capitdation wit.h 
bygen& reeipect to tlie militia were $so violated. Pelet 
rol filct, 
npwidcd ta indigrintly denies tliis cliarge. He aays the garri- 
;;:;,i'::vee son sccing thc maquis of blornn, their cauntry- 
C o n c i u h  mnn, amongst the French generals, ofi'ered for tlie 
drl  Ia'rnn- 
p i s .  most part to  ~ierve, and tliis version is corrabo- 
;ilr, ~ t ~ ~ f l g  rated by ttwo facts. The 24th Portuguese regiment 
" m e ~ o n d -  certajnly took service aitli the Prench in s body, 
erice. MSS. 
and Maseena released the Arpuil mgiment of 
militia who rcfuscd to do ao. Yct, so cneiIy rarc mcn's mindc 
moved by p r ~ e n t  circumdnnccs, that tlie grenkr numhcr 
deserted again when t h g  saw the etllied armies. Bareiros 
joined the enemy m d  escapd punishment; Da, Costa was, 
long a€ter~artls, sliot by order of rnamhal Beresford, aiid l i s  
cuwastlice and mutiny merited rleatli; yet tlie only evidence 
p d u c c d  a~nins t  lijm \vns fin cxpliinntory Iettcr, writtcn t o  
lord Livcrpool by Cox whiFe a prisoner at Terdun. TIic 
explosion, the disappenrance of the steeple an(l cessation of 
$re, procl&d the fa11 of Almeida in tlie allied camp; bnt 
tlie s u m d e r  was iirst ascertaind by Wellingbon on 
tlio 29tI1, when, with s tetescope, he observed many French 
ofiiccrs on tlic glacis of tbe plnce. Then Iie witlidrew to 
liis former position beliind tlie hlondego; ruid while this 
huppend on the Coa, tlie powder magazinc in Albiiquerquc, 
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strnck nith lightning, alco cxplodcd and lrillcd four h~indred 
men. 
Reynier now madc demonstrations tamards CmtelIo Brtmeo, 
in one of which he lost a sqiiadron of liorse; but the 1 s t  of 
September lie suddeilly entered Sabugl,  and tlie British 
piquets on the Pinhel river were driven in the following doy 
by Xcy. Massena'g plans then sccmed ripc for exention, xnd 
Wellinghon, Graosfedng bdquarbers to Govea, witlidrew his 
lnfantry beliind Celorico, leaving thc cavalry in front of tliat 
place with pocts of obser~diion on the flanks, at Guarda and 
Tranwso: but ReynierreGurned to Zarza Mayor, and tliruwing 
s bridkp over the Tagus at Alcantara again involved tIie Frenclt 
prqjccts in obscurity. 
Massena, cdiilled by and honaure, ram msting time. 
He found it diicult to f e d  his tmops, wtts disinclined to 
i n d e  so late in the year, and undecided as to the mode, for 
].lis knowledge of the country was derived entirely from 
Alurna m d  Pamplona, It waa two montlis since Ciuclsd 
Itodrigo fell, Almeida liad only resisted ten dgs, yet the 
French nm;v wns still heliind tlle Coa; nnd a sooond inter- 
q t c d  lette~, dictnted by Xapnlcon in Septcmhcf, indimted 
hi4 fmr of f u ~ t l ~ e r  inaction : ' h r d  Wcllington,' hc observed 
to Massena, 'lias only eighteen thousand men, Hi11 has only 
six thousand; it would be ridiculous to suppose that twenty- 
five thousand English can balance sixty tbous~nd FrencL, if 
the latter do iiot trille, but falCrtl boldly on nfkr Iiaviiig wl t  
ds& wJme t h  Eih nacqy bci givm. You have tmelve thou- 
sanrl r~valry, and four times as much arhillcry as is necrssnry 
for Poi-tngnl. Lcavc six tlions~~nd cavalry and a proportion 
of q n s  betw~en Ciiirlad Rodrip, Alcantara, and Ralamanca, 
and with the rest comrnence operrrtions. The emperor i s  too 
distant, and the positions of the enemy cliange too often t o  
direct how you should attsck; but it is certain the utmost 
form tlie English can muster, including tlio troops nt Cadix, 
will bo twenty-eight thousand men.' Thii lettcr was acciirate 
ae to the nirmbers of the English army, but Yapoleon wns 
ignorant how ~trondy WelIfn$on had umured Portugd in the 
retir; and before his Ietter arrived, Massena had cnmmenced 
tlie invmian. A remarkable event in the worlrl's history it 
proverl, and it is essential to a cle:lr undectrnding of tha 
opemtions diicli followad to describe tlie couiitry in wbicb 
thcy were conducted. 
It 1ins h e n  s h ~ w n  that tlie arlvanced positionu of  the d i e s  
extended froin hlmeide across the Bierra de Estrella, by 
Guarda, to  Fundno, Snnedns, und Cnstella h n c o ,  tliua 
guarding at encL side of tlie Estrella tlie twci great eiitmiicw 
to Portugal by tho Beirn hnt icr .  d serious nttack at either 
slde wrss tn be the s ipnl  for n p d u f i l  cancentric rctrt:ot of 
the army towads Lishon. Giirirda, the eonnecting point, 
was bowever to be Leld to tlie last inoment; b e w e  from 
tlience tlie enemy could, wliiEe menacing Celorieo, move 
secretly by Delmonto und Covillino between Hill i~nd  Welling- 
ton, wliose distnnce from cndi otficr wns dnuble tlint of mch a 
masch. It was t o  l>alance this disatlvantage, tlie Covj l l i ~  
road h d  been brolrcn up, and a bripde from Hili's mrps 
stationed at  Funrlao. TIYO entrcnclied positions also were 
forme¿¡, between wliich Leitli's r w e m  was placed, Tlie first 
h h i i d  tlie Zezere extending froin ihs confluence with tlie 
Ta91.iis to tlie h r m  de Corlics, Tlie ~econd Iieliind tile Alvn, 
a, strearn descencling from tlie Estrella, antl fnlling into the 
liondego a few miles above Coitnbra, Botli positione mere 
strong, tlie covering rivers deep, swift, and difficult of acccss, 
antl tlie Alva was ts%ged on tlie left bank by the rugged 
Sierra da Murcelh. Uuring tlic spring nnd summer tlie 
militia deñtined to reinforce Leith on the &zerc hud bcen 
Irept in winter qunrt.ers, hecniise money coiild tiot be ohtaiiied 
from tlie English ministers to bring thcm into tlie field 
until tEie last moment: they were now Lo~verrer l 'lecd in 
secoiid line t o  support IIiIl, ~vho wuld fa11 beck on tlie Zeeero 
froin Esrzedañ, aud guin the Alva by the military rmd of 
Espinnl, 
It has been sliown that fmm Cclorice t o  the Alw, sixfy 
miles, the road is a long defile between the S i m a  Estrella 
md tLe Monrlego; the r i d p  upon which Cclorico stands, 
being a dioot from thc Estrella, closeies tLs defile a t  one end 
and ig covcred by tlw Moiidego ; the Sierra Muroella covcred 
by the Alve closc~ it nt tlic otlicr cnrl. Tlie principnl rond 
leading tliraugh this defile had Iieeii repired and joined t o  
the military md of Fqinal, having s branch also carrid 
across tlie IIontlgo to Coimbra, nnd t h  interna1 i lm- 
munication rvas estublislied for the junction of al1 the o o q ~  
Between Celorico aad tlie Alva, the countty was not per- 
mnncntly tcnablc, because from G u a l a  m d  Govilhao roada 
lecl over tlie Estrella to Gouveq Ceri, and Gallims, in mar 
of Celorico; snd the enemy could also tum the whole trrtct by 
moving f h u g h  Trancoso and Tiseu, and so down tlie fight 
bank of tlie Mondego t o  Coimbra. But while the head of the 
n m p  mas one mar& behind Celorico, in observation of the 
fianking r o u k  over tlis Estrell% and tlie rear dose to the 
Alva, the line w m  mfe; and m tbe Montlego was for&i.de in 
summcr, md bridged at severa1 ploces, it couEd be passed in a 
f ~ m  houm to meet tlie encmy on thc nght hnnlt, whwe tlie road, 
dio momt in Portugal, wm crossd by scvcral deep strcnms, FIA 
the Criz and Dao, rand wafi a long defile bctweeri the Mon- 
dego and tlie Sierrn de Alcoba or Curnmula : tliere a1.w a 
trnnsverse ridge, called the Sierra de Busaco, seemiugly x 
prolongation of khe Mnrcella, barred tlic way to Coimbra. 
me Caramula exteniiing from the Douro t o  Coimbra sepa- 
rated the Xondego valley from the mast line; but it had 
hreaks, and one near Visw by which the Fiench could gain 
the roya1 r o d  from Oporto, nnd 80 reacliing Coimbrn, turn 
Eusaco: in this system ths weakmt point was Guarda, and 
tlie mnss oE the allied force wm kept on tliat side with a 
mmlry po& in thc t o w a  
B I ~ I s R E ~ ,  ill-rscquaintd with the militnrp features o£ Por- 
tiiqal, w n ~  Zianlutely ignormt o€ the lincs of Torrcs Ved=. 
So circumqcctIy h ~ d  thosc worka been mrriecl on, that only 
vnge rumorirs nf their exigtieenoe rcwhed tlie btilk of the 
Englkb army; neither the Portuguese government, nor the 
British envoy, sltliough a w r e  great defensive worlcs were 
constructing, knew their nature: they imagined tlie entren&- 
menta irnmediately round Liahon mre  tlie Jinesl Xany 
Eritish oíiicem lsughed at the notion of remaieing in Por- 
tugal; the major pad supposed the campaip on the frontier 
to be only a decent cloak to cover tlie sharne of an ernb&r1c& 
tion. In England tlie oppopition agserted tliat Wellington 
wadd emlark; tlie Portuguese h a d e d  it, tke French nrmy 
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universaITy believed it; and the Engliah ministers e n t e r h d  
- tlie =me opinion; for a$ tliis time nn rifñcer of engiriiieew 
arrived at Lisbon, whose instmctions, remived pe l~onn] ]~  
from Iord Liverpool, wer0 unknown te  mellington, and com- 




~ T A w I ~ T . ~ ? ~  command extended from the bmka of tlie Tn<qts 
to the Bay af Bimy, from Almeida to Burgos, Ris tmops 
nnder a m  exceeded one hundred and ten thousznd rnen; bnt 
thirteen thousand were in the Asturias and the pro~inee o£ 
Aantander; fonr thousand in the government of Valladolid; 
eiglit thonsand under Serras, ot Zarnora and Beilevente; nine- 
teen thouanrl nnder h u e t  at 13nyonne. This Iwt nnined 
bodg entcrcd Spnin in Aupst  ne tlie nirrtli corps, lmt thrirr~h 
replmed at byonne by anotlier reserve nnder C:iffarellI, it did 
not join Masaenz vntil long afterw&d~; hia &&ent troops 
were not more thm seventy tliousand, axid as e T e 7  man, 
combatan& or non-combatant, is borne on the strength of a 
French army, only íifky-five tliousand bayoneta and eigllb 
thousand pnlire-men werc witt  the enghs. Tlie ninth mrps 
hnd horvevcr ort1m ta follnw his mnrch, antl tIic void thiia 
made nt Rurgoa and Valladolid was filled by &teen tliousxnd 
of the young pard .  This amngement. shoms hew nbstittlllly 
Napoleon hw been cnlled a rash warrior, never tliinlring of 
retreat; no man eever mads holder marches, yet no man 
sscured hia base with more are. Eere, he would not suffer 
m y  dvance to fresh conquesta unta liis lino of communiw 
tion had been fitrengtlicncd with tliree ndditioml fortresses,- 
namely, AAorp, CClurlarl R~lrigo, and Almeidn; nnll whila 
lie cmploged sixty-five tliousiand men in the invasion of Por- 
tugd, he kept more than eighty thouaantl in reserve. Thc 
total lo& of the amy destined to rnalíe wLat is twhnimllllgr 
temed ' a  point' upon Lisbon, would, aa a mere militay 
dimter, have scarcety fih~lceceir liis hoId of Spain. 
l f ~ s e n d s  instructiona were, t o  convert Ciudad Itodrigo 
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Mas ena's e lls WJril:o"O
md Almcidn inta pIaces of ama, nnd niove on both sides oE 
the Ti~g~~ira agrtinst Esbon in the heginning of Scptember. 
But khinking his force too weak t o  rtct upon two lines nt 
the same tiine, or trusting to tlie m-operatiun of Soult, he 
relinquishcd the Alcmtcjo, nnd lonked only t,o tlie norkliern 
bank of tlie Tqus;  nnd aa ?Jitaot1a mnrch in 1807 warned him 
off tlie Sobreira mountaina, Iiis viem mere confincd t o  the 
tliree roads of Belmonte, Celorico, and Yisea. The strength 
of the puaitiun beliiiid the Alva river was Lnowu t o  him, au 
were nlso the impedimenta to his dcsmnt fram Covilhno upon 
Espinlial; but Alorna, Pnmplonn, and the othcr Portufiriese 
in tbe Freneh camp asserted with singular ignornnce, t h ~ t  
Eote by the road by Viseu to Coimbra along the riglit 
gcn~rni bank of the l~omlego waa ewy, and no irnpownt 
I'clrt. pnsition covered tlie Iatter town. She Frcneli 
general thus dcceived, rcaolved sudilcnly to aasemble al1 I i ia  
forces, distribnte tliirteen daya' bread, and nish in one masa 
down the right of tlic Mondego7 not doubt.ing t e  reacll 
Coinilm liefure Hill could join lord Wellinghon. In  tliis 
view, tlie threc c o ~ s  were directed te concentrate on the 16th 
of Scpt~tl1her; Ilpnicr'r's at Guartla, Neys and the heravy 
mmlry at Maqal de Cliao, Junot's at Pinliel Ey tliis dispo- 
sition al1 three roads were menaced, and tbe allies kept in 
suspense as to tlie ultimate olijeh; Miissena tlius Eio~ied to 
gain one morch, a p e a t  tliing, a e e i n ~  thnt h m  Coirnbia lie 
was not more than n li~indicd rnilcs, whcreris Rill's diatancc 
from t.hat town was grenter. To mver his real project and 
keep lIill as long as possible at Sarzedna, 1ie causd the toa 
of Guarda t o  be aeixed on the l2U1, by a dekhment, whii 
homever witlidrew apin al if it were only a cuntinuittion ,. 
former feints: meanwhile llcynier, baving ascctaíned tlint 
Mortier was at Monnsterio, mcnacing Estrcmdura, destroyer3 
his boat-bridge at Alcantar$ and marched rapidly towards 
hbup!. 
On the 13th tlie allies ro-esttmblifihed their post nt  Guarda 
On the lstlli, it WM a-pin drivcn nway by n consldcr!rzble mnss 
of the enemg and retircd up the side o€ the Estrella; the 
cavaly in front of &lorico was aEso forwd bnck in the centre, 
aod the post nt Trancoso cliased to~varrls Mongualde on tlie 
?eR. ~Vellingtou tlicn felt assured tlie iovrtsinu was in serioiis 
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pmgress, and having ascertained that the Gruopn in Gunrdn 
were of Repier'~ corpe, despatched his final orderri for Hill 
and Leith tu conocntrtltc on thc Alva. On the 1 6th, Rcynicr 
descended fram Guarda ta the low p m t ~  bordering the Non- 
dep, where he was joined by Ney's corps anrl Montbrun's 
cavalry, rtnd the wholc passed the river. Pushing tliroug-1:li 
Celorico tlieir hommen drove back the cavalry poats of tlie 
alties to thodltnga of Curtiqo, but the first Gerrnnn hussam 
turned there snd charged tlic lending squndrons malsing somc 
prisonera. The roa$ divaricateot ta Fornos on the riglit, to 
Uouvea on the left, and a French brigde ndvanced along tbe 
latter to cover the march of the main bodg towardc Fornos, 
but ibis feint was scion discovered; for tliere ia a custom, 
peculiar to Ghe Brititish amy, of aending mounted offieerc, 
p o d  ridcra, singly to observc tho encmy'a motinns; they will 
penetrate througlt the miílst of his wntonmentr, cross tlio 
line of bis movement, and haver almost witliin rnnsket-sliot 
on the akirb o€ his columna to learn bia numbem and tlie 
tme direction of  his march. CoIonel Waters, one of tliese 
exploring oficers, Eieing on the left of Re-ynier's troops tliis 
dar, soon noticed the muvement on Fornos and following witli 
BOmB Qermnn cnpalv, r n d c  scvcral prisoncrs and took tlio 
b n g w  of a general. Tlis Frencli operations bcing thiia 
opened, Wellington made the first, third, and fourth divisioas 
march towartls the Alva, witlidrew the heavy cltm1ry from 
the front, and placed the 3ight division at St. IEomao in tlic 
Estrdla, to cover Zhe liead-qriarters, whicli were transfcrred 
that night to Cm 
The 17th, the second rrnd ~ixth corpa pasad the bridge of 
Fornos, and £he advanced giiti-rd approached 3fanpalrle. TI ir: 
ei#h corps kept on the road leading towarrlri Oporto, to 
observe ten thoussnd of the nortliern militia wlio under tlie 
comrnand of Trant, S. Wilson, md Miller, wero colleded to 
karass Mossena's right fiank ancl renr. Trent wos nIrendy tit 
BTolmenh de %'B in the defila leadiq through the Tiills t,o 
Larnego, the ordenanca were al1 in arms, the countrg. on both 
sides of the Mondego bid =te, the mills destroycd, and tlie 
belpless part of t,he populihtion bidden amongt the Iiigliest 
mnrintnins. 
On the 18th, the French dvnnced g u d  rcuclicd tke 
deserted city of Visen, and P~ck'si Portnguese brigade was 
sent arross the S lnudep  at Fosdtio to  tlie Qiz, wliile general 
Pakeuliam entered Coimbra with a ZirjgnJc of the fint division. 
On tlic 19th, captriin Sumcrs Cocks, n gírllrsnt and xcaloiis 
officer, who commandetl the cnvalry post driven from Guarda, 
a m e  d o n  from tlie Estrelln, and Eollo\ving the enemy 
tIirougl~ Celorico asccrtainetl tliat neitliicr ~ick men nor atores 
were left behind: hence it was  evident tbat Massena, re- 
linqiiishing his communicritionti, liad thrown Iiis cavnlry, 
i nhn tq ,  artillery, parca, bnggage and hospital wriggons, in 
onc mass upon the worst road in Portugal 1 
Wellingtoa vas in motion to cross tlio Mondego, when a 
f&e repart tliat thc eeemy wns qn in  on the left hnnlr rtrrestcd 
thc rno\*ement. Tlie ncxt dny tlie truth became known, and 
the third, fíturth, and light divisionu, and thc Britiah cavalry, 
passerl the river at Pena Cova, Olivarez, md other places. 
Tlie liglit division marclied to lfortagao in support of Fack, 
the tliird anrl fourth cntercd tlic villagcs betveen the Sierra 
de Rusaco and Modngao, tIie horscmen occupicd a ~ l a i n  
between tlie Tiglit division and Paclr's IiriptIe. Eiit now tfie 
eightli corrs pointed towards the valley of the Vouga, and 
thus rendered it doubtiul urlietlier Massena nrouId not that 
may gnin l;lie mnin rond h r n  Oporto to Coimhrn. Spencer 
movcrl thereforc with thc tirst diviaion iipon ' ililhwli~, ond 
Trant w a s  directed t o  join liim hy a mmch tlirougli San 
Pedro de Sul and Sardao. Meanwliile LaEth mrived un tIie 
Alm, and Rill \ v a  olily one marcli behind; for bwing dis- 
covercd Reynier'u rnovements on the I%tb, nnd lwnring thnt 
the French bortts on thc S a p s  had been deatrnyed, he witli 
rmdy decision, anticipxting ordcrs, sent hia a r t i l l e ~  by 
Thomar, anrl marching rapidly witli his troops by tlie militav 
way tyeeached Espinal tlie evening oI tlie 30th; tliere he ivns 
joiaed by genenal kcor ,  who with equnl vipnr tbnd judp 
ment had lirought tlie Port~tgese brigadc by Iong rnarclim 
frorn hndao .  The alst, Hill reached the Atva and pushed 
bis carelry in obserrration beyond that river; thus tlie aliole 
of tlie allied m y  waR uniterl on the very day the main b ~ d y  
nf thc cnmy entcred Yiscu: the French horricmen wero 
ind~fid on tlie Criz, but tlie liridges h d  ben dcstroyerl by 
rack, and the project o£ suFprislng Cojlnbra was baHed 
Nor Iinrl Mlissciia eacnpcd othm evil conñeqiiences from h i ~  
falac rnovement. Forcd t e  repair tlie rowl. from day to day 
for liis artillery it was twcnty miles from Viseu on tlie 
Ititli, anri Trant formed t31e Eiardy project of dcstroying it. 
Quitting Moi~nmta da Beira in tlie nig-Lt witli a squadrun of 
mvalry, two tliousnnd militia nnd fivc guns, he pnesed between 
thc convoy and tlie army, nnd on Ghe 20th surpriscd a prttrole 
of ten mcn, from wliom Iie Icxnicd tlint tlic giins wcrc closc 
at Iiand anind Montlirnn's mvalry in tlieir renr. Slie enter- 
prise w a ~  xriouq Iiut the deíiIes wcre nnrmlv, snd charging 
tlie head of the esmrting troops he took a Iiundred prisoners 
witli aome baggage. Tlis oonvoy fell Iiiwli, Tront i"ullow~1, 
a1111 sudi ivaa tlie rufrgcdness of tlie dehle tliat .tnIo~itlirun's 
m v n l s  eould ncrer gct to the front. Sbc Frcncli wcrc in 
diaorrler, anil a resolute ~ttnck woiild bnve ruined thcm, when 
tlie rnilitix hocnme slnrmed 2nd unmanageable; fhe enprny 
tlien repulsed tlie Portnguese horsemen with a losg of twelve 
troopem, anA Trant secing nothing more cuuld be effected 
returned to Moimenta de Ueira and from thence marched to 
h c g o  with Lis prisoners. Montbrun, jpomnt of  tlie 
numlier and qunlity o€ tlio ascail~~tits, fe11 back, and tlie artif- 
lcry (lid iiot rezcli Viseii until the 25d, whercby Mnsscnn lost 
two maat impodnnt d n p  
Wliile these evenb were pxqsing in the valley of the hfon- 
dego, a srnall expedition from Ciirliz a p i n  landed nt Moper 
to  aid IJopons in collecting pro16siona on thc Tinto; it was 
liowcver quickIy oliligcd t e  rcimbark, and Copons was defeated 
by pneral Reirio~id witl~ the lo= of three hundred irien on 
tlio 15tli. Mennwl~ila Ihineria uttaclíed tlie French posts 
ncnr Monnstcrio nntI liushcd hla envrtlry towniuls Sevillc, 
whwcupon S.rirlt smt Mortier against him, nntI lie was benten 
at Piiente de  Cantos on tlie carne d q  that Copons liad teen 
defcated OII tlie Tinto. Tlie pur~uit was eontiiiued to Fuentc 
del >Ilaestre, nnrl tlle wlicile army wiu Iilro to  disperve in 
fligbt, alien hf~lden 's  l'ortupctr c cavalry cnming up cliargd 
thc purwcm witli signnl pllnntry, overthres tlio leading 
squdrons, rccovertrl Rome prirtonem, nnd s i n e d  time fob the 
Spaniards t o  rally. Nevcrtlieles~, the Frcncli entered Zafra, 
and Romana retreated by Nm~udralejo and Herida t o  Mon- 
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fijo on the 18th tlirowing ae he pwed a garrison inb 
OIivcnze cnd three buthlions into Bnrlnjos, whicli tvns how- 
ever so Iitjtlc alile to resist that  Iie scnf tlie jilnta t a  Valencia 
de Alcantara and took refup 11iimsell under tlie pm of Elvas. 
WelHngton's antimpations were thue realized and the Nem- 
tejo laid open. FurtunakIy Sebstiuni was at thi mornent 
nenr Cartl~~tgena in pl~irirtuit of tlie Murcian rnrmy, tbnrl a fresh 
jnsurrection M brolren out in tlie Grenada mountains, where 
tlie French posts of Motril and Almunccar ri7cre taken. 
Cupona &u dvanced tu  t41e Tiuto, and tlietie events falling 
at onc time picvcntcd Xoult fmm scnding more tlinn twclvc 
invasion of the Rlcmtcjo, because several Britisli rcgiments 
mitlidmwn from Cadiz, snd others cnming from Eiigland, 
reached Lishn aliout tliui period, and furmed a reseme of 
more than fivc thousnnd good troolm. Wliercforc thc Frcnch, 
who nere riuffering from sickness, returned to Itonqnillo, 
the Spania-rds a p i n  advanced to Xeres de los CavalIeraa and 
AmeIia, and this biigerous crisis glidcd gently away. Dut 
to udemtand its import,ance, it ia riecessav to show how 
inmming polltlcnl emharrncirinierits hari tiiwartcti thc original 
plan of tl~e English general. 
Althougli the first vexations interfcrence of the Souza fnc- 
tion hitd h e n  cliedred, th loss of AImcidz furiiislied a fa-vour- 
able opportunity to renew tlicir clii.moroun liostility to tho 
rnilitary prococrlings, Ffil?icIy nsscrting that the 
;$e?&. provisioaa of tIiat fortress liad been cnrried away 
by the EliglisEt cominissariehi, and falsely pre- 
tending th t  WeIlingtau l i d  promised to raise tlie siege, tlJs 
party llypocrjticnllg ntrsumed, tbut hia expressione 
Bppen'lix 21, 
#?,  O€ sorrow for ih falE wcrc asaiirances of m 
intention to remove by a eplcntlid vidorg the 
public depondcncy. Tbey insisted tlierefure thrrt thc frontier 
~liould be defcrided, inveigllcd agninst thc destnia- 
Kr. Stoartg 
lIaper& iMSS. tion o£ tlie mille, endm\~owed to force tlieir oivn 
fidttIgo ffuction on to the staf of Rcrctiford, t o  
embarrrass the operations, tlnd even proposed to have the 
fleet and transporta sent away from tlie Tn,ga I Bu4 neglecting 
or d d a y k  tlie memures agreed upon for lnying w&e tbe 
couritry, tliey protected tlie minor nuthoritiefi dien disobedient, 
refmined from puniehing detingu~nts, and took every occasion 
to  mialcd Uie publíc mina mlicn tlic cnemy commcnced tlic 
inmion. Nor mas tlicrc wanting eithcr aceirlent or india- 
crction to incrme thc growing confusion. 
When Alme:da fell, an officer o£ t,he guarda, m'ting to a 
friend at Oporto, indiseredly declared that 3fassena was 
advancing in front with a. huntlred thousand men, and eighiy 
thousand more n-ere rnoving in iear of tlie nllics upon Lisbon. 
Tli:s Eetter was mnde public, and created snch a pnnic amongst 
the Englisli merclitmts at Oporto tlmt one and aIl applid for 
sliipa to carry tlieir fmilies and property away; and su& a 
tumult cnsucd, tlint Trnnt, who ~vns  stili govcrnor, hrad to quit 
thc fidd to stipprcss thc commotion. To d q  up this spring: 
of miscliief Wellington nnnounced in geneml orrlers thnt lic 
mould not eren aeck for the nutliors of tliat nnd similar letkrp, 
being assured their Renae and feeling would prcvcnt a cont,inu- 
ance of SU& pernicious comspondenrre. Tliis appenl lmd 8 
good eE& 
To the regency he addrescied s, more peremptory rebuka 
Bzproving tliem for tlle fulse colonring @ven to his cornmani- 
cations, ho deolared, 'he would Rever permit public clarnour 
nnd panic to induce him to diange in thw smallest depee a qs- 
tem and plan of operntion wliich be hatI adopted after rnature 
canñidcrat.ion, nnd which dnily cxpcricncc proved to bc the onIy 
onc likely to produce a good cnd.' Tliis only incteascd the 
vimlencc of bis opponents, and before he rericbed Busaco, he 
was forcecl t o  teU tbm,  ' their miserable intrigue4 muat; c a s e  
or he would advise his o m  government to  withrlrm the Britisl 
arniy.' These fnctious procecdings 11d liowever been so mis- 
cliievoufily successful, tliat the countiy lietween tlie Mondego 
tlie T n , g  and tlie Línea, ski11 container1 proviiriuna sufficient 
'for the Pi-eneh during the snsuing winter; mrl betwcertfighting 
the invnderu on the Mondego, or wsting tlie country by forcc 
aa he retreated, the Englisli general hnd tlien t o  clioosc Bnt 
~vl iat  an act tlie Iwt ! Final siiccess rlepended on the moral, 
strcngtli he could Al fortli, and he wonld h a ~ e  hnrl to retire 
~ 4 t h  s mixed force, liis rear-pard engaged dkly wiih a 
powerful arm.  Si advmced gumd drivlng unhappy mdtitudea 
c: 2 
befo~e it to tlie capital, where no preparation  va^ m d c  t o  gave 
Oiem from famine; but mliere rr violent ~ionerful fnction was 
m d y  to miarcpresent every proceding nnd inflnmc tlie peolilc's 
minds. And tliis whcn tlie criiirt of Rio Suneiro waq rliecon. 
tented, ancl tlie English ministcm wcrc panic-strickcn by tlie 
desyonding letters of geacrsl cií6cei-s imniediatcly about tlie 
had-quarters of tlie cunimunJer-iii-cliici I It wuti riecessary 
tlicrcforc to Fight, dtlinugli tlic Frcncli mmliul liad sisty-iivc 
tliou~nntl vetcrnns, niid oiily fiftj-ttlioitsnnt troopa, Iinlf of tlicrn 
untricd, wuld be opposed to liim. It was ncccssriry to figlit, 
tlioiigli thc tnttlc \vas iiot t;o be cstiniated by tlre result of tlle 
iigliting. Ma~seiia iniglit by victory pin cvcryilii~ig; a 
dcfcnt wouId senrcely Iiiirt liiiit; a scriou8 clkcclí miglit send 
him from Coimbra to Oporto, wlicrc hc would Zic more FOP- 
midnhle,-wlierc he could feed nnd be strringly reinforced. 
But tlic Englisli. general's resources coiild not bc mucli im- 
~ M V C ~ ;  and Iio could scnrccly expect tlut Englxrid or Portugal 
would cudure a wnr \\pittiout any pnlpalilc advnntagc to LnIuncc 
tlie mFsery and expensc. 
Wliilc BInssenn remained at Viscii, Spcnccr liclri Milhuida 
wjtli tEie 6rst rlivision, obsening tlie grcnt road from Oporto; 
tlio Iiglit dinsion \vas at IrTarlagao, witcling tlie wd from 
Viseu; t l~e  remaiiider oE tlie Lirniy was in resen-c rcndy to move 
tu cithcr side. But 1~11m tlic Frcncli nrlvmmrl s x r i l  rcp~ircd 
the bridgea over tlie Crix a1111 passed tliat rix-cr, tlie fimt divi- 
sion \vas rcczllcd, nnd tlie Sierra de I3iisaco cl i i iscl  for tlie 
position of hattle, Tliis mouukiin, eiglit miles in lcngtli, 
nhuts w i h  its riglit o11 tlie Itoiidcgo, wliile its left is connected 
witli thc Eirrrn tlc C~rnniuln by n rugged country imlicrvious 
to the rnnrcli oF nn nimiy. A rond nlring tlie crcst nffordcil nn 
eaay cornmunication from rigk to Icft; and bchintl thc lidgc 
on the right, tlie ford of Pciin Covls furnislied a pasw ovcr 
the Nonllego to tlie A l v ~  Tlie f:icc ol Busaco wnr s t e e ~ ~ ,  
mttg-h: and fit fur defence; tlic urtiIlcry of tlic nlliw, plnced on 
cert:iin seficiit points conlrl liloy nlong tlic frtmt, ranrl: tJicrcvna 
some glound on tlie summit s~iikb:aliIe for a #mal1 borIy of cavalry, 
But neitlier guns nor liorsemen on tlie Frcncli side Iixd a field, 
and tlieir iiifantrq* were to contend witli e v q  di6cdty of 
approach rwiQ atta& 
After passing tlie Ci-iz, a table-lrtnd pemitted 5iassena to 
march 1viL11 a wide orrIer of bnttle to Yoctagao; liut from 
thence, a sucuession of  ridges led to the 8ierm ISuuncu, which 
wns seporated frmn tlie lnst by a chmin, so profound the niilrod 
eye could liardly distinpish tlie movement, nf tronp in tlie 
bottom, yet in pads RO namow thnt. twelve.poiinrlcra mnld 
rmge ncross. From Jlertngrto four ronas contlticted t o  Coim- 
bm Tbe first, unfrcquented and narrom, crossed the Carnmula 
to Boyalva, it, vilhge situxtcd on tlie western slopc of that sierra, 
and from tlience led to Sarclao xnd l~ilhearla, Tlie otlier 
ro'ds, penetrnting tliroiigh tlie rougli groiind in fmnt, passed 
uver tlio Sierra de Rustaco; oue by a large convant, fronting 
tho cncmy's Rght, nnd on the liigliest point; nnottier on his 
lcft, by n v i l ln~c  cnllwl Et. dlntonio de Cnntnra; thc tliird, a 
birtncli from +he second, heing $ti11 rnorr: to  h i ~  left, fdlnweci 
tlic filondego to Prnn Covn. When t h i ~  fmmidnhlc position WRS 
chosen, some officers exp~essed tlieir fa that Massena mould 
not assaiI it. ' But if he does, I sliall bmt llim,' waa t.lie reply 
of fhe English g e i t e d .  IIe was howcver wclI rissurctl tlie 
prince, wliose dvanccil g a r d  wac nlready ovei thc Criz, would 
atbck. The sccond md sixth coq~s werc rnassad Iieliind that 
ritrearri, arid Musscna ms iiot likely, mmely n t  tlie sight of n 
strong position, t o  mnlcc n rctrogrndc movemenf nnd adopt a 
ncw linc of opcrations by thc To~lgn, which woiild be exposed 
tu  &cccllm*g militia : he was indeml nnxious for a battIc, but 
being ~till misled by Alorna and Painplona to  the topo- 
p p h y ,   vas convinced Wellingtcn would retrext and enibark. 
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GENERAL Pnca hwing detroyed tlie bridges on ths Crh fd1 
back on the light divisiun, tiut tlie Frenc.I~ restured tliem tlie 
23rd and dmvc thc British ihmlry into tlic liills behind 
Ma~npo. SSi oo reven sqwdroils were retriined there, the 
res* went to the low cauntry ahut  RTXllic~dn, from whenm 
Spencer waa rccnlled t o  Busaco; I'icton surd Cole dso took  post 
on that pditiun, tha former at St. Antonio cla Cuntarn, t l i ~  
lattcr nt thc convcnt. Tlie 3iglit clivision enc~mpcri n n pine 
wood, wliere hnppencd one af tIiose extrnordinq panics nttrj- 
buted in ancient times t o  the influence of a god. No enemy 
was near, no aIam given, yet suddenly tlie troops, m if seixed 
with a f r e n a  uhrtJed f r m  slccp and dispcrsctl in cvcry 
clirection; n w  wus tliere any possiliility of rillzying this strange 
terror until asome per$ons caITed out tliat the enexriy'~ mvalry 
were amongst tliem, wlicn the soldiere med~rinicaIly m 
togetlier, and the iiiusion rva6 disissipated. On tl ie 31th tlie 
Frcnch slíirmishcd witli thc piquct" thc divisien retired 
Iei~urcly to some strong grouncl four miles in t11e rear, and 
towards evening some Erench ca~alry, vcnturing too close, nem 
charged by a squdrvn of the 14th and lwt tliirty men. 
Aext rnorning Craufurd moved to the lom grouiid in rront 
md seemed diposcd to rcncw the fnult of tlw Con. Tlie Prencli 
cavalry wcrc gnthcring thickly, find thrcc eoliimns of infnntry 
were descried on the tablslxnd n b o ~ e  Mortnpo m i n g  on 
all abrcast witll an impetuous pace, while lichind tlicm cloiids 
of dust l o d i g  tbe atrnosphere for miles, showed that the 
whole m y  lind passctl the Criz and ivns in mnwh to  atta&, 
The homcmcn wcrc nctiii~liy exchnnging piritoI-shotq, when 
WelEington arrived and td~ing tlie commanrl in licrson mnde 
the divhion retire, covced by the 58nd, the rifles, and R~SS'EI 
Iiatkry. It m a timcly interferenm, for tlie Prcnch lirought 
up guns and infantry so quickly, thnt al1 the sFrill of the 
general nnd tlie rcadiness of the troops could scarcely erade 
a disaster. Rowbeit a series of rapid evolutiona under a 
sliarp cmnonads plriced tlie divi~ion in an Iiour snfelly on the 
Busaco Sierra) nnd tlie opposite ridg-e was imrnedi~tely crowncd 
by the mnsñes o€ tho ~ixtli corp~, tho Frcnch bnttcries oycning 
h i l e  tlie Fnglish troops were yet ascending tlie position. 
Reynier, puming a P ~ r t t ~ p c ~ e  battalion, arrived about the 
same time a$ Antonio de Cantnrn in front of Picton, anJ. 
Iiefore tlirec dclock forty thouwd French infanbry were 
cmlixittlcd on tlia tivu lioints, theis guns trying tlie rnnge 
aliove, aliilc tlie skirmishing elatltsr of muslretry arose from 
tlie dark-wooded c l i n . 4 ~ ~  beneat.11, Ney, wliose miiittlry glance 
was surc, instnntlg perccivcd t l~at  the mountain, a crestcd not 
a tablc one, could hidc no grcrit rcwmcs, that it wna onIy linlf- 
uccirpied, nntl tlint tlic nllics wcro moving witih the disorder 
usual on the tnking unknown grounrl. ITc ivi~herl thcrcfore to 
attack, but Mnssena ww ten miles :n rear, the officer sent 
t o  Iiim waitcd tmo houm fox an a~~iidicncq and tlicn retumed 
mith aB ordcr to ettend the prince's amival. Tliu~ a great 
opportunity aas lost, for Spcncer wns i iot ~ i p ,  Leith's troops) 
now called tlie 6th divisioii, were only ~itrssing tlie 31ondeg0, 
and Hill was atill beliind tlio Alva. Bciirccly twenty-íiva 
thousnnd mcn mcre in tlic linc, nnd witIi grent intervnls. 
Next rlay Rcynicr nnd Ncy lvrnte in conccrt to bfnsficna to 
urge an immeilinte nttack; but Iie did not come 
hpyiendix 8, 
up from Mortapo until twclve o'cl~cli) bringing g 
witll liirn Junot's corps and the ~rimtry, wliich Iie 
formerl r ir~ a reserve to connect Key's aud &ynierYs troops; 
tlieii tliro~ving out skirmisbers nlong tlic w1101e front he care- 
fiilly exxmined the allies' position. lt was no longw denudd 
Hill, I~aving crossed tlie Nondego, waa athwart t he  road 
leuding over tlie sicrru to  tthc 15enn Cvvn fod;-on his lcft Leitli 
prolongcd the linc of defencc, liaving thc Lusihninn lcgien in 
rcacrve;-Picton, wppnrtcd by Clinrnplemond'~i Portu, wese 
bripxrle, wa9 next to Lit1i;Spencer oocttpied thc l i i~hwt 
pnrt of tLe ridge, lietwecn Picton anrE the convent. Cele \vas 
.en tlie extreme lcft, co\re~ng a p ~ t h  leding tu the fiat country 
about Milhada. A regiment of lieavy dragoons mas in re- 
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serve on the summit of tlie sierra, and Paclcys Eirigade md 
mmc other Porbugucse troops wcre iil front of Speiicer iidf 
w y  down tIie ~nuiintiwn. Ori tlicir left, tlie liglit diviaion, 
tiupporterl by a Gcrmun bripdc atid tlic ninctccntli Portu- 
p e s e  rcgiment of tile line, occupietl a spur, juttiiig out. nearly 
hnlf a niile in ii-ont of but Iowcr tlian tIie coiivciit, tlic spnce 
between bciiig scooped likc tlie Iiollonof it iv\-nvc befure it lircaks: 
tlie tv!ide moiiiitaiii side was corercd witli slrir~~liiidicrs, aud fifty 
pieces of  nrt,illcry ivcrc clis~ioscd upvn tlic most snlicrit l)oilits, 
Ncy wa.q IIIHV BYCPSC t o  attaclr, I I I I ~  3l:isscne rcsolccd to 
storm tlie ridgc. Ecynicr tIiiiilci!ig Iie liad oiily to dcd with 
a mar-gu,d eneottr;qed t,lic priiicc; and t.lic lattcr, too con- 
fident in thc vaIour o l  Iiis ariiiy 2nd Iiifi ulvn fortuiie, directed 
tlie secorid uutl sixtli cui'ps to  fiill ori tlie ncxt duy, c:icli tu i ts  
own frent, w1,vliilc t3ic ciglitli corps tlic cnvn1i.y nnd t11c nrtillcry 
renininerl in reserve. To\vmds dusk tlie Kglit troops, dropping 
by tivos and thrces into tTic lowcst parts of t l ~ c  valley, eiillca 
v u u d  to hteaI up tlie ivooderl dclls nnll bolloivs, nnd cstntilish 
tlie~nselves unsccri dosc tu tlic ~ i i q u v t s  uE tlie liglit divioion; 
tlic rifltincn nnd eryndurcs dmve tliein Iinclc, liut rerieived 
nttemlits secmed to inenncc a night atttack a~~iiirl excitcd nll tlie 
vjgiliance of tlie troops. Yct only t-eternns tirerl of war could 
hxve slept mliilc tIiat serciie slcy glittrrctl nliove, and thc darle 
rnuuntriine ivcre crowiicd witli 1111: iiiiiutneriille Liivuunc Gres of 
more than n liunilretl tliousnud wurriors. 
SE+ Plan, pw 1s. 
Before dipbre0.1~ on the 2Iitl1, Ncy plznted three columns 
of attfik opposit~ the convcnt, and Eejmier planted tivo at 
Antonio de Cantara, tlioso poinh beiiig ahout three miles 
q n r t .  Reynicr's mcn, lilaving easier grountl to assniI, were in 
tlic midst of thc piqucts and slrirmialiera of Picton'~ division 
nlmast as ssoon tliey eould be perceived in movement; and 
tliough tiie a l l i ~  fought wdl, and sir; gung played dong the 
asceiit with g a p 4  in lcss than linlf an hour the French W r B  
done upon tlie summit : so s\r-iftlq. and witli sucli mtstoiii~liing 
power and rcselution did they s c a l ~  the mounhin, ovcrtlirow- 
ing evcrytliing thnt gposcrl tlieir prosess. Tlic riglit centre 
of tlie tLirc1 clivision was forced liaclc, tlie cighth Portuguese 
regirncnt brokcn, the IiostiTc niasses gnind the higliest part 
cif tlic crest, just letwecn tlic ttird and tlie fiftli divisions, 
nnrl tlie lendiiig bnttdions estahlislicd thernselves amongst 
tlie crowniiig ruclcs, wLiIe a confused riinss i i i  rear ivheeled Eo 
the riglit, intcnrling t o  swcep thc suniinit of tlie sierrn, At 
tlint iiioment Welliugton cnuserl two guns to open witli p p e  
ripon tbeir flnnk, m 1 i ~ a ~  miislrrtry wns poiired into t8hcir 
front, and ín a littlc time, the nghty-eightli rcgiment nnd n 
wing of thc forty-Fiftli cliarged so fiiriouurily thtrt cvcn fresh 
men muld not hnve witlistood tLe sliock; the French, s p e ~ t  
with tl~eir previous cffurts, gave way, and botb particti went 
mingled t,ogctlisr dowii tlie nloiiiitnin aide wilh n mighty 
clatriour iirirl cunfusiun, t11eir truck lieiug rnarked witl i  deail 
mtl dying cvcn to thc buttom of tlie valley. 
Mcnn~i.hilc tIio~c Frcncli bnttulions aliicli lind first pinet l  
tlic crest, rvcrc fnrmcd ~ c r o s s  the ridgc with thcir right rcsting 
npon a preclpice twerl~anging tlie reversc side, md the position 
ivas in füct pined if nnp reserve l i d  been at hsnd; for the 
grentest part of tlie tliirtl division, DritisFt md Portugucsc, 
were fuIEy ensged;  sonie of tlie Trencli skiriiiislrers were 
dcscciidiiig t3ic Lnck uf tlic pwitian, aud a rnioty cloud cnpped 
tlic sumrnit, su tliat the Iiustile niass, ensconced amungst tlie 
rocks, wuld only he sccn by gcncrnl Lcitli. Thnt oficcr, notic- 
ing tlie first imprcssion m d e  on Pieton's di>idon, h~rI  moved 
witli a lirigde to his ttid; lie harl 6wo milctr oE rugpd ground 
to traverse on a narro\\- formation, but he wns now corning on 
rapidly, and directed tlie tliirtj*-eighth regiment to turn the 
Fwncli riglit íiaiik while colonel Carneron witli the ninth 
nssnilctl tIieir front. A precipite stopped tlie thirty-cightli, 
but Caineroii, Iiezriug frorn a staff-ofimr tliti cñticnl state of 
aff'uirs, formed lina unricr n violcnt ñrc, nnd witl~out rcturning 
a aliot rnn in iipon nnd drove tlic Prench ~cnmdicirr from the 
mcks witli irrcsistiblc brnvery ; pIying tliem witli a dedructive 
muslretrg as lnng M ttlicy coirld be reachec?, and yet; with 
excellent discipline rcfraining from pursuit lest thc crest of 
the position shoulú be agnin Iost: for tlie mountain w s  so 
nigged no general view could be t&en.. This sccured the 
captain tliis distinguishcd honour, recovered his temper, and 
sent a compny of the Eorty-thrd d o m  wliich clcarcd tlie 
viUw in a ECIV minutes. Meanwliilc linppcned an affmting 
incislcnt, contrnsting strongly ivith tlic snvngc dinmcf,cr of the 
prcccding evcnts. A poor orphan Portaguesc girl, aboiit 
ae~cntecn, and vcry hnudsome, uTm sccn corning down tlie 
mountain, driving an aus loadetl with al1 lier property tlirorigli 
the midst of thc Frcnch army. Wie h d  alianduned licr rlnell- 
ing in obedicnce t o  the proclanintion, nnd now pnsscd ovcr ttie 
ficld of bntt.le with a chiIdish simplicity, totdly i~nconscious of 
her perilous situation, and scnrcely understanrling wliicli were 
thc bostile and wliieli tlie friendly troops, for no man on either 
side ww so brutal ns t u  molest LLT. 
Tlie Frcncli wcre, notwitli~tnntling tlieir mtonisl~ing ~alnur, 
rcpi~lsed in tlie manner to bc expectctl from thc ~t~cngtl i  of
tlie ground and the brnvery of tlic soldicm opposed to tliem; 
tlicir loss waa preliosterously exrtggcruted at tLe tiiiie, but it 
wns renlly gre~t, OIIE gcncrul, Grniir-ri'orge, and ciglit Iiundred 
mcn ivcrc killed; Foy, &fcslr, anrl Sinion wcrc woiinrlcil, nnd 
the lmt mmle prisoner. ! i l ~ e  whole loss rnight be nhoioiit fmr 
tliousand five htindred, wtile that of tlie dlics wa9 anly 
tliirtcen hundretl, becausc tlic Frcnch strove to win by ztudacity 
rntlier tlinn by Cre, orid wert: exposnl t o  p p e  ull tlie time. 
Mmsena then finding Busaco imprcgnnblc, and ~ccing it could 
not he tutned bp the Mondego, bccnuse tlie nllies rnight pws that 
river on a sliorter line, held a council in ivhich it \vas proposed 
t o  retnrn to  Spain; but at tlmt mornent n. peasant told of a 
m d  leaging from Horhgm over the Caramula ridge to 
Boyalvn, antl it wm resol~~cd to tum Wllington'~ left. To 
mask tlie movcment, ~kirmishing waq rrncwcd tlio 28th so 
vigornnsly thnt a generril bnttle wa-s expcctcd; lint m uiostentri- 
tiotrs dispIay of rnen, diappmrnnce of bjiggagc, and casting 
up of mrth on the hill covering tlie road to Mort~gno, plainly 
indicatcd sorne other dcsign. Towards eireriilig tlie Yracli 
infnntry were sensiblp diminiiilid, tlie cuvnlry wero descrietl 
by tlie light division winrling ovcr tlic distnnt moiintnina to- 
witrds the dIiesVeft, and iit that moment Wellingtoo arrived 
from the riglit, and looked at tlie distant columns with great 
emestness; he scemetl uncnsy, Lis countenance bore a fierce 
nngry cxprcssion, and suddcnly mounting Iiis liorse he 
rodc away witithoiit ~pcnking: anc hour nftcrivnrds thc wholo 
army was in movcment. Bill recrossing tlie Montlego retired 
by Espina1 uppon Tliomar, the centre and lcff dcfiled in tlie 
nigIit by nnnrrow roads upon Milheadn, the p l i s  follotvcd tlie 
couvent ruad, and tLe liglit division furiiislicd tEic rear-pard 
unt,il thc opcn coiintry cntdilcd the cavnlry to WSC tl~nt diity. 
Massena's scouts rcxclicd RoynIva in tlic cvcning of tlic 28th, 
and it has bccn aaerted tlint Trant's xhsencc from Sadm 
ennbled tlie Freucli to exccute tlieir dcsign. Tmnt wns Iiow- 
ever xt Sarrlm four niilcs from nnydvn zt one okdoclc lttlie 28tli ; 
but Larring, under orders from Enccellor, moved from htnego 
by tlie circuituiis ivay of Oporto instead of tlic direct rouil Fiy 
Xan Perlro Ja SuF, liia nuinlicrs wera rcilucoil liy fatiga and 
dcscrtion t o  fiftccn Iiundrcd, niid liia prcscnec cvcn nt Boynlvn, 
as Wcllitigt,on linrl dcuipcd, worilcl Iiavc prorliiccd no ci1?&. 
As it m a ,  tlic Frcncli cnvdry ptislied bctwcen 11iim antl tlie 
Britisli liorsemen, and drove liiin witf~  1089 beiiind tlle Tougn. 
Thcn Jlnssends main body clearing tlie rIcfiIc of Boynlva 
mosclicd upon Gimbra, and tbe zllics, crossing tlic hyondego 
near tliat city, commcnccd pssing tlie ciefiles lcading uliriii 
Cundeixa ünd PomFin1. Tlie comiiiissaritit, dores, previously 
rcniovctl from Pena Cow t o  Fipcms, wcrc cmkmrlrcd n t  
PcnlcliE, tlic liglit diviriioit nnd tlic cnvnlry rcin:iinrd on tlic 
rig1.lrt linnk of tlic $ronriego, nnd Rncrcllnr wns tlircc.t~d ta 
bring down 1111 tlie militia of tlie nortlicrn proviirccs upon tlie 
Voriga. The pernicious cffcct of tlie regency's folly antl neg- 
ligeiice mas nom mnnifcd. Notmitli~titnnding tltc proc1aiiia- 
tionn, nid tlic urgeut aud even menriciiig miuiisti.nnccs of tlie 
Englisli generiil, tlie regency lind not caiiseil tlie criuntry bcliinrl 
tlir. 5 fondgo  to h ~ ,  I i ~ i r l  ivn~tc; wlrliilc tlic cncmy wns ñtoplicd 
nt Rticaco only thc riclicst inlinbitnnts Iinrl qtrittcd Coinlbrn. 
Tlrlrcn the nrmy rctrcntcrl tlint city wns still popuIous; and 
wlicn Ma~setin's nppronch lcfií only tlic clioice bet\t.cen fliglit 
aiid tlic clentli and iiifamy aiiiiounced In tlie proclmntioi~, EO 
diwful a sccue of distress ciisuetl tlii~t nulie could bcliold it 
without emotion. lfotliers ivitli cliildrcn of nll nges, tlie siclc, 
thc olil, tlic bcdrirldcn, anrI cvcn lunaticñ, went or were cnrricd 
fmtli, ttic most purt ivitli littlc hopc and las hclp, tu joucney 
for days in mrnpany witli contending armfea: fortunatdy for 
thre unhnppy miiltitnde, the wcatlicr mm fino antl tlie roda 
firm or the greatcst iiumber must have perirlied in tlic most 
deploralile manner. Antl al1 tliis misery was of no avail, the 
objcct was nok guined; the peoplo fld, tlia provimons were 
Ieft, nnd tlie mills were only partit~llp and impcrfectly r u i n d  
On the 1 s t  o€ Octohcr, tlic ~ll ied outposts were driven 
fmin t l ie  liiller nortli o€ Coimbra, but tlie Frcilcli h o m  
men, cntering tlie plain, sufered some loss from n m- 
nonade. The Britisli c w ~ l r y  wem in Iine on open ,goun& 
the disparity of numbers \vas not grent, tlie oppvrtunity fnir; 
yct thr, Englidi wcre wittidrnwn across tlic Mondcgo, nntl so 
unskilfulb, that the French wt down sonie trnnpeirr in the 
middle of the river, and thus forcetl a combrit in ~vliich fifty 
or E ~ X ~ Y  inen fell. Tliis scrambling arair cansed the light 
divisi011 to  niureii 1i:islily tlirough tlie city to  p i n  tlte defilee 
of Condcixa, wliich ccimrnence at tlie cnd of tbe bridge7 and 
tlicn a11 t l~c  inlinliihnts mho lid nof, quittcd tlic place 
nished out, drivinp bcfore them a niimber of animrtls Ioaded 
witli sick p p l e  and cliildren. At tlie entrance to tlie bridge 
the press wsc great and ttbe troops halted a fmv momenb 
under the prison; tlie jailer liad fled with tlie kv, the 
prisoners, crowding to tlie windowe cn:ntlcavourcd to tcnr down 
the bnrs with kmheir hands, and cvcn witli tlicir tcetll, l~cllow- 
ing in the most fmntic manner, while tlie bitfer Iamentations 
oi tlic multittide on the bridge increased, mcl thc pisto1 ~ h o h  
of the cievalry e n w d  at t t e  ford below were distiuctly heard. 
William Campliell, s shF oficer, Iirealiing the prison duo- 
soon freed the wretclied jnrnntes, uiid tlic troops forcd a 
pnsmgc ovcr tlic bridge; birt ~t tht: othcr cnrl, tlic dEfile, C I I ~  
througli liigli rocks, wsis so cro~vded no effort could make 
way. A troop of Frencli dragoons wliicli hnd pmscd the ford 
now caine close upon thc flaiilí, md n single regimcnt of 
infiintry woull liwe dcstroyed tlie rlivision, wedged tis it was 
in n h o h w  mny, nnrl nnnhlc to rctrcnt, to ndvhncc, or hrcnk 
out on eitlier sidc. At Iast a passage was opcned to the righZit, 
nnd tha road was denred for the p s ,  yet it \vas dmk before 
tlie trooliu reached Coudeim, nlthough the didance was leris 
t h ~ n  eight miles. 
Tliat niglit tlie h e d - q w t e r s  were at W n h a ,  the next d g  
at Le:ria; tlie marches were therefore a y ,  and provisions 
were abundant, yet tlie usuaI disorders of a retrmt had alrearly 
commenced. In Coimbra n quantity of hrtniess and entrench- 
ing tools wers scattered in hhe strcet~ ; ak LeiBa, tlie maga- 
dneii were plirndered hy the tronps and cnmp-follouers; at 
hndejxa, a magazine of tenta, ~hoes, spirits, anrl salt meak 
was destroyed or abandone8 to thc enemy. And wliile the 
town was Aowring ~vitli rum, the liglit division and Fwk's 
Portupese brigde, only n qunrter of a milc distan6 liad to 
slaiightcr tl~eir o m  bulloclrs, and reccived but linlf rtitions of 
liqtior ! Wcllin$on however nrrcsterl these gmwing disonlma 
with n strong liand. Tlirec men tnken in the fnct wcre 
hanptl at Leiria for pluiidering, and some regiments moro 
tainted than others, were forbidden to enter a village. This 
Gprous: exercise of commaud, nided by the fme meatlier and 
tlie enemy's i~iactivity, restored rcg,riilarity amongst tlie al1 tes, 
while Mussena's conduct, tIie revcrse of tlie Englisli general's, 
~ntroduced the confusion of a rctreat in thc purstiin~ nrmy. 
At Coimlirri, he permitted such nwde, tlint resoirrmñ were tIi.9- 
sipatorl in x fcw days wliieli woiild have siirplied his troops for 
two months under potl  arrangements; and iluring this licsn- 
tious delay the atlvantage gtlinetl by bis dmgerous ilank mnrcli 
to BojfaZva w a a  lost, 
lo. 'Atlm7c W ~ O T O Z C ~ ~ ~ ,  m&?ei- hm<y obmed wdl  w7me fa 
stds. '  Tliia simple b i~t  profoiind cxprcssion in Nq~oleoii's 
lettcr to Jfassena fiirnisl~cs a test for the lnttcr's operationq 
wliich were not conformablo to it. Bis des ip  to turn the 
deriles kliind Cckirico by Ihe may of Viscu required mpid 
movements, pet he dirI not quit ITjseu to marcli on Coimbra 
until thc tenth day niter pns3ing tlie Pi'r~bel rriver: tliat was 
not a 'viprons attack.' Again, n bnttle rnight hnve beon 
forccrI on Wellingtan when AlrncirTrt fell, or even hefore t h ~ t  
event. T h e  rnules r e q u i d  for transport Being then incom- 
plete, tlie commissary-gcncrnl Kennedy \vas depcndcnt on tlie 
country caits, and wlien the fiist retropade movement from 
83verca commenced, tbe drivers ffd with their bullwks and 
~)roduccd infinitc cod~~sioii.  I<ciiiialy in a fcu* d a y ~  pro- 
curcrl intlcctl fiftccn Ii~int3rcd ntltlitionnl inulcs, liut, inter- 
mediately n vigoroiis ndvance of tlie Frcnch woiild Iiave forced 
a battle or a rctrent iiiore has@ t l iw siiitctl tlie Englisli 
generiil's politicül pcisition. Tlicre also th Freiicli mnrslinl 
Faitcd. t u  ~trilío vigiirorisly. 
2 9  If M;wacnn Iiwl not bccn ~ntircly rni~lcti by Alorna nnd 
Pamplonrs, aiid tlie more renrlily Ficcnuse tlie Inttcr's estntes 
, werc abaut Coi~nbia, he would I i a ~ e  jurlgcd, tliat tthc direct 
linc rrom Celorico, ~o jctiluusiy p a d e d  1 y  liis cIieiny aCter 
eiglit rnriiitliri' ~t,uuily of thr. coiirit,w, TVM morc lilrcly t o  offcr 
ntlvnntiiyrs thnn tJic circ11it.1~1~ nnrl comp,xrnt,ivc7y ne~lccf,ct,cil 
roiitc €)y Viscu. Ignosnrit of tlie hpogrnpliy, liut iiwin'; t.lie 
strongcr md morc movcnl>le nrrny, Iic slioulrl lisve lircsacd liis 
adversrii-jr cluecly; n rqiiJ. ~iilrsuit tliruuqli CeIorico wi~uld 
Iitavc! binuglit liim to  tlic Alvia licfora llill or cvcn LeitIi 
coiild Iinvc cnmr! in to  linr, nnrF Wdlingtrin miist tlicn hnvc 
foiikit ~vi t l i  nuly lidf liis forw or gonc b~wlz to tlic lincs. Tf 
Ilt  wccl~fed tiattle, Iiis positioii bcing onIy lin?f manned could 
be turnctl o11 liis riglit by tlie slolies of tlic Estre!la, on Lis 
I ~ f t  by ccriissing tlic Xorldcgu. Hrnce it is c1c:ir tlint ths 
pcnt ol>jcct of forcing 11 S:ittle Lcf~rc  nill ~niiltl rntcr tlio 
line wns morc nttniiinlilo an tlie Icft bniik of tlie 3lonrlcgn 
tlixn lly tlie r o d  to STiscu. Ecre tllcn tlie ' wl~crc to  strilrc' 
was iiot wcll oliscrved ! 
3'. Urheii I l i e  rocks o1 13iisac0, glillering mi91 im~otietq 
fimt rose oii the prinea of Esling's view, two cliicstio~r~ were to 
hc solvctl. Slioiilrl lic atfnclr or tiirn tlint foniiitl;alilc post! 
Slioul(1 he Ircrli tlie d i c s  in check, A C ~ Z C  Oporkn, nnrl nrdcct 
Lisbon until bettcr co~nbi~i:~tions couId be nindcl Tlic 1 s t  
question b n s  Lcen alr~wly salvcrl, 'u~it, coritrnry t n  tlic ;,:iicral 
upiiiion, tlie attxlc iipuu EI~S:~CO nlipcui*s frtuItp iii ilic exccution 
ratlier thnu in thc conccption; nnd tlie murdi by whicli 
tliat posit,ion wnq t,iirncrl, iviia n, viol>~tion of tlie tioiindcd 
princililcs o€ wiar: in a purcly militxry view, the EtigIish 
general nuy be censurctl for not punishing liis a d ~ ~ r s a g v ' ~  
rasliiicss. Wihli respect to tlic athck, sixty-five tliiiusnnd 
Frellcli vcteranu h d  no reasson t o  lidisve, tliat fifty tlitiusa~d 
inexpcricnecd trtiops, s~ircnd ulong a mountriin crcst more tlian 
eight r n h  long, were Imprepably psM; and it is an error 
fo supposey aaa some persons have, thnt guguas conId not have been 
used; the light division R-as constantly within long r a n s  
and thirty pieoes of artillery employed on tliat point wouId 
have grmtly aidcd tlie attack by tlie sixth cor~s,  But wlieii 
n genernl in cliief remnins ten miles from a tield of bnttle, 
givw hig  ~clver~nry two daga to settlr! in ii position, rnaktng his 
athclcs mithout connexion nnd without artillerjr, and brinp 
forward no reserves, success :S impossible evenwith suc11 valiant 
eoldiera as Massena commanded. 
4'. ' h army ~liould always be in a condition to fight.' 
' A generni diould never ahandon oue line oE comuiunieatioii 
without estatilishing another." 
' Flank mnrchm within reach of nn encmy are m h  antl 
injudicious.' 
Theae rnaxima o€ Eapoleon have been illustrated by many 
cxamples. IScnef, ICollin, ~ s b t i c h ,  the valley of  the Erenta, 
Salamanca, attest t1,~ieir vdue. Massena vioIated al1 three by 
his mmcli to  Boyxlvta, wlieii no desperate crisis of affairs war- 
r:mtod such a deliarture from genoral principies. sir Josliua 
Rcynold~, trcating nf anothcr aart: says, "nilis hegins whcrc 
rulw and.' Wem ,geni~ig wtt5 rlormant nnd mlcs rlisrcgardcd. 
blassena wraa not driven to  a desperate game, the conquest oQ 
Oporto was opea t o  him, eo was a match t o  f he Voiiga by 
Visen; yet he tlirew his whole amy into s single narrow 
defila within ten miles of an enemy in position. And, as 1 
liuve been told by an &cer of Nefs stniT> witli sucli disorrler, 
that t,he hngyng~, the commismrint, the wountled ond tlie ñicIr, 
wcm mixcd vith thr, nrtillcry, cnvalry, nnd infitntry, ewh 
striving who slior~ld first mnke m y  ;-that ~llscortl raged 
m i o n g t  the generals, confusion amongst the soldiers,-and al1 
tbis in a night march ! 
' M m d s  a m y  waa ml tJm hz o c m & h  to$yht--J1~ 
d e  a J a d  ~ K ~ T C I ~  wi&/&nreuc?~ o f m  emmy in, podiola, and 
As d a n d d  h6 line of c m m i c t k l w n  witlwat Imirny estd-  
liabd rtlwthm*a 
B o .  lVcllin,@on wnq within fnrir hour~' mnrch of cither end 
of the dcftlc tlirough which thc Frcncli nrmy mns moving. Rio 
might mith tiie fimt division and the cavalry, the Portupie& 
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regiiiar troops and Trant's militia Iiaw prescntett twelve or 
foi~rteen thousund meri at Sitrrlxu, to  Iiead tlie Frencli in tlie 
dcfile, mhils the seeond, tliirri, faurth, fifth, nnrl liglit diviioni 
advancinp by itrorfagao, a s ~ a i l ~ l  tlicir mar. Thnt he did nat 
do eo is to be attributad to Lis politiml position; his mixed 
and inexlicrienced army  vas nof easily liandled, wtir is fulI of 
misclinnces, and tlio Ioss of a singlo brigndc miglit lim musd 
thc F,n~lish government to nlinndon flie eontcst nftogcther. 
Neverthclesa, Iiis retrcnt was as dangerous as sudi an nttack 
would llave been, and in a military ~ i e w  tlie liattle of Bnsacti 
sliould not Iiave been foiiglit; it wau cxtrnncotis to liis original 
pIm and forced upon him by cventri; it n.as in fine a political 
hxttle and he aftftcrw~irds d l e d  it a mistake. 
6'. 3Iassena'~ marcli was successful, and tlie alIied nmy 
could not cope with hirn in the open cnunty, lietween J3umco 
nnd tlie @ea, where liis cnvnlry would have Ii:d a fnir field 
Wcllington tliercforc, rcvcrting to Iib ori~innl  pinn, rctrcnted 
by thc Coimbra rind Espina1 ro~lils; but tlie Frencli w r e  a$ 
Avelens de Cima nnd Milheda on tlic 30tl1, the allied cavalry 
and the light di~vjsion being t l~en ori tlic riglit bitnk of the 
Mondego, wlijoh watr lordnble in rnnny plnces bclov: Goimlira 
Hnd Jlassenq murcliing lry TcnttigaI, c ros s~ l  aat thc loraer 
fords, md pushcd on t o  Leirla, the retreat would I ia~e  becn 
intercepted, terror nnd confusion wouId Iiave mgcd at Lisbon, 
t.he patriarcli'a faction would bave trinmplietl, and a dnngerons 
httle rnust have becn fought to r e d  tlie lilies. 
14 ltThen thc rtllics l i ~ l  secured tlicir retrmt, thc fntc o€ Por- 
t u p l  wes hill in Masñcna's hnnds. Re coultl have established 
si. frecb itt Coimbm, employed tlic nintli c o r p  to seize 
Oporta, and secnred Iines of communication with tliat city and 
with Almeida by fortificd posts. Tlien attacking dbrantes 
he codd linw connectetl Iiis opemtions witli Soult's troops in 
Edrcmadurn, and would have cffcctunIly frustrnted botli tI~e 
politicaI and militxry defence of Portrigd. Weliington dmded 
this danger, and to him the rencwed advance o f  the French 
ww as tlie rising of a lienvy doud shosing a clear hohon.  
89 Even at Coimbra Nossena k n w  notliing of tbe lines of 
Torrcs Vcdrnq and bcliwed tlic country bcpond 
Apmix 6 ' thc Mondego 20 be fit for the umgc of d1 -s. 
Yet Junot, Loison, Fay, and mony other office~ 
who ha11 semed in Portu,$ were with him and ahle t o  come& 
Alorna and Famplonak emoneoue infomation ! Rut thia 
crimpaign ww ~l strange one and il1ast.r~ked Masscna's cfiaracter 
as d r m  by hTapoleon. ' Dull in conversation, decided and 
intrepid in action, danger gavc his thoughts cleamess and 
force. Ambitious and seffish, he was neglectful of discipline, 
regardless of good nrlminiptrrition, and conseyently dialilred 
hy Lis t r o o p ~  j Lis dispositions for a liattle were always liad, 
hui hís tcmper wns pertinwious to tIle lmt degee: hc WRS 
navcr &sceurngorl.' 
94 Tlie Frencli renched Coimbra just m foiirtccn dnys 
bread carried by tlie soldiers was exiiawtetl. Frcnch soldierg 
onIy are trecustomed to carry so much bread. Other nationa, 
and notably thc Snglish, would not huaband it; yet it was a 
pnctice of tlie ancient Romms and it; ought t o  be thepractioe 
of m11 m i e s .  Lt requirss previous discipline and wcll-con- 
firmed rnilitnry liabitg and it is s vital element of succesa 
Tho miccrct af mnlcing perfect soldiers is howeycr onlg to bc 
found in nntitionnl customs nnrl inatitntion~; mcn ~hould carne 
t o  tlie mnks fitted by prcprcviaus Iiabita for military mrvice, 
inste~d af lieingí;tretclied as it were itpoa the betl of bcmstea 




Fun;\! the ht until the 3rtl, tlw French army was in disorder.
The 4th, 'Mnsscna resllmed his march by Condcix:a and J.Jciria,
leaving his sick and wounded with a slender gunrd at Coimbra.
ilis llOspital was established at the conveut of Santa Clara on
the left bank of tllll river, aml all tho iuhaloilanLs who were
averse or unable to enter the lines, immediately Cl\mc down
from their lliding-places in the mountains. But scarcely had
the prillce left the eity when Trant, Miller, Imt! Wilsoll closing
upon his rear with ten thousand militia, occupied the sierras
on both sidCl> of the )1o1ll1cg:o, uuu cut off alL \:QlilllJuuiw.tioll
with Almcidu.
On the evening of the 4th the French drove tllll English
piquctsfromPombal,andllcxt morning Ilushcd so suddenly upon
Lciria as to ereatc gcneral confusion, The rOM was however
erossed by t\ succession of purulld ravincs, and captain Sowers
Cocks, defending one with 0. single s<1uadron, dlllrged the
heM of thc encmy's colullIlI vigorously and checked its march
until Ansoll's brigade of horscmcn And Dull's artillery calllC
up, The :Freuc!l thr,n formed three eolumn.l:i, amI endeavoured
to bear down the British with the centre onc, while the others
tunlCd the flllnks; but the ravines we:-c dimeult" llulI's :"Irt iller)'
played well into tlle princip:"Il hoily, and Anson, ehm'ging fill it
emerged from eyery defile, slew a great number. The British
lost three officers ulId fifty mell, tlle French lost more, and in
fiye hours did not gain as mlmy miles of grounil, llltllOugh
they lwl tl,irty-six. squ:uIrolls opposed to ten. During this
delay Lciria was cleared, and the army retreated, the right hy
Thomar and Santarelll, the centre b}' Batnlha and Ilio Mayor,
the left by Alcoool(lI. and Obid09; at the !lIIIUC time l\ ntIti\'o
force, undcr colonel Blunt, WIIS thrown into PcnichlS, Mas!\C1l1lo
followed in onc colUUln b},tlle wayof Rio Mayor, but meanwhile
the most daring and harcty entgrise executd by a y  partisan 
during the whole n-ar, con-ricted him of bad genemiship nnd 
sliook liis plan of invzsion to its base. 
Trnnt hnd rctiirned from the V o n g  to Millieaiia aft~r the 
French p a e d ,  desiping to  unite witli MilIer anrl J. Wil~on ;
biit thme officers mere still dititant, nnd his own &val heing 
unlrnown nt Coimbra, be resolver1 to rittmk tlle Frencb in t11at 
city without waiting for assistance. Surprising a post at 
Pornos enrly in tL0 moming of tho 701, lw sent his cavalry at 
rt gallop tliiough the drtreek of Coimbra, with orders tu pas6i 
the hiridge ancl mrt oF al1 communication with tlio Freneh 
army, of whasc -pro-ycss he WWI ignomnt. His infnntry then ' 
penetrated at differmt points into the pt.jn$pal parta of the 
town, the actoundwl enemy matle little or no raigtance, and 
tlie convent of Santa sirira surrmdered at3iscretion. Viua 
on the third dny afkr Massena quitted tlie Mondego, hia 
depdts and hospitah, and naqrly ftve tliou~and prisonem, 
wounded aud unwounded, amongst them a marine company 
of thr: imperinl p a r d ~ ,  fdl into f,hho hnniIs of n small militia 
force! The next dny, MiFler nnd Ivilson a m e ,  ítnd ~preadinb 
tlieir men on al1 sidm picked ap t h r ~  hiinhed more pisoners, 
wliilc Trant condueted liis to Oporto. During the first con- 
fusion the militia ill-need Borne prisoners, and the Abb6 du 
Pradb and otlier French writem hrive in consequence wcused 
Tmut of disgracing liis uniform by enmuraging mdi fcrocity. 
Eut it wns he who repressed tlie feroeity: only Ap~endix  ir. 
ten Iiveu werc lost, md tlie falschood js rcndered 
conspicuous hy a Idter of thnnka nddressed to him by thc 
French officem who le11 into his hantls. 
Thia dissster dilid nof, stop bim~ena's march. The 8th hEs 
dvanced p a r d  drove Slade's cavalry piquets out of Rio Bii~ayor, 
anrl piisliing on tolfllcoentre were l i t e  to have captured the 
field battery tliere. The royals and the sixteenth dragoona 
forced the French back and szbred rnany, kut the combat was 
reneived next morning and the BRtish cavírlrv, ill-liantlled by 
SMe, r c t i r d  Meanwhile the lines were bcing omupied 
Coic and Lcith toolr tlic ccntre at S~ribml, Rcttin occupid 
Torrlar Tedras oa tlic Ieft, Bill entered Alhaadra on the 
right. h u f u r d  and Pack shoull hnve gone to Anrtla, bnt 
the former, n&o reached Alcmq~~cr on tlie 9111, was still then 
rtt tthrcc o'cIoclr P.M. on the 30th. TIie neatlier lvns utumy, 
nnd he put the men vntler cover fina lct tlicm cook; he kncw 
the cavdry had fiIed into the limes, yct he postd no goards, 
sent no patroles f o m d ,  took no precaution ngninst a sur- 
pri~e, nltliougli tlie t o ~ ,  situnted In a cleep ravine, wraa 
peculiarly linhIe t o  siich a disnstcr. Sorno officera, unenay 
8t thii state of affGrs, anxiously watched tha height iin front, 
and about foiir o'clock observed French dragoone on the 
summit, witLin cannon shot, She alarm wa~i nstantly given, 
but the nsscnllily post l i d  been rnnrIrcd on an open spnce 
cxpomd to  m cncrny's fiw, and from thcncc the rnd Iwl 
through an ancient gateway to tlie top of a mountain behind, 
Tlic French, incrwing every rnoment, feigned to be pointing 
pus, and the genetal hat i ly  desired tlie regiments to break 
nnd raform on tlie other sida of thc arcliway out of rango. 
In s moment nll wm disorrlcr. Thc strcch wcrc crowtlcd 
with the cxmp followers snd baggage nnimals, anil the whole 
in one confused mass mhed or were driren heacllong to the 
nrchway; several were crushcd, witli worse troops a 
gencral punic mud have ensued, but most of thc oficcrs nnd 
soIdiers, 881iamecl of tlie order, stood firm until tlie first con- 
fusion liad abated. 
Nevcrtlidess the rnischief mas mfficientl great, and tlie 
enerny's infanty, descending t l ~ e  lieigl:ts, cncleavoured to tum 
thc t o n  on thc lcft, wliilc sonic pushcd dircctly tlirougli the 
atreeb in pursuit; thus d t h  his front in disorder, liis rear 
skirmishing, and the niglit hlling, Craufurd commenced a 
retreat, buC the wmtber iieing boi~teroua tlio fire suon ceasd: 
gome wounds and thc Iosti DE baygngc was al1 tlio liurt 
sustiiincrl, y 4  80 unmrtain ;B cverything in wnr, this affair 
had like to liave prcduced the most terrible results in another 
puartm. Por th division, instcad of rnarcliing by Carpgada 
and Cntlafaes, fullowed tlic routa of Sobrnl, anrl tlius mnde in 
the da& 6 flanlt mwch of scvcrnl miics nlong thc font of tho 
Zinm to gain Arucla, wLeh wm mcanirhiIe lcft opcn to t h  
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enemy, In this state, the camlry pntrales from Billa Franca, 
meeting some stragglem and followers: nenr Caregada, mere by 
them toId the light dipision wvs cut off; a report mnfirmed 
Lu some ineasurr! Ly thc unguardeü state of Aruda aria by the 
ptesence of tha enemy's scouts on tliat side. Thia infomiition 
nhrmed Hill for thc fiafcty o€ t l ~ o  scmnd linc, nnd tho moro so 
that the weelrest part w~,s  in the viciniiy of Anida; he tl~ere- 
fore mnde a retrogade movement tomrds Alvcm, whh a 
view t o  watch the valley of Calandrix, or to gain the pass oT 
Ducellas, according t o  circumatances : hencg mhfle the exreniy 
wa in march against the lincs, ttbe latter, froin Alhanilrra te 
tlie forts uhovo Gabml, a distance of eiglit or nine miles, were 
disprnished of troopa Tlia true stato of  nffaim waa however 
quickly sscertslínotl, m d  HiII repined Allianrlrn before dny- 
1igl:lit on the 11th. During tliis time Reynier anrl Junot 
passed Alemquer. The fimt marched upnn Villa Fmnen, the 
second upon X o b d ;  but Reynicrk opciations wcra langnid, 
he did not discover the unparded state of Alhanha, and his 
piquets only entered Villa Franca the next day. It was 
different on Junot's side. CIauseI, one of the ablest genemla 
of the Frencli a r q ,  leding tlie heml rif tlie eigl~tli corpg 
cania upon Sobra1 in tlie dusk, dislodged tlie fimt divi~ion, 
occupied the ridge upon mliich tlint toivn i~ huiIt, and Iiefore 
mo~aing thrown up works closc in the ccntm of thotie 
jnstly-celebrated entrenchmenta 
TiIE LINES OJ? TOlZES% Y E D W .  
Tlicy consisted of tbxeei diatinet rangos of de- colonel 
fence. J ~ E S ,  noya1 
The first, extenfing from Alhandra on the ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ; s ,  
Tagus to tlie mouth of the Zizandre on the sea- P r i ~ l M  for 
criast, ws, fulIoming the iiiaections of the Lills, E::::,"& 
twenty-nbe miles loiig- 
Ttie second, traced et  a distmnce, vmrying from ~ i x  b tea 
miles, in rcnr of tlle first, stretched from Quintellrs on tlie 
Tups  to the mouth of the St. Lorenzn, being twenty-four 
mil es in length. 
Tiie third, intentIcd to covcr a farcorl crnbarkation, extended 
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from PSSO d'drcos on the Tapts, to the tower of Junquera 
on tlie ooast. Uere an out.mrd line, constructcd on an open- 
ing of tlirce thousand yzrds, cndosed an entrcnclied camp, the 
latttr bcing rlcsigncd to covcr nn cmlinrltntion witli fcmcr troops 
iF RIICI~ an operntion shoi~ld be dclxycd by 11ad weatlier. This 
second carnp cnclosed Fort St. Jrilian, ivliose bigh ramparts 
and deep ditchcs defied an escalade, anrI were nrnied to enable 
a rear-guard t o  resist any force. Kum Passo #Arcos to tlie 
nenrcst pnrt of tlie second linc wns twentp-four milcs; from 
tlie fimt line it WRS tlvo marches, but tlie principal roiitcs 1 .4  
tlirough Lishon, where means to retard tlie enemy were 
prepared. 
Of tliese stupendous linw, tlie second, ivlictlier for strength 
or impurtance, mns tlic priiicipal; tlic otlicrri ivcre appendages, 
thc tliirt2 R MCIT plnce of rcfiis. Tlic first linc n.m originnlly 
deeigned as an ailr:incerl urork, to stcm tlie primaq virilence 
of tlie enemy and cnabIe tlic ranny to tzke up its groitnd on 
the second lino ~ ~ i t l i o u t  liurry or prescurc; but wliile Mwsena 
remaiued inwtive on tlie Dutitier, it acquired ~trength, which 
mns naw so much nupmitcd Iiy thc rnin tlmt Wcliington 
resolved to abirle the attuclr tliere pemimently. 
It orered five distinct positionrt, which slidl be clcscribed 
from +?ti t o  leJ. 
19 From Alltadro to t 7 ~  7md of t h  w l l q  of CaImrk&x. 
This portion, fivo miles long, wns a continuous xnd Zofty ridge 
defcnded hy thirtccn rctlo~ilits, nntl for two miles rcndrrcd 
inaccessibIe by a scnrp fifteen to  twenty feet high. I t  was 
guarcled by llill's corps, nnd hnked from the Tagus by a 
flotilla o€ gun+tioiits rnanneed with British seamen, 
2". F T ~  t ? ~  kead af Iba ei& of Cdandriz do tJe Pi? de 
Jl'oluie. Tliis pnrtian, nlso nf five miles, prcsciitcd tlve sitlient 
molintains forrning the valley of A~utla, tllat tom being 
extrctlg in tlie rnouth of the pass. Only tbree fccble redouhts, 
inwprible of  skopping aii enemy, were constructed here, and 
tlie defeuco was eiitrusteii to t1le Iight division. 
3O. Tlu Mod! A p q a .  Tliis lofty rnountain overtapped 
the atljacent country, nnd from its snmmit the whole of tho 
first line could be seen, The right mas separated from the 
Anida position bg a decp rnvine \vliicL Id *o nothing; the 
Idt overlooked tlie d l a g e  and valley of Zibreira; the centre 
ovcrhnng the h w n  of Sobral. The summit waa crowned by 
an írnmense redoubt armed with twenty-be g n s ,  round wliich 
tliree smaller worlrs, contaiiiing nineteen guiis, were clustereri. 
Sho gmiaonq nmounting t o  two thousand men, sere supplied 
by Pack's hrigride; annrla on the reveme slopc, which rniglit bo 
nbout four miles in length, h i t h  m posteJ. in reserve. 
4'. P m  ti@ wlFey of XiMrtc b t o m  Ved~ag. Tliis 
portion, m n  miles long, wm at fimt witlwut works, bccaiise 
it was only when tlie rilius had set in the resolution to rlcfenl 
tlie first line pe~rnanentlg was adopted. But th0 gmuntl, 
ron@ aud well defined, hnving a vnlley in front, dcep and 
naercd  b~ tlie Zixandrq now a cnngirlerable river, pressczited n 
fine field of lmttle. Rere Spenoer and Cole, rcinforoed witli II
sixth dipjsion, formed of troops rocently come from England 
md Cadiz, were statianed under the irnmediate commaud of 
Welliugtan, wliose quartem were fcsed at I'ero Negro, j u s t  
under the lofty Secora roclc, ooa whicli a telcgrapli was erected 
to comrnunimtc wit1i weq pnd of tlio line. 
P. F r m  t l ~  Im$ikq nf T ' m ~ 8  Qeclrm to ~ F M  muth of &!M 
Zknr&& The right flnnlr of this prtion nnd a pasa in frunt 
o€ tlie town of Zbrres Vedras were secnrecl By a p e n t  redoubt,, 
mounting forty guns, and by smder forts jucliciouslp plmtnted 
so na to commantl: all the approactclies, From tthcse worka to 
the sea a rawge of uiodemtc heiglits M V S  krowned witli ininor 
redouhts; Iiut tlie chief defence tlicre, aRer the mim hlid ~t 
in, was to bo fonnd in thc Ziaancirc, unfordable and ovcrflow- 
ing so as to form an impaasable marsl. Sucli were the 
defences of £he first line, atrong, but at several points defectíve; 
nnd there wm B paved m d ,  running parallel to the foot uf 
the hiIls through Torres Vedras, Ruña, So'bml and &u& t o  
SEliandrn, whicli gnve tbe enemy Iin adpnuhqe. 
Tlie aecvnd Y I I ~  m06t Surniirlatile lirie shll ttow be deecribed 
fiom lefl ik &y&. 
la. &m fh d of tlm St. Lourmzp to Afqfm. In this 
distrtncc of sevcn milcrr, tlierc wns a rnnge of hills, naturnlly 
steep, adificially scarped, covered by a d e ~ p  and in mmy prts 
impracticable ravine. The snlicnt poinh were secirred liy ferts 
wliich flanked and c o m w d e d  the few moessible points; but 
ns the Iine wns extensive, a sccontlnry post was fortified a fem 
miles in the rear, to s m r o  a r ~ a d  leatling froni Ercceira to 
Cintra. 
2'. TJie Tapada or ~ q d p a r k  of JfuJra. Hcre there w 
some open but strong ground wliicli, witli tlic pass of Rlafm, 
\vas defiiicled by a qsteoi of Eourteeri rcdoidits, constructed 
witk grcnt inboir a k  mrc, mctl coiisidcrsd with rcspFct t o  
thc natural fcaturcs, znd in somc degrcc conncctcd witli +he 
aecondary post spulren of above: the %erra de Cliypre, covered 
with redoul~ts, )vas in frout nnd olistructed nll ali~iroaehes to 
hfafra i tsclf. 
3'. P r m  t h  Tupazla ta t h  p a  of Bwcellas. Sm this 
spce o£ ten or twclve miles, forming the niiddlc of tEie aecond 
line, the country is c l iok~l  by t1ie lfunte Chiquc, tlie l i a d  of 
whicli is in tlie ceritre uf ond uuertups dl tlie otlicr rriountsin 
massea. A roatl conductd dong ~t chnin of J i i l l ~ ,  high nnd 
salient tliougl~ tess bolrl tlian any othcr post of tlie line, con- 
nected Mafra ~ritI1 tlie Cabe:s, and sas secured by a number 
of forts. Tlie couiitry iu froiit \\.as extremely dillicult, nnd 
Leliirid WM a parallcl anrl stronger rjdge whicli coultl only be 
nyiproilclied witli mrtillcry by tlic connectiiig roiid in froiit; 
b11t to rmdi tliat, the Sierra, de Cliyprc on tllc left, or the 
defls of tlie C n l i e p  oii tlie rigfit, ninst liavc becn mmied. 
Nurv the latter ?vas coversiT by a, cluster oi' rctluubta con- 
strueted on some inferior rocky helids in mlvnnce; ttiey com- 
mitnded al1 tlie approaelics, liind froin tlieir artificial md 
natural iltren$li wcre 11carIy impregnublc. Tlie Calicca itseFf 
and its inimedinte flaiilrs were secure inbtlieir natural preci- 
j~itous streligtli; so lilíemise were thc rirlges co~inecting Slis 
Cnbeca ~sitli  tlie pws of Buccllns, mlicrcforc, snvc tlic lilocking 
of one muIe pnth, tlicy werc iintoiiclied. 
3". F m  B~~lzrceIlm to tls loeo grmnd dozct t?~. 2 " ~ .  
Tlie dcfile of Dlicellas, nnmow snd ruggcd, was defen(1cd by 
redoulits on eucli side, and n ritlge, or rz~tlier collcction o€ 
inipcsatilc roclcs, mllcd the Sicrrii dc Ecrvcs, strctcliccl to tha 
right of it for two niiles witIiout a lircak, nnd thcn died 
aaaay by a succession of ridgcs into thc low grouiid on t,he 
bank OS tlie Tagiw. Tliesu declivitie~ and tlic ilat banlrs of 
the rivw off'crcil nn acccssililc epciiing, two milcci nnd n hlf 
widc. Tt wns InbmiouiiIy defended indeed by r'dunbt~, wntm 
cuts, retrcnchmcntu, and emrefiilly connected witli tlie heiglits 
of Alhnndm; yet it was thc weitkest pnrt of the lint?, and 
dangerous from its pmximity to the ~a1leys of CuInndrix and 
Anida. 
Fim r o d s  practicable for p n s  picrccd thc first line of 
defence; two at Torres Vedras, two at Buliral, one at Alhan- 
drii; but as two of tliese united nguin at the Crthecib, tlicre 
wcre only four points of pnssuga tlirough tlic sccond linc, that 
is to eap, ~t M a h ,  Montc Chique, BuoeUns, nncl Qirintelln i i i  
tlie flat ground. Rcnce t,lie aiin anrl wope of all the worka 
were to hr thase rods anrl strengthen the Eavo~~r?,bbte figl~gliting 
psitione between them, without impeding the movements of 
the nrmy; the loss of the first line tliercfore would not h a ~ e  
Lilrzn ii~jarious, wave in reputation, Gecausr: ttie rctraat was 
secure upon tlie secund and struiiger line ; moroover tlie guns 
of t l ~ e  first line were ail uf iiiferiur calibre, niounted on com- 
mon triick wrringes, ininioveable, and useless to  tbc encmy 
The alIiesl movcmcnts werc quitc unfcttcrcd hy tbc  morlrs, but 
those of  tiic Prcnch arrny wcro impedcd aiid crampccl by tho 
Monte Junta, wFiicl\ rising opposik to the centrc of tlic first 
line, sent ont a sprw cdled the Sierra de 13asriknieda in a 
slmting direction towarards tlie Torres Vedrav mountain, and 
only ~elmrrtted from it liy the puas of nuÍía, whicL was coni- 
manded by Iimvy redoubts. Massena \\-as therefore to dis- 
pose hirr arrny on one or the other side of the Unritgucila, 
whicli could not be cmily puscd; nor could ti movement 
ovcr it bo hidden Crom tho nllics on tha Monta Agrrqa, who 
from thcnca could pour down simultancourily on tlic licad 
and tail oT the pacsing columns witli the litrnost rnpi~lity, 
becanse convenient XOAUS hd been previousIy preparcd, nnd 
telegrnplis estnblidiexl for the trnnsmisqion of orders. 
These mlchrated lincs werc g e a t  in eonception and exeeu- 
tion, mora in keaping with ancicnt thnn mudern rnilitriry 
hbours; anrl it is clear tliat t h ~  dcfenm was ilot dcpeiident, 
us sumo Frericli miter3 supyose, upon tlie first line. If that 
lid been stormed the starldnrd of Prirtuguese indep~nderioo 
would stitill havc floated securely amidst tbe  rocke of thc 
second line. But to  occupy fifty d e s  of fortificnt.ion, t o  man 
one linnclred and fifty forts, and work six hund~ed guns 
required many men, and numbers were not wanting. A great 
flect in tho Taguu, a sulierb body of marines scnt out f o m  
Endnnd, thc civic guards of Lkbon, the  Portupese henvy 
artilIey corps, the militia and ordennnqx o€ 1Sñtremndurn, 
furnished a powerful reserve t o  the regular trrmy. The 
native gunnem and tilo militin snpplied a11 tlie garriso~is o€ 
the forts on tlie second, and must oE tliosc on tlic first line; 
the British mnrines occupicd tbe tliirrl line; tlte n w y  rnannd 
tlie giin-bods on the river, nnd aidetl in wrio~ia wnys tlie 
opcmtion in the ficld. Tlie wmits from t1ie dcp5its, xnd tlie 
caIling in of al1 tlie men on furlough renrlered tlie I'ortug~i~se 
army stronger tlizn it liad yet beei~, wliilc tlie Britisli troolis, 
reinforccd from C d i z  nnd Englnnd, nn<l rcmnrlcalily licdtliy, 
prescnte(1 sacli n front as n gcncrnl would dcsirc t o  ficc in a 
dangerous crisis. 
It was liowevcr necessary t o  h a ~ e  tlic apliearaiicc of cvcn 
greater strenglli, and wellinghn thercfore so dedt witli 
Homana, thnt witliont much nttention to tht! wirrlirs o€ his 
own govtrnment he joi i id  tlie ~ l l i e ~  witli six thousantl men. 
Tlic Knglish gcncral did not howevcr aslc tliis until assured 
Massena's force mas insufficicnt to dBvc tlie 13ritisl1 froin 
Lishn, as it would llave h n  ditilioncst to dmw tlie 8paniards 
to ib corner, whcre thcy could not from m n t  nf sliippiing 
have ~ c n p t d  in thc e ~ c n t  af failiirc. Rnmaii~ crmserl tlii! 
Tagus at Aldea Gnllcjiz the lgtli, and took post tlie 24th at 
Enxm de los Cavtvalle~os, just beliind tilo Monte A m a .  
The remainder of tlie Spanisli amy, reiiiforced witli Mdden'8 
Portug-uese drapons, radvnncc~l townrds Zafra, and Ballesteros 
rnoveti on Aracena Mortier ignomnt a€ Remnnh'~ alisenca 
had retreated over tbe Morena on tlie Mi,  deirous to be 
nearer to SodS who mas tben seriousiy mcnzcing Cdie. Thus 
fodune Ridd the Rngli~li gencrai's cforts to incrcllse tlic dis- 
tnnee betiveen Míwaenrs nnd Soult, tlnd t o  divcrsify their 
objects at tFic moment he hatl concentmted thc geatest force 
on the most important p i n t  ; for before Xcptem1)er more thae 
one bundred mil twenty hl~ousand fighting msn were mt iond  
witliin tlio linm, ~ B V E ~ ~ Y  thuusand being regiilar troops. 
Hassena, surprised at tlie cxtcnt nnd strcngtb of woraia 
whicli he h d  only hard  of five days heforc lie carne ulion 
tliem, emploped sweral days fo exnmiíle their natiire. The, 
heights of Alhandra were inexpugnable ; but tlie vallep af 
Calandrix and Anida attracted liis attention. Ey thc former 
he couId turn A l h d r a  and reach the weakest part of the 
sscond line; but the abattis and redoubts, hourIy strengtlien- 
ing, @ve little encouragement t o  attmck there, Tlie pouiid 
&out Aruda did not gire liim a view of the troops, nlthougli 
hc ircqucntly skirml~lid to mnkc Crnufurd ñliow his Toree; 
but that geneml, hy occupying hritdx xs m ndwnced post, 
had rendered it impossible to  discover his tme situation vith- 
out a scrious aflnir, and, in m incredibly sliort space of time, 
lie seciircd liis posikion in a manncr ivorthy of arlmiration. 
Acmss tlie ravine on the left, a loose st,one wdl sixteen feet 
thick anrl f o r g  feet liigli was raised ; a c w s  the great valley 
of  Aruda a double line of ahnttis ivas drawn; not, as usuat, of 
the li~ribs of trecs, but oE Eull-gro~vn oak.ks and dicsnuts, diggeti 
up witli al1 their roots and Lisanches, dragged by main force 
for scvcrial hundrcd p n l ~ ,  nncl tlicn rewt and crmsd so tlint 
no liumnn strcng8i corild hrcntr tliroiigh. Rrcnst-works, at  
eonrcnicnt distniiccs to dcfcníl tlris line of trees, wcre aIso 
cast up; n-nd along tlie summits of tlie rnountain, for a space of 
nearly three miles, inclurling the sülient points, otlier stone 
walEs, E ~ X  feet higb by four iu thickness, \vi.jtIi bmquetttei were 
piled up! Fw~nulis never raiscd grezter worlcs in tlie time I 
Monte Agraca avd tlie u p r  Zimndro vale liad uo out- 
worku; neitlier tlie Zibreirm vulley, nor tlle Eiills ahove liuña 
Iisd bmn fortificrl, and Iiattlc could be joincd tlicre on morc 
cqunl tcms; but thc position wa9 by nntiirc strong, tlie rear 
supported by grmt forts, a powerfui b o d ~  of trorips occuliied 
tlie ground, and six btlttalions clrawn from IZili's corps formed 
a rcsewe ah Bueellas. l3yond lluña, M ~ s e n a  could not take 
a rietv; tlle Baraigueda ridge antl tLe fork of  Torres 'Vedras 
stoppd dliim. Corivinced by tliis survey ttti~b tlia linea were 
not to be forced, lie diq~osed his troops inperrnanent positioiis 
between Tilln Frsnca nnd SobraI. Rcpnicr lioldirig tlie 
Iieighta oppositc Alhsndrn with liis Icft, cxknclcd Iiis riglit 
nlong open gronnrl as fhr as Arircin wlierc it wns covered hy 
cmnlry; Junot hcld tlre ridgc nenr Sobrnt scized by CIausei, 
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nnd ~ R O  occllpi~d tlie lomer slionts fmm tlie 'Rnrfi$~crlrq and 
l i d  tllc Ziznntlre to Dum Portas an t l ~ c  roatl to Rufia, tEie 
out,posts of botli armies being tlerc in co i ikt .  Key remainwi 
at Otta, Tliese clispositicins were not mnrlc witliout fighting. 
Clnuscl's men, nttcmpting to didodge; tlie 713t regiment From 
s work nenr Sobra4 wcrc rcpulscd anil drivcn also from their 
a m  retrenchment, wliich was lield until the ivlioIc of Jiinot's 
corps advmccd to re-estxblisli tlie position. Tlie nllica in t6is 
and otlicr pctty combats lost a liunrlrcd nntl fifty mcn, most of 
whom fcll at Sobral, nnd tlic Portiigncsc gcncral H a w g  mnti 
woundecl. On the otlier h&nd tlic Frene11 general St. Cioix, a 
young man of s ipal  ability and promise, ww lrilld by the 
pn-boats nt VjHa Franca. 
f i c  wur was nolv reduccd t o  s blocltndc. Mnsscnn only 
so~ight to  feed hia nrmy iintil rrinforcenients rcncl~ed it; 
TTcIlington endeavoured tu stame tlic Freneli I-ieforc miccour 
could arrive. Tlie forrner spread his mo~enble colurnns in the 
rmr to seel< for prmisions, ancl sstablislicd ma,pines at 
Snntarern. I?ic lnttcr drew down al1 tlic militin rtnd orde- 
nan? of thc north on the Prcncli rear, piitting tliem in com- 
rnunicafion mith the garrison of Penicli6 on onc pide, and on 
tlie otlier with tbe militia of Lowcr Deira: Carlos Lt'España 
also, crossing tlie Taqs, acted between CasteIlo Brunco nnd 
hbrnntes. Thus tlic Frcnch wcrc completely cnclosed withoat 
any ivcakening o€ tlie reglar arm y. 
Obidos, liaving an old mll, liad k n  amed as o. post o€ 
commnnimtion between the nodhcrn militia and Pcniché; 
tlie regency left it witllout provjsiona, and it wze evmaterl 
wlien Xa~~cnnm fir& nmivcd; the conccntration of liis tmopa 
now permitted msjor Fenwick to re-oee~ipy it with thee 
hnndrd northern rniIitiamen, nnd he mas mipportcd by a 
Spanish battdon rand some Bntish cavalry sent from tlie l ina 
a e s t  of the Bzrapeda At the same time coloriel Xraters, 
isming forth with f i  mavcabla coliirnn ngaiiist tha French 
marouding pftrticri, made aevernl prisoners and cnptured 8 
convoy pasaing the Baqueda.  hTasscna was tlius harassed, 
but his detachmentsl continued to scour tlie country as far as 
Leiria, rand obtained abundmce of food. During tliis partisan 
wndnro 'C\rcllington remained quiet, k~ the surpria~ of inany 
pcraons; for Mnssenn's right IPRS mucli cxpoeied, mnd four 
British divisiens and Romana's tronps, forming a m s s  of 
twenty-frve tl~ousand men, were uonnd Sohral. If tlien, the 
six hattdions at  RuceZla~ and tlie avalry had joined the Iight 
division, ten tliou~uid men would have been at Aruda, and, 
in coniunctiwn fYit11 H i l h  force, would have I idc l  Rey-nier in 
ciieck, wMo tho twenty-fivo t1iouslind pouring at ddglidit 
from JIonte A p p q  tlie ~ d l g  of Zibreirn, nucI Riiñra, cnva- 
loped and crusl~licd ;he head of ,Tunot*~ corps licforc t,lie resewcs 
could come kom 0th. War is a cnrious and complimtorl meb ! 
Thc Portugese pvemmerit was a di re^ eneiny to the English 
general than Maxsenh Scnrcely could the former 
inaintah liis defensive attitudc against thc follfes Annnlsofthe 
I'eninsulzr 
and intrigues of men, who iiave, neveitlieless, war, 
bwn pmi&.l by a recent writer fur tlicir e~mest 
and m k l y  co-operntion ! with mliat jjustice nnd knomiedge of 
fwta sluill b siiown in the ncxt cliapter. 
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M A S R ~ A ' S  invaqion seriously affcctcd the Portugcse han= 
nnd tlie regcncy eipplied for sin additional su-mi~ly. 31r. Stuarc, 
seeing tho extreme clistmss, direchcd tlie liousc of Sainp~yo la 
furnish provisions t o  thc troops on thc crcdit of tlie firsf sub- 
sidy; nnd he nlso mntlc p e n t  cxcrtions to fced 
Etnart'% tlie fugitive inliabitnnts, forty thoiisand of mliom l'npers, HY. 
arrived bcfore the 13th of October, and otbers 
wem EiourIy comiug in, clcstitute nurl sLarviii3 Corn at any 
?rice \vas auuglit for in Irclniirl, Ameriq fiad E,gypt; and ona 
t h o ~ l ~ n i l d  ton8 of govcriimcnt xliiliping wcre lcnt to  rnerclixnts 
to fetch grain from ATgicrs. Onc commission of citlxens wrci 
fermed to facilitate the obtaiaining cattle and com from the 
northern prwince; anotlier to rrplnte  t l ~ e  trnnspost of pro- 
visions t u  t;lie army, aud to pusli a trude witti Spaiil tiiruupli 
the AIcmtc,jo. Srnnll crnft wcrc scnt iip tlic Tngus to  carry 
off tlre inhabitnnts xnd tlieir stock froin tlie idantls and the lcft 
banlr, and post-vessels wcrc cstublislied along tlic coast t o  
Oporto. Bullion and jewels were pub on board the men of 
wnr, a proclaniation wiis issued, calliirg upon tlic psrilile to l~ 
tranqni1,and a~f,rong pnlicc wns errtnlilislicd to cnforccthiso~jcct. 
Finally, to siipply thc deficieney o€ tonnage ocmiuned by 
se~iding tnnsports in search of c o n ,  an cmbrirgo was lnid upon 
tlie port rif Lisbon: tE6s mtm protested against hy the Ameri- 
cms, bu€ an irnperiona nemssity nilecl. 
All thcsc rncnsurcs wcrc vcherncntly oppmcrl by thc Fiitrinrcli 
and liis f k i o n ;  and tlint notliing miglit be wxnting to show 
liom entirel y the fnte of the PcninsuIa ilependcd i n  thnt liom 
upon Wellington's firmneas, the fettrs of tlie Dritisli cobinet, 
~vhich had liccn increasing ns tlie crisis npproaclied, were iiow 
plainly disclosctl. 'I'lieir privute letters contiiind hints at 
vniianoc witli. thcir public clcspatchcs ; they wislied tho :encd 
to abandon the country, get threm the respons%liky en- 
tirely upon Irirn. Thcy thought liim rasli, because they were 
unequal to t l ~ e  crisis; and liavfng neither the modestg- to 
resign, nor the maninlincss to continuc the contest. with vigour, 
m§t tlicir base policy witli a vicw oniy t u  tlieir own intemtp. 
ln  cnsc of fuilurc. During the retrcat; from Bcira, Borne officem 
of mk lct thcir correfipnrlmcr: bcnr eviclcnee oof their own 
dcspondmcg; Spenocr antl Charles Stewart especidly W ~ & B  
so Jiopelrsdy to lorcl Liverpool, thnt he trrinsmittetl tlieir lettem 
to WeIlilingtoii, and by eanestly demnnding his opinion oftheir 
conknts sliowcd how deeply they liad disturlied his own mind. 
Tlius Iieset, the English general rose like a Gmt. Witliont 
noticiiig tlie xrguments or foreborlinp in these letters, he took 
a mEm Iiistoric~l review of tlie circumshces which hsd in- 
h c c d  Iim to defcnd Portugal, snd prl~icl~ he had before 
explnincii to thc very minister he iws ddressing. He showed 
Iiow, rip t o  tiimt perid, his opinions had been justified hy the 
rcsiilts, nnd thereforc lie clnimcd confidente for the future, 
tlien trncing the prolinlile cnirrse of coming mente, he dis- 
ciissed his oivn and the encmy's clcsigns with such sxgncity 
tlint tlie subsequent c o m e  of the war never belied his antici- 
p&ons. This remarliable Ietter, ñfem all o thu  records lost, 
would suirice to vindicate liis great reputation to posterity. 
Having witli cunscious supcriority replied tu his oivii guvern- 
mcnt, he, mtli a fierccnncss ren!nrkrd necessary by thc crisis, 
turncrl upon thc pntrinrch nníE Iiis coxiilrljutors. Bcpronching 
them for tlieii nnnatriotic. foolish. nnd deceitfol 
condiict, he told tliem they were nnfaitlifiil ser- ~~~~~,~~ 
~ m t s  of tlieir c o ~ i n t ~  and their prince; and Iie 
tbrcntenecl to witlidraw the Britisli army altogetlier if the 
practices of whicli Iie cornplaimd wem not nmended. ' Tlie 
king cif Eugland and tlie prince regent of Portupl liad en- 
tmstcd liim with the military operntions, and he would not 
miffcr my person to  interfere. Ha kncw what to do, rrnd 
would not alter hia plnns t a  meet thc scnselrsii siigptions of 
the rcgency. Let thc lattcr look to tlicir own diities ! Lct tlicm 
providc food for the a m y  nnd thc pcople and keep tlio capital 
trnnqui1.'-'Witli principal Sou7s i t  wm impossiblc to nct, if 
tbiit pcrson contininried in power the count rg  would be bst. 
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EitIier the principal or himsclf mnst qiiit tlicir cmplopent. 
If it was t o  be himself, he worilrl take a r e  t,Iie ~vorld sliould 
knom tEie reasons: mennwliilc lie would nddrcss the prince 
upon tlie conrluct of tlie regency.' l í e  h ~ l  liopcd,' lic rcsumecl 
in nnotlicr letter, ' thc l?ortugrn;c govcrnnicnt ivns sntisficd 
witli liis aets, xnd instead of swking ta rentler nll defencc sise 
les9 by clisturliing tlie minds of tlie popuInce at Eislion, would 
have atlopted measurea to sccure trnnquillity jii Ilie cnpitnl. 
But like utlier weslc individuals tliey adtlcd rlu~ilicity tci wwk- 
new, nnnntl t,lieir past, expressions of itpprolintion nnd gntitiide 
he mpposcd wrre intended t o  convry cciisnrc. Al1 Iie nsked 
from them was to preserve tranquillity, to provi~lc food for 
tlieir onFn troops wliile ernliloyed ir1 tlie liries, rind lic preprird, 
in ~ $ 8 8  of dkaster, k~ sive hose pci+soiis aiid tlicir hnilieu wlio 
mere obnosious Eo tlie cncmy.' 1 lmve,' Iie mi(]. ' litlle ch?dr 
success, bu8 X JLCCW fouglalat EC mficicnt m u d e r  qf baftlas 
to knm,  tJ& tlae ~ e d t  of amy 6 no€ cerlain waa with tb hest 
mangemm&zv' 
l'liese repmaches were ncitlier tuo sevcre nur ill-timctl, for 
the wnr hncl bccn hanging in cvcn balance> aiid tlic wciglit of 
interetited folly thns tlirown in by tlic rc>gcncy was beginiiing 
to srnk tha smle. l a s t d  of perforining its ami dutics, ths 
governmeiit assumed tliat the mr could be mainttiiiied on the 
frontier, antl w h n  it sliuuld have removed tlie peoplc and Eood, 
urgcd imprncticablc rnilitarp operrations. Wlicn ooiivictcd d 
error by facts, it thre1.r the ttisk o€ driving tlie country upn 
tlie general; dtliough 11ie was ncccssarily ignoranint of tlie n a m a  
nrid liluces of abode of the oficers and inagistrates ~ v l i o  ivece 
tu executa it, mii there \as Iiut one Purtugucse ugent &head- 
qunrters tn give a~sistance in tran~latinfi tlie ncccssary orrierg. 
When tliis was pointed out, thcy issucd thc odcrs, but mnda 
the execution refer~ble fo the general witlioiit his knon-ledge, 
ivell knowing he bad no mmns of communicating ivEtli the 
provincial folks: th0 stopping of Massena at nusnco alons 
enaLIed tlic ordcrs cvcn to rcxh t l ~ c  o u n t l  nutlioritics. Eiit 
thc  great  oliject of tlie regency was to sootlie znd nourish t h e  
mtional indolence and tliroiv tlie odium of rigorous mcasures 
an tlie Britisl~, and thougli ~ e l l i n g b i i  rclirotrclied them fur m 
duirig, he never slirunk from tliut odiuni. Avowing liimadf 
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tlie author o€ the mststinp plan, he permittcd the regency ta 
slielter thcmsclves under his nme,  but Le wouId not tamdy 
Iet tliem deprive Iiim of tlie f ru i ts ;  nor would he sufer tliem. 
slirinking as tliey did in tlie trial, ta seek popularity at tlie 
cxpeiiss of their country'8 stifetJ: 
After tho diquka ahicli fnllowad thc fa11 of Almeida, tlie 
EnzlisIi govemmcnt, infliicnccrl by Wcllington, nnrl convincctl 
thfitA fi mmarc scciire and powerfiil p m p w k  11c hlcen o€ Por- 
tugal, insistcd t l i n t  ?lic siilisidy s1~ouIrl be plmed under ttbe 
control of the Rritiah instead of the native authorities. Lord 
Wellesley, ashamed of his collewes, dso gave agsurnnce, thxt 
if the arrny \vas forcd t o  quit Gshon, tlie Fortuguese troops 
shoirld be cnrried to Oporto and tlre war rc-commeiiced in that 
qumTtcr; but Jfr. Xtuart ~irurlently reserved tliis information 
iintiJ tlie nccessity aliould mrive, well knowing tliut tire pntri- 
arch nnd Souzn, wlio hnd ulrearly proposed t o  go tliero tliem- 
sdvcs, mould engcrly seixe thc occasion to urge the cvacuatioa 
of Lisbon. Tlie 2nd of Ochbcr hlr. Stunrt toolc his seat ns 
R rcgcnt, and procccded t o  control tlic in tr ipcs  nnd rinlcncc o€ 
the ptriarch sud tlic principal. It wtts full timc. For both 
w r c  formally protc.;ting qainst  tlic dcstniction of tlic rnillc in 
&ira, nnrl vigorously upposing crery mexsure propoeecl by 1Vel- 
lingtoii. 
Deeply offended by tlie mppression of tlie Ltisitanian Iegion, 
mLch about this timc was incorporated with tlie regular forces, 
tliey hnd openly rleclnred the Portuycse troops slionld not 
retreat Srom tlie iroutiers; and if the cncmy forced tlie Brjtish 
to etnburlc, not m iirrtive, whetlier soldier or citizen, srioufd, 
they anitl, jie with it. Wlien tlie allics, notwithhnding t h i ~ ,  
fcll l ~ d r  to thc lincs, principnl fio~ixn proponer1 t h f~ t  tlic 
regcncy sliould fly to tlie Aljinrvca; nnd wlicn t,liis was indig- 
nantly opposed by 3Tr. St~inrt, hc threatcncd to  quit tlie 
governmcnt. TIiis d i ~ u t e  being rcfcrred to WelIington, 
drew from liim tliose sevcre eapres~ions of whict an a b s t ~ c t  
lins been given above. Diit when tlie army npproachetl the 
lines, Sourx proposd t.llist ttie Portiipese troops siiould renuain 
outside while the British took sbelter withinI a notion 6 0  pre- 
postcirius aa to jiistify Deresford'a observrttion, t h t  lie knew 
not whetller the prgoser werc more fool, roguc, or madmaa 
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Uiicheckedby tliia, tlie rcstless princjpril purmd Lis scliema 
with tbc grwtest activity, and in ctir~jiiiiction witli his Iirotliers 
and tlie patriasch, estnhlIsliet1 a rcgi~lni. niid ~ystcmntic o p p  
sition to $he plan of defence. Factiourt in council, t l i q  ware 
cIamorous out of doors, wliere mnny cclioe~l tlieir sentimenh 
from snger at some ivnntun rnvaglges ivliicli 1w.l mnilied th0 
rctrwt ; tlicy nlso courtcd tlic mob of J,iqbon scrvitdy; and 
the principal, gettii~g the superintendeiicc of tlie succours for 
the fugitive population, hciüme tlic üvoivcd patron of all 
persona preferriiig coiiiplaiiits. He stiinuIi~ted aud exusperakd 
tiir, piililic! gr i e f~~  nnrl fi+cquentl y hi ntcil tliat tlic Portugilcsc 
people, not tlic British nrmy, liad forincrly drivcn out tlie 
Prcuck A11 tliese calumnies mcxe eclioed by tlie numeroas 
friends and partiwlis of tIie crtlidlers, aiid liy thc tidalgos, ivho 
endeiivowd t o  spread dircoiitciit m wirlcllg as ~iossilile; tliey 
werc so successful tliat tlie siiglitcst cncoi~rngcrncrit from the 
Brnxils motiltl linve fannwl a nntioiid prirty ol>cnly oliposed to 
tlie conduct of the wnr. To olitaiii tliis eneouragcmeiit, Xap 
mundo, tlie olll tu01 of tlie pwty in tlie Oporto niurdcrs, su 
~ e n t  to  tlie court of Rio Jancim to excitc tlis priiice; untl the 
patriareh wmtc ta tlie princc of Wiilcs aiid to tlie rliike of 
Sussex, tliiiiking t o  inccnae tliem also ngninst tlic Eiiglish 
general. But tlie exteut and naturc of LIie iiitrigiicil may 
1~c estimated froin reveldiunr, iiidrle at llie tiiiie by haron 
Ehen, and by tlic cditor o€ a Lisbon ncwspnyicr ciillcd thc 
B d i m .  
!hose persons, abandoning thcir faction, nssertcd tliah the 
prttriarch, tbe Suwas, aiirl, ivliile lic rcrnüi~ccl iir Purtugd, ilie 
ex-lilrnipotcntiiiry 3Ir. Villicrs, Ficing licsonnlly iiiiriiicral ta 
U'cllington, hr jm,  nnd Rcrcsfortl, wcrc sc.clririg to remove 
tlicm and get tlie dukc of Rmnswick appoititcil gencralissim~~ 
This pmt of t he  project wm natumlly ai ; iJ~ l  by tlw liriticss of 
W'ales; imd Ihe wliillers iii Luudrin Iitbrl nlso sounded t l r ~  
rIukc of  Sussex, but Le rcpulscrl tlicm. I'nrt of tlicir plim was 
to cngngc n ncwspaller as tlieir orpn in Londuii, tlie Bre 
zifiense bcing so ia Liulion. I n  tlicir corrcsyondcncc tbey 
d I c d  Urellin$on Albsrmi, lord WclFcsley Lama, Bcmlord 
I~'erugmq Ilr. Stttart LaZi~e, tiic pntriurdi Xam, -4ntonio 
Lande~i, colonel Bunbury and Mr. Pwl, tlic undcr-sccrctnria 
of state, f l~ in  and By-t?i.in, Rir Robert Wilson DE Cmp, lord 
Liverpool If~balwE, hlr. Villiem Patut, %Ir. Cnsnmnjar Prvr- 
vélzu, nnd so on of many othcrs. After llr. Viicrs' dcpudum 
fho intripc was eantinucd bp thc pntrinrch and thc Souzzs, 
but upon a diffcrcnt plan. Ovcriiornc by Mi Stnart'a vigour 
in the council they agreed fo refraln from oprnly oppouing him 
or firjas, but resolved to write down what either nligh t utter, 
aníl transmit thnt which sitited their purpose t o  the conde de 
Linhares and tlie chevalier S o n q  wwho undertook to present, 
dter their awn fnshion, the infomt ian  m reoci~ed to the 
mbtnets of St. Jamcs' and Rio Janeiro. 
Mr, Stuart having olhained tlieir s e c d  wns resoluh t o  
fiiippress their intrigues. Yet he first endeavoured t o  pub 
tliem from tlieir miscliievous dcsips, by the humorous 
cxpcdient of writing a letter to Domingo Souzo in bia omn 
ciphcr, mrning lilm and his condjiitors not to proeccd bocnnsc 
their p ~ r t y  WRS insccitrc, rand Mr. Stiitlrt, Wcllington, Rcrcs- 
ford, ~nr i  F~~jns, i inikd and wsolved t o  crutih ni1 oppn~ition, 
might bc m d s  friends but woi~ld prove rlnngeroiis enemies ! 
TIiis had some effect, yct priiicipl Souza would not take any 
Iiint, and tlie Molent temper of the pntriarch soon broIre out 
n He avowed bwtility to the EngIish general; and 
while thwarting every measure neceswry to  resish the enerny, 
his ftction exercised odious cruel. agai~ist persons denomi- 
nated by tliem well-wislier~ to tho Frencli, provided they were 
not of the fidtilgo party. A &cree of  tlie prlnce regent's, 
dntcd 20th o f  Marcli, 1809, pcrmittcd privah dcnunciations 
iii enrics of dianffcction, tho infomcr's name to bo kcpt sccrct, 
nnd in Scptembcr, 1810, this infamous @cm, althoiigli 
~~ent ious ly  opposed by Mr. Stniart, wns octed npon; many 
persona were riuddenly sent to the islands nnd others thrown 
into dungeons. Some rnigl~t have been guilty, and the govern- 
ment pretended a traitorous correspondenoc with the enemy 
was carricd on tlirongh a h n d o n  mercantile houge, mhich tliey 
indiciited; yet it rIoes not appetir thnt duect crime wasbrought 
home te any, and it i s  certain that mnny innoccnt peisons 
were oppressed. 
At last lord Wellesley, to prevent the niin of the general 
cause, dedt so with tlie Brazilian court, t h t  intrigue theré 

of Palmdla, 8'. Felippe de Sctuvnl, antl AIirnntcs, wit,li cmpty 
rnagaxin~q. Wcllin,nt,on, thinlring thc ordennncn on thc lcft 
bunk, of wliom five Iiiindrerl mere, contmry to his wishes, 
armcd 6 t h  English muslrets and furnished Gth two pieces of 
artilles; woidd be sufiicient t o  repcI any plunrlering partiea 
aitcmpting to ci-oss tlie TWs, was unwilling to  spare men 
from the liiies. Re ~vnnted numberc tlierc, and thougi t  &e 
ordenanca woulrl if assistcd by n regular farco Ieave tlie war ta 
tlieir allies. But In ton io  Souxe mas continuauy urging tl~e 
plnnting of nmliiiscndcs nnd othcr lilie frivolit,irs iipon tlic léft 
bnnk of thn Tnnus; h i ~  opiiiions sprend rahrond: and t i la 
gotrernor of Gjctttval, adoliting tlie idex, suddenly advanced lvitb 
Lis gamison to  Salvatierra on thc &ver side. Thia rirlimilous 
rnovement nttrncted tlze cncmyk attmtion, md Wellingon, 
fcaiing n detdimcnt wouTd cross to disperse the Purtugnese 
troops nud seizc Setu~al before it coulri be succoured, ordered 
tIie governor to  retum to that fortress. Thk retrogradc 
moveinent, liuivever, caused tlie dispervion of tlie ordcmricu rand 
consternation pervaded tlie Bleintcjo; tbo nupply of grnin 
coming frorn Spain w3a stoppd, tlio cliain of comm~iention 
wns IiroIrcn, tlie n l n m  sprcnd tfi Lislion, nnd tlirm mns no 
reniccly lirrt to  senrl gencrnl Frtne, witli some p n s  and Portu- 
g w e  cavdry, ji.liicli could be ill sparcd from the Lines, to 
tlint side. 
Fanc dcstropl  nll the boats he couId fina, hnstened tlie 
removal of provisions, and kept w stiict m-atch upon the 
enemy'a muvern~iit~s a liigli as tlie mouth o f t l ~ e  Zezere. But 
other embarnissinents wcre continurilly rirising. Tlio pnsoners 
in  Lisbon hnd nccumalatcd 80 ns to liccomc a serio~is incnn- 
renicncc; for tlio English ArimimIty, pretcnding dcrm at n 
fcrer gcnernted by tlic infnmons trentment of tlic prisonm> 
refusetl to let tlicm be transportetl to England in vesscls of 
war, and no other sliips could be hnd; thus tlie rights of 
humanity and tlie good of tlie service, wcre aliks disregardctl, 
for liad tliere heen rcal da~iiigar Welliiigdon would not hat'e 
ctintinually urged tlie mcasure. About this .time also, n d m i d  
Berlíelcy aihnitted t h t  his el:iliurate reporh, ~ i ~ e d e  the ytkr 
before, ~Etatiiig tlint tlio eneiny even tliough he ijliodd seize 
the liciglita o f  Almntiu codd not injiire tlie iieet in the river, 
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was emrineous : hcnce the engineers werc directcd t o  coristruct 
tinw on ihat ~ i d e  also, but it was in tlitr eleveritii hour. hnd  
nom Jso the nntive nrmy sl:lio~vcd tlic eFccts of ty!zITf. tha regency's foÍIy. Tlie troops were so iu 
snlpplied tliat more tlian once tlicy woulrl have 
dicbanded, had tlig not Lccn succoured frum the British 
ningazines. Scn thousnnd sokliem of  tlic line dcx&cil be- 
tween April nnd Deccmber, tand of tlic militin L~O+tllirds were 
absent from their co.ours; for as no remonstrancc coald 
induce the government to  put tlie laws ia force against dclin- 
qucnts, thnt wliicli WM nt first t.Iie cfect of ivuiit Lecame a 
linlnt : even ivhen rc~ilnrly fcrl from tlie British st orm witliin 
thc lines the rlcsertion wns aIxrmingly grcat. 
Notmithstanding the miscliicfs tliiis daily grou-ing np, 
neither tlie pdriarch nor tbc principal cmsed their opposition. 
Tlie order to fortify tlie hcidits of hlmnda cuusod n riolent 
altercntion. wclIin,&n cornphincrl of t l l i ~  oppoIiition to tha 
Portuguese prince rcgent, wliicli prorlucd siiclt a pzroxysm of 
rngc in the patrinrch, thnt he personally insulted Nr. St&, 
and ven d Iiis passion in tlie must iiidcceiit language. Soon # &er B i s ,  tlie stnte of the finunces compcllcd the govcrnmcnt 
to rcsort to  the dnngcron~ cxpcdicnt of reqiiisitions in kind 
for the feeding of the troops; nnd in thnt critica1 moment t t ~  
patriarch, whose influcnce mns from various causcs vcry great, 
toolr omsion to declare that ' hc ivoiild not s d e r  
'ppenaix ''3 burtlicns to be lnid npon the pcoplc mhich wrre 9 10. Vol. TI. 
widcntly for no otlicr purpose tlinn to nouri~h tEie 
m r  in the heart of the kingdom.' Rut  it wm his nnrl bis 
coadjutors' criminal condnch tlint really nourislictl tlie m, for 
tliere were ample means to liave carried off in time ten times 
the quantity of pro~+ions lcft for tlie enemy, Mmscnn could 
not thcn linvc rcmnincrl s wcck hefore thc lincs, nnd Iiis rct.rwt 
would hwc been attended with famine and disnster, if tbe 
measuree previously agreed to by tlie regcncy had been rlrily 
erecuted. The couiitry abobout Thomar, Torres N o v ~ ,  & l I ~ g & i ) ~  
anrl Santarcm wns ahsolutdy untoucherl, the inhabitnnta ra- 
mained, the rnills wcrc lfttle injurcd and p i c k l y  iepairetl; ímd 
mellington liad tlie dcep mortifrcation to find bis gand 
project fmstrated by the very persons from wliom he hacl a 
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rig-ht to expect the most zealous s ~ i p ~ o r t :  thcrc ~ c i ? m ~ l  
notliing to prevent tlie prince of Eslinp holding hiu positionsi 
until an overwhdming force aliould arrive from Gpain. It js 
h&bmlíing, oxelnimed tIie Bri tish gene&-' It ts heart- 
breaking to cnnkmplate the chanca of failure from such obti- 
t l a q  md folly.' 
MASSENA wnR convincd by tlie iiicrcnsiiig ~t,rrndIi of the 
works, mcl the report of J3ritisI1 descrtcrs, ~inlitippily r c r y  
numerous at this period, tli& to  force tbc Iincs Iic iiiiist Iinre 
great reinforcementa; bis ainiy nlso suffcrcd froili S~CICHFSS, from 
tlie imgular hrws iri Iiis rc:ir, alid fruin tlie vcngib;tiice uf iridi- 
virlumls rlrircn to rlcspnir by tllc cxccqscs whicli tlie liccntions 
Frencli soldiers too oftcn committecl iii tlicir forngin,: courses. 
Neverthclesri, ii?tIi a pertinacity only to lic appreci;itctl liy those 
ivlici liave lorigiiintleivar,tlie Freiicli gericrnl mr~intriiiicd Iiis pmi- 
tion until thc corintry fur mnny Icngcs behintl hini ivns 41 c!cscrt; 
tlien reluctantly yielding to neccssity, he aoiiglit for a frcsli camp, 
in wliich to  make h e d  against tlie allies while Iiis foragem 
scarcIicd rnorrr distimt countrics for fooil. Esrly in Octcibcr, 
Re liitd cuElccted bt~nts for crossiiig hotli TIic Tagus and the 
Zexere, and Monthriin's cwiilq, rico~tring fJie i.ight Iinnk of 
tIic fomer,  grithercd lirovisions snd stored tIicm xit Sxntarem. 
Tlicre and alw n t  llarquina, a crcek iil tlie Tngus bcIow the 
moutli of thc Xezere, m r t ~  werc forriicd and buats constmcted 
witli whccls t o  movt! from onc plncc to nrir~tlicr; hiit the 
cxtrcrne liaucity of mrttcrials and t o o i ~  MII~IC fllc prrigres 
sluw, and Fnue, rcinforccrl witIi some infantry, closcly wntdid 
tlie movments froin the lcf't baiilr. Carlos d'E<!inñu lilícwise 
c m c  down from Cwtcllo 13ranco to  Abrnntcs, Trnnt ficted 
shxrldy on thc aidc of Ourcm, alid Wilson's I'oi.tiiqicsc militiii 
so iiii'estcd tlie coiintry from Bspintil to tlie Zcsere, that 
Loison was dctaclied towards Tliomxr to Iiold hiin in clieck. 
Towwds tlie enrl oE October, al1 Mwscii;i's liospitals, &ores, 
nnd otlicr inciirnI~ru.~ccs wcrc rcmoved to Siiritftrern, nnd on 
tlie 31st, two tliotisantl mcii fordcd tlie Zee~rc above l'rinhete 
to cover the construction of a bridge. From tlris body four 
hcndreli infa~try uiid t w o  liulidied dragoons scn?  lcd by Foy 
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lll'uurcu infantr,): alld t o lJullurcJ ul11goons were leu ur Foy
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as ins t  Abrantes, aud aftcr skirmisliing with the prrison 
nindc tol~nrds Xohrcirn Formosn, wlicrcupan tlic nlltcd hri~lgc 
nt Villifi Vcllin wm foolislily burnt. Foy lio~*evcr piislicd for 
Pena Mamr tvith a smaller escort, and the 8tb gnined Ciudad 
Thlrigo on Iiis way to France, having undertrtlien t o  cnriy 
itiformation of tlie ~ h t e  of affairs tO Yapolcon, a task diicli 
he perfortncci with singular npidity muragc and address : tlie 
remairider of liia cscort returiied down tlie Zexere, and lieing 
athcked by Wilson ~ u f ~ r c d  some loss. 
3Insscnda bridge on the Zezen! \vas dcstroycd by floods 
thc Gtli of Novcmbcr, but having now cntrcnchcd thc hciglit 
owr Piinhete hc cnsily restored it, nnrl m.st n secnnrl nt h1iti.- 
tinchel higlier np tlie iiwr. Tlien he commenced a retro- 
grade march dt l i  greit circtimspection, bccause his position 
7ms overlooked from tlie Montc ilgrara, and the defile of 
Alemquer behind the eightli corps rcntlcred it a dclicatc 
operation To hlind thc partisans on his rcnr nfontbrun's 
cal-alq marclicd upon Lciria, and liis dctadments scourcd 
tlie roa& to I'omFial on tlic one side, nnd townds thc Zczcre 
on the otl~cr. Ncy marcliecl from O t b  nnd AEcniq~~cr to 
Tlioinar, aird Loison, reiiiuring tri Golep~u, was reirifurwd with 
a bri,@t? rif draguons, C1:iusel tlien witlitlrew from Sobra1 
dt~ririg tlie uiglit of tlle 14th, urid Junot's coryis pacserl tliu 
defile in thc marning of the 15th, his march being protccted by 
some cavalcy lcft in front of Arurln, and by a stibong rcar- 
p ~ s r d  on tlic hcigl~t covcring Alcinqucr. ltcynier nlso fe11 
bmlr townrils fhntrarern hy tlie royni miwewny, wbile Junoh 
continued I i i s  rnarck by Almcntre npon AZcanhcde nnd Torres 
Novas. Tliese movemeiits were not intermpted. T h  rnorn- 
ing of the 15th proved foggy, and it \vas some koirrs nftcr 
chyLyiireak ere the void spwe in front disclosed the ability of 
thc Frciicli g e n e d  Fane had repoited on tlie 14th that 
h a t s  were ~(~llecting ~t Sautnrem, w d  informsitio~~ nrrived at 
tho samo tima tliut reirifurcemcnts for JIi~sscnu rvere on Ih 
marcli from Ciudad Rodrigo; Iiut the cncmy's inteution \vas 
not dcarly dcvclgpcd; it rnigllt he a rctrcxt t o  S p i n ;  it 
miglit bc to pssc roiind the 3Tontc Junta, iaiitl so push ttLo 
hewl of  f3iia nrmy oii Torrcs Vedms wliile tlie alties were 
following tlie rear. Tbe principal pwt of the uriiy t11crefai.e 
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remnTnct1 stntinnnry ; only HiIl nnd Crrsiifrrid folloivcd the 
enemy, thc former along tlie cnuseway to Trillo Pr~nc% the 
la t t~r  by Alemquer : at tlic same time the cfivnlry ivere 
broug1:lit Eorward alid al1 tlie Loats of tlie flcct went up tlie 
Tnps, to  cnaEiIo the ollics to pnsa mpidly to ttic otlicr bnnk 
if necesmry. 
Early on the lGth, tlrc Frendi were traclícd an tlie rmds of 
Xio Mayor mnd Suntarcm. Hnving pnssctl Alcocntrc, it lvna 
clear tliey lind no views on  torre^ VH~FIIU ; biit wlietl>lier to 
cross tlie Zeaere by t l~e  bridges nt Pudiete mtl lia~,rtinchel in 
retreat or to mnke for the 7iionclcg0, was stiIl uncertain. In 
eittier cnse, it was important to strilce nt  tlio rcnr Iicfore 
reinforoements and n eon~~oy, ~ a i d  to bc nn tlie r o d  from 
Ciudad kdrigo,  conld join. TIie first di~ision \as thcrefore 
bmuglit up to Alemqucr, tlie fiftli cntercd SoGraZ, tlie liglit 
division and cavalry continucd thc pursuit. Four liuntlrocl 
prjsonere, principnlly marnndem, wmc soon piclrcd np, aiid 
a rernarkal>le expIoit ms ~ierformcd by onc Rastcr, a scrjennt 
of tlie sixteentli dragoons. With oiily fivc troopers 
RoieicisCocks he carne sriddcnly itpn 3 piiluet of liky meri who 
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mcrc cookin~; tlicp mn to tlicir nrnis, fircrl, nnd 
Iril ld onc of the clragoonír, yet Baxter broke in amongst tfiern 
and wihh tlie assistance of some countryinen marle forty-two 
captives. Tlie 17  th, Junot murclietl upoii hlcaii- 
pf 11dc anrl Pcrnm, aad Rcynicr rcwlict1 Snnturcm ; 
Fane, deceived by some false moremelita, rcported 
tliat the wliole army wns in fulE retrcat3 aand tlic troopg nt 
Euntnrem s renr-guzrd; and tliis iiiformation seeined io  be 
confinnd by the ghta of tlic immcnse plnifis slcirting tlie 
Tagas, which wwe Icfi covcrd witli strnw-riclrs: it \VAS con- 
duded therefore tliat lfnssena intcndcd to pnss tFic Zezere, 
uver which it wm known lie id mst a second Lriilge. Hin 
irnmerliatcIy p ~ s c c l  tho Tngus witli thc scmnd division nntl 
tliirtmnth drWoncr, t o  auccoiir rllirrintes, or to Iiead ttlie 
march of the Prencli nocording to circnmstanccs. Tlie fourtli, 
firth, and sixth divisions were directd upon Alcmquer, the 
first division and Paclr's bripdes upon Cnrtmo, tlic lig-ht 
division upon the -ril?age of 551 Valle on tlic Rio 31nyor; Iiem 
a considernlile mar-gud was left by the Prencli, and Cnu- 
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gsmt lieigl~t of 8antnrc.m could bc rrnclicd : finallp, tliak tomi 
with its old walls oflered a fourth point of rcsistance. 
In  tliis forinidable post, Reynier's corl~s covcred t l i ~  ricli 
$nin nf Qole,vo, wliicli wm occupirrl Iiy Loigon, wlio imq 
placcd tliere to mtc l i  tlie Tn*gus 11nd kccp thc commnnicntion 
mitli Punhctr. On Eeynier's ri~l it ,  in a rngged coitntq 
selt;~ratirq S~rztxrem froui tlte IIoiite Jittiki arid tlic Bicrra de 
Alcob~rtc, Jiinot lvns pnstctl; nnt in a coi~tinuoirs lint! with 
Xtcynier, biit lixving his riglit piislicd forivnril to Alcnnliete, 
his c n t r a  at  Pernes, and 11;s left tlirown Iiaclc to Torres 
h'ovas, wliere IIiisse~ia's lieail-qu:uters were fixed. Oir tlie 
rigEit uf Alcriiilictc tlie cnvnlry were clispnscd, ns fqr nna Lririn, 
antl tlie sixth corps wm nt Tliomar in rcUefvc, linving pre- 
viously forcul '¡TiIson's militia to retire from tlic Xczcre iipon 
Espiiial. l f s sena  tliiis ciiclosed nn inimmse tmct of fertiIc 
countr-y. TEie plnin of Golcpo siipplierl liim witli miiize nnrl 
vcgetnlil~q tlie 8icn-a de hleohcrte nitli aittlc ; prrscnting 
a formirln.ble hearI to  tlie allics at &%nttxrem, lie commandrrl 
tlie road tlirougl.li Lcirim to Coimbrri, mitli tlic eiglith corpe md 
thc cx~alry; tlitit tliroiig11 Sliumrar nnd Oiirem t u  Cuirnlirn 
~vitll  tlic sixtll COSA; n11d by hclp oE liirr 1iridg~:rrr nl7cY thr, 
Zezcre, Iie hnd opcnctl tmo ncm lincs of rctrntt towxrrls tlic 
Xpanish fmntier, one thmiigh Cmtello Ctiinco, tlie otlier hy 
tlie Estmrla Nova to Delinontc. IIe dsa prcscrved tlie pnivcr 
QF rc~uniing offcnsive opcratioiis, wlictlier by e pnssagc of tlic 
Tngi~mon liis Irfh or by ttirning tlic Mrintc J~inkri, on liis ri~l~:lit, 
and tIiiis pari~lysing tlic allid army Iic nppcmed, cven in 
rctreating, to xct on the offensive. Iris first tlispositions wcre 
liowevcr fniilhy in detail. Proin kntnrem to tlie ~i~nrest  
division of Junot'a corpa wns trn or t~vclve milm, nnd the 
Xritidi p n c r n l  miglit thiis tirrn Rcynicr's riglit, nnd ciit him 
off frorn the m3 o€ tlic nrrny; and indeed Reynicr, fenring 
sucli an xttempt, lincl bnstcned off Iiis bazrage and Iicipitrals 
to GloIcg;so, dcsptclicd x rcgiment up tlie Rio hfnjror to 
wntcli twn hridgcs o11 liis right, and cnllcd for miocour. It 
wrtq t he  hurried mnrcli of Ii is bnggfige that misled Fane to 
tliink Biassena n-as retreatiiig to  tlic Zen~re; nnd at tbe time 
it w a ~  siipposcd dso t o  lime catisecl thc dispositions foi 
xttnrking Snnhrem; but from tho Qspntches it would nppcar 
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rncn~ced sevemi puints ~ n d  eommmdcd two distinct lines af 
rctreat ; but he had other objects also in view ; he eqected 
dehcliments and convoys fmm Castille, aiid tIic nintli coqq 
wliidi lid Intely been plnced nndcr l i i ~  uders; his ~iasition, 
toucliing Iipon Lciria nnd the Xcxerc, ennhlcd Iiim to giw his 
hand to thcse reinforcement~ nnd convoys, eitlier by the lino 
nf the Mondrgo or tht of Belmonbe and the Estrada Nova; 
and nt the m n o  time t e  could communicate witli troops 
coming from dndnlus i~  He waa undoubtct~ly opcn tu n dan- 
gcmus at?hclr bctween hntarcm nnd h?cnnlrc.te ; hut be 
tliougl~t liim8elf safe from such n decisive operation by an 
army composcd of tliree difl'erent nations and unpractisd in 
great evolutions. Guidcd by a long axporieiice, lie czlculated 
upon moral cnuses witli confidencc, nnd hc wlio cnnnot do so 
is but half a genernl. Lilre a great commanrIer Iie connted 
lilíewise upon the politienl cffect his mcnacing attitudc uonld 
prorluce. IT7iile he maintsincd Sautnrcrn, lio appcared to 
bcar.~e Lisbon, nnd cncorirngcrl thc rIisnffcctcr1, ~vlio werc 
exprctcd to r ice;  and he prolonged tlie sufferings of the capital: 
forty thousmd pctlsons are said to Iiave dial from primtions 
within tlie lines iiuring tlie winter of 1510. He tlius sbook 
thc ICnglisli influence in Portupl, and so obsrnircd tJic fiitnre, 
that fccw mcn ltid sagwity to  jiidgc rrightly. At tbis period 
dw, tlic illness of Georgc tlie TIiird, rcv iMn~ tlie question o£ 
a regency in England, liad strengtlicncd tlie oliposition in par- 
liamerit, and Mliyuend's ppositiou suypcirted tlieir arguments 
q a i n a t  the w a ~ .  Whcrefors hc did riglit to hold hia ground: 
ond if he committed emrs early in the campaign, he nolv 
provcd himselr a daring, able, and pcrtinacious comrnander. 
Oii thc Eng1i:lish gencral'a side the dificnltics wcre so e e n t  
tht a h t t l e  w a ~  squally to be defiirccl anrl dreaded. Desid 
because ~ ic to ry  woulrl silerice opponents in England and Por- 
tugal, rind enable bim to dictate to the rninisters instwd of 
trtruggling incesssntly agdinst tlieir fcars. It ~voultl relieve 
tlic miser-y of the Portupcse pcoplc from thcir Iiorrible suf- 
fer ing;  xnd maa nlso to be desred, lest a second and a third 
army, no~v gatltliering in Caqtille snd in Andalussia, ahoiild 
reacli IIiinsena and qa in  shut up the allies Ei tlieir ~ v o r h .  
Urcntlcd, bccausc u dcfcnt oi cvcn n repulse would lmve niined 
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the muse; for it waa ab tliis periad the iliaputes relative to tlie 
lines at Aimadrt were most violent, and tke slightest diwter  
wotild Iiravc plnced tlie p~triarch at the hmd of o nationnl 
pfirt?. Dreaded, hemiiae of tlie regency discussion in Eng- 
lana, as a serious checkwould have caused the Wbigs to triumph, 
and the troops would Lave been withdrawn from PortirgaL 
So powerful inrleed was tlle opposition, and so much did the 
ministeru rlreatl its cry for ecouoniy, tliat, furgettiiig tlie army 
in their heen Iove of plucc, they actually issncrl ordcrs to dis- 
chnr~c al1 thc trnnvort ~ h i p s  to save expcnee! In Rne, the 
prirnc minihter Pcrmval, witli tliat narrow cunning nnd selfisli 
sipirit which marked hig mhole pulilic career, was, to use an 
expression of Lis own, starving the war in the Peninmlq 
dcspite of lord Wellesley's indignant resistance in the mbinet, 
and lord Vellington's enegetic remenstrauces from the 
field. 
ln tliis lialaoced shte, it wm essential that tlie httIe sliould 
not be fouglit except on terms of advontuge, and tlicise terma 
werc not to he had. WeIlinsoa, reinforocd from Hnlifax nnd 
Englnnd, Eind inrleetl ninre tlinn ~cventy tlionsand rnen under 
arms, and tIic encmy not more tliiin fift.y thoiisnnd ; nevertlie- 
Iess, tlie Iatter muld from the advantage of position bring 
more soldiers i n to  the íiglit. The Poituguese a m y  had in six 
montlis lost four thousand men by deatli, four thousand by 
discliarges, and teu thousand by desertiun. Tliirky tliousalid 
recniits hiid come in, therefore tlie numbem wme incrmed, 
but eficicncy for p i ~ t  opemtions was dimiuished; and cvcry 
department m s  ncglectcd I>y a ggovernmciit wliiell neither pnid 
nor fed ita ad<licr:rs. The Spnnish ~uxiliarics, ill-govcrned an¿i 
turbulcnt, q~inrrelled mith tlie Port~~guese, ~ n d  tlieir generalsi 
were not zble in war nor amenalile to  better ofñcem. The 
heiglrts o€ Almada being nnkcd, twclve thousand rnen were 
required on the left bank of the Tagus, and two Biitish di& 
sions were necessarily kept in the lines, Liecnuse the French at 
A l a h e t e  were ueamr ta Torres Vertras tlian tlie allies were 
at Cartaxo. Reynier also miglit break out froin Santtlrem 
during an atta& on Pernes, wliercfom ten thuusand men were 
wariting to hold him io check; nnd thua the djsposnble troopa, 
mmprel~endig soldiers of tliree nations snd many recruits, 
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would hme f d c n  short of forty-fivc thousrand: but hTnsaena 
could bring nearIy al1 his men to one point, because a few 
woiild have sufficed to mtch tlre IEritisIi division on the left 
of t l ~e  Tng11:iia find at Santarem. 
Wellington's experienee i p a s  not a t  t l i i ~  period equal to his 
adversq's; and thc attack wxs te be m d e  in x heavy diffidt 
country, whme the Alviella, tlis Almonrln, nnd ot11er rivem, 
gwrtkly ewelled by incess~nk min, furnislid a succe~sion of 
defensive lines to Massena, aand in case of defmt tlie ineaiis of 
carrying off two-thii-ds of his army. Victory miglit croivn tlie 
attempt, but the stakw were uiicqual. If 3Insseiin lost n tliird 
oT hia forrc, the nintli corpa coiild linvc replnml it. If thc 
allies failed, the lines were gone nncl 4 t h  them the whole 
Feninsula. Wellingtnn tlinuglit tlie relief of the northern 
provinces, perhaps of Andulusiii, would reward a victory Iiut 
those oh,i~& mighh bc oht~incd n.ithoiit fight,in~~ nnd a bnttle 
would bring the p t e s t  part of fhe Frencli truops in Sliain 
upon him without bringing tlie Xpaniards ta bis side. '1 
cannot forget,' he wrote ta lord Liverpool, ,'tliat lwt year 1 
brought upon mpclf and gcneml Cucda not Icsñ f,linn five 
corps d'arm6e, and the king's guards ancl reserve, morc tlisn 
equal to a sixth corps ; and when Castille and tlie north of 
Sliain was cleared of tlie enemy, not; aman was put in the 
fieId by t h o e  provinccs, nar evcn onc rniscd!' Tlicac t h inp  
considered, it was judged better fo rcmain on the dcfciisive, to 
strengtlien tIie lineq to forward the works at Almnda, to per- 
fect tlie disci1)line of tlie T o r t ~ ~ g u ~ c  troolix, to iml?ruve tlie 
orgnniantion of the militila in rcar of tlie encmy, nnd to remedy 
tlie evils occauionecl by Qie ptritlrch3's ffnction. Ainnngt thorie 
evils, the destitution of tlie fortresaes wns so promineiit, tlint 
at one moment tlie drawing oíf tlie gnmson frtm iLlir~ntes t o  
prevent ttie men fmm shrvirig, seemerl incviknlile. 
Jn tliirz dcfensiw viem of afffiirs tlie Fi~1:lit tlivision, siipp&ted 
by a brigade of cav~ilry, occupied El Valle aiid tlie Iieiglitrr 
overlooking tlie mnrsli and iiiundation. The bridge at ttie 
Endi& eiid o€ tlic cwseway wm rnined, nnd a .algar-lord 
hill, loolring straigl~t dnwn tlie approncli, wns cromorl ñith 
embrn~ureñ for artilleq, and l~ced in Frontwitli a zigzag c o ~ e d  
way mpable of containing five hundred infant.ry ; tlie caus* 
NOT. 18i0.] BOOK XL-CHAP. 10. O7 
why hing tlius bloeked, the French couId not while tha watcm 
were out niake any sudden irruption kom Santareni. On the 
left uf tlie liglt JiPision, posta: wma extended dong the inun- 
datian ta Malliorquija, and thence by a range of heigbts to Rio 
Mvor. Beliind the latter plnao, Anson's cavdig watched the 
rnruis lcnxling from Pernwi and Alcanhede; nnd in renr of 
Anson, an entrenclied position rat Alccientre was occupieied by 
a division o€ infantry. Tlius nll the roads Iwiding upon tlie 
lines bctween the T a p  and the Monte Junta, were secured 
hy what are tecllnicallp callcd h e d a  of cantonmcnts, undw 
mvcr of mliich the troops took wintw quartess. The first 
division tind liead-quartertr were at Cahxo,  a few miles beliirid 
El 'Valle ; some trriops were kept at ~ilemquer and Eobral, and 
Torre Vedros occupicd in force, lmt t,he enemy should 
make a surlden mnrch round the Monte Junb .  Mawena wm 
building bontq he h d  fortified a post at Tancos on the Tagus, 
and expected with impatiencw a convoy, csmrkd by five tliou- 
sand men, wliich Gtirdanne was mnducting frornCiudad Rodtigo. 
Tliiri force, consisting of dchhments and convalescerits left in 
Castille when tlic army entered Portugal, had marched by 
Belmonte and the Estrada Nova, and was at W i j o s  tlls 27th, 
witliin a few lewes o€ the Frencli brigades on tlit! Zezere. A 
cnvnlry pntrole on either side woulri hnve opened the eommuni- 
cmtion itntl uemred the junction. Btit GnrdrLnnc, hnrawed hy 
the arrl~nanqa, anrF decciverl by R mmour t h d  Hill m s  in 
Abrantes t o  move ~gtainst liim, sucldenly retreated npoa 8ubupl 
with sucIi haste and blindness that Iie srscrificed a part o€ Lis 
convoy, atad lost many men. Rill was not at Abrnntes, yet it is 
remarknble tliat Wellingtoa h d  contemplated sending him 
there to malre an attack upon the Frencli posts beyond tlia 
Zezere, and tlie arlvance of Gwdunne's colunin, tlie strengtli 
of wliidi he wuld not clearty ascertttin, deterred him! 
Rotwithstandin~: thia event,Massena continucd to stmngthen 
hiis positian at Santarern, wliich enubled him t o  tIraw thc bdlr 
of hifi forma to Iiir right, anrl p u d ~  his maranding exmirsions 
in e daring manner. Gcncrnl Fcrey, crossing the Zeeercmith 
a strong dctachment of the sixth corpa, forag.4 ua far aa 
Cn&cllo Rranco witfiout dificulty, annd retiirned witlioiit loss. 
Junot oecupied Leiria and Oarcm with detachentg nud cn- 
F 2 
613 PENIKSULA WAR [Dec. 1610. 
deavoured to m~irirprise Coimbm, bid Trant bafflcd that pnlject. 
Dronet made movemcnta avowedly t o  invade tlie Trm cw 
Monks, but on tlie 22nd he vmu~ried tlie lino of tlie Coa ~v i t l i  
thc ninth corpri, and Masaenda patroIcs nppenred again on tlie 
hloiidego ahove Coimbw mxlting inquiries aboiit t l ~ e  forda, 
Ak tIie saine time tlie spies reported that a p a t  re-iinion of 
forces from tlie south was to tuke place near &Idl id ,  which 
gai-e reason to  fear tlint IIussena intentled to file lieliirid the 
Mondcgo nnd scixo Oporto; ur tlint tho c q e c k d  rcinfow 
ments wotild enable bim to throw bridge3 over tlie Mondcgo 
and oocupg the northern country without qiiitting his present 
position. A tenth coqis was furmiiig at Buqos, tlie head of 
the Sihh ccrrp s ag~iin in E~t~rernadurn, tlie E'rencli boats ' 
nt Punlicte and Xnrqiiiñu ivere numcrous and larg~, and in al1 
parts there was evidente of peat forcw assembling for a 
miglity effort on botb sides of tlie Tqus. Wcllington da- 
lakcd thah more tlian forty tliousxnd fresh troops would c& 
operate witli Mmsena, md liad marle prepnmtion accordin~ly. 
A n olit~vard Iinc of rlcfcnee from Aldm C~llcga to Sctiivttl wra 
in a forward stnte, and a cliain o f  forts prrallel to tlic Tngvs 
W ~ S  being constructed; Abrantes, I'almella, and St. Fdippe 
de Setuval wcre at lnst provisioned, and tlie u~orks of 
Alliantlra, Anida md Monte Apnqa, wcrc stren&liened, so 
as ik dcfy any forcc. Lord Lircrpool was uqetI to send reinh 
forcemtnts, and five tIiousand men fiom England and three 
regiments from 5icily were embarlreil for Lisbon. Soult was 
nolv collectiiig a Eorce lieliinci tlie Morena, tlie troolis on tlie 
left of the Tquo wcrc therefore augmented, and as general 
Hill was sick, Beresford took tlie command. Re had eighteen 
guns two divisiona of infantry and five regimcnts of cavafry, 
In alL fourkn thou~and men, exclusire of Carlos d'Españn'g 
brignde, which bcing at  Abmntcs w a ~  also undrr his o h q  
yet so trouhlcsome and so ill-beliaved, tliat lord Wellin,&on, 
who liad not asked for tlieir assistmce, threatened to  sand 
tliem out of Portugal. 
To preveut Mas~ena pessing the Tu.p8, and to interceyít 
oommunimtion Gctween him and Soult, to join the mnin 
body of tlie army by VeIlaJa if in retreat, by Abrantes if In 
dvance, were the inatructions $veen to Deresford ; wbose head- 
qnlirters were nt Chamusca, hia troops being disposed alorig 
the Sagus from Alrnegriin, by Chamusca, to  tFie niouth oS ttie 
Zexere. Signals fur cornmunicntion were thsn establistied, 
thc ro& lending to Spanisb. Estrmadura were scoured, n 
aurc intcroriiirse m s  openerl witli E1va.s anrl otbcr frontier 
fortresscs, an(1 good sourws of intelligence wcre organixed rat 
Glekmo, Santnrem, m d  Tliomar. Ba tteries op posite the 
moutli of the Zezere were also constnicted, hut, 
Appendix S, 
against the advice of tlie engineers, at too great 
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distance fmm tlie river, anrl in ottier rcsliects 
unuuitalily: Prendi cmft dropped dowu towards Snntarem 
witliout Iiindranoe, vntil coloncl Colhomc, of t2ie sisty-sixth 
regimen4 moored of his own ancord n qinrd-bont cIosc to the 
mouth of the Zexere, and dispoeed fiwa in siich a mnnner on 
the bmls of the Tws that nutliing coiiId pasa withont being 
obsmed. 
On the right of the T a p ,  the comtry between Alcanhete 
md the Ponte Xem continued impracticable from the rain. 
mid both amiea were of necessity tranqui1. Anson's cavdry, 
liowever, wting in concert with major Fenwick, wlio carne 
down from Obidos towartls 12io Mayor, tinrnssd the enemy'a 
fiirnging partics; nnrl in the Upiper Heirn ~ever111 uctions took 
place ivith the militin, ~ l i i c l i  must be noticed na essentinl. 
parta of the combinatioas. Droiiet hnd been so d~layed 
scouring Biscuy and Uppcr CCaslle, in Iiis progress towvards 
SInssena, tlmt he Ioct al1 connexion with tlie amp, and this 
eiiabled tlie partidas of Leon so to molest Serras that the n a a  
os ;\Tontea was unmeuaced; wherefore, Silveira, falling down on 
the lowcr Douro, invested Almeida tlte 29th of  October, and 
mnde an unsuccessfal attcrnpt to surprise a French post at 
S*n Fcliccs. However, in Nuveml-ier, Dmet  rwl ied  C i u U  
Rodrigo mitli a l a g e  convoy for M~scna,  which Wellington 
m s  a n x i w ~  to i n t e r cg t ,  ~ n t l  with that vlew directed Silveira 
t o  waylxy it, ardering MilIer to he at Vieu in support on 
tlie XGtli. Bi~t on the 13th general Qardanne, who liad clinrge 
of the convoy with four thousand infmtry and some squadrong 
raised tLe bIocliaxle of Almeida, and being supported by 
Drtiuet witli tLe ninth corps procceded ton-ards Pemmacor. 
Edveim fe11 upon him while in wach md took mmy 
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prisoners, but Enrling hrtlanna too ~trong  retired on the 
17th to Trancoso mhere Le found Miller. Gndanne then 
pursiied his march and, as bcfure relrtt~l, aftrr reiaching CRI"- 
digo3 retre~ted in a panic. At that time Drouet hnd no order 
to phce his corp under Mnssc~idti curnmiind, Tiut, being 
urgcd by Foy, moved fomarclc, timt sprcadiq tlic report 
More notieetl thxt his d e s i p  wtls to invado tlie Tras os 
Montes, O n  the 17th of December lie pirsserl tlie Coa, and 
the lBnd reaclied Gouvea witli fourteen tliousand infnntry 
and t ~ v o  t;iiousnnd liorsemen; from tlience he detaclierl G l a p  
rede's divisf on antl thc avn l ry  in drivc Silvcira from Tmncmm, 
and with the rest of his troops mt~rclied on tlie Ponte Hw. 
cella. 
IIitherto Iord WellingEonq~ comrnunications with general 
BacceIItlr Iid hecn throirg11 Tmnf; nn tlie side af Coirnbra, 
and tl~rough WiIson on that of Espina1 and Abranta; this 
d ~ a n c e  of tlie nintli mrps forcetl Wilson to crosfi the Mon- 
dego, and Drouet having effected his juiiction witli Xassem by 
Espinal, tlien occupied Lcirin, iind spreaditig torvnrrls tlie w c u t  
off nll cnrnrniinicntion hctwccn t2ic nllica nnd tlic nortliern 
provinces. On the 2nd of January, Tmnt intesccpted a letter 
from him tn Claptpxretle, $Gng account of Lis own arrival 
arid tlie date of Massena's a m y ;  lio spoke also oE n p t  
opcrntion bcing in cnntcmplution, suir1 tllc fiftli cnrps waa 
expected in th Alcrntrio, ttnd diroctctl Claparede to seiza 
GunrJa, forage the neigl~bouring villngcs, watch the r o d  of 
BeIrnante, and if Silveira was truublesoine to ciw~li Eiim. Tliat 
vain insufficientmon had d redy  attaclted Clnpnrcdc ncar Trran- 
coso, \VA8 dcfcntctl wibli Zoss, rand RB Oporto mnq tlius Iaid,open, 
Eamellar cal ld Trant urid Niller to its succour. Tlie last had 
io-crossed tlie Mondego aiid takcn rt hundred of Drnuet's 
strqglers, but botli liurried townrds Uporto, nom in srrious 
dnngcr; for Silvrirn having agaiii p~ovokcrl Maparcdc wns 
driven ovm the Douro, and the FrencL general seized Lnmego : 
Baccellar howwer I~rouglit up his reserve to tlie Pavin, Miller 
~ n d  Trant reached Castro d'Airo, aiiil tIien Clzpwde returned 
t o  Moirncnta de Bcirrt Follo~ved by IViEstin. 
Mmnwhile Drouct's rnomentnry prcsencc in L o n  hnd 
embled Sena  to menace the Tras os Montes, wliich d r e ~  
Silveim bnek to Rmganqa, and Miller died at Visen. Trant 
anrt Wilson continued in Beirr, hut Claparede mtering Cliiarda 
seiaed Covilhao, snd Foy with tbree thouaand conval~ccnts, 
gathered h m  Massena's hospitals in Cartille, was again in 
Purtugal on bis return from Paris. He liad encountered many 
perils, aiid at Pnnwrbo anly escaped from tIie pnrtidaa with 
tlie luss of bdf hie cscort tbnd hia deaptches; and riow &t 
Enxnhnrda, notwithskanding Claparede's vicinity, lie ms so 
liar~ssed by coyonel Gmnt ivith a c o q s  of ordenan~rr from tho 
Lower Beira, that throe hundred of his nien died on the 
mnuntain from cold, yet he finally reached bntarem, where 
sflairs were coming to a crisis. 
During Decemlier and Sannitry, tlie m n t r y  being more or 
leas flouded, tEie armies remined quiet, and Wellington, 
hcnring tlint; a smious nttaclr on Ctlcliz was at hmd, prepareti 
to scnd snme Britisli rcgEments t o  t11c assishnce of that place. 
hlnsscrirt lint2 mmnwliiir ~tmngtliencd I i i s  work~~, rcinforccd 
his outposts, znd extentld liis msrauders in proportion to Iiis 
increasing nec~sitien. Both genrrals watched ñio Mayor 
mith jedousy as t F ~ e  scason dmnced and tlie roa& became 
firmer, and when some reinforcements landecl at Lisbon, 
Massena tliinkiag the allies mere concentrating at Alcoentre, 
aent Junot to drivc tlieir autliosts h c k  from f i i o  Mayor aiid 
probe tlie stat;e of affaits : a general attnck sas expected, hut 
after a slririniuli, Junut returiid with a mounrE whicli disiibld 
him fnr tlie r r ~ t  of tho mmpnigt~ Soon aftcrwnrds aix tlion- 
snnd French wourml nll thc coiintry beyond tlio Zezere, nnd 
foiind oonsidemhle storeu concealcd nenr P~Tmpoa; thence 
tliey mlrrchd to the Mandego rand camied off from beInw 
Coimbra fuur Iiundred oxcn rand two thousand sheep intendcd 
fur tlie allies. Tlicse excursionfi gwe rise t r i  liorrible excesaes, 
wliicli broke down tlie discipline of the Frencli amy, and 
were iiot nlivnys executd with impunity ; tlie British avalry 
w t  various times rarleemcd many cattle, antl braught in a can- 
siderable number of prisonm, amongst them Clauscl's aid-de 
cniitp. 
4Ittssena also orpnized a secret communication witli. Liabon, 
througl~ tlie Portuguese geenertll Pamplonn, who effected it by 
the kclp of tLe fiddgo~ in thnt wpitiil; tlieir agents, under 
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prehnce of selling supr  at Thomar and Torres Nwas, paased 
by tlie road of Caldns, und througli the muuntuins of Pedmgoa; 
and it ww suspectcd this tenson extendcti to  tlic provisioning 
of tlie enemy on 80 large a scale as to be one of the resourca 
whicli enabld Mwena so Iong to Sravc tlie di€ñcuItics o£ his 
position, Certain it is that lienls of cattle were ofken phced 
in his wny undcr circurnstances raising douhts if jt could be 
done without design. On the otlier linnd, lord Wellington 
had aecret intelligence with a French officer of high rank, and 
tlius beth genernls liad excellent infosmntion. I n  tliis manner 
bostilitieawere cnrried on, eacli caminrtndcr impatiently wniting 
for rcinforccrnents which should cnahlc Iiim ta wt oFcnsi~cly: 
b o i ~  110th were disappointed, and hom otlier events, liitherto 
nnnoticed, bore upon the plana of eacEi, must be thc subject of 
anotliw book. 
lo. "CVar ia not a conjectural &,' Massena conjectrired tlie 
d i e s  would not stand in front of Lisbon, tliat tlie rntlitia 
wouid not attack Coimbra; but the Lattle of Busaca nnd tbe 
mpturs of his bospitals evincd the soundness of tlic rnnxim. 
Again, he oonjectiired tbe Englisli woulrl re-embnrk if pressed, 
and tlie lines put an end to  that dretim. Then lie ewake and 
mnde war iike a great man, more formidable kit11 reduced 
means and in difficulties, tlian lis had liecn wllen opp~rt~unity 
wm rife nnd his numbem untouched. His ~ tny  nt bnhwcrn  
showed what thirty tlionmnd axlditional t roop  actiiig on tbe 
left bank of tbs Taps would have done. 'Ilad tEiey reíiched 
t l ~ e  Iieiplrts of Almach before admiml Bcrlrcley's error wns dis- 
~overed, tho supply of proviriions froin Alemtejo and from 
Spsn,  would hnve been tmnsfcrred fmm Lislion to tlie Freiich 
armies; tlie fleet wauld have been drlven from tlie Tnps, and 
then the misery of tlle inhabitants, tlie fears of thc Britiah 
caliinet, tlie mactinations of tlie ptitriarcli, ntnd tlio Iittlc clinnm 
of find guccess, would probably have furccn tlic Kritiaii gcncml 
to abandon the country. 
29  It has been said Massena migl~t in thc first ivcck have 
pasaed the TagusI s m r e d  tlie remurcm of the Alenitejo, and 
drivcn tlie ESritish flect out of tlie port. This wns not ao 
pmticalle as suppsed; the mina were heavy, the fords irn- 
prtasalile, and tlie Prench bad nut fioats sufficient for a bridp ; 
to d e h h  a small force would have bbeeii us~less, to detricli 
larply dangerous; to collect Iioats, cast n bridge, tand misi, 
tlie anhrcnclimcntrr nwssnry to  dcfcnd it in thc fncc of tlro 
aliied forces, would hme baen neitlier snfe nor silre: morenver, 
& f a e n a  woulil t!ius h a ~ e  relinquished the ceitaiiin aiJ of tlie 
ninth fui the uncertnin assistance o£ tlie fifth oorps. , 
3'. It bas been s&d lord Welliiigton mi& httvo striiit- 
ened tlie enemy's qunrtcra more eFcctually st Sunhrem; 
tLat Hilrs corpñ, pwing thmugh Abrantes, mnld huvc 
destroycd the bridges at Ptinlietc, lined t,lic Zezere, ctit off 
. 
hfassends reinforcements, and forced him to abandon liis posi- 
tions, or weh to capitulate. This arpment held at the time 
by colonel Bquirc, nn engineer of abiiity, well acguainted witli 
tlie localities, merits emmination. A pnrtinl attack of this 
nature waii contemplated by lord Wellingtoii, but a successruL 
result on tlis larger design of colonel Equire was ncit wrtairi. 
Whilc tlio lines of ~Yrnada were uufinisherl, to leave tlie Tegus 
nnfvartlcd bcforc an cncmy wlio posñcsscd cighty largc boats, 
~xclusive o€ thase forrning tlie bridgefi on thc Zexcrc, monId 
Dave been msh. Hill's corps must tlerefore l m  been reldaced, 
rind tlicn tlie f o m  bcfore Santarern would have been so weak 
as to invite uttack, to tte danger of tlie lines. F o r  ~vns the 
forcing of thc Frelielr works at Punliete a sure matter ; the 
grounrl \ F ~ B  strong, thera wre  two Frericli bridge8 on the 
Xczerq and Ney eiiglit bnvo passed at Mmtinclicl nnd tnken 
Hill in flnnlr. 
4'. Coloncl Squire, ab 8 later period, miacalculnting the 
enemy's numliers nG thirty thousnnd men, and the allies nt 
more tliaii seventy thansand, proposed tliat 13eresford should 
moss the Tngus at Azingha beisind tlie Almonda river, and. 
rnn~cl i  upon Golegao, wfiile Welliu;;4on, concentrating at Rio 
Mayor, puslied upon Torres Novas, Seventy tliuwand men 
would tlius, in a singIe mardi, Lave been pIaoed in tlie mi& 
d the enemp's extended quarlers; but tlie Iiand o f  Napoleon 
muld ~carccly have Itiunch~d such a thunderhlt. hfmsoiia 
had fifty thousnnd figlitlng-men, tlie boata from Abran& 
rnust huye come down to pasa tlie Ta~ws, aud the coticentm- 
iion of t r oop~  at Rio Mayor couId scarcely have wcnped the 
enemy's notice. Exact concert, in paint of timc, was csscntid, 
bnt Junot could bave hcld the alliea in dieck on tlie Alviella, 
wbile Repnier from hntarem, and Ney írom Thomar, cmshed 
13eresfod befmeen the Almondn and tlie T w s ;  moroover tlie 
rosds a h i i t  Trerncs s ~ r e  irnpnssnlilc from ri~in diiringDeccmlier, 
and in Janunry, Soult, wl~ose opemtions are now to he rclated, 
ms rnenacing khe Alemtcjo. A disaster \vould at this time 
llave relicverl the enemy's difficulbies, ivlien notliing else could. 
RelIinghn, wnvinced of this, cnrncstly wislicd Masscna to  
retire; and was 80 far from desir in~ to liem him in nnd force 
a brittle, that Iie doubted if Fie had not a l r d y  renderd liis 
line of retreat too difficult Iiy tlie operations of the northern 
militia. A cainyiaign js; lilie otlier worlcs of ark, accessories 
howcvct rrplndid m u d  be rc,jcctriI when ncit cnndiicive to the 
main object. That jndgrncnt wliicli duEy classes the value of 
e\-eT fea~ibla o~ieration is tlie hest quality of a general. Lord 
Wellingtou possessetl it in a reinarlcalde degree and to  it hia 
gcniun nn11 his cournge wcm marle siibscrvicnt: witliniit tliat 
rnentnl balnncc, lie miglit hrwe performed mnny brilIiant 
exploits in the Pmiinsula, but he couId never have conducted 
tlie IYW lio s siiccessful end. 
BOOK TRE TWI3LFTI-I. 
CHAPTER 1. 
SPAXSE afaiis ao deeply affected the operations in Portngnl 
tliat some riccount oE them is absolutely necessary. TLe 
genml defcnsive line oC tho allicjs presentd a greut cresoent, 
extending from Coruña t o  Cadiz, in the concave of which tlie 
Frcnch ' armics wcro aperntinp. ' Tlicir rnsiin body mcnaccd 
Lisbon, tlio most importriot point; if cherked there they could 
rcinforce it from tbc wings, unless the itllies at tlie liorns of 
tlie crescent scted vigorouslp upon a aystem which tlie har- 
bours and fortresses at each extremity indicated as suihlile 
for those who poasessed the absolute command of tlie sea. A 
Britislt army and fleet wero tlierofore estnblished at Cadiz, a 
aqudren of fr iptes  nt Coruñra, and how far this warfnre 
rclieved the pwsure on lord mJelIington shll nom be 
sliown. 
Mahi"a (Xtlllicians, usunlly hanghg on tlie borders of Leon, 
wcrc always reporte4 al>ovc twcnty thonsand men ulien a r m ~  
or dores were dernanded from England; but tliere were never 
more than ten or twelve tl~ousand in he. They suffmd 
Scrraa' division, only eiglit tliousanrl stro~ig, to spred over 
the plnins of Leon, from Bcnevente t o  the Agueda, during 
hfnssena's ndvnnce; and the nrriwl of the ninth corps, iu 
Oetober, quitc paralyscd thcm, whiIa thc parti J~hs oftea mr- 
pn'scd botli posts md convoys. 
Rehintl Mahi w a s  a second armgi, about s k  thousand stronp, 
emhodierl to defend the cmt l i ne  toí~ards the Aattirk; and in 
t .11~ latter provinec, eight thousznri men, including the irreplac 
bnnds of Porlier and otlier eliiefs, conritently ~ a t c h e d  ths 
mwvements of Bonnct's divisiou This genem1 frequentll 
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mastcred but could never hold tlie Asturiae, became & 
country is a lung defile lying betivecn tlie grent mountnins and 
the sea, &ud being crosved by u succcssion of parallel ridges 
and river~, is ndmirnblp ciilculatcd for partiaiin wnrfiirc in con- 
ncxion mjth a flect,. If lie pcnetmtcd toivnrrls Gnllicin, Xritiali 
and Spanish frigates fmm Coruña, ltinding troops at tlie porb 
of Ghon, Santader, or Saritoilq could f o m  a junction ivith 
tIie great bmds of Longa, Mina, and Amor, nnd cxcite insur- 
redions on liis rmr. I n  this manuer, wlien Iic I ~ n t l  dcfmkd 
Ponte, a t  &des, just beforc Mmsena's invncion of  Porttigd, 
Yorlim forced liim to ~vitlidra~y from Castropül; znd tlie 
admnbge of sucli operatiuns beiug tlius diown, sir Home 
Poplizm and general Wdker were seiit to  direct tlie naval and 
rnilitary affvirs at Coruíín. ficpnrutioris wcro tlicri .niale to 
cmbnri.lí I largo forcc undcr Rcnovulcs, for nn nttriclr on Snn- 
,ton& and Bantander, the pnrtidas of tlie interior lieing to 
cc-operate; a battnlion of niariues frou Eiigland was t o  form 
tlie garrison of Stintona ~vlien takcn, and bIa1~1~i pro~nised to 
m-olierrtte by un ineuraioii ulurtg tlie const. 3ut Serras 
tlireutened the frontier of Gidliciu, Niilii rcninincd in uuapcnsc, 
and tliis with the iisiial procrastination o€ tlie Spnniade, and 
tlie Iate arrivnl of Popliam, dclnycd tlie cxpcdition uutil 
October, olthough furlier, Escadron, aiid otlier cliicfs liad 
commenced an isoIated attack in tlie begiririing of Septenilier. 
Finnlly, Scrius rcturncd t o  Xnmorrq, Ti.lnhi liicciit x ílivision jnto 
Leon, and Bonnet, aivme of tlie prqariitions at Coruña, fcll 
back towmds Santander. lcaving only a post at Gilion. 
On tlie 16th of Octolier Rcnovales sailcd witli tl~ideen 
hundred m e a  He was  iicwmpuiied by Wulk~r ,  wwhri carried 
ten thotisrind shnd of arrns antl ammunition, and on thc 19tI-1, 
they cxptured in aihon some Frencli vessels, wbile Porlier oa 
the Iand side, took some treasitre and eighty prisoners. 
EenevaIas tlien pruceeded to Santona, Liut; teiupests iuipded 
bis landiug, and the 2nd of Novcmber lie rcturncd to Curuna 
with only eight huidred and fifty men; a frigate and brig 
eoataining the remainder of Lis men harl foundered in a, 
dreadful $le, wLch destroycd al1 tthe Spnish naval force 
along the culist, arid wreckcd twclve vesscls even i i i  ilie ber- 
beur of Cowh Mnlii, tlicn lenving Tobondo Gil's divisiun to 
~"atc11 S c m ,  cntcrcd tlie hsturiau, and being joined hy the 
trmps of that prorince, aud by Benovales, waa very superior 
t o  tlie Prcncli : yet he effectecl nothing, and Bonnet re-estab- 
lished liis line from GtiEion, througli Oviedo, fo tlie borden of 
k m  During tiiese nctiona tlie junta of the Asturias reinaincd 
diatinguishetl by venality aad inriiflerence to the public p o d .  
l'heir province nrts in n misernblc ~ k t t e ,  the powrrs of the 
Britisli naval officem on tlie coast were not defined, disputes 
arose between them and general W~lker, snd the junta was 
tlius embled to interfere imgroperly with the distribution of 
tha Eiiglisli storea, Gallicia wac coniparatively ricli, but its 
junk cufpabiy inactive in th discharge of dutiw 
Gcnernl 
nnd opprw~i~e,  diigusted thc whoIe province. WnlkLrB 
Diirinp tlie wintcr tlic clcrgy combined t o  oppose "+'r""ts3 
MhS. bath tlie provinckl junta and the genera1  corte^ ; 
and they msumd such a menacing attitudc, that Malii, then 
in the Asturias, dreaded personal violence, and applied for an 
Englisli vwsel to take liim to Coruñra. One Acuna was soun 
after arrested at Poiiferrada, but tlie discontent slirend, nnd 
tho army wns mere emplopd to  overawe thjs faction than to 
oppose the cnerny. Ipinnlly Walkcr, dmpniring to  cffect any- 
thing useful, desired eitlier tlint, a Rritish forre sliould be 
plnced at his disposd, or that he mjght join tlie nrmy tn 
Portugal. 
These expeditions from Coruña naturrillj* increased the 
audncity of tlie inland pdidas, wlio Iiecnrne rally dnngcrous 
only shen tLey hrail a sea-purt where they could recaive s u p  
plice nnd reinforcements, or ?y ernlia~ling =ve tliemselves in 
extrcniig antI chranp thcir tlicntrc of  operations. TG prevcnt 
this, the cmperor cniploycd many mcn in Qic milihry govern- 
ments toricliing on tlie Bay of Eismy, and directed al1 tlie 
reinforcements, in their properis towarrls Portugal, to scour 
the clisturb~l countfies to tlie right and left. The ninth corps 
h d  been thus employed during tlie months of Aupst and 
Sepkmber, but wlien it pasried onmrds the partidas resurned 
their activity. Mina, Longri, Cainpiilo, and Amor, frequently 
united aboiit Villar Cap and Espiiiosa, in nurnbera suIficient 
to athck large French detachments sitli. mccess, and tu aid 
them, 'lYnllrer repcntadly recomrnended t b t  hntciuti should 
bs ocmpied witIr British troops: it had tlie best winter har- 
bour nlong the coest, was biiilt on a mountain promontory 
joined to tlie main by tt narrow sandy neck, and could h a ~ e  
been made wry atrong. It wodd liave cut Iionnet's com- 
munimtion mith Frnnce by pea, giren tho Rritish squndron a 
i3ccuri: post from wlience to rex the Frcndi constu, nnd fur- 
zlished a point of connexion with tlle partidas o£ tlie Rioja, 
Biscay, and KaWrre, 
Lord Liverpool, sw~yed by itEicso consideration~~ dwired to 
employ four tlrousnnd mcn t o  uemirc it; hut Inri1 WeIlin$on 
earnestly dissiiailed him from siicli mnritimc opertitions. 'Fbr,' 
said he, <unIess a T r e y  l a r p  forcc be serit, if will 
Lettor to loFd 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ j ,  srii scamcly be able to effect a laiiding and mmiatain 
31ay. 1811, tlie situntion of wliich it might take possession. 
JISS. Tlien t1iat Iarge foroe mil1 he nnxlitc to move or 
effect any object at al1 adequatc to the expenae, or to tlic 
expectations mliicli wouId be forrned from its strengtli, owing 
to  thc wnnt of thoso efluipments i~nd siipplics in wliich an 
atmy landed from its sliips rn~ist  be cleficictit. It is \*sin to 
hope for anp assistance, even in tliis way, much less militnv 
aasistanm frnm tlie Spaniards; tlie firat tliing tliey )vil1 require 
uniformly ivill be money; then arma, nmmunition, clotliing of 
al1 desmiptions, provisionq, forage, hores, mcxns of transport, 
and everything wliich the cupedition wou9cl llave a dght to 
requk from tliem; nnd afkr 811, tliis extmonlinrrry itnd per- 
verse people wiii smm1y d1ow tlie coinmnndcr of tlic cxpedi- 
tion to have rt rnice in i;lic plan of opcrntions tu be foIloired 
when the wliole shdl be ready to undertake any, if indeed they 
wer shauld be ready.' 
The qnest,ion was goon act nt rcct, Cafnrell.lli's resme nnd 
other forces entered Spnin, Santona wrm seized nnd fortified by 
tlie French, and ksit :rcs took the command o€ a new orgnni- 
zation mlled the army of tlie nortli, wliich included tlie young 
pwd, t he tliird nnd fourtli govcrnmetits, ond Ikinnct'ri divi- 
aion, and in Febniary, 181 1 ,  it wm scvcnty thoa- 
*maix sund strong, nenrly fifty-~iine thoasand men and 4 6. Vol. H. 
nine thousand horses being prcscnt niider ams. 
Bcssibrca mas invested with unusrial piiwcra and had ortlers 
to mpport Masscna'a operations. The king's ariny ulso was 
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augmented t o  tweiity-seven thousand, excluaive sf hia French 
and Spitnish guads, and of juramentdoa, native troups wlio 
had talcen the oatli of allegiancs. Ti th  thia force he watclied 
tho Yulencians, protected his capit~l nna chaaed t,lii partidas, 
who continually hovercd in the vicinity of Madrid, ciitting oiT 
srnall dctnehmciits nncl intcrcepting al1 despntchea not pro- 
tucted by larirge escarts. To obviate tliiti vcxnt,ion smnll biit 
strangly f h f i e d  poak protected the linea of  corre~ondence, 
running by Guadarama rtnd Segovia to thc provi~ices of Tallri- 
dolid and Salamanca,-through ,huitrago and the Somosiem to 
the army of tlie notth-through Guaclnlaxara and Colatapd 
to the m y  of bragon-t,liirough Za Mancha to tlie army of 
the muth. A line aIso went b~ the bridge of Arzobispo t.o 
Truxillo, ~vliere a brigacle of cavalry m s  generally stationed 
to communicate with tlie fifth corps iluring its incur~ions into 
Estremdura. 
This partida warfare bsing only a succwsion of surpriscy 
and m s s r t c w ,  need not be detailed; Iiut during tlie surnmer 
and autumn, not leas tlian twclve considerable, and an infinita 
numbcr of trifling afi'nirs, took plnm hetween the rnoveriula 
columna nnd the baiids, Tho lattsr wero gcncrnlly bcittcn; 
thc Empecinado, Dumn, Snchex, Xlonpv CampiJto, Forlicr, 
nnd Minn only rehlnctI repiihtion, and tlie country people 
were so harm9d, tliat many eounter partidas apsisted t hc  
Frcnch. Joseph miglit therefore hwe aided Nassenn liy sn 
advance t o  the Elp ,  or by reinfor'cing and sitpperttng Mortier 
in Estremdnra; hut troubled by the partidas nnd liaving 
many convoys to protect, he woufd not &T. He m s  aveme 
to join the marsbals, witli nll of whorn, except Massena, he 
was on ill terms; nor wouId his fcelinp towartls Napoleon 
let liini taIre an iinterest in atiy military opcrations, save 
those wliich affected the iminediate security of 
tlie court. His po~erty was extreme; lie ww zqPeY2 l: 
surrouncld by intrriperu ; his plan fur orgnnizing 
a national party mas tliwarted by Iiis brother'e regulatiom; 
ploh were fomed, or supposed to be formed, ngaiiist h i ~  
perpon; snd in tliiti atate, fccling tie codd only aet a seoondary 
p r t ,  nnd Iieing frurii nsturtll gentlenesa averso to  the terrib;e 
~cenec aruurid hui ,  he resolved to resigv the t h n e .  

would draw the troops from that city to its B U C C O ~ ~ .  Genemi 
Valdemoro, commanding at San Roque, promised to aid, and 
an armameni was p m p d  
Cnphin Hope sailed from Ceiit~ mith thc Topexq n division 
oC pn-bwltq und a convoy conhitining u brignde 
Oweral C. of fivelve-p0~11ders, iiixtg-five gunners, a battralion CRmplicllg 
of thc cightpninth regimen4 a detachment of cormsvona- 
cncc, MSS. fomip deserters, snd Qie Epanish imperial re@- 
ment o f  Toleda, in al[ fiftecn hunn<lred men, nnder I o d  
13layney. E e  ms t o  make a hlss Eittmk on hen@ro1a, 
and i f  tlie enemy carne from Mdap,  11ic w to mil ngGnst 
that pl~ce. A lnndig mas effected, rind Selwrstiani iustantly 
marclied, Ieaving only three liundr~l msn in Malaga; lord 
Blayney m m in&ntly appri~iaed of t l i ia,  yet %e remaind 
two daya mnnondiug the cnstle witli tjvelve-pounders, aftsr 
the hewier mcbl  of tIie gun-lioats mbnd frigate lid fi~ilerf to 
mnke any imprcssioa His rlipositions lietrayed tlio utmost 
contcmpt of militnry niles, and on the setlond d q ,  he being in 
a gun-liunt, tlic gnrrisnn, ahout two hundred men, having 
dmciied Schci$titinni's column app~nnching, mxde n adly, toolc 
the h n t t e ~ ,  and d r m  the Xriti~li investing force liendlong 
tolvnrds the boats. Lord Rlnyncy lancletl, rdlied hjs men and 
retoolc tlie artillcry, but two squadrom of Prench mmilry 
corning up, he mistook them for Spaniards, advanccd done, 
ond wns immediattly m d e  a prisoncr ; tlien liis troops 
a g i n  íicd, and would h a ~ e  h e n  al1 sabed but for fhe oppor- 
time a r r i a i  of the Itotliiey with the eighty-xecond rcgiment, 
tlie flaiik con1 panies of whlch were immediately disembarked 
and first cliecited the enemy. Tlie Spauiards, untouclied by 
the panic, repiiied tlie ships without luss, but of tlie Britisli, 
t ~ v o  oficers uiid tliirty mmBn npere killed or wounded, n general, 
sersa irifcrior officem :iiid two liundred serjeanb oiid privirtes 
taken, and tliiu expstlition, weell-contrived and adequate t o  its 
object, w a ~  ruined by mtsconduct and hrminated in disuster 
nnd disgrace, 
Scarcely iras the nffnir finislied, when Valdemom and tha 
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marquis of Portasgo appeared in tlie Ronda, an insui~ection 
coinmcncd nt Vclce Mnlnga and thc ncigIibouring villages, 
and Rlalte, who hnd retumed from Cnrlirr to the a m y  in 
Murcia, advrtnced with eiglit thousand rnen towards Cullar on 
the side of Baza. CuinpbelI furnishd money t u  Porkgo, 
embnrked a thousmd stand of urms for tlie peoplr? o€ 'Valex 
Malw, snd Penrbse sent a fr iptc  to  m i z e  nlong the &; 
but Ekbastiani, relieved from tlie coact descent, soon quelled 
this insurrection and tlien turned agrtinst Blnke. That 
general h d  bcen held in clieck by Rey witli n -11 foree, 
and wlicn Rfilhnud &d with 8ebnstiani's cnviilry, hc retired 
behiníl the Almamora rjx-CF, where he was clefeakd the 4th of 
Novemhr: hk m y  then disperse4 and aa a conhgioua 
fever broko out al; Cartliag~na and slirwd along the cowt 
to Gibraltar ~ n d  Cnilix, opcrations on tlie sidc of Murcia 
maad 
In the kingdorn of Seville, the war turned cliiefly upon tbe 
Iilockada of tho Isla and tlia movemcnts oC tlie Sgauisli mnia 
in F~trcmatliim. Yrovixions for C d i ~  werc principnlly drawn 
from thc Concldo de NciBla; anrl it Iins been seen that 
Copons, aided by desccnts from thc ocean, enden~oured to 
acure tlris important resourco. But iicit1ier ~vould Iiave 
nmilcd, if Rallcriteros hnd not constnntly incnnccd hvjlle 
from Arace6a ~ n d  tlic Aroche mountains. For  could 13rilles- 
teros l ia~e warrcd there witliout tlic support of Ddajos and 
Olivenzs, from whencc Ramana supportcd his line of operrir 
tion, and sent Iiim at times niilitury mpplics: on the pos- 
wsion of lhdfijos thcrefore tlie snpply of Cadia chidy 
depended. Seville aas tEie licnd of the Frcncli system in 
Andalusia. Cadiz, Estremdura and tIic CuiiJüdo de Neibla 
were objecta for tliair oEensive operatiuns. So oblnin pro- 
vision4 to cat off Spanish conpoys, or to  mcet cxpeditions 
fiam Cadiz against their posta nt RIoper nnd HueIva, they 
were foreed to act on tlie eoast side; the enterprisea d 
Ballesterus t h e w  them tawards Araeeca; Eomands o p e r e  
tians broriglit tbcm to Estrcmntlura; whcre tlie countiy m 
m ivasted that Eoult could only scnd Jdortier there for sudden 
momentaq strokes, and to prevmt the Spaniards cstablishing 
a formihtble rnilitary base on tliat irontier o£ Anddnda. 
Tliis occnsioncd mnny irregulur rnovernents witlioiit a definite 
objcct wl~icli cnn enly be ~liglitly tmatod. T ~ ~ T E ,  wl~en 
Romann cnkred thc lincs, Meiidixalicl, who rcmnined with 
two divisions in Estrcmndura, fintling that Mortier, un- 
conacioris of Romnnds ribsencc, lid rctircd across thc Norcno, 
occupied hlcridra in the view o€ fecding on the yet iinwssted 
diatriet of Zlerena, but a roving column from the king's unny 
jn La Mancha sent liim back to  Badajos, from wlicnee he 
mrtrclied to join Ballesteros, Soult tlien fortified Gibraleon 
nnd other posts iu tlie Conddo de Neiirilts; and Girarrl's divi- 
sion, rccrossing tlie Morena, joined tlie column from La 
Manchti, antl furngerl the Llerena district,, ~ h i l c  Mendizabel 
occiipied Xai'm witli nino tliousnuti inhntry and twu tliausand 
cavnlry, incliiding hIadden'a Portupese lirigndc. hfeanwhile 
Copons mna defeated in tho Condado. 
At Crtdiz, no uiilihry e-rent occurred aftcr the affair af 
Mnkn~nrdg ~ n v e  tIic crpcditions ngninst Mrig~r-f, aalrentIy 
nnticcd, nníl n d g h t  nt,tcmp of tlic Spnninnh ngninst thc 
Cliiclranla works in Scptc,mlirr. But, after t * ~  y~ntrt of 
in t r igen  tsnd delay the national Cortes barl nssembled, nnd 
the long truppresscd voice of the people wns to be heard. 
Yet only pnrtislly, for deptitics could not be l gn l ly  cliosen in 
thc provinccs possesserl by tthe encrny, and some members 
ivere captured on tlieir journcy to C d i z :  Iienrc maiiy un- 
Bnolvn wcn by uame to tlieir sripposed constituents were 
clioscn. h new principie of eleetian wiis $so adopted. 
Every man tii-enty-fiva years old, not holding oRco or 
prrisivn undcr the govemmcnt, find not incapacitnted by crime 
Iiy dcbts t o  tlie stak o i  bodily infirmity, wwas cligiblc to sit 
if clio~cn, wwliich lind never hcforc: hccn tbc! nile. h mipplc- 
mcnt of ~i~tJ'di~hOrht mcmbcrs wnu Iikcwisc provirlcd to ~upply 
socirlcntnl v~icmcics; nnd it wa9 agrectl that tn rn ty -~ ix  
pcraoiis tlicn in Spnin, nntives of the c01onies~ should repre 
sent thme depmdcncies. Tlie assembly met the end of 
Septcmhcr, nnd toolr the title of mnjesty. It declarea the 
prcss free in mpect of pulitical, not of rcligioiis mattcra; it 
aboliclied some provincia1 juntas, re-nppointerl caphins-gcncrd, 
md proceeded to form a coiistitutionivorded in the rcry spirit 
oE dcniocracg. These things, aided by a vehement e l o q u e n ~ ~  
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drew inuch attention t o  the procccdings, and a frwli impulse 
seemed given to the ww: Liuh iiicil Lrotiglit up uridcr des- 
potism do not rcatlily attnin tlie fasliiuns o£ libcrty. Yie 
provincial junta, the ceuti-al jiint% the junto, of Qdiz, the 
regenc?, l i d  d been in succesaion violeut md oppressive 
nrliile duinirig ody ta be liol~ular lletiders; anrl this qi r i t  did 
not dcacrii t l i ~  Curtes. Abstrnct principltx of lilxrt,y wcre 
freely promiilgated, yet tq~aunictil nntl linrt,iul praccdings 
were of commun occurrence; a i d  tlie rcfu~~nutioils, outstrig- 
ping t1ie E~~Ii l ig  iind ~tide~slauditig uT h e  nutioii, weülíeued 
tlic springs of its rcsisb~iicc to tlic Frcncli. It \r7ns nnt for 
freedom, Iiii~t from nationnl prirle nrid religious inllucnce tlie 
people struclr. Liberty had no attn~ctioi~s for tlie nobles, 
ilor fur tlie inomstitx, nor cveu Tor tlie iiierchaiit3 j rt~irl th0 
Cortes, by suppresuiiig old cst:tlilislimcritfi urid riolnt,ing 
ancicnt ciistoins, ~l~ockcd tlio3c vtry prcjurliccs wliicli hd 
produced rexistance to Xapoleoii. Nuil iiiig Iiciicficinl was 
givm in retuiu. In tlie coiiduct uf tlie w:u, tlie excciitioii of 
tlic lnws, tlio trciitmcnt oF thc ccolonics, tlirbrc wns ns niircli of 
vniiity and intrigtic, of procrastinntioti ncglipcncc folly nnd 
violence as liefure. TFic pcol~le bccaiiic discontcnted, and 
when tlie Curtes proposed to abolisli tlic iriquisi~iou, tlie d c r ~  
turned bitlcr opponciitti. Tlic prineililc 01 ieutl:il ~irivilegc 
bcing oncc gvm up, tlic nntiiml kndcncy oF tllc Gortcs ivcs  
towards t l~e nemy ; ancl a bruzrl line of Jistiiictiori was tlins 
drawn bctwccn tlic olijects of tlic Spnliisli antl Eiigl:liqli govern- 
mcnts in tlio prciseculioii of tlic ivar. Ero tlic cuiiteat fiilislied, 
such ~li~;tcmpcrntiirr: wris lictirrcit ilicm m woi11d linve ISiven 
tlie Peninsiiln ta Napdeoti, ir fortuiic liad riut Eiefriiyorl Iiim 
amidst tlie snow o€ llussia 
Jetdous of Ilie Cortes and diuslitisfied witli klie itifcrior titlo 
of Iiigliiicss, tEie regcncy l i ~ r t ~ u l i  n ~ t  uf' tlie rc~iulilican s~iírit. 
Anxious tfi clicclc iniiovntion, it lintl enrlq- iii tlic ycnr inviten 
tlic duke of Orleans tt) command k!ie provinces bodci.iiig on 
France, pcrmittcd hini to issue proclamatio~is, ~ind received 
l i i  at C d i ü  witli tlie Iiouours uf a ruyd prince, desijiriing tu 
oppsd i iu  nutiiority to thnt of tlic local jiriitm nt tlic morncnt, 
antl finalIy to  tfink of the Cortes. He l i d  h n  well receivd 
at Turagona, but at Cadix he wm regarclcd with indifference. 
Mr. Tellesley opposed hia ~tny; lord WeIllngton judged hia 
presence in Spain would render the Spanish mar popular in 
tlie 8011th of France; the Engliih niinkters ~ e n t  liim a verbal 
invitation to reside in Englmd, mhich he ílld not accept, aud 
the Cortes, aware of the cause of liis amival, compelled liim to 
qnit Spain. Boon tifker this, the regency of five was effaced, 
mí3 one of three memlicrrr, namcly, EUlnke, Cigar, nnd A p r ,  
werr! nppointed. The two íirst werc absent, and mbstitutex 
were provided, one of ml~om, Pnlmios, Iicsitritcd to tnke thc 
onth, wlierenpon lie mas declnied t o  linve fdci ter l  the confidente 
of tlie nation. The nem regents mere as tsittle pleased with the 
democratic cpirit ns tlieir prerlecessora, bnt wisliing to retPLin 
porver, refused fo listen to Carlottds clnim to be sole regent, nnd 
tlius Fxtions spfung up on every sirle. Por the republicans 
mere not nt first pnromount in tlie Cortes, nnd tlie mtijority 
were so guhtilely dedt  witli by Petlro Soiiza, tliat t hq  privatdp 
dmitted Cnrlottnk lirctensions both to the sucwsriion and the 
immedinte control of tlie wIiole PeninsuIa. 
Nxouel hpeiia. wns declaretl criptxin-geneml. o£ AndaIusia, 
nnd comrnentlcr of tlio forcea in tho Ida, nnd de n-m subser- 
vicnt to tlio Cortcs. Thc new rcgency, jenlous of Rornnnda 
pomcr, atloptccl t l ~ c  complnints of his encmics in 33ndejo~, 
rcmovcrl Iiim from his command, xnd ordmcd l l i ~  divisions to 
xbantlon t he  Enplish a m y  nnrl comc to Cridiz. 
The conduct o£ bis troops liad bcen very rinsn- nhp~ 
tisfnctory, yct numbers were so cssential t o  kecp 
IrIassem in cl~cclc, tlint lVcllingtoa sent coloncI O'Nazl to 
remonstrnts ; and as hc clearly sIiomed tlie regenta tliat tlie 
loss of Estrernwlnra rind of nll communication witli tlie 
interior of Spaiin would ensue, a mouientiary respito m9 
obtained. 
In mntters touching tlio mar or the adminirtkrntioa no 
Spanielr party rictcd cordially or wisely; b11t townrd.s the 
culouies al1 allarccrl to -piish vioiencc, ir~juskicc, criiclty, and 
impolicy to tlieir utmost bounds. 27ie Rritish government 
l i d  oolitaincd from tlic firñt rrgcncy ra dccrcc, pcrmitting 
fioiith hmcricn to expod its o m  pmducta undcr ccrtnin 
conditions, Shis lcgulixing of B trndc, which eoitld a o t  be 
suppressed, and which wne but a docent mturn to Eng* 
lland for hcr assistance, p v e  offertco to tlic municipnl jiintn of 
Cndis ; nnd its rescnt,mcnt was so miicli rlrcndcd, t81iat in Junc 
the regcncy disowned tlicir orni decrce of the previous montb, 
atid even punislied thc printera of it for liaving givcn b i h  to 
a forged imtrument ! Tlio eolovists had rcsiskd al1 tlie 
intrigucs af tFic Ftencli mit8h an ;ndcpcnrIcncc niid ~inglcneris 
of purpose very dfsplmsing to the government in Old Spain, 
for the lntter wislietl t o  Iiave tliem folloiv in its walclra 
Wlien, exasper~terl by ttlia arropance, they expressed tlieir 
rliscontcnt, thc aut.Iioritics in flie motlier-coiintry, tliroming off 
the mask of Iihrzility and patriotim, cxposcd tlicir eim ~ecret  
vicws. .' l t  is not enough thttt Americans sliould be Spani~h 
subjccts now, but tlmt in al1 c:iscs they sliould Liclong to 
Spnin,' wne thc procluinntion of tlic rcEcncy, iin answcr t o  a 
dcclaration from thc Caraccns a~oning zttxclimcnt to Ferdi- 
nand : mcanning, tliat if Spain sI1ould pass to tlre usurper, 
Amcrica must follow, ns having no right to  decide in any me 
for hcrsclf. 
Wlien tlie Cortes m&, tlie Amcricans expected jiistioe. 
Tliey liad contributed ninety millions of dollars for the 
support of tlie war, and many liad served aexlously in 
prssrin; America hnd also been declared nn integral part of 
the c m p i e  by thc ccntral junta, nnd hcr depiities were to wt 
in tlie peat nationnl nssembIy. Slie was howcwr soon made 
to undemtand, tliat the first meant etcimal slavery, and the 
second was ra mcre form. 'Tlio Amcriczns complnin of 
liibving been tyrnnnizcrl ovcr for tliree liundr~l ycnm! thcy 
shall now snffer for thrcc thoasmd yenrs ;' ami ' Wc knom not 
to d a t  class of h s t s  the dmericanfi belong;' siich werc the 
expresvions Zicartl nnd nppIauJed in tlio Cortes, wlwn the 
riglitri of tht! eolnni~ta wcre agitatcd in thnt nsscmhly. Xcttcr 
~Gve Spriin to Joseph if Americn be retained, tl~an sme Xpain 
if Americn bc separateti from lier, was a feeling roated in 
every Bpanish lieart, eu~ertly expressed in many ~iutilic clocu- 
mcnts, and opcnIy onctcd iipon. For whcn rcpcntcd insul$ 
treachmy, and violente, had dgvcn the colonists t o  defmd 
their rigllts in a m ,  the moncp and stores, supplied by Englnnd 
for tlie mpporh of the war aD&t the French, wcre applid 
to thc fitting out of expcditions ngainst Amerim. TIus the 
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win~mt ion  of tha national Cortea, ftir from impmving the 
posture af nfiira, dried up the chief saurces of rcvcnue, 
weakcned tlie amy i.i tlie field, offended many powerful 
bodics in thc ~tfite, involvd the nii60a in a ooIonial war, and 




WUlLE tho Spaniards were entirely occupied wiUI the ucoot.es
in congrcs,'l, lhe French workR wore lillisl1Cd; their chain of
forts was OOIllIJ1cteu, oach fort having a ditcll and palisades
with a week's IJfovisions. Soull came to SUIl Lucnr, and his
flotillns there and at Sallro )latin, Puerto Honl, nnd Chiclaua
~illg aB ruatly for action, 110 ]lro~cdc(1 to concentrate them.
In tho IllSt night of October, thirty pinnnccs find gUll-ooats,
slipping out of tlu: Curululquivir, eluded the allied fleet.,
passed along the coast to llota, and from thence, aided by shore
batteries, fougllt tln:ir I....uy to Santa J1aria amI the Sun Pedrll
river. But to llvoid thCl dunger of doubling l\1ntngorda, the
vessels wero transported OVCl"bnd on rollers, nnd 0110 hlltllll'Ctl
and thirty armed vcsseb am] trnusporls were thus snfdy
assembled in the 'l'rocadero canal; tIle success wus 110Wever
alloyed by the detJ.lh of gcncral Scnarmont, a I111111 of great
fCputation. At t11e Troendero point there wcrc immense bnt-
teries, and somc llot:\ble pieces of ordnance invented by
colonel Villautroys, called cannon-mortars. Thesc Iluge engines,
OIlC of which now lltullds in St. J:UllC~'~ Park, were cast ut
Seville, and being )llnced in t>Iillgs, threw projcctiles over
CaJi~.• l\ distance of more than five thouSllnd yards. To
obroin this flight the sllells wcre partly filled with lead, and
their charge of powder was too small for nu effective explosioll,
yet they ulurmcd the city. null were trouh1csome to the
shipping.
SouJt.'s design was to ruin by superior fire the fort of thc
Pulltales, Own to p:\Ss t1)e strnits wilh his flotilla, aud estab·
lish llis army between the lslu and the city; nor was this
plan chimerical, for on the sido of tllo bc.~iogcd there WM
neither concert nor industry. New drafts, made by Wcllillgton,
had reduced Graliam's force to Bve tliousand men, and in 
Qctober tlie fever brolre out; but w S~ulk's pmparatilins Liec~me 
fonnidnlile, reinforceinents were drawn irom Gihrilltar and 
Sicily, find nE tbe cnd of thc ymr, sevcn tlinusand Ilriti~h~ 
Germans, nnd Portuguese werc etill tclirnd tlie Santi Pctri. 
Grnham maq confident that, n-itli dae prepnretion, he could 
maintain thc Piintales even though its fire should bc ailenced, 
-that Sotilt must wtiiblisl~ a stronger flotilla than the allics, 
or l i s  comrnunication with Xahgorda mula noG be malntaind, 
-and that the intercourse betmeen £he Isla znd tlie prrison 
of C d i  cauld not le interrupted, iinless tlie g e a t  redoubt of 
tlia Cvrtndura vas Iost. To iusure naval superiority, arlmird 
Keats drew nll tlie rirrned ~rafb from Gibraltar. 
To sccure the Iand Jefencc, Gr~linrn uqcd tho gz!~;~, 
regency to adopt certain planq md he was wvarmly =SS. 
sceondcd hy air Hcnry 1;C'cllcsley ; hut ncitlicr tl~cir 
entrcntics nor the ~mmincncc of the dnngcr could ovcrcomc 
the nputhy o€ thc Spnninrds; tlicir troopa wprc manting in 
discipline, clotliing, md equipments, and anly sixteen tlionsand 
Inen of al1 nrms wene effective on a mnshcr-rol1 of t.wenty- 
t1iree thousmd. The labour of the British troops, fnr from 
leing nssistcd, was vexatiously impederl, aiid December enifed 
beforc Qrnliam, aftcr many altermtions, could A ppmmlS, 
wen obtain leare to put the interior i i ie  of the $8 1.2, s, 4. 
Cortiidura in a state of ddenoe, altliough Smlt "O" Ir' 
su rwdy for an attaclr tliere, wTiicL wouId have been exe- 
cuted md protiably fatal, if events in Portugul hd riot suddenly 
arrcsted his opcrotioiis. 
Wiicn Mnqscnia cnterorl fliat ltingdom, his mmmiinictations 
with Franco bccame so uncertain tliat the ernperor's principal 
informntion carne throiigli thc English aewsprapers : Foy 
brouglit t l ie first exnct intelligence. It was then BessiSres 
was directed to supporb tlie army of Portugal, aad tlie ninth 
corps w s  made a coinponent part of the latlcr. Mnssena ww 
enjoinetl t o  hoId East between &ntnrem and tlie Zesere, to 
bcsiege Abraiites, anrl i E  forccd to retreat mornenhrily, wwas 
to keep Lis bridges nncl protccting werlrs on tlio Zczere 
witli e view t o  a reneworl invnsioa frtim Cwtello Brancn. He 
wiw to expect Sjoult who l id  bccn scverd times com- 
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Joseph,aCor- mmded to movo through the Alerntcjo to bis 
respondence, wskt~nce, m d  thatMarsha1 was cmsured for suffer- 
MSS. ing Romana to join Welin@on unmolested, when 
he ougiit to have b e n  closdy followed by iyho fiftli eorps. 
The emperor seerningIy eontempllnted thc evacuation of Ando, 
lusia and the conccntration o f  tlie wliolc. army of the ~outh  
on the Taps, because it mas more importnnt to cmsh tFie 
regular warfare in Portugal, than to hold rtny particuInr pro- 
rinm. Massenda instmctions rcnclid liim in due time, Soult'a 
were intercepted by the pcriIlns, and tlie Ruplicotcs did not 
arrive bcfore tlic end of December, R?ien tlicy did reach 
Iiim bis ripe design apinst Czrlis wns rendcred a nullity. 
Drawing off Latour Bfauliourg's czvalry u t d  fvc tlieusand of 
'Irictor's inbntiy lie reyirtired to  Beville; but his instructions 
pointed out no fixed linc of movcmcnt nor s spccific opcmtion, 
-Massena was to communicate his plan and Boult w n ~  to 
conforrn to it. No certajn intellipnce even of IIassena's early 
operationa liad rcaclied Sevill~, and sucli wns Welliiugton's 
vigilonce, ond the activity of the bands, tliat tlic Frcnch mar- 
ahds wcre now forccd t o  oper~tc sitliout cernmunicrition, and 
entirely ignomnt of each othcr'a plms md situntion. 
Soult did not l n o w  of Romana's being in tlie Jines, bnt 
gontt's coi- ~howed Iie cotdd not linve Sollowed bim, for 
rnponamce, Meniliznliel Bad covcrcil th c movement d h  con- 
MSS. sidcrablc farccs, sntl fivc fartresqcs ivcre nn the 
fronfieio of Portugal whicli he dared not neglect. Nor could 
he now co-operate directly with Massenri. Scbastiaiii's hands 
were full, tlie blockde of Cndiz ivas to be maintained, nnd 
Seville protccted from tbe 8pnnish forccs nt Arnc~iin and in 
the Neilila : Iicnce only twcnty thousmuid mcn wcre disposablc. 
Vith tliat force be dnred not enter tlie Alemtejo leaving Oli- 
venza and Bdajos in his mar, because 13alIesteros would join 
Mendizaliel to vex his commuliications, and Romana, witliout 
counting EIili's fame, eould oppose him with Bn thousnnd men 
in front. Vhercforc lie demiinded and obtnined Napuleon's leave 
to reduce tliose fortresscs before he co-operated dircctly &th 
liasseiia. While awniting thc answer he prepred for the 
sieges rind the proteetion of AndaIusia. Dessolles' divisiun 
rejoincd tbe king's m y ,  and Godinoth now replacd it at 
Cordub~; a, corps o€ obemt ion  under general D i son  wna 
posted at  Ecija; Seville, being entrenched on the NeiMa side, 
wm @ven in cliarge to gcncral Dar*cau, and Remond occupied 
Qibraleon. Tlic expeditioiiary force of sixtaen tliousand 
infantry, four thoucand cavalry, and fifty-four pus, was 
m~cmbletl tlie 2nd of Jmuary. A siage equipage, Joaeph's 
a light pontoon brain, aud scrcutcen huudrecl cnrts C O I T L ~ O I I ~ .  
for stores and previsions attcndad ths troolm ; and cnml 
ao efficient wus tlic civil udmiiiistrlition, tlist Soult ordered a 
levy o[ &ve tliousaud youiig Spaniards, callcd escopeteros, 
(f~tzilcer~), to muintnin the polica of hndalusia. 
Martier, moving from Gundalcnnni, cntcrerl Zafra the titli, 
whcrcupoñ hícndixnhcl rctircd to Mcrida nnd ~nllcstcros 
pwsed 01-cr the moiintain to Frrjcnal. Thc Frcnch convoy 
WIW detiiincd at thc foot of  tlic liills by t l ic  wintcr tcrnpcsts 
wllich tlien rngerl, nnrl t o  protect i t  and drive Xdlesteros from 
Frejenal Gaxan's division mnverl from Zafra The Spnnish 
learlers in Estremadura sud at Crtrliz judged lightly of Soult's 
ol~jeet; some said he wm t~ pnss the Tagu3, otliers t l i ~ t  he 
only aimed ab Ballesteros; Wellingfon done  di~ined hia inten- 
tiona, and 6rct gave hlendizabel notice thnt the 
ficnch mere assembling their airny at Seville: ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ :  
liwce d e n  they broke into Estremadura terror 
and cunfusion prevded. Badajos mas ill-provisioned, AIbu- 
querque t1ieug.h gurrisoned wns in miiis, Olivenza nearly 
dismaatld; and in t110 midst of al1 tliia disorder, Bnllesteros 
waa mddenly h w n  oíT towards the Condada de TJ~ible by 
tlic rgcncy, d o  thus dcprived Estrcrnariu~a of hnlf its 
dcfcndcrs at the moment of invilsion. 'IVcllington h d  ndvisd 
s concentration of tlie troop, thc clcstruction o€ the accessiblc 
bnclges over tlie Giidinna, ~ n c l  a dispnted pansage of tliat 
river ta p i n  timc ; these tliiiip wcre neglecterl and an d- 
vanced guard of cavalry carriecl the bridge of hferida on the 
6th. Soult then turned upon Olivenza with the infantry; 
and mhile his drngoons held hfendhbel in check on tlie side 
of Badajos, his light horsemen collected cattle on the side of 
Estrcmadura. Guan's division protected tlie madi  of the &5 
lery and convoy, nnd La Eoussaye'~ bripde, belonging to tlie 
iarmy of the centre, murclied from TruzrilIo agninst the par 
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M a s ,  and scoiired the banks of the Tnps from Arzoliispo to 
Alcantara 
Tiiis place fortified witli nine hastions a comed wny antl 
some unfinished wveliis, m s  incapabla of R good dcfeence, 
XTitli an olrI brcnch diglitly rcpnircd, vcry fcw p ins  rnount~l, 
and commanding no passage, It mas o€ little jmportnnce; but 
it contained four tliousand troops. WelIington liad pi-essed 
&mana t o  dcstmy tlie dcfences entirely or fuinisli good 
m w s  of rcsistance; tlle mmorqtiis rlecidctl on tlie furtber, tiut 
Hendixnl)el, sligliting Iiis orrlcrs, hnd thrown his bcst division 
i~ito thc plncc. It mas inveatcrl on tlie f f tli. An abnnrloned 
ontmorls, three hundred nnd furty yards soutli of tlie torw, 
was talcm posscssion of tlie iirst night, and breacliing md 
counter-lirittcries for eigiit; snd s i l  p n s  were marketl out. 
Tlio trencl~es wcrc openetl on tFic ~vest, nnrl npproadics l)y tlio 
flying anp wcre mntlr! npinst; tlic old hrcndi; yct hcnvy rnin 
and a R c W C ~ ~ ~  of cntrcncFiing tools m t d e r l  thc sicge untii tlie 
herid of tlle great Frencli. cont-oy bad pnnd tlic rnountains. 
Iloivever, the covered may m-as cronmed and on tlie 20th the 
breacliiiig batterica opened tlicir Tire; two rnnrtnrs tlircii. sliells 
ínto thc triivn nnd n dobe of comprccñian IYAB prrpnrcd to 
blow in tlic coirntcracarp. Iii tlic crcniiig, IIencllxnbd 
s h i s h e d  unsiiccessfiilly ~ 6 t h  Lnto~ir l\fnirbourg's Iiorscm~n 
cuvering tlie siege, and on tlle 21st t l x  mine wa? complded 
mcl preparnticiris made for tlic p:magc of the ditcli. Ncn- 
ilimbcl, wculrcned by tEic ah~cnce of ~u l~es t c roq  demnnrled suc- 
cotir from Romana, who was ciick htiiit scnt Ctirlos rl'l":qpnfin 
witli twe thoiisand mcn from hhrnntcs tlis IStli, ancl T7inias, 
with hls own di~isions from Cnrtnxo the 20th. TIie Zlst, 
$he governor of Olivenzn 1 ~ 3 s  infnrmed of tliic, and replid 
r.liat he would rnaintnili tlio plwe to  thc 1 i ~ t  rnomcnt; yet hc 
cn-pibilntctl thc ncxt dny, 11aving stitl p~ovisions, 
French 
dourna, am~nnnition, cigliteen guns, nnrl four thous;md 
aprgtims one hnndred effective soldierñ. Tlic prisoncrs MS3. 
were inimedirately ~ e n t  o  Co~?oba, cscorted by ri 
regimcnt, nnd on tlie 2 6th Soult rnarclied apinst  Rajndoa 
Diiring tlic sirg~ Rnllcstcros atl~onccd iipon Ncibln, hut 
hehg fdlowed by Gamn, was bmtcn at CastiIlcjus tlic 28% 
nnd: driven oyer the Guradiuna into Portngnl witli the luss of 
fifhen hunrlred prisonera besides IrilIerE and woniiJed: liis 
artillcry cscapcd to thc mtlc of P~ymigo, t1ie infantry t o ~ k  
rcfugc nt Aleontin nnd McrtoIa Hje force wns thus rediiced 
hy tliree thonsand mcn and the rrgcnry recnlled Coponn to 
Cdix !  In this manner rr fortress vas takcn, nnd twelvc 
tliousand men, who well emploj-eil iniglit Lwe fnistr:~ted the 
Prencli designs apinst Bndnjos, wcre ilispcraecl, witlidrawn, 
or made prisoaers in twenty dzys nftcr the commencement of 
Soult's expedition. 'ITcllington liad strivcn linrd to teacli tlie 
Spnnil. comnianders tlicrc 1 .a~  but oec snh niude of pro- 
cecding in Estreiriailum, s n J  Rornaiin liad just yicldcd t o  Iiis 
coirnacls, ivlien tl ia siidrleii nrriml of tlie Frcricli tliren~ evcry- 
tliing into confiisioii, and tha defence o€ thc G~isdinna~ thei 
disinnntling of  Olivenzm, tlic conccntrntion of thc nrmics m r e  
nc~Irctcd. Romnnds own iiiviaions rrmlird ?ifunternor tlie 
2 2 n 4  hnt the 33rd tlicy rcccivctl JTcndixnlicl's nrdcw to hnlt, 
hecause Olivenzn Iinti riumndcrcd. Tlic 21tli Rninznra dicd 
uf nn xnciirisrn in tlie hcnrt. A wortliy innn and of qiiiclr 
pxrtr: altlioiigli deficlcnt in milit. hlent, l i i  dcatll wns a 
~ c a t  105s; yct Iiis influcnce wns oii tlic wme, and Iie liad 
in:tiiy cnc~nics; hiR auiTiority FVTLS 011ly susta.ined by tlie 
nttnchment of liis troops, and by bis rfdics; for liis estatcs 
bcii~g in tlic Balenric Islcs Fii rwcnues dicl not suffer by 
t l l ~  WiIP. 
MclidixaLtlicl, nora coinmnniling iu Eetrcrnmlu~a~ Iratl roceived 
~wrnniui's ortlers tu follvw 3Vcllingtori'~ couwels. Tliese ivert; 
to concentrtltc Iiis ten or clmen thuiisilnd meri, and hcfore 
Eortlt xppcnrrd on tlic fliinrlinnn to ocmipy n poaitioii af gieat 
natiiral st.rcngth closc tn Pi,?r.Iajos. Tlic ri~lit  \vas to tnr~di 
tlic fort of St. Cliristovill, tIic front to br. covcwd by the 
Gcbom river antl tlie Guarliana. Tlie fortress oF Cnmpo 
II~yor wag t o  be iinrnediatcly iii renr o€ tlie lcft, Elvas beliind 
tlie centrc, Entrcnclid in tliat position ivitli a strong gar- 
risoii in Exdajos, tlie Englisli general tliought Meudizabnl 
niigllt defy Soult to invest or even straiten tiie communi- 
cntions of thc town; yet Iie proplietically observe4 
Appcndtx 1%. 
' with soldicrs of nny 0 t h  nation sriccess is cer- 
,,+ 11, 
taiu, lsut no cnleulntion can bc madc of nny opertb- 
tion in whicli Spanish tmops are enpged.' M l c n  Olivmm 
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fell, Mcndizabel had a smrall gairison in Alhurprque, another 
in TTalencia de Alcantara; Itoinaiin'tr divisions were at. Mon- 
temor uder Pirues, and Carlos d'Eslitiiiu wns at Cnmyo 
Mayor. Zn~tcnd of conccntmting iall t l i i ~  force nt once on 
tlie Celiorzt, he nprritd imtil hi i l t  rfrove bxck Iiis outposts and 
tlien sliut hirnself up with six tlioucrind men in Dndnjos. 
That lilncc  vas still unprovisioned, tliougli a siege had "on 
constantly exliected for a ymr, nntl on tlic 37th Latour 
Moubourg's clragoons bnving crosacil thc Glindinno nt Mc,rido, 
faderl tlie Glcbora, nnd cut off dl commi~nication wieh Campo 
Xaq-or iind Elvas. 
This city atmrls n t  tFie conflucnce of tlie Giiadiana witli tIie 
Rivilhs; tlie first a, noble rivcr five Iiunílrctl yartls brond; the 
seconrI n trifling stream A rock, one hunclred fcct high, 
cromed by rin old cxqtle, overhanp the rnccting of tlic watcrs. 
Tlie town, spreniIiilg likc a fan as tlic land opens betwccn 
tlie rivers, was protected by eig1:lit rqnlnr rurtilins and bnotions, 
from twcnty-tlircc to thkty fcct in Iicigl>t, mitb good oountcr- 
~cnqs ,  covered m y  anrl glacis. On tlic left tinnk of tlir Gnn- 
diana thc outworks wcre, lo, the Lunette of Snn Roque, 
coverjng a dnm and sluice on tlie nivillas by whicli sn inan- 
datirin could be marle; 20j an isolated rerloubt, cnlIerl tlie 
J'icurina, sitt~ated beyond tlie i:ivillcis, nnd four hundrctl ynrds 
from tlie town ; 3O, f,hc Pnrd~lcras, a defecti~e cmm-work, 
central between the lower Ciiadinna and tlic Xivillris, two 
hundred j-ards from the ramparts. On the riplit bnnlí of the 
Guarliana a liill crowned by tIie San C31riatov:cl fort, tlircc Iiun- 
drctI fwt squnre, ocivcrlooked t l ~  intcrior of thc m~tIc; nnd a 
quarttr of n mile farther dnwn t8hc ~trenm, the liridge, 4;ia 
Lundrcti p r d s  in lengtb, sns protected by a bridge-hend, 
~Bgh.hGlg couneckd with &n (3ristovaI but commandcd on 
wery &de. 
CriouIt construct~d a ferry on the Gadianina, above tlie con- 
flnmcc of thc Gchowi, annd opcnr~l threc nttnck~ tlic 28th, tmo 
against tlie Picurinq one qainrrt the Pardaleras. The 29th 
and 30th sligIit sallies mere iepnlsed, but tempeptuou~ waither 
niined the French works; Gazan's divisinn was dist~nt~ lie 
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infantry before the place wcre few. and on thc 
Conqnete de 3?st, a sally frorn the Pardaleras, kiIlad or p,,,,,,,;, 
wotnderl sixty men anrl cleared the trencha; mrfiluun* 
LnpCne. 
some of tlic Spanish cavnlry also, gliding round 
the left of tlie Prench pnrnllel, sabred several engineers and 
sappcrs. Two nights afterwzrrls the XivilIas, ffoodd by ;i 
tempest, carried away tlie French bridgeI drowned rnen atid 
horses, damaged tlie rlepbh, and rreduced the 
sic* 
besicgcra to the grcntest distress; nnd ncxt J I ~ ~ + M .  
rnorning anotlicr sally from t l ~ c  Par~lnlcm lriIIcd htn"R". 
or wounrlcd cighty mcn nnd rufnccI p r t  of the parnllcl. Tlie 
cnvdry ernpleyed in t l ~ e  investment wuld not forage, the con. 
voys only carne in Iiy dekqchrnents, scarcity wrw felt in tlie 
camp, and the rigoirr of tlie tvintcr liivoniim musd siekness. 
Gaznn arrived tLe 3rd, but tlie French cnvalty Wp,iindm~ 
wns withdrawa from tiic right banlc of  thc G w  ~ o r ~ ~ i o r i i l .  
ditina in conscquence of tbe scvere weatlier, tlie 
Spanisli cornrnunicntfon with Elvas was re-estnblished, nnd 
Mendizxbel called al1 the di\-hions frum I'ortupI to his 
assistnncc: Tiruc~i marclied upon Elvas, Carlos 
#Espaiia and hIadden uiiited at Campo Mnyor, rizmn* 
and Julian Sxnclim 7.rouglit duwii Iiis partida from 
Upper Estrematlura t o  tFio Tagus. 
In tlie night o€ tho Gtli, RIcndiznbcl rcpaired to Elvw nntl 
toolr tlie commnnd of Virncs' divisions. Ho passcd th0 Caya 
the next rnurning, nnrl bcing joinerl on Iiia march hy Carlos 
d'EspnSn, ~iiishcd tlic f c ~  Prcneli cnvalry posts stiIl on tlie 
rig1:lit bnnlr of thr. Gtixdirtna ovcr thc Gchorn: Mndrlcnk Port~i- 
giesc  even C T O R R P ~  thitt river and mpt-ttre snme biagpge 
beyond. Tl~e French aoon retiiined, forced Rf J d c n  to recross 
thc stream, and lcilled many of hhis rear-guara; tlie Spanish 
cavdry khen fled shamefuIly, and tlie infaatry entered Badajos. 
Mcndizabel, instend of taking tlie strong position bcJiind tlie 
Gebora recomrnended by welliagton, resoIved to rniae the 
siege by a sally, yet he Jelayd the execution until next morn- 
ing, at tlie risk oT being shut up in BuJnjos witli Iii6 wliole 
m y ;  and tliiri would inevitalily have I~nppened if a gr&t 
body of the French cavalry liad passed the Geboru iu ~iursuit 
of tho beatcn horserncn. 
Bndnjos nnm contnincd sixtccn tliniisnnrl f i~ l~t i i ig  mcn, nnrl 
the projected sdly was rnarIe Gtli p n t  vigaur by Ciirrera 
and Carlos d'Espxk. Breaking out on tlic Piciiriiin side wrth 
five tliousand infniitry mrl tlirse liundred c a ~ n l r y  t.licy carried 
al1 tl ie trenclies nnd Iiztteries, ror tlie eolrlicrs fouglit ivitli sur- 
prising nrdonr, but t l~e  gcneiwlri Iinrl Eorp-ktai cvcn to liravide 
tlie mems of spilcing tlic 3tns mlien tnlícn. Mortier tlicn fe11 
with liia reserves upon tlw front and flank of tlie colninn and 
drove it back in dibordcr ivitb a losa of six Iiundrccl lrillcd and 
wonntlcd. It was a Iiartl strtigglc, md tlie Frcncli lost ~everal 
cnginsrm mind foiir liiinrlrerl mcn; hiit wliilr. tlic nc.tion mns 
ticirig foiiglit, Latoiir ñfaul-ioiirg's cnvnlry occiipicd tFic gi-oiind 
between tlie Getiorx and tlie C.~ya, and again cut tlie com- 
municakion witli E l ~ a s  and Cnmpo BTayar. l l c  was l iowmr 
toe wcak t o  mninhin liiinself tltcrc, arid M:~tirIdcu forccd Iiim 
t o  rcpnss tlic Gebora on tlic 9tli : Itlciidiznhcl tlicn g v c  ovcr 
Rndnjoq to  the gnvcrnor Rqfilcl Vcnnclio, antl liitclictf Eiici own 
winp round Xnn Cliristoval. Somc days prcvioiis to ttiese 
evmts tlic Frcncli liad bonilinrdcrl thc plncc; a proceerling 
only miscliievoiis t u  tlicmselvcg fur tlic irilittliituiits fled iu 
grcitt numlicrs to  nvoid tlie da~~gcr, lonving hi>Fiiiid tliem pm- 
visirin 8 wliich rnrililcd hf ciinclin tn  fccd his gnriison. 
Sonlt now seeing that tlic Sliimiartls liar1 p e n t  resources if 
tbcir gcnernls Icucw Iioiv to  usc tlicni, fcnrcd a clinngc of oom- 
innnders or of systctn, and resolved to  briiig t1io sicge to it 
crisis rupidiy; iii Iliiis vicw he storiiicd tlio Parr1:ileiw oii the: 
I l  tli, scnt fiftecii Iiiinrlred cnvalry ucross tlic Guiidinna l o  
Montijo nn tlic 12tl1, nntl tlic 14th tJircu, i;lidT~ into tlio mmp 
about San Cliristu.rd. Ris eti;irts ~vci.c rvcll tiined, foi 
nomana's soldiem, \&o liad lona considcred tiicinselvcs iiidc- 
pendcnt of tlic centrül govcriiiiii:nt, wcre iioiv ciiiñge:erl to he= 
tliat Ctt~tai i r is  wus madc mritain-gerieml o i  Estrcriiatlurn, and 
Tiecrtrnc so unnrlg tlint whcn tlic position b(1liintl tlic Gcliora 
ww acsiirner1, ne onc dnrctl intrlrllo witli tlicm nntl militwy 
discililinc cexsetl. Tlic Spaniarrls I i d  been ex- 
Appcndix 5, 
o. prmsIy counsellerl to entrcnch tlicir camp by 
we,irns+on Tllellington, d o s e  dcsigii ivxs to Iiwe tfiern on 
to  loni 1.irer- nn iinprepiilile post, frorn wlicncc thcy coiiId aid 
pool, ,risa, the gnrrison, aiid prescrvc frce wmmunicntion 
with tlie Alemtcjo unti1 the reinforcements from Kngland 
enabled liitn to rake the sicge. IIendi~~ihcl  hung for twclve 
b y t i  on the Clinstovfil heiglkts, torpid: nnd wlien driver1 from 
thence by tlic Freneti sliclls, Le rtierely destroyed a smnll 
bridp on tlic Gehorn, cnst iip no entrcnchment, nnd kr,pt no 
y n r d  in frnntR: wlrcrcforc, Soiilt, scciiig this ncgligcnce, sud- 
denIy lenped iipon Iiirn. 
l3A'iTLE OF TIIE CXUORA. 
Altlionyh the Giinrlinnn and the Gelmra covercrI the Spmisl~ 
cnnip, %ult hoped to pms h t l i  nnd siiryiriqe the cnieless 
gencrnl ; but first, to mislcncl and deprive Bfendiznbel of tlic 
auppr t  of tlie fort, he thiew sliells again on tlie 17tl1, and 
tlie swell of the rivcrs dclayed tlie great opcration unta the 
18tli. I n  the crcning of tliat daj- tlic cnmlry drcw dowii iTia 
right Iiank of thc Gliiadiana from Ilontijo, wliilc tlic &ilIcry 
and infantry crosccd tlic fcrrg four milca abovc tlie conffuence 
of the Gcbora; tliis combination was cs~ctly time4 nnd prc- 
cisely at daybreak tthe lgtli, fivc t1ious:d jtifankty nnd tlrrec 
tl~ousand ca~lilry wcrc on tlie riglit linnk; but the 'Gchra was 
stifl Lo bc ~iassed iii t ~ c e  of ten tliounand irir:mtry, two tlioumud 
mvalty, u.ud i i i i~~iy m c t l  c m p  folIo~'i~cr~, in ull not l rss  t l i i u i  
fiftecn tliou~nnrl fightiiix mcn. A tliick mist Iiid tlie Prcncli, 
nn S p n n i ~ l ~  post or pntrolc w n ~  in nilvttncc, nntE Soult nft,c~ 
Adiii: tliroir~li thc rimlrs nnrl cxliortiiig liis xoltlicm tri figlit 
stroriql y, commenccd the l-inssrtge of  tlic C ebora the cnvnlry 
forrlcrl five miles iip tlic ~trenrn, tiir infnntry on tlie riglit and 
left o€ tIie brolcen Iirirlge; tlicn some randam shots from 
the Preiidi gris awal<eiictI bfendfariticl, sind tliougl~ tlie 
mist still Iiid all things, a loud clamour, followjng tlic cannon 
sliot, sliometl tliut tlie siirprise wm complctc. Mortiex, acting 
uuder soult, ROOn fornied Iiis linc nf battlc, tiie mist cIenred up, 
and üt eiglit o'clock illa first h a m s  of  tlie sun and of victory 
ffalied togetlicr on tlia Frcndi suldieru; for t.lieir lioi.semt?u 
w r e  rirounci JIendkahd's Ieft, and his infentry cavalry ziid 
pns  IVTC henpctl topethcr in tllc ccntre wnGviil~ te anr? fro in 
disorder. His rigllt, hiiving fifiillcn away from b n  Cliristoviil 
the 17f;li to  nvoid tlie shellq h~r1 no po~ition, antl in a few 
tnoments Girnrcl p h c d  tliree battalions betwccn the Spaniaii 
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centre nnd tbat Eort; tlie artillcry tlien opened and t l ~ e  
Frencli bore onmrd S oue nian to tlio attnck. Bix battalions 
pressed the Rpanish front, Girard struck thcir riglit flank, 
the mvalry cliarged tlieir left, and instinctively the miiltitude 
aowded on tlie centre; but the French intntry closed wit,h a 
destroyiiig muslretry, the howenicn sspurrecl in nitli luose 
liridlm and tho liuge quivcring iniiss wna tirokm: 
hppendix 18, s. II. tlie m~alry fled oiitrigl~t, nnd cven 3fndrlen's Pnrtu- 
pece, regsrdless o€ liis examlile nnd i.ep-tche$ 
sh~mefnlly turned their baclcs. 
At ten o'cluck tl ie fight .mis over. Vinics was taken, 
Ncndixnbcl rtnd Gnrrcm cscnpcd with tliflictilty, Espnfin dono 
made an orderly retrent to Cnmpe Mayor witli two tlioii~nd 
men, A few reached Elvas, tliree tliousilnd got iido Bdqos 
by thc bridre, nine liiiiidred bndies strewetl tlie fieltl, Eight 
thoiisend, including armed fofoilowers, were made primners, 
togetlier with ai1 tlie guns, eoIows, miiskets, arnmunition, and 
baggnge, l t  was a sl~~tnefnl defeat. Soult, wit l~  a sniall fom! 
hatl passd twa dificult rivcri, crirricd a strong position, and 
annihilatetf an a m y  wliich liad becn two yenn in contihnt 
serviw. Mendizabel, i n s h t i  of kstroying tlic bridge over tbe 
üeborrs sliould hxw mst otfiers, tlint he niiglit freely pass te 
nthk tlio Prefich wliilc crossitig tlic Gundiaiia; he sliuiild Iiave 
ripposcd them a p i n  in pnssiiig tlie GeLrtra; or lie migIit hnve 
gonc throitgli Bndxjeri, und fiillcn on tFic t roop~  in tlic trcnch~s 
with Lis whuole army, mliile Xoult m s  s:ill cnlaiig1w.l hebeen 
tLe rivers. 
After the nction tho Frencli cast np eiitrendimerits and 
liosted tliree hnttniions and tlie Iieavy w~ntry o11 tlir position 
gaiiicrl. ~ c x t  dray tlic R ~ ~ E G  Gas renewcrl, ~iiit lic (Iificuity 
mas rendered apparent by the victory. Gntinunl mina 
interrupted the convoys, and nien ~wrc detnched a @ 
didnncv to gratlier provisiuiis; nearirty two tliuusand liad lieea 
killetI or woilnded in tlio two eicgcs nnd tliis Iin~tltlc, many 
werc sicIr, and E ~ l n j o ~ i  wris still powcrful. Tlie giirrison was 
nine tliotisnnd strong, and by tlie ffigIit of tlie iufiabitants 
wdl provided with food, there -rpas no wnnt of atlier stores, 
tlie governor \iras resulute, tho seuson rigorous for the b 
si~gen: no minmudcntion h d  h c n  opcncd witli bfrinscng 
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nnd Wcllington, momcdtarily expccting liis reinfowemen& 
wag e q c y  to Ruccoilr the plwe. Andnlusk wns mmnwhile 
serioiisly menaced. 
CONTLNUATIOY OP THE BLOCKADE OF CADIZ. 
mhcn Grnlnm knm that Soult harl gone to Errtrcm~dum 
he iintlertook ta drive Yictor from liis lines. 
Troops miling from W i a  wcre t o  disembark 
3n rear of the French and be joined by the o f a l i i w  
g k s o n  of Tarifa undm mnjor 13rown, and by 
!:[:+rh' 
three thotisend Spmiards from San Itoque under 
general Eeguines. Contrary winds ddayed the expedition, 
and the de~patcli vessels carrying counter orders to Bmwn 
md Reguiiwr3 lieiiigr likewirie rehrtlml, thwe aficem mtdvanced, 
the first to Meditia, tlie secoi~d to Casa Vieja, Victor got 
notice of tlio dcaign and kept cIose in  his worke until Iie 
Iiearci of tliis failuile in the comhinations, when he sent truopa 
t o  retalta JIctlina nnd the &su. At il~lio sams tinia twe1Ye 
tl~ousand mcn from the northcrn no-rcrnments maclid him. 
nnd, Iiis wliolc forec bciiig twcnty tbuusnnd, he 
h d  fiftccn tliou~nnd in tlie Iincs: tho remninder $ ' ~ ~ ~  
wcrc at San L~icar~ Wcdin~,  nnd otlicr podg, 
Tliis nraq knomn st  CRdiz, liut tcn tho~lssnd infantry and Rix 
Iiundped cavalry n7cre npin embarkerl, being this time to h n d  
at Tarifa and rnarcIi straight on Gliidana. General Znps 
was left in command of tha &la with oders t o  throw a hridge 
over the Xanti Petri neitr tlie sea morith. &?lesteros witli the 
rernnmt of his brol~cn force ww tu menace Seviville, tlie par- 
tidas mere to hold Sebastiani in check, and insurrections were 
expected in all qumtem. 
On the 22nd tEie 33ritish troops pnssed tlieir port in a @e, 
liut lrandecI nt Alesiros, rnnrclied to  Tarifa thc ncxt dny, 
nnd werc joincd liy the twenty-cighth rcgirncnt nnd the fi nnlt 
rampnnics of the ninth nntl eidity-sccond rcgi- 
Appcndix 4, 
ments. Tlius more than four thoiisand cffcctive 2. 
troops, inclrtding tmo cwmpmies of tlie tmutieth 
Portugese nnd one hiindced nnd eighty Gcrman hussam. 
w w  assembled nnder Grahsm ; ail good and hady trutips, 
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and liirnwlf a daring oId man and of a readg temper for 
bnttIe. Tlie cnptain general La. Peca lnnded tlic 27tii mith 
seven thousnnd Spanimds, and Graliam to pi+cscmc unanimity 
ceded tllc wniniliurl ulll~ough ili ivas Contriil to  Iiis instruc- 
tions. Next duy rt marcli rif twclve miIcs carrictl tlicm over 
tlic ridgs wliicli ficpnrnt,~ tlic plnina nf Sim h q ~ i e  from tliose 
of Mcdina and Chiclnna, and Iieing tlien witliiii four leagues of 
tlic encmy's liosts, tlic troops ivere re-organizcd. SIie van- 
guurd was giveil to h~rdisnbal, tlie celitre tu ttic prince of 
Auglonii, tlio reservc, coiii~ioscd of tivo Bpaiiiuli regirn 
and tlic Britisli troops, w m  c o n í i d ~ l  t o  Gnilixni : tlic cm 
of botli natiolis, formcd in one tody, was iint'ier colunel P 
tii~glinm, tlien in tlic Spiliaiiisli scrvice. 
Bcfore tliis Bcg~ines nnd tlic pnrt,idm l id  driven tlie 
Freiich from Cih~u Vieja arid lfcdiatt; Lut geiier~d C~iissagnc, 
bcing rcinforccd from Arcos, liad rctdicn botli plnr~s ond 
cntrcnclicd Metlinn, nctiiig as n covmiiig fmcc to thc lines. 
Mean\vliilc the gcncrals i i i  tlic liiglicr districts of dnddusin, 
seeing tlie peo~ilc rilie for coiniiiotiun, gntliercd tlicir sc~ttered 
troops, anil, followin~ 8iiult's orilcrs, coiiceiitratcd at Scville, 
Ccncrn1 Ecija, niid Cortlolia. Xr i  Grcnadr~ tlic iu~urxcnt.9 
WeriC to wcrc cspccinll y nctivc, nntl Scliastiani, rfoubtful 
Scbartlunl, 
Allinma, if tiie storin m w h l  not lircnl~ on lu's sirlc, con- 
irxrpil 12. centrated troeps at  Ectipona ns a co-veriiig poiiit 
Iiiierwpled. Eur tlic c o u t  liilc, wlieiice lie could casilp p i n  
Ronda. Victor mannerl Iiis worlrs at Jbtn, Snnh RKnriri, 
Puerta Feal, nnrI tlic Trnccndcrn, mitli n ~iiiscrl hrcc o€ 
jurnmentades and rcgrilxr troops; liut lic nssenililc(1 cle-rcn 
tliousand good soldicrs iienr Cliiclunn, bctwce~~ 
'ppcnaix ''P t l ~  roucls u£ Ctiiiil i m r l  Jlcrlinli, tu await tlie 5 7. 
unfolding of tlic dlics' liroject, ivliidl wm not 
long dclayed. b t firrit IA Fcñrl's ninrrli ~iointccl ta  Mcdiiiii 
SicIonia, liia ~anpmrl  stormctl Cnsz Vi+ on tlie 2nd of 
Nard~, and Iie was joinetl Ly Degiiines witli sistccn liundred 
inhntry nnd several Iiurirlrcrl irrcplai. ca~rilry. IIaving 
thcn twclve tk~ousund inf;iiitrj-, ciglit liundrcd Iiomcineii, 
and twent~-four  gnnq lic tiirtictl towiirrls tlic con~ t  nnd 
drove the Fr~ncl i  frain Vcjcr dc In Prontcrn. f l ic  following 
evwing he continucd Es movcineiit, und ut iiine o'cloclí iii 
MARCE, i8li.] BOOK XIL-CHAR. 2. 1 0 1 
ndvmced girarrl of cwalry wns roiited by a French srlnadron, 
lie reached the Cerro de Puerco, callerl by the Englixh the 
hc;dita of  Dlirosx, being tlien four miles from the =;ea mouth 
of tlie Santi Petri. 
Esrosa i~1 a IOW ridge, creeping in from the cosst about 
one mile and a liiilf; it overlooked a high broken pliiin of 
smdE est~nk, bounded on tlia left by tho coast clifi, on the 
right hy the fnrest of Chicliinn, in front by a pini-rvood. 
Rcyond tliis wood n long nurrow height, cnlIcd tlir: Rcrmejq 
filled the tipace bct~vevec~ the dlrnnnsfi cmek lrnd the: sea, nntl 
could be reaclid by rno-i+q ti~rotigh the pine-wood in fmnt, 
or by tlie bmch unrler tlic cliffs. Cmliam, foreaeeing that 
Tictor would come out of Iiis lincs to fight, had previously 
obtained La Peñn's promise to rnnl~e rihort marches, to keep 
thc troops fresh for batttEe, and not to approach 
tlie ene~ny sxcept in a mnss; but in violation *ppdk4m 
9 1. 
of tliis promise, tlie marcli fivni Casa Vieja, made 
on liad ruads ivitli ignomnt guides, Iind occupicrl fifkeen hours, 
and tlie niglit rnnrcli tu Birusa liad becn dill more fa t iy ing  
Thc troops tlisrcfure carne up ia a stmggling mmncr; and 
cre tliey liad xll arrivcrl, Iab Feria, mtliolit dificlosing lii8 own 
sent Idnrrlisnbel, rcinforccd hp n sqrindron and tlirce giins, 
strniglit t o  tlie moutli of tlio %nti Petri. Znyw had cast 
hig bridge on the Znd, and commencd an entrencliment, 
but in &c niglit he bnd been curprised hy the French and 
drivm again into tlic Lla; Lnrrl'iabal's movement was there 
fore dangcmus, yet, nfkr a sliarp figlrt in d i c h  t h e e  Iiundred 
Spmiards fell, be forced the Freuch posts annd effccted a 
j uiiction witll Zayas. 
La h l i a  dcsird tIie British troops to follow, but Oraliam 
Wa8 de~iro~w t o  liolrl t,Iie 333rosn lieight in strengtl~. He 
mgud t l ~ u t  Tictor could noO a t b ~ l i  Lardi~mhI and Znyw, 
as lie would tlius lcnd his flnnlr to thc nllics on Rarosli; 
Lnscy, chid of the Spxniñh stnff, mntrovcrtcd tliis rcasaning, 
nnrl Ln Pcfin pcrcmptnrily commnndcd Gmlinm to mnrrh thc 
Britigh tronps tliroiigh tl ie wnorl to Rrrmga. With g-rr~t 
tempcr be ohycd tlic uncourteous ordcr, but 1cR the flttnk 
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cumpanies of tthe ninth and eiglity-sccond rgimcnts un& 
mzijor Brown to g a r d  liis liaggage : he moved tilso thinliiiig 
Lra Pcnn would remain st hrosn  ~ e i t l i  zlnglonds divisien and 
tlie mvalry, nid tlic morc ctrtninly tlint itpnnisli rlctnchment 
was stiIl on tlic side of hledina. Urt tlic Britisli liad scarmIp 
entereil the w d  in front, whcn La Peiin, witliout notice, 
carried off tlie corps of Iiattle, atid rlirecting tllc cavalry to 
folIo~> rrpaired himseIf by tiylie scaruuri to  Santi Pctri, Emving 
I3nrosn crowdcd witli linggnge nnd protcctcíl only by n, rerar- 
gmrd of four guns and fivc I-iattalions. 
Victor Siatl hitherto kept so close ta tlie forcst of Cliiclana 
that the allies' lintrolcs could iind no ciiemy, wd Graliam'~ 
marcli of only two rniEes seemed mfe, but tlie FreticIi xnurslial 
m s  kccnly mtcliing Iiis opportiinity. Hc had rccnllcil C m  
xage's infnntry from Mcdina Siidonin whcn L n  ReíÍn rprtched 
Bsrwa, and, mornentnrily expoctiiig its atrrival, fclt so surc 
of success, tiiat ttlie g r e ~ t  body of Frencli cavalry, thea wt 
Bfedins and Arcou, was dircctcd upon Tejer nnd otlicr point~ 
to cut otf thc fii$tivcs nftcr tlic hnttir. He IinrI foirrteen 
pieccs of artillcry anrl ninc tliousand excellent 
Appndrx 17* soldiers in liand commanded by Laval, Rufin, and 4 1. Vol. 11, 
Villatte. From tliese lie draftcd tliree p a -  
dier FiatQlions to form rcservcs, nttacliiiig two of tliem nnd 
thrcc sqnndrone of  cn\,ali.y to It~~ffi~l'~ llrig: (lo ~vllicli fomrd 
bis left w!ng: Ghe ot.hcr wi~it~crl on Laval's lirigxde wliich 
formed Iiia centre. Vill~itte's brig~de~  t v o  t110usanLnd five 
liundred strong, originally on tlie Bcmejn, had retired from 
thenee beforo Lardixrabal, and was riuw ~iusted close to a 
bridge on the Almnnza ercck, to cover thc worlin of the 
camp ~ n d  to watch tlic Rp~panish forcm at Srrnti Fc t r i  atid 
the Bermeja 
Cassagne had not yet m i v d ,  but Tictor seeing Graliam'8 
corps in ttie wood, Zayas and L~rdixuhl  on the Bermeja, a 
tliird body and al1 kbc bagpgc on the %rom licight, a fourth 
In rnoveinent by the comt, anrl a fiFth still on tlie march from 
Vqer, paured at once into the plein and begun the battla 
Laval was directed agaiiiist the British in thlin w a d  Victor, 
leading Ruffin'e troops in person, ascended tlie rear of the 
Rnrosa hcidit, nnd tlirre interwpted t,he Spanish dchchment 
coming frnm Mcrlina. He rIrovc thc rcnr-griinrd o f  thc IiiI1 
to\vz~rtIs tlic scn, dispcracd the bnggnge and follnwcrs in nll 
directions, and took three Bpnnisli giins; bnt major Brown 
kept his companies iii good ortfer, and though unable to stem 
the torrent ~loivly retired into tbe plain nnd wnt to Graliam 
for ordcrs. Tlmt gcnernl was ncnr Bermeja, and sirnply 
nnmered, íigl~t l thcii fncingr abont Iiimseif regnincd the plain 
witli grcat celwity, expcctiiig to find La Peñü with the curpa 
oF h t t l c  aiid tlic cavalry o11 tlie Barosa Iiill, mien tiie view 
ripencrl lio belield RuRn's brig~de, liiinlred by the two grenadier 
Iiattttlions, nc:tr tlie summit eu tile onc sida, tlie Spanidi rmr- 
qiiiird anrl thc b a , ~ n g c  flying towt~rd tlm sea on thc athcr, 
tlic Frcnch ca~-aIry followinfi tlic fugitivca in gmd ortlcr, 
T~lnvnl closl: iipen Iiis nwn lcft flniilr, nntl La Pcñn nowhcrc ! 
Tn t l i ~  (lc~pernte ~itnntion, feeling tlmt a retrent fo Rerrnejh 
w-oiild l~ring tbe enemy pcll-mcll with tlie xllim on to that 
narro\v ridgc, and must lie disastroug Gmiiam resoIved to 
attnck, althaugh the Irey of t he  fieIr1 of  bnttle wns in tha 
enemy'n possession. Ten guna, nnder major Dunmn, instantly 
opcncd a terrific fire apinst Lavar3 mlumn, and colonel 
Andrew Darnad ninning vehemently out aitli his riflemen 
and svme Portubwese cornpitnies, corntneticed tlie figlit while 
t!ie rest of tl ie Britieli troops, witl~out any attention to 
rqyimeiits or brigntles, so mdden wm tlio affair, fomed two 
masscs, with one of which generul Dillces marched agoinet 
Riiffin, wliile coloncJ Whentely Icd the ~ t b e r  ngninst Lnd .  
Dunmn'~ guna rnvnged tlie French ranlrs, La~nl5 ~i.tillery 
replied vigorozisly, Ruffin'~ bntteriefi took WlicateIy*$ coliimn 
in flank, ilnd the infantr~r on both sides pressed f omrd  
cagerly and with a pealing rnusket~" But when the masses 
d r m  near, a fieree rapid proIonged charge of the 87th re$- 
ment arerthrew the first line of the French, and though tlm 
1at.ter fouglit mnghly, they were daslied violently upon tl~e 
~econd lime and h t h  being broken by the shock went off, 
the reserve battalion of grenadiers, hitl~crto posted on tha 
righb, alone remsining to mver tlie retrmt. Meaiiwliila 
Brawn hvkg received Graham'a laconic order, fdl hedlong 
upon Ruffin; and though nearlg half of hís ¿it+neliment ment 
down nnder the enemy's first fire, he niaintninctl tlie fight, 
nntil Dilkep' column, rvhidi hnrl crosscd a dccp liolloiv imd 
ncver atopt cven t o  rcform tlie rcgimcnts, nrrivccl, ivith llttle 
oder indeed but in n figlitiiig mooii, aiid tlicn tlic \r.lioTc nia 
up towards the mimmit : tlicrc wns no slnckneas on eitlici side, 
for nt the verj edge of tlie asceilt tlieir galImt opponciits met 
thcm, when a dsfi~dful aud for soiric tiine a duiilitful cornliat 
raped. PinalFy Ilufiii, nntl Cliniiilron Roiiñseau, d i o  cum- 
mnnded tlie clioscn pennili crs? fcll, botli mortal1 y ivountled, 
the English bore strongly onwnnl, and tlieir slauglitering fire 
Eorced tIie Frencli from tlic hill ivitb tlic loss of tlircc guns 
and many \irave soldicrs. Lhc discomtited divisions, rctiring 
concent,riricnlly from tlic diffccrcnt points of linttlc, sririn mct, nnd 
~ 4 t h  infinitc ~ipirit cndtavoured to reform rand i.cne!v tlic action, 
but tlir: play of Duncaii's gune, rapid nnd murdcrous, i.c:idcred 
tlio attcmpt v a i ~  ; Victor tlicri rliiithi tlic ficld of liattlc, rind 
the Britisll11avirig hten tweiity-four liuuru undcr iirms mithout 
food, lverc too cxhaiistml to pursnc. 
Wliile tliwc terrible combiits o l  inSnntry wcrc figliting, TAL 
Peíín lookerl idy on, ncitlier sending Iiis cnvzlry, nor his 
liorse-arbillery, nor any pnrt of liia army to tlie nssistxnm of 
bis nlly, nor yct rnenwing Vil1:~tto wlio ivas closc to  him and 
compnrntivcly x\-c.cnl<. Tlic Spnninli Wiilloon gnards, tlic rcgi- 
ment of Ciudnd h z l ,  nnd some guerilln cavnlry, turned 
indccd without oders nnd carne iip just as tlic actioii cewed; 
and it sns erpcctcd thdt Wliittingliam, an Englisl~rnzn, com- 
manding o po~vcrful hody of Spniiisli horsc, mo~ild 1iwc done 
ns much-liut no stroke in nid was striiclc by a Spanish 
sabe that d:iy, altliough the Prench cavivnlry Jid not cxccetl 
two huildrcíl aiirl fifty men, and it ia cridciat tLe eight I i und rd  
undcr Wliittingliam iiiiglit, by swcepitig ruuiid Elie lcft of 
Rtiffin's division, hnve rcndcrcd tlic dcfcnt riiinous. Sa cerhin 
intled WM tliirr, that FredericEr Ponsonby, drnwing oti  the 
hundrcd and eighty Germnn hussars belonging to tlie English 
amy, reuclied tlic ficld of httlt., cliarged tlie Pceiich aquarlrong 
in their rctrcnt, ovcrthrew t l im ,  tuoli: two guns, and cven 
, n rons ~ttCmptcd though vriiiil y t o  sahrc ~ o u s s c n ~ i a  cliosen hritt 1' 
Tliis was tlie figlit of Bwom. Sliort, for it Iasted only ono 
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hour and e hnlf, violent nntI bywly, for fifty officcrs, sixty 
sergcnnts, eleven hundred Rritisli soldiem, and more than twu 
tliousand French wwe killed and wounded : aix guns, nn eagle, 
tmo generds, both mortnlIy woiiudetl, topther witli four 
hundred 0 t h -  prisoners, fell into the liands of tlie victors. 
Gral~am remabed soine liours on tlie heiglrt, still haping La 
Peñz wuuld aivnl~e to tlie pro~pect of success and glory whicli 
tIie oxtrerne valour o€ tlia Eritisli had opcned. Four tliou- 
snnd men md n powcrful artillcry I id  come over tlle Santi 
Petri, and t,he 8pnnich gencral was thcrcfore nt tlic l i c d  of 
tvelvo tlioumnd infuntry and c i ~ l i t  liundretl cnvnls; nll frcsh 
trooprc; hrforc liim wcn! tlir, scmnins cif tlie Frcnch linc o€ 
bi~ttlo rdrcnting in tEie grc~ittcst dimrrlcr upon 
Cliicliznn; liut miIitnry fccling WM cxtiact in liim, 'm 
xnd Graltliam no longcr nlilc to cntliirc tliis sccnc, 
lcft the r ? ~ ~ t n r d  on tlic Rcrincjn nnd filcd tlic Xritíñh t m o p ~  
ovcr tlie bridge into thc Ida. 
On the Frencli &de, Cnssagnc's rcscrvc cnmc np from 
Medina mil a coiincil of mar \vas helrl in flie night of the 5th. 
Yictor, altliougii natnnlly of a desponrling Gernpcr, propoxed 
anotlier nthclt, h t  tfie siiggcstion wns ill-rcccivetl, annd tlie 
Gtl~, &iral Kcxts landed liis scumen nnd marines md &S- 
mantled, with exception of Catalina, cvcry fort from Rota ta 
Santa Mari&, and even obtriiiied rnomentnry possessioii of the 
l~tter place. This ceusd such nlarm in the Frencli cnmp, 
tlint 'STictox, leaving garrisous at the great pciiuts of Ls lines 
and a renr-parJ. nt Chicl~nii, rctrmttterl leliiild tlie Abs,,met of Smi Pdrri, where lio expected t u  Lo immcrliittely ltilit~ry 
nttziclrctl ; and ii Ln Pcña hntl cven thcn piidicd p 1 5 r t K  
to ChicInna Gi~i~I~nrn antl Kcats ivcrc rrilling to 
.d 
make a, sirnultaneous attaclr npon tlie T r o d e r o  ; out tivo d n p  
pnssed without even a Spanisli patrole folloiving the Frcnch. 
On the 8th Tidor returned to Chiclana, mhercupon La P ~ Ü B  
rt?crossetl tlie Santi Petri niid destroped tlic bridge; liis detaeh- 
ment on tlie ~ i d e  of Mcdina wris tEiufi cut off from tlie Isla, and 
soon a f t e ~ ~ d s  retired l o  AIgesiras. 
Al1 tlie paosnges iu tliis extrnordinary bzttle werc broadly 
markecl, anrl la l'eñn's contemfiible weukness waa surprjsingly 
contrasted witli tbe hcroic vigour of Grdmm, whose attuck wns 
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nn inspirntion rnthcr thnn a rcsolution, rio wisc 40 finddcn wt~.as 
tlie cfccision, so swift so canclusive tlie clccciition. Tlie 
original plan of the enterpriae ha however becn censured. 
Sehastiani, it is srtid, mi@. by mo"ng on tlie reitr of the 
allies, havn crusbed tlistii, and tliey liad no rig1:lit to a~lcu1uta 
upon I E ~ R  infictivity. Tllk is ~hnI101v criticiñin. Graha~n, 
wcighing thc nnf8urnl dislikc of cinc gcncml to scmc i~nder 
another, judged tlmt Eebastimi lroulrl not hastily fibanindon Iiis 
o m  distrjct, rnenaced as it wati 1 ) ~  inmirrection, tii siirniir 
Victur Sefore it was clear wlicre tlie LIow ivns to be struck. 
TIic distnnce fmm Tnrifn tu CJI~iclnnra fifty niilca, Sclins- 
tiani's nearesf post to Chiclñna wns abovc n liiinrlierl, and tlie 
object of tlie xllies could not be 1~no-m until tlicy pnsserl tlie 
mountains separating Tarif~ from iilctlina. Cotntiiniiig tllase 
niora1 and pllysimL conaiderntions, Gnlinrn exlirctctl scverat 
dnys of frec nctinn, rtnd tlius it linpbyipnerl; ivitli ii wortliy 
colleaguc he \voulcl have mised tIic lilockntfc, nntF innrc flian 
tli~t wuld not Iinve bccn hopcd, as tlie Fmncli i d d  l iavt 
concentratea before Cadiz or &out Seville or Xcija, xnd tliey 
liad still fihy thousanci men in Aiidalusiii, Tlic rcnl error of 
tIic French 3 2 ~ ~  bccn pointal out hy Nnpolcon. Soult dissemi- 
nated his force~ too widely, and mrlilc tinrikilfiil cnrnbine~tions. 
Geville and tlie lines at Cadix mere the importnnt points ta 
guard dnring liis nhaence; lie sliould tliereforc liave collected 
11is liospitnls in Ekvillr, leaving Iiis smttcrcd p t s  free to move 
t o  uny point. Sehnstinni nnd Godinot shoiild Iinvt! licen untler 
Tictor's ordem, w110 could tlien hnve dram them t o  his 
succour in time, and cruslied tlic allics. In tliis manner 
Sehstiani miglit oertainly hsve prevented tlie exlidition alto- 
getlicr; but Grnliam l m w  Selisatiani was not undm Victo& 
commanrl, and it wns rt proof of genitia t o  rely ns he diil on 
the effect of the insurrections in Crcnada. The errar mti. mith 
Eiehm~iani, wlio suffered his sixteen tliousmd exccllent troops 
t o  be paralysed by some insurgents. Vjctor's atta& wm well- 
timed, and vigorous; s i t l i  a few thousand morc froops he 
would have dcstropcd thc allics. The unconquerable English 
spirit prevented tliis disaster; biit if Grabnm liad given way, 
cr cren hesitntsd the arniy mugt have bcen drivcn like sheep 
into an enelosur~ hs~ing tlie Almnnxa ereelr on ona side, tlie 
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 ea on tlia otlier, t11e Ssnti Pctri to bar tlieir ff igllt, atid tbo 
enemy lianging on tlioir rear in al1 tlio fierceness of vietory. 
Indeed, such ivns La Pclia's miscondud t h t  tlie French, 
althoiigh defcntctl, gnincd thcir mniii point; the Eiloclcde was 
renemcrl; nnd ditritig tlic nct,ion rt Fmch  rl~t~nclirncnt, pn~sing 
thc Srrnti Pctri ncnr tlie bridge uf X~tnxo witliout difficulty, 
broiiglit back prisoiicrs : witli a kw more troopsVictor iniglit 
I ~ T - e  seized the Isla. nallesteros menaced Seville during the 
opcmtions, but wns chiven hck in a misernble condltion t o  tlie 
Aroclie liills by Daricau. 
Tiolent disputes arose in Cadiz. La Peña, in an address to 
the Cortes, claimed tlie Yictory for liimself : he said tliot tlie 
arrangemeiits previous to tlie Iiattle mcre mde with the 
kno~vIvlwIge and apprahatiuti of tlie Engli& general, and the 
Inttcr's setreat to the Isla w~ tlie red rcause oT failure. Lascy 
m.ilrl Cruz-hfurgeon, &u puLilisIted i n d m t e  acctiuuts of the 
i~ction, md lid deceptivc plam engravcd t o  uphold tlicir 
statements. Graham, incensed at thcso unn.orhhy proceedinp, 
wrotc n 1cttcr to the Rritisli cnvoy in which hc cxposed Im 
Peiia's misconduct; ho refused wjth disdain the title of p n d e e  
of tlie fiwt CTMS voted to liim hy tlic Cortcrr, nnd nrhen T,wcy 
uscd eñpressions rci~tive t.o tlic aetion pemondly offensive, he 
cnfoiced m aplogy with Iiis swod. Rxving thiis shown 
liirnself mperior to !lis opponents at dl points, t l i ~  pllxiit  old 
m m  relinquislid his conimand to geiied Cooke, arrd joined 
lord Weiiington's army. 
Ah-nnrcc~a continiied to he riisk~~.rirlirii l y insiirrrctinn, hiit 
Soult's resolution to talre Btirlnjos i.einniiicd unslirtkcn, nnd 
carly iii Marcl~, tlie appi~aclies beiiig cnri-ied by eap to tlie 
covcred wxy, mines w\.ere prcpamd to  liluiv in tlic cuuriter- 
scarp. Xaftlel Mciinclio tlkc govcrnor iviis Iiowcvcr n rwolutc 
mnn: liis courns ?can(] nctivfty gninctl the conftdcncc of his 
troops, hia sdlies weTe frequent anznrl vigorous, lifs fire mns 
supcrior to that of thc Frclicli, nnd hc liar1 ciitrciiclicrl the 
~trects  Iieliind tlic breadi; but on tlic 2nd Rtarcli, in a succcas- 
iul oully, lie \\.as killcd, and tlie cunirnnnd fcll to lniiis, u i r i n  
so linse tlint a w-orsc coiild iiowlicrc lie fountl. Tlicn thr 
spirit of the gnsrifion ~ u n k ,  tlie Frcricli pzssed tlic ditcli, a 
lorlpncnt \vas marle on one O£ tlie rnvelins, tlie rnmpnrt 11-aa 
hrc:iclied, and tlie p1:ice vas suiiimoiied prcviuus to  tlie 
rissnult. 
At  tliis time tlzc p c n t  crisis of tlic cnrnpnign in Fort~ipl  
having pítss~l, a strong Iiotiy of nritisli nnrl Portiipcse trtiopa 
mm in rnarch +m rnixc tiie siegc. In tliree diRcrcnt ways, 1iy 
telep-npll, liy lcttes, by a coiifidentisl messenger, Imas was 
told tliah hlasseiia 1vu8 i i i  selrcal, and xii ariiiy :~ctu$ly iri 
mnrcli to siiccoiir tlic plncc. Tlic hrcnrli wna shill imprnc- 
timiile, provisions wcre pIentih11, tlie g-arrison \vas above eig-ht 
tl~ousand atrong, nnd tlic PrciieIi arniy rcduceil to lcsc tIi,w 
fourteca tiiousaiid mcn: Imas rmd tIie lcttei, rcceived tbe 
rncssligw wd intitantly surrendered, lianding over nt tlie &ame 
momcnt thc intclligcncc thus ohtnincd to  tlic cncmy. ñ e  
only dcninnded tlint hiu grennrlicw shoiild nisrch oiit of thc 
breacli, and it m g a n b d ,  Iriiit be was forced to enlzrge the 
opeiliirg Ilimself ere they muld do se I Yet tliis man wwlio liad 
secured lik uwii Iilicrty wliilc consigniug liis Ectlow-soldiers to 
a prison, mns ncvcr piinicilietI hy tlic! Spnnigh nilcrs; for though 
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procesa I d e d  dnring tlle wlioie war. Wben the place fell, 
JIortier marclied against Cnmpo ñhyor, and Latoiir Mauburg 
s~ixcit Alhqaerquc, and Valencia $Alcantara maliing six 
liunrlretl pririoncrs, hut Soult, alnrmed by tFie effects of t l ~ e  
bzttlc of hrirosrr, returued to biirlrtliisia. He liar1 in fifty dsya 
ma~stcred Euur Erirtrcrirjes urid invwted a fihli; he liad lrilled or 
tlislicmerl ten tliousniid uicn, and m d e  twenty tliuusilnd 
prisoners \vith a forco nt no time exmciling tlie number of his 
captiva. Qrcnt itaring csnrl succcssful 1iis opcmtians h d  becn, 
y(:t tlic prineilinl 01)jcct ~ 1 1 9  fru~t~rntcd, hflt~~scnn wa~i in fiill 
rctrc~f~\Vclli~igton's coinliintitions Iincl pnl~icd the hbnd of tlie 
conqneror ! 
Vl i i l c  tlie sicge wns proccrding, no cliange took place in tlie 
main positions of cithcr nnny nt %iitnrcm. Afasscnra nm 
enconragctl by tlie dcotitnte state nf tlie Portriguese nrmy, 
ivhicli he tiolicil woulrl Tirc:ilr iip tlie nllixnce; for tlie nntive 
troops werc stnrvinp in tlicir oivn coiintry ivlille the Eritidi 
\vere weIl fed, niid tlic rlcsertcrs from tlic fomcr, withoiit 
knorving tlie cni;se, Iinrl n story, as triie as it wns pitiaMc, to 
tcll of tlicir mirjciics. Tlic English pncrnl, certraiii tlint tlie 
Prendi, rcduccd Ly sicktiess, inust soon guit tlieir pound if 
Iic coulil rclicvc Badajos, orlFy wtiitcd for Iiis rciiiforcments to 
acnd Tkresford witll fourtcen tl~nusxnd men agaitinst Soult. 
Tlrc dercah uu thc Geburü riiiried tliis ~irojoct, tlie cxpcctcd 
reirrCurccriiei~tY rvorild uut sufice Eur tlie exccutian, hlmseiia 
could uot bu skarved out in tirne, and tliere orily rutnainerl tlie 
rcsourcc cif a gcncrnl Iiuttle,-tlke prince of Esling lid tlicrc- 
fmc rcason for snying tlint so far from licing niilcd by Soult 
Iic Iind coucrctl tliiit rnnm1inl7a opcrntions. Wcllingtnn'u rlcfiigti 
w:iq t u  post tcn tlio~~qnnd mcn Zicfnrc S~nt~nrcm to Iiold Rrynicr 
in clieclc; ta mnlíc Beresforul cross tlic Tagus nt Ahmntm alid 
fa11 on Rf:isccnn's rcnr; nnd witli tlic rcst of tlic wmy, moving a 
by Rio 3Iuyor and Treincs, te driipe baclr the cnclny's ccntre 
anrI riglit, cut off tbe leR nt Santarern, and drjvi! it into the 
Tagus. Eut day aftcr day hc lookcd in vain for Iiis reinforce- 
nientu, TEey liad been e111b:trked in Jauuury aiid woirlcl llave 
resrLed LisLun ltcfore tlie euJ oT tliit moutI1, ir tlie iuhnird, 
&ir JOSC~II I'orlre, lid tnlrcn tadvaritge uf a fwotirnllc ivind, 
hloiviug whcn the troops {vere first put on board; but th@ 
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opportunity mas negleded, contrnry gnles iollowcd, mnd tlle 
oidinary voyage rif ten days was pnilongcd for six wecks. 
Massena's situittion liowvever \as becoming very pcrilous. 
He could not Iisdiiego AIiraiites, and tlist lilnce, altliough a 
strntcgic ~ioiet for tlie allics who hnd a movmble bridge, wns 
not so for him, as it dicl not give x liassngc over tIic river. 
Three courses remained for d~oice. To force a passagc of the 
Titgus aloue, to  ~ a i t  Soulb's co-opewtion, or to retrcat. He 
seorned inclined towards the fir~t, showing grcat jenlougg of 
tbe entrenclimenh opposik the rnoutli of tlie Zezere, nnd 
moving bis ha t s  oa wlieei carriages clown tlie bank of the 
Tws, as if to ularm neresford and make bim wncentrntte t o  his 
left. Hia demonstratians produccd no efíect, Bsresford held 
his groirnil, and wns ao vigilnnt thnt ncit,hcr spy nor ofñce 
could pasa Iiis line, Massena only knew tliat Soult  as lwfore 
Badajos, notliing more. Meanwhile siclcness ivasted the Fsench, 
famine meuaced them, discipline was loosened, the Imding 
g~nernls w r e  at ~ o p s  disoord, nntl tlis conspirncy tu place 6t. 
Cyr nt the Iicwl of nll thc nrrnics in opposltion t o  tlic wperor 
w a ~  still smouldcring. These acc~imnlati~ig difficulties nver- 
a m e  Massena's obdurncy, 11e pro~niscd to retreat when he lid 
na more provisions left bl~zn would mipply him for the march; 
and tliis tnrdy ossent a u s  given wlwn ly llolding Iiis position ten 
days longcr Iic ~ o i i l d  Iinvc insumrl tlic co-operntion af Soult? 
It \vas l~owever ming  from hirn by neccssity, and gcnernl 
Pelet, speahing 3Taasends sentiments, says tlint Soult's sjeges 
ivlien lie sliould have wme down to  tlre Tagus itt once were the 
great ctinse of fniliim;-it would LB juster to say tliat Welling- 
ton's coniliinntions, wlticli bnrrorl tlie r o d  +,a So~ilt, cffccted 
t l ici~ object. Refore tlie sieges of Olivena and Badajos, Men- 
dizdel could bave assemble(l twenty tl~ousnnd men on Soult'a 
rcar if he moved to~vards tlie Ttips; there was a large My 
of militia on  tlie Ponful nnd tlie RI* wwho conld by Alimtcs 
havc joincd Bcrcsford, ancl thrtt mnrslid Iind foirrtem thoumnd 
rqdar ttroops bp~ides ordciianra Wellingkon aIso hacl so 
rnany Iioatfi thnt be couId llave tlirown troop over the river 
with a celerity farereachilig any effort of Jlassenrn to join 
Snult, who would thus hnvc to p n ~ s  thirtpfirc thousnnd men 
and sereral fortresses to  iigb t a auperior army, 
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Tlie difficulty of oommunimtion was always a stumbling- 
bloclc f o ~  the French rambinationa in Spain. At this time 
Napoleon l i d  ramodeUd the opnimt ion  of his troope in a 
rnrsnncr to give Massena p a t  relief. TEie king's furce was to 
bc diminialicd, Soult's wm to bo augmented; Drouet mas to 
join Morticr with cIc.rcn thoumnd of tlie 9th corps. tlic 
rcrnnindcr nf whicli was to Iic incorporntcd in thc dinsiona 
of tlie army of Portttgal irnrler Cla118el and Foy. Marmant; ww 
to siipemde Ney witli thc sixth eorpg Loison m remover1 
to the sccond corps, and Eessjeres wis to sena six ixthousand 
men to Cindad Rotlrigo in sirpport o£ general Claparede. 
Seven tlioiisand of the young paras  were to occupy Zarnora 
in observntion of the Gdlicinns, nnd the remninder were fo he 
at Valladolid mith strong cav J ry  p0st.s between to inqitre fra. 
quent intelligence of whnt was passing in Portiigai. fliese 
rlisporiitioiis, & an exrlier period would hme enabletl Mzssrns 
t o  ndopt Fsny linc of operalions without regrcrtl to hia originnl 
liase, and made hls comman{l easier by remoiing captious s u b  
ordinntes; but they (lid not remh the armies iintil a late 
pcriod, znd in tho cnd of Februa l  tlic Frencli forces about 
Santnt;ai-em lieing redticed t o  fifty tliousand fighting men, excIu- 
sive of Druuet\ troops about Leiriu, could no longer defentl 
tlieir exteilded ~iositiuns ag-ainst Wellingtoh'e projected xbtack. 
Bence wlien tlie pririce of Esling Iinew from tlie fidalgus tlvt 
Ghe Iong-expectcd reinforcements from Englmd had lunded at 
Listion cin tlie 2nd of &Iarch, lie commenced bis retreat, and 
on tho 6th all hia positions mere void. 
Severa! pmjects were con~idered. lo. Athnipt to pass the 
T a p s  Iictivcen Punbete aud Santarern by bolits, or possibly 
by fords, wliicli mere ofkn pmticriblc afkr e week of dry 
wentlier. 29 Fall liad< by Sobreira Formom upon Cnstello 
Brnnw, nnd cominunicato by I'lnsclicia with tlie Iring, anJ with 
Sodt  by AdIutntnrn. 3". Rctmt  by tlic Estrada Nom annd 
Eclrnonte, to Snliiigd, anrI aftcmilriis act t~ccording to circum- 
Rtancc~. 4'. Gsin the hiondcgo, aiid asccnd tlic left bank of 
thnt river towards Cuxrda and Alnieida, or, eroaqining it, mar& 
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upon Oporto through an untouched conntry. OF thcse four 
plan3 tlie first ivas thought perilous, Icciiuse the weatlier was 
toa uiisettlcd to be sure oE tlie fords. Tho second and tliird 
were rIil'Iicult from the ruggedness of  tlie Sobreira, and don- 
gcrous, ticmurro thc aIlies could break oiit by Abrantcs upon 
thc flank of the n m y  dii le  in retreat. Mnssena decided to  
gain the hlonde*, but ivitIi intent t o  lialt behind it nnd 
d u c e  Oporto willi a dctaclimc~it. For Iie cxlculated tbat tlie 
junetion of ti10 niiitli corps niid otlicr troops from Lcon, would 
mise Iiis forcc t o  sevcnty tlinuanntl inen, anrI rnntilc Iiim te 
remain tlierc nntil grc~.t,ter mcnris wcre prcparrcd for ta reneived 
adclrnnce agninst Lisbon by botll 'tianks of the Tqyis, with an 
interiiiediate corps on the Zcxere, afkr tlie ernperor's o0ind 
scheirie. Tliis deuigii iavolved, as n 1irelimin:iry step, a ilaiiic 
niarcli, with moiu: tlixn ten tlioiisniid sirli nicn find nll tlic army 
storcs, iincler tlic bead of an rilile a<lver.s~ry: yct tliis Iie effected 
lilre a grcnt commander. 
Coii~ir~encing l ~ y  tlie rlestniction of amnunition, and lill 
guns ncit liurscrl, Iie passctl Iiis siclr niid biiggagc Iiy degrces 
vpon Tliomnr, lrc~ping oiilg his figl~tinc mrii in front, nild 
strongly ín~licai~ing nn iiitciition to  Iiars tlic Xcxcre. nut 
when tlie impdirnents liar1 grtiiiccl tivo marclies, Ncy sud- 
denly assemliled tlic sixtli corps and tlie cavnlry nn tht. Lys 
near Leiria, ns if to  ailvnlict! xpi!ist Turrec YcJmr ; tlius 
liolifing Wcllin~ton ln su~peiisc, wliilc tlic ñcconti i ~ i i d  ciglitli 
corps, quittinp S:int~rcm Trcmcs nnrl Alcnnliete in tlic night 
of the 5tl1, M1 bnck by Pcrnes iipoii Toirc3 Novas nnd 
Thornnr, nnd dcstroyet! tlie Iirirlges oii tlic Alvidla Iieliiiid 
theui. Next rnor~iiiig tlie briats werc biil.iit ut l'uiilicte, aiid 
Loisun rctrrat~d 1~y t,lic road of Eyiinal to covcr tlic fl itiilr o€ 
thc nziiin line of rctrcnt; lic wns i '1~1To~~cd by Reynier hiit 
tlie rcst of the army rnarle npid conccntric rnarclics to~~aiula 
a position in front of Ponibnl. Tlic linc irf inrivement to the 
3Iondcgo wns tlius seciired, and furir rlrigs p i n c d ;  for Wel- 
lington, altliougli kuuwing a rctrent tviis iii Iirogrcss, could 
take no dccir1ci.l stcp, lcst hc dioiilrl opcn tlie lincs fo his  
ndver~ry. Nevertlieless he liad m d c  Rcrrñfortl rloqe tnmards 
Abinntcs the 5tI1, nnd on t11e 6th finiling rtt dnj-liglit tliat tlie 
h~aiit:ireiri caIup  vas abandon~cl~ he fullo\~~ed Reynier witL his 
OiVU fíIr!% 
Thomar seemed tha F m c b  point o€ mncentrntlon, but ae 
thcir bonts were supposcd ta be still at Punhete, geneml 
Ste\i.art wea directed to cross tha T ~ U R  at Abrmtes with the 
grent~t pmt of 13eresfod's troopii; tlic light division moved to 
Pernes mhae the broken bridge was rapidly restored, and the 
first, fourth, and sixth divisiuns with twu brigdea of c a v a l ~  
mmhcd on IXolegao. When it mns found that Massena bad 
bnivied his boata: the Abrantes bridge wns floated down the 
Tnps  for Stewart to cross nnd move by tlie shostest line upon 
Tlicirnar, ttnd on lhnt poinh also tlie divtyions at Golegno were 
directed. T ~ B  Iine of l-etreat beilig tlien clexrly prououncsd 
for tha h'londejio, the main borly blilted at Thornar, but the 
ligl~t division tlie Geman Iiussars iuid tIie royal dragoons fol- 
lowd klie 8th eorps snd took two liundred prjsonem. During 
this marcli, in an oliscure plaoe anlong the hih ,  a largo liciuee 
was discovered filled wjth taming peraona. Above tliirty 
Nomen and children were alrendy dead, md sittiug by tlie 
botlies were fifteei~ or sixtcen living Iicirigs, af wliom only one 
wm a maii, and nll so enfcebled as t o  be unrai.de te swallow the 
littlc food tlint could bc offcmd t e  tlicm. Shc youngcst had fnllcn 
first, al1 tlic cliildrcn wcrc dead. nonc wcrc cmaciatcd, hut the 
rniisclcci of tlicir fticcs wcrc invnrinbly drnwn trranwcrscly, 
giving a la11~1:1iEng nppcnranct: rinimn,~innbly ghns~y. Tlie 
mnn ~emned mmt e n e r  for life, t1ie women paticnt and 
resiped, tlicy hnd rarefulIy covered and arranged tlie 
botlies of  the dend 1 
Wbilc part of tbc amy thus traclred tlie French, the tliird 
and fiftli divisions moved from Tomes Qedras upon Zeiria, and 
tlie Abrantes' boats dropped down the il*.er to Tancos to form 
a new bridge; tliat eeñeded, the second and fourth divisirins 
and some ca~elry coming back from Tliomar, rewussed the 
Tagg t o  succour Badajos; and in tlmt view alsu Beresford, 
wlio liad remained at smt a brigade of cavalry to 
portalep.  
WelIiugton, misled by a Ietter from T m t ,  by informatiun 
o h h i n d  in biitnrrm, md by bfmsends fird movemcntdi, 
thoug-ht on thc 7th thn retrent would be by Puente Murwlla; 
on the 8th be trembled fur Colinbrn,; but the 9th the princc, 
instesd of continuing hia retrogrtlde movcment, concentrateti 
the foiirth and eighth corps and Montbrun's covalry on ri high 
table-lmd in front of Pomhl, wliere tlie light division skir- 
rnished with tlie d v a n d  post$, and in a cavnlry iiglit tlie 
Geimans took some prisoncrs. Tliiii was: ~ierplexing. 1'1'3 fight 
with dvgntage it woiild be ncccsaary to bring iip thc troops 
d ~ t i n e d  to relieve Badajos. To decline battle would be giving 
up Coimbra and the untouched eountry beliiiid tLe hioniiego 
to Oporto, and Massenn woulrl retire as a conqueror. Wbile 
thus crnbamassed, Wellington received 1cttcr.s from Blaclnjna say- 
ing the place could hold out for a montli, wliicli decirled tlie 
qnestion; tlie fourtli clivision and the lieavy cavalry, then at 
Tancos on rnarch fcir tlie Alemtcjo, were recalled, general 
Niglitiiigale was sent witll a brignde of thc fixst division and 
somc horse by Espina1 to follow Fkynier, and tlie rest of the 
army closed concentrically npon Pombal. How dangerona a 
captain Massena could be was liere proved. He had main- 
tained an a m y  for nearly six inontlis in a country s u p p o d  
to he incaphle o€ su~tnining it for fifteen dayri, and crtrricd it 
off witli consumrnate alrill. Mnviiig tlic 4th, it was the 11th 
before sufficient troops oould be ausemliled to fight him at 
Pomlial ; in tliese seven days hc executcd a very difficult opera- 
tion, pined four marclics, and orpnixcd Iiis retredt; had rain 
fdlen the first day, the dlics could not lime I>rought rirtilfmy 
by those bnd roads; tiut 1ie had before sent off or destroyed all 
his guns, cxcepb a few light pieces. 
Pack's brigade nnd tlie cavalry; tlie EA, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 
and liglit divisiow; and t.lie Portuguese troops, attaclied to  
mcli division Iike the Latin auxiliuries to the Rornan lcgions, 
wcrc awcnililing ba figl~t on thc lOth, wlicn Massena, wlio lid 
sent bis bnggnge ovcr the Sourc river in tlie niglit by the 
bridge o£ Pumbal, suddenly retircd tlirough tbat towi. Being 
followd closety bp the light division, Ney, who ltad clinrge 
of tlie rear-guiird drew up on a lieight M i n d  and t l~rew 
a detnchment into the mtle. Be hntl waitd too long, tlie 
streets mere still enciinbcred, and the French wrny was 
moving ~ 4 t h  some confusion by s long defile betiveen the 
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monntxins and the So~ire rim which m s  forrlxble, while the 
Rritirih main body waa moving along the opposite bank to 
c m s  lower down and cut the line of retreat. The fa11 of night 
marred tliis operation, but a sharp action happened at Porn'tiat, 
where tlie riflemen and cacadores of the iiglit di~ision drove khe 
Fruicii from the mstle and town with such vigour, they could 
uot destroy t l ~ c  bridge althougll it  mised : forty of the allies 
were Iiurt, and tlie loss of the enemy was ~omeivliat greater. 
l a  the nigiit hfasaena continusd liis retreat. His Ziaggqe 
nnd sick w c h e d  first, protected by the reseme mvalry; chcy 
were fullowed by the eighh corpa, d i l e  tIie sixth, reinforced 
with some light cavalrg and the best horsed of tlia rutillerg, 
were destinetl to stem the pumuit. Ney lid beeri directed 
to d e h l i  Narwpet's brignde from the Lp river on the 10tli 
to seize Coimbro, but be neglected the ordcr, and d~asacna 
now sent Montbrun on thnt servjce; o, very imporhut one, 
for Wellington's ohjcct wnhi to hurry Mnascna pmt Coimbrn, 
and fosce hirn out of Portugnl. This ho hopcd t o  effect 
by opernting oa his Annke rather than by bnttl- for be 
judgcd %he moral cKcct wouid mffice for tlre genernl cnuse; 
yct he still retnined the fourth divi~ion nnd the mvalry frorn 
the ~ U C M U F  of Badajos, bciug wjlling enough iC occnsion offered 
to strjke. Thc country was liowever fui1 of atrong pocitionsi, 
every villnge\vas a defilc, the watber wag moderate, antl Ney, 
14th a happy rnixture of cournge and skill, illustmted eve y 
h g u e  af grottnd by aome p i p a 1  camliinatioii. 
Doiyhrcak, on the 12th, ww both armies in rnrivement, and 
eight miles of marcrch, with some ~light skirmishing, brotight 
tlie head of the British into a hollow way, leading to some 
table-lanrl, on whicli Ney had dispmed five thousand infantry 
a fea squadrons of cavdry and some gnm. His centre wae 
oppmite the hollow rond, his wings covered by wooded 
hcighta whicli he occupied with light troops, liis riglit rcsted 
on the revine of tlie Soure, bis left nn tlie Rediriiia strcain, 
which eircling ronnd his retar fcll inta thc Sourc Uehintl 
him the villnge of M i n h q  situaten in a hollow, cavcrcd a 
nmow bdr l~c  and 8 long dcfilc. Reyond the atreom, some 
rugged heights, commanding a vien- of tlie position in front of 
the vilEage, were occuyied by a division of hfantry, a regi- 
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ment of cavdry, and a battery of Iieavy guns, cio well Sdispcxsd 
oa to nlipear a conaiderablc force. 
The liglit division, nom ander sir WilHam Erskine, was 
directed to attack tlie wooded slopcs covering Ney's right, 
wliich wcre imnicdintely carricd, nnd tlie ~Icinnisliers even 
dvanced on the open plain; but the Prencli linc, aupprted 
with four guns, opened s rolling fire, ,and a squadran o f  their 
liussarc led by colonel h Fei~iere c l i q e d  and took some 
prisaneis. Erskine then formcd his Iine, consi~ting of five 
bat t~ l inn~ anrl aix ptns, in aticli a rnnnner M t o  aiitff itnlr the 
French right anri tcnd towards thc ford o£ the Rcdinlia 
He was immediriteIy rcinforced witli trvo rcgiments o€ Jragoons, 
and at tlie same time Picton seized tIie w d e d  I~eiglits cover- 
ing tlie Kencli left. hrcy's positiun was tEiua laid bnrc, bnt 
be pesceivd that SVellinfiton, cleceived ns to his numberq 
memt to use lis wliole furce iii attack, and nith great cool- 
ness held hie ground and even ciiwrged Pictoti's skirinisherq 
dthougli tlmt general was nearer to the villago nnd bridge 
thnn thc Frcncli ndlt  wns, and tlicre wcrc alrently trnops md 
guns cnaugh on the plain to overwhelrn him. In this hate 
fin liour p;tssed away, hut then threc csnnon shots vere fid 
from tlia nritisli centre as a sigial, m ~ d  B ~ ~ d e u d i d  spechcle 
ms presented. TIio woods on thc fiunks accntetl d ivc  vith 
troopsj nnnd thirty thouannd infnntry wcro strctclierl in thrce 
gorgeous Tinca of battle across the plain bending in a gentle 
curve, and moving onwards wtiile the horsemen and gunq 
springiiig forrvard sirnul t~neously from t wo pinta, c11ar~~l  
under n geneml voIIcy from tIie Frcncli, wlia were instantly 
shroutletl in srnoke : when t l iat  cIcarcr1 rtway no encm y was to 
be seen Por mamhal Yey, ~iv~iIe k enIy watcliing the pro- 
gress of thfs mapificent formntion, Eiml opposed general Picton's 
foremost skirmishers with his left, rind covered by tlieir fire, 
h d  wittidrawn tlle rest o i  Lis people, and with sucli nipirlity 
as ta ga!n thc d a g a  bcforc cvcn thc m v n y  couId touch 
them: t11e utmost efot-ts of Pjcton's lig1,lit troops sud the 
horse-wtillery only enabled them to gall the bindiiiost Gth 
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their fire. One horpit'mr wsrr dismounted, but the v i l l a s  oE 
IledinI~ii was in flarnea betiveen it and tlie pursuers, atld Nep 
tri eorifiriii tlie courage tif bis soldiero ordered tko Freiich 
oficer Erue to stand lmt witlt some iufuntry, wliiIe in Iieraon 
lis cbii.rid oK t h e  howitzer. This w&s effe~%Pd witIi tlie loss 
of fikeeu ar twenty of Erüe's mcn, and with great dnnger ta 
tlio mnrslinl, for the Iiritish gum wem smitiag his rcnr, and 
tlie liglit troops of thc tliird division, clinsing Iikc lrcntcd 
blood-lioiinds, pnsscd the ~ i v c r  nlmost at ttlie snmc tima 
witli the Frcncli, mliose memes cnnnonaded the bridge, yet 
were sonn compelled to fnll hsck ten miIes to Condeixe 
Twelve officers and two huudrcd men of tlie allies were killed 
and wounderl: Ney lost as rnany, but he should iiave Leen 
destroyed. Neverthrle~ tlie facility witli whicli tlie Englisli 
iimses ir+erc liandled d e  him more cuutiousi thouylt it clid 
- 
not entirely clieck l i i s  over daring. 
On tbe 13th ttie allies, zbout ten o'clock, found the Fiench 
amy iii order of battle, Rejmier's corpa, which was at Espinal, 
exeepted. The crisis of the retreat Lad arrived, The defilea 
of Condeixa leacling upon Coirnbra were behind thc French; 
thosc of Riiranda de Corvo leading t o  the Puente <le Miircella 
werc on tlieir lcft; betwcen tliern Ney was in position, on 
a strong muge of heiglztg covered by a marsh, and only to be 
npptomlied by tbe liigh ruaed wliicli led tlirougli a hollow 
ap~inst liis riglit. Trees were felled to obstruct tliis pssagg 
tlie Iiollow way was palisaded and breast-works thrown iip ut 
cach side. I-lore Mussenra resolved t o  stop the allies unti1 
hiuiitbrun scixed Coimbra; then arisuming a permanent posi- 
tian bcliincl the lfondege 1 1 ~  rlcsigncd t o  ~ n i t  until Soult'a 
opcrations should drarv off Wcllin$en, or thc advancc o i  
Hcsihres Jioiild cnaMe tiim~clf to rcaume the offcnsive; for 
he judged justly that the devastated country between tlie Iines 
and tlie Mondep mould secure him from serious operations on 
that river. Hitherto he had appcarcd the sMer tactician, l u t  
non* liis adversnry, being no longer compelled to await the 
deveIopment o€ the Fíench projects, assumed the superioritp. 
When at Tliomar, tliiking tlic Mondep could not be defended, 
lie M directer! Baccellar to luok to the aecurity of Oporto 
hteuding himself to foIIow bfassena closely. In tliat view he 
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ordrrcd Trnnf &d Wilson to dandon thc MonrIego and thd 
Vouga when the fords shouId liecome passable, to hke  the 
line of t.lie Douro, ma to break up the roa& a they retreaied 
antl remor0 al1 bu& und meaw of transport. TTiImn mae 
then near tht? Pucnte do Murcclln rozul, biit Iitwing the euemy 
wew mmcing Coirnlira, he crosscrl the Mundcp, pawed 
betwecn tlie French scouting liarties and effected s janction 
witli 't'miit, when both fe11 baclr. Tlie latter homever swn 
rcturneil, for hc hnd prcviously dcstroycd iin nreh of the Coim- 
brs bridge, the river wm flootling very fut, and the aound of 
gum told hitu the dlies were dose at Masma's herIs. Ordm 
from Baccellar indeetl oomlielled Iiirn to  sena tlie peatest past 
of Iiis force kclc agnin towards tlia 'lr0ug.i~ tlie 1 ItIi, yet with 
tlic rcmnindcr I IC  rc~olved ta rlispiitc tllc pnvnge of the Mon- 
dego thriugli some Frencli dragoons had acttistlly forded tht 
river at Pereim. 
On tEie 12th Frencli oficcrs weie seen t o  ex3mine the 
brids, n slcirmi~l~ took place along the bnnks of t.he river, 
and a party which attempted to crcep on t o  the bridge wa9 
dispcrsed with grape. Tlie fords ware heivever practicablefor 
cavalry, and nut more tlmn tliree h u n d r d  militia wera in 
opposition; lience, if Mnrcognet's hri~wle liad marched iis 
originiilly ordercd by Massena, aimlira rnitst 11invc fallen, but 
nom the French, thinking the reinforcements from England hd 
come by sea t o  the Mondego, fenred to attack, and thus 
Coimlira was saved by Trant aud a few mili timen. Montbrun 
~ e n t  iin exnggemtd repurt of ita resiukiiice to Mitsseiia tlie 
lW, nind tbe  lnttcr thcii crcduloudy rclinquishcd liis plm foi 
the rivcr : to t.he ernpcror he msigned sn ndditional cause, 
namely, that Hill was raid to be in march from the 7Rzere to 
thc Mondego by tlie mountains in hia rcar; liut FIill was in 
EngLnd. Tliere rtimaiued only the line of retrmt by the 
Pncnte de MurcelJu, nnd to CQVCr that, and prcservc thc com- 
munication witli ISRynier on the side of Espinal, Mnssene bad 
placed h i son  at Fonte Coberta, a village five miles on hi l & ,  
where the Ancho road joined the MurcelIa road; he now 
reinformd him with Clausel's divisiuii ; alid being thiis pivotted 
on the Anciao Siem, liaving hyuicr bcyonri tliat mounhin 
and Ney at Condeix% he offered as confident a front aa if 
Coimlim h d  Iieen gained, His bggage liad howeva been 
observcd filint; off by tlie 3furcella routs, and WellingGon, com- 
preliending the rnat,tcr, detached tlio third division tri turn Iiiri 
lcft by a dificult p~th over the sierra. The pnnm was & 
Ponte Cobcrtn, rtnd Ncy had odcra ta fire Cond~ixa nt a mrtaio 
hour, ivlien al1 tho divisiona wcrc to concentrnto nt Cmal 
Nova on anot,hcr potition, perpendiculnr to tlie fimt snd 
covering tlic?. mtld to the Murcdla; but towards tliree o'clock 
Picton \vas descried winrling round a bluff enil of the AncEan 
Sierra, eight miles distant, and as he was &&y beyond the 
French Ieft confusion pervnded their camp; a thick smolre 
then arose from Condeixa, oolumns were seen hurrying 
tomards Caca1 Nova, and the British troogs pushed forward; 
bnt the fclled trees and obstacles impeded pumit, and 
mnny fires, kindld at once, covered tlic retreating troopa with 
amoke, wliile tlie h e a  of Condeixra stopped the artillery. 
Hence only the skirmishera and some cavalry could close with 
tlie enemy, and they did so> mtting o f  the Prench in Fonte 
Coberta so rapidly, that Massena only escaped by taking 
the feathers out of IUs hat; and riding tlirough the ligtt 
troops. 
When Condeixa was thus opened the Briti~h camlry pushed 
towards Coirnlira, opened tht3 curnrnuni~l~tion wlth Trant, and 
captured some af Montbrun's cavnlry. The a m g  kindlcd its 
firss, md tlie Iight divisionpiquets, being pushed close up to tlie 
enemy hcnrd in thc night tlie march of the French division 
roming from Fonte Goherta to regnin tlie main budy. Its 
isnlatiun m iinknawn to tlie EPitlsh mtI it rmched Miranda 
da Corvo witliout difficnlty: but tlie noim of  the marcli 
mas rnistaken far tlie morement o€ bctggage, and so reported 
t o  generai Eml~ine at dayligh6 ~Phereupoli that oficer, rashly 
cowluding the h n c h  were in full retretit, put tha division 
in march. 
COMBAT OF CASAL NOVA. 
A thiclr rnist hid evergthing, yet there twts tbe dull aonnd 
of a movingmultitude in front, and sereral officers objeckd to 
m.ii sdvance witliout superior orders in such a fog; but Etskmq 
diiregarding tliese remonstmnoes, with astounding indiffeienaa 
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sent the fiftp-wcond regiment forward in a simple columil of 
sections, mithout sn advancecl guard nnd cven bcforo tho 
piquets had coine in. The md dipped mddenly into a 
valley, and the regiment vanished ia tlie rnist, wliicli wns se 
tliick tlmt the Frendi out-posttu were unwittingly pnssed, and 
Ney who hed remained al1 night near the piquets wus nearly 
wrptitred. l'he riflemen followed, i~nd tiie r e ~ t  of thc division 
\vas about ta plunge intu the mme p l f  wlien tlie rattling of 
iausketry and the boorning of iound shot were Iieard; tlien 
tlie vapour rose sluwfy, and thc fifty-~ecrind was deacried un tlie 
slopes of the opposite rnuuntnin, closely engagcri without 
support in the midvt of Ney's corps. At tLat moment 
W~llington arrived. Bis design bad bcen to turn the Eeft of 
the Prench, fur tlieic front )vas strong, and tliey occupied 
mountain ridges in wccession to  tlie Deuca or Deixa rivar, 
nncl the defiles a€ Miranda de Corva. Tlicrt! was a r d  
leading from Conrleixa to Espina], by which Colo waa moving 
with tlle fourth division on hnella, having orders to commu- 
nicate witli Nightingale, attiick TCepier, and gain the sourcea 
of the Dmca und &ira rivera; between Colo and Ney, 
Picton was also t u r n i n  thc French left fl i m k  in a mam direct 
line; and the main body, coming up in one long oalumn 
required time tu f o m :  sil tliis fine combination wm marred 
by E~iakidpi folly wlilch h d  forcell on tlie actirin prcniaturely, 
and thc whole of the liglit division was necesñariIy ppusl~ed 
forward h auocanr tlie fiftydecond rcgimcnt. Ncy's ground 
w a s  so extensive, and his ~kirmiahers so thickly spread, so 
eadly aupportecl, fhst tlie division was soon stretched in one 
tliin threnrl und closely engagcd at e v q  poiut witliout a 
reservo; nor could it wen tliw present ari equtil frout until 
Picton ~ c n t  he mxticth niicmen to pmlong the link Fight- 
ing strongly, raiuidrrt the stone endosures on tlie moiintuin 
side, it parthlly turned the French ripht, bnt their position 
$vas not ahnken until Picton aear, and CoIc further o& turned 
tlie Iefi; tlien also carne up on tlie centre the fird filtli md 
sixt.h divitiions, tho lieavy cavnlry and tho p u s ;  whercupon 
Ney, covering his mar with liglit ttroops and artillery, retired, 
disputing ridge afkr ridge with dmirable akill. Long he 
did ~ with littla los4 but t o w h  noon the p n s  and 
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skimiahers disordered bis rnasses and hurried bis movements 
towartls the Btrong pmn of Miranda de Corvo, wliere Mirssenn 
was in position with tLe mnin body; rtnd there Moiitbrrui 
carne in, hhaving from Coirnbrn made way tliruugli tlie Iiillti 
for thc Dcum by n ~ e r y  difficult ioad. 
In thiis wmbat the liglit division lost eleven offiwrs and 
one hundred and Hty men, but took a Iiuntlred prisoners. 
During the fight, Eeynier abandoned I'anella, and NigLtinple 
wbo liad constantly followed liirn uiiiterl witli CvIt; when botli 
paiissed the Deucn. Mwaena, fcnring to find them next dny 
on his renr, bui-nerl Mirnndn, afid croascd tho &ira in tho 
itight, and hia wholc army wns thus crowded in tlie narrow 
wuy betvíeen the Sierras mind tlie Mondego. To eme bis 
niovement he dewtmyec1 baggngc aand ammunition, yet Ria 
a m y  was still so encurnbed a d  disordered, tliat lie directcd 
Ney to caver the piissage with a fcw battulioris, clinrgirig kim 
not to rjslt. nn action, Ney however, in contempt, retained 
tcn or tweIvc battnlions n brig-rtdc o€ m d r y  and some guns, 
and tl~us wilfully provoked a Eght. 
The French right rested on woded and rugged p n d ,  
tlieir left upon the nllage af Foz d'dronce, Tlie werntlier 
wns obscure and rainy, tlie nllies renclicd tha Ceim at four 
o'cloclr on tlie IStll, and cxpecting no action kindlorl firea; 
but Wcllingten, hnving rrapidly scanned Ney's position, 
directed tlic lighk division and PacYa bripade; to Eiolci the 
riglit in phy, and sent Picton against tlic Icft, wI~ile the 
home-artillery, g-alloping furward to a rising ground, opened 
ivjth a p e t t  anri sudden effect. Nq's left, overthrown by 
tlie first chrrrge, fled in coniusiazi towards tlie river, aud some, 
missing tlie fords, ni~~hed into the deeps nnd were drowned, 
othem, crowding t a  tlic bridgc were mushed t o  death. On the 
rigl:1iC, the ground being ruggcd and elose, the ilction resolvod 
itself into a skirmish aiid Ney was enabled to use some 
bnttalions to check tlie pursuik of liis left, but darkncss carne 
on anil the defeated tmops in their clisorder fired on ettcli 
otlier, Four ofíicem and sixty men fe11 on the side of the 
Rritish; the French lont fifive hnndrcd, one half king drowned, 
and an cagIe was afterwads found in thc rivcr. IInssenrt had 
gone beliiiid tlie Alva, get Rey, notwithstanding tbis dis- 
astrous combat, B q t  bis post on tlie left bank ~f the Gira 
antil every encumbrancm hnd pwscci, nnd then hlowing up 
seventy feet of tl~c bridge sent Iiis eorps on, rcrnaining hiinself 
witl~ tlie rear-pard. 
This terminated the first part of tlie rdrmt from Santarein, 
En wliicl~: if the greitt emr of relinquisliing Goitnlira he 
excepted, Massena displiiyed infiiiite aliility, but aithal a, 
liarsh and rutliless spirit. I l i e  burning of lhdinlia, C o n d e h  
Miranda de Corvo, and many villaga on tlie route, covered 
Iiis movements, und iiumetliing muy he attrihted ta tlie divorder 
of a fmcecl rctreat; bnt tlic town of Lciria nnd coiivcnt of 
ATcobap, though out of tlie line, were given to the fliimes by 
express orders. Tlie Iaws of wxr, rigoroudy interprete& 
aiithorixo sucli examples wlieu tlie inlialitants taka arms, yet 
it can only be judy done to overawe and not to revenge 
defeat : hut cvery Tiorror rnnking war hideous, nttended this 
dreadful rekeat ! Distress, conflqration, de&, in al1 mudes! 
from wounds, fmm fatigue, from water, from tlie flames, 
from shrvation : on every side unlimitetl ferocity ! 1 m~iself 
ww a pmnnt houndiiig ori liirc dog to devour tiie c l e d  
nnd dying, nnd tlie spint of cructy once unchained mote 
even tlie brute creation; for on tlie 15th Mvlnssena, to diminisli 
the encumtrrances, ordercd kltlie destruction of sorne teasta of 
burtlicn, nnd tiic inhuman fclloiv cbarged witli tlic cxccution, 
ham-stringed five hundred m e s  and left tlwm t o  stiirve. 
Being t h s  found by tbc IBritisli m y 7  tlie mute yet deep 
eqresuion of pain and grief visible in their looks, wondcrfully 
aroused tlie fury of the ~oldiers: sud w little ~veight 1hw 
rcnson with thc multitndc whcn opposcd by a monienhry 
sensation, thnt no quarter would have been givcn t o  any 
prisoner at that moment, and a humane feeling wonld have 
lcrl to direct cruelty. Tlie French h v c  however been accused 
Eortthty's of crimes wliicli tliey did not and could not 
lleiiiiicii~ni ~ o m m i t  ;R U C I ~  OS tlie driving ~f all wonicn nbov? 
W nr. ten years of age iinto tlieir mmp at Rdinha, nmr 
whicl1 tliere were neitlier men nor women t o  be drivenl 
The country was a desed! nioy have Iieen also c h a p a  
the sarne wrikr with tho mutilnting of John the First's h d y  
in the convent of ñntrtlhk, tftiring hfassena's retreat ; whe- 
the body of that monarch had been mntonly pulled ta piecee, 
and wried off by British officers during tlie retreat t o  ths 
h e s !  
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CBAPTER IV. 
QN the 16th the rtllies haltcd, pnrtly bccnuue tlic Ccim WFL~ 
swollen and unfordable, partIy thst the troops, tvEio hd 
mffcred £m peater priviitions tlian t l~e enemy, were ex- 
hausted. The Fmch, following their custom, clirried fifteen 
dsys' Iiread; the allies deriended upon 0 comniissarint mliich 
Pirolíe down undcr thc clifficultics; nat from dcficiency in 
thc chief, for he was distinguislied alike for xml, probity, 
and talent, but fmm the ill-conrluct of tlic Porttipme goyern- 
ment. Deaf to the representattions of 15relli~i$on arid Rercs- 
fod, iit ~vould neitlier fced tlie Portupeac troops rr~ulnrly 
at  hntarem, nar fill tlic mapzincs, nor oollrct thc nicxns 
of tmnsporting food during tlie mnrcli. Hence, after pnssing 
Pombal, few of tlie native forces had been able to continue 
the pumuit, and the brigades under Pack and ,4sli~vorth, 
which did lreep up and erigageil daily with t1ie eneiny, were 
actually four days d thou t  food of any snrt: numbcra died of 
inanition on khe roads, and to save tlie whole f ro~n destruc- 
tion, the Dritish supplics were sharcd with them. The eom- 
m k r i a t  was thns overlaid, tlie wF~olc army suffcred, and was 
Torced to lialt. knd tlicrc wrrc nlso intlicnt,ions of trcacliery; 
for, r1urin.g the piirmit, nt Coimbm nnrl on tlic Alvg Trnnt 
discovered large supplies placcd by Portuguese government 
tigenta within rench of tPie Frcncli at critica1 momcnts. 
Notwittishnding tliese dificlulticn, CoiniLm lrad been salred, 
md Eilnssena, turiied out of evcry fitroiig position, had bcen 
formd into a nnmm intrimte nntl rnmgcd country, by a 
series af nxsterly operations; for Wellinpton liad consblitly 
menaccd the passes in bis rear aad t h s  compelled liim to 
~~bantlun positions wliich could scarcety have been forcurl, Tu 
turn the strcngth of a country tn  profit in this mnnncr is tlie 
sccret of mauntain warfare; he who receivw battle in the liills 
hiis an nirlvantage; and hence, if a general seriously m e m s  
a pnss or position behind bis axlverriary, tlie lntter must retreat 
or become tlie ossuilant, We1ling"con hd tliw consbutly di* 
lodgcd Mrissenrs, aniod with int'criw number~ &£ter fitednlin, 
seeinp that when Coimbra wrts =ved, a brinde of mvalry, 
some p u s ,  sna a division of Portuguese infuntry Lnd been 
detaclied to tlie Alemtcjo. Antl wlien the fdl of &Indajuti, 
whicli uncuwred Listiun, waa known, G~CiEe't3 division alsu 
marched to endile Ueresford to retake it hefore the brenclies 
couId lie cloacd: tlie pursuit tbcn bccamc more cirrumapemn 
' Ihe loss of the fortress wrts indeed known the 13th, hiib 
Welllngton, erroneuusly tliinkig the ninth corps was nitli 
Xttssena, mnde Cole's division available for that day, using it 
howevcr on tlie ~ i J e  ol  Ptutella, hecause flie road of Espinal 
being tlie ~ l i o r t e s t  o tliei liridgt) on tlw Tliguq it attaisined two 
abjecta nt oncc. 
These dispositions wcm finely cornbincd and succcssfnl, gct 
the rnilitary horizon waa sti!l cloiided. Intelligence from tbe 
narth slwke of k11e imperial guads at Zarnora being designed 
to invade Gailicia, and though MalJ liad aixteen 
thousand men Wellingkun tinticipated no resist- ~ h ~ + ~ ~ ~ ~  
ante. In thc souhh ufnirs were moro doorny. 
Thc battlo o€ Barosn, tlic dislintcs wliich follancti, nnd t11c mis- 
condtrct oC Imas and Xtendizald, pmvorl tliatfrom Spain noitscful 
cwperation was wcr to be expected. Mortier liad invested 
Campo Mayor and it wits not expected to  liold out until 
Ber~aford wdd succour it. Tbe Spnnirrrds, to ivliom it liníl 
been ridivcred under nn engapment o€ lionour, contrtlctcd Liy 
12oninn+ to keep iit apninct tlio enemy, liad disluynlly $m- 
doned it wlicn Badajos fcll, and t r o  hundrcd Portugucso 
militia, tliroivn in at tlie moinent, had to defend a furtrec9 
which required a garrison of five thousand r~gulars. Nor 
wag tlie enemy im~nediñtely ia the Dritisli front the Iast to 
be considered. Wey liad witlidrnwn from tlie Ceira late on 
tlle 1 Gtli, and next Jay tlie liglit division fortled it with great 
diffioulty, wliilc the mrtin body used ~i, trcstle bridge tlirciwn iri 
tIic night, But Mas~ena hal-ing repnired the hcnte Muicdlii 
ancl occupi~ l  the Siem de Hoitn beliind tlie Alvu, msolved ta 
lialt for come days. In this view he again Jmtroyed the Mur- 
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cella bridge, aad nnother nem Pomhira, nent Fkynier to gwrd 
the liigher prta  of t l ~ e  river, and spread Iiis foragers abroad. 
He wns scion rlistnrbed. Threc British divisiuna marched tlie 
18th by the Sicrrn dc  Guitcriit, muilc way ovcr tliiet riigfid 
inountain with p"severing atrength, and meuwed Rcynier 
while two other divisions camonaded Ney. TTEic upper Alva 
tlius tlimtened, ran parallel to the Frencli line o€ retrent, and 
Bfassena, seeing the extremc ruggedness of tlie mutiatains lid 
not pmtcctd his left, recallcrl Ilcynier, nbrindoned tEic lowcr 
Alva and concxntrated on the Sierra de Moitn for battle. 
The allies had tlien to concentrate also in advnncc, lest tlieir 
disminatcd colurnns should be cruslied in detul. T k  Tvaa 
difficult. Tlie lowcr Alva was wide and mpid, but tlie st&- 
Eorpa contrivcd an inpnious mft, by whicli tlie light division 
pwed above Mrircelln ; the right of tlie army tlien closed to 
Arpnil on the upper river, aiid Trnnt and Wilson closed on 
t11e nght bmlc of tlie hfondego; fur those afñcers bad orders 
'o move on tliat side pardlel to tlie Fi-ench line, to preveut 
thcir forngers paming thc hfondgb and to interfcrc bctween 
them antl Oporto. Tlius prcressctl, hIaasena re-commcnced Iiis 
retreat, and being deaimus to gain Celoriro aad tlie defiles 
leading upon Unarda betimes, ngnin destroyd bnggage and 
arnmunition. He even abandoned hi~l more distant foragng 
parties, wlio were takcn ?n the number of eiglit Iiundred; fox 
Wellington, seeing thc success of liis coml~inntions, liad eon- 
ceniitmtd al1 his columns upon Moitn, thc 19th. The 20th 
the pumait was rcne\ved tlirough Penhancos by tlie ligl~t 
diPision and the ca~alry ;and a commuuication \as opeiid 
with Wilson and Trant, wha bd reaclied the bridge o€ Fornos, 
iilid with Silveira wlio was nliout Trancriao. TIls third nnd 
fiixth divisions followcd in rcscrae, but ihe. rcmnindcr of tha 
nrmy halted at Noitn, until provitiions, coming by sea from 
Lishon t o  the Mondego, arrird. 
>lassena having reachd Celorico the 2Iet with two corps 
and the cavalry, opened a commnnication with Alwirlg and 
posted detactiments of liorse on the l'inhd, wl~ile lteynier, 
who had rctircd tliroiigh Govm, ocmrpied Guarde. Rc had 
now regsrinecl liis original basc of opriitions, and bis retrcat 
m q  be saicl to liwe terminatcd; yet he wws f~ir from wishing 
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to ra-enter Spain. There Iio wuId only appear aa a b d c d  
general, and sliorn of half his authority, h a u s e  Bsssi+re~ 
now commnded the northern provincea wIlich hnd becn 
under himaelf. Hence, to  make hia prcvious retreat appear 
only s cliange of position, Iie f o m e d  tlie design of throiving 
sil Ris sick men snd other encumbrences into Almeida, nniI 
then, passing the Estrella at Guarcla, countermarcli tlimugh 
hbngal and Pena Macor to tlie Elga, iind estalilish new com- 
municntions across the Tngus with ISoult, nnd by thc valley trf 
the T a p  with th king But the faetione in his army had 
riaen to euch a height he could no lowr command the 
obediente of his lieutenants. Drouet, hfontbrun, Junot, 
Rsynier and Ney, were nll at varianca with each otller 
and with him. Tlie first lid been desired to secure Coimbra 
early, instead of wliich he quitted I'ortug~l, nnd carricd tvitli 
him Claparede's divislon. liiarcognet was then orciered, but 
did no* rnove, and Montbnin ftriled in d e f d  of vigour. 
Junot \vas disabled by his wound, yet his faction did uot 
the lm show tlieir discontenk Beynier's dislike to  the 
yrinm was so strong, tIie officm carrying flag5 of truce 
from his corps never frtiled to speak nf it to tlie Britisli, 
and Key, more fierce than al1 of tliem, defied Rlassena's 
authority. To him the dangerous ddny at Pombnl, Yar- 
cognct's neglect aud tlio too sudden evacuation of Cundeixg 
hnve Leen nttributed; and 5% js alleged tliat far PEIetri h.ok 
from beinc. ordcrocl t o  sct firo to thut t o m  on 
., 
tlie 13tl1, as the signal for a preconmrtcrl retrcn*, hc had pro- 
mised Massena Co maintain tlie position for twcnty-four liours. 
Tlie personal risk of the lntter, in consequence of the hasty 
diange of position, would seem to confirm this; but wlieii 
ñcton was abserved passing tlle Xiwra de Anciao liy u road 
Lefore unlrnown h ths Bbencli, onri by wliich Xeynicr could 
be sepnrtitcd and the pms of Miranda de Corvo sdaed, Yey 
wonld llave been insane to llave clclayed. 
At Miranda the long gathering anger betwcen the prince 
nnd the marslid broke out in a violent altermtion, and nt 
Celorico n'ey absoiutely refused t o  eoncur in tlie inurcli to 
Corin; he eveu moved his troops in another direction; biit 
Nwenrt, a man not t o  be crosscd with impunity, t1ien dcprircd 

In this &ate mTelIin,&n's ready boldness again boffled the 
piuee'a cdculrations. Ail tlic Brilish furces Siad comc up 
tke 28tl1, and witli tliem tlie reiilforcements from Enghnrl, 
forniing ra scventh divisiun; whereu~ion tlie liglit division and 
the caralry pwcied tlie Yondego at Cclorico, drovc the Prcnch 
from Frexdas, rind occupied the villagcs bcyond that place. 
Then thc ii~ilitia toolr post on tlie Piiiliel river, cutting the 
coinmunic:itiun witli. Alnieida, aiid tEie tl~ird divisiun \vas 
eshblislied at Porcn de hfis?rella, lialf way up tIie Estrella, to 
Renre thc brirlges ovw tlic Iiigllier JToiidgo. This done, tlirec 
dividoas of infantry anrl two regiments of cavaIry were dis- 
posed ti five colurnns of nttnck, on a Iialf circle ronnd tt ie foot 
of the Guarda inoiintain, and on tlie 29th ascended by as 
many patI~n, lending concc~itricnlly upon tlle town and ovcr- 
lapping thc Prcncli flnnks. Xupportcd on one wirig l>y t,he 
militia, on flie otlier liy the fifth division, in tlie centre by the 
4rst and seventli dirisions, they dvanccd expecting a, p a t  
liattle; but the absence of Ncy was felt by botb amies; tlie 
appeartwice OS tlie dillierI colurnns tlisc~v tlie Frencli for the 
fimt time jnto the greatcd cviifusion, aud witliout firing a shot 
tiiis ncarly imprc~mnhlc position mm ahnndoncd. At day- 
ligllt an tlic 30th, tlic liorse arti1lei.y and c n v a l ~  were Iaunched 
against Rcynier, ~ 1 1 o  ww zt Belmontc, zntl liis corps mould 
llave becn cut ofT if gcneral 81xde 1d Ied tliose troops witli 
tlie celcrity rcquired by tlie occmion, but lis \vas too slo~v, aud 
lteynier esci~ped in tlie niglit ivith w loss of onIy three Gutidred 
mcn. 
On tlic 1st uf April, tiic nlliod army, ddescending tlie motin- 
tains> r~aclied tlle Coa, wliere the Frencch general, who had now 
recorered thc niiith corps, a11d was anxious t a  hoId on to 
Portugal arid prmerve tlic power of operating ou tlie side of 
Curia, or Alrncidn, nFus ngnin iii position on tlic rjght Iianlr. 
Tho sixtli corps hcId Roviiia, witli dcbchmcnts p~nrding the 
bridge of Sequirias und the forri of Atnlnyon; the communica- 
tion with Almeida nTas mnit~tained by a brigitde of tLe ninth 
corps, posted new tlie ford of Junqa; the sccend corps occupied 
the l i i n~  belrind Sabugl, strslcliing towards AIFqatea, witli 
strong dctnclimcnta at tbe bntlge of &bu,@ ltnd tlie f o ~ d  of 
bpoulha de &a; tlie eighth cerps wns at ~ u y u t e s ,  and u 
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post was  established ak Eendo to mainhin tlic comrnunication 
lietwcen the scconll and tlie sixtli corps. Tlie Freridi m y  
wns t l i u ~  di~poscd an two a i d a  of n trianglc, tlie apex at 
Sabugal, and both fronta covered by tlie Coa, lieciiiise Sabupl 
was situnted in a slinrp beiid o£ tlie stream. M=nn wari 
cven inclined to retake the oKciicivq for a notion prevniled in 
his camp, tlint tlic ollicd divisions wcrc vcry mrich amttcrcd 
and might be betiten iii d e t d .  Tlie dispiitcs arnongst the 
superior oíñwra preventd tliis cnterprise, whicli was foundcd 
on hlse  inforrnation; bul tfio strcrigtli of tlie position ngnin 
luIleí1 the Frencli into a fiilric seciirity, from ivliich tlicy wcre 
rotighly rtwakened. 
Il'eIIington oecupied a line parnllel to tlic encmy's riglit, 
mbich could ilot be attacketl, because the Coa, a considerable 
river, runtns iu a r u w d  diliuiiel, Jecpening us tlie strci~m flows. 
Smnt ~ n c l  Wilson wcrc tincrcforc dircctcd to turn Rlnxsenn, by 
passing below Almeida and pelietrnti~g betwcen tliat fortregs 
anil Ciudad hdrigo; tlie 6th division was tIien placed in 
uppositiuu to Loigon at Eovinn, aiid a IintLaliori uf tlie 
aeventb division was postcd at tlic bridge of Scqiiirns to rover 
the left flank from incursiona. Tliis rlisposition sccmcd to 
menace the French riglxt, but tlie mal trttnck nras desipnd 
against tteir left, whicli ~ms t o  lic cnvelulied aud cruslied by 
tlie maiu Liotly. To efl'ect tIiiri, Slude'~ cwulry wwns to  cross tlie 
uppcr Coq wlierc tlir: berl uxq lcss rriggctl, at tly.l>rcnl; on tbe 
3ri1, tlic light divirrion wr~q t o  ford tliiit rivcr n littlc Iiclow tlie 
cavalry, and tlie third division still lojver. The fiftli clivision 
and the artillery were to force tlie Iiridgc of fialugnl, but the 
fimt and seveukl~ divisiom were held in rcscrvc. Tlius ten 
thousand men, pivnterl ulion tlic fiftli divisioii nt Sal~ugnl, wcre 
clmtined to turn neynicr's Icft, t o  scpnrnte him friim tlic cighth 
corps, anrl to surround anrl crusl~ bim liefore G11e sixth corps 
cauld come from novina to Lis succour; oae of tliose acci- 
deuts wliich are freqmnt in s a r  ninrrd this wcll-ctinoerted 
plea 
l3-iTTLE OF SABGQfi. 
A foggy morning prcrented the troops from gaining tlicii 
respective posts with the gimultaneous r c p h r i t y  esscatial to 
sucecss; Erskino toolc no p i n s  to pub tlie liglit division in a 
right direction, hi columns wcre not held together, and he 
arried of tlic cnvnlry ivitlioiit commu~iicili~ing vitli Reckwith, 
who cornmandetl Iiis first brigada TIiat officer remained 
therefore at n ford waiting for orders, when one of the staff 
d e  up liastily nnd ~ k e d  why he did not attilcli? The tLing 
apgwed rash m tLe cuiiibiruitiuii~ were nut ilevelope~l, but 
witli an enemy in fi.ont Iio muld ninlcc no reply; wlierefore 
pnssing tlic rivcr wliicli mnc dcep nnd rapid, hc ascended a 
steep wmled hill in front. Pour rifle complinies Ied, md 
were c~acely follomed by tlic forty-tliirrl j but the direction 
was wroiigly giren, and the caqadorcs of thc bripde were, ~t 
tliis time, pxssitig liigber up aluug witli t 1 ~ s  other Liignde of the 
dirision, ancl inuí-ing on $110 tme poiiit of attack, wliich wa9 
distsnt, R c n q y  rnin m d c  it itnpossitilc to distinguisli fricntts 
or foes, anrl tlte ohcurity liar3 nlso retardecl the arri~nl of the 
other dlviaions. This atbck .mas therefore ugtirnely, partid, 
dangerous, and on tlic wong point; for hynicr's who1e corps 
sas in [ron t, nnd Beck~vi tli liwing only onc hyonet  batklion 
md four cumpanics of rifl eineii, was assuiling twelve tliuusand 
infantry supportcrI by cavnlry nnd artillcry ! 
Xmrcel~l biid the riflemen renclied tltc tq of tle liill, when 
a &ong Iiotly of Frencli drove tliam bzck upon tlie farty-third, 
ths weatlier cleared rtt the instant, and Beclrwitli saiv and 
falt al1 tliu diiiiger, but liis hoart ivm too liig to quail; with 
a fieree diurge lio beat hadc tlrc assnilants, nand kcpt tlie top 
of the billa al tliougTt two Frcncli Irowitñers poiircd slinwcrs 
of pape into his ranks, nnd fres1i forecs assailcd liini in front 
and menaced Tiotli flanks. Pynier, Iittle especting to be 
stkkeJ,  tatl for tlie convcnience of \vater placed Iiis mnin 
Liorly in low grounrl, beliind t l e  lieiglit on wvl~icli tlio action cem- 
menced, antl Iik rene~vsll n t b c l ~  wus thereforc up liilt; yct 
his muulrctry, hcnvy irom tlie bcgi~ining, soon increased to 
a stom, and his men slirung up tlie acclivity wvith such vi+ 
lence and clamour, that tlis most desperate fig1,litLig only could 
Eiave tlie Dri ta .  Captain Hopkins, comrnanding a Aank 
oouipany o€ tlie forty-tliirrl, ninnii~g out to the riglit, with 
admirable preseace of rnind seized ra small eminencg close to 
the Frencli guns and commi~nding the w c n t  up which tlieir 
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troopsj turning tlie riglit flank, nero  approacliiiig. Bis fimt 
firc thrc~c- tlic assailmts inte confusion; tbcy rullicd but wcre 
a p i n  disordered by his volleys; a tliird time tliey endcs- 
voured to form a Iiead of attnclc, but Hopkins witli a sncId.cn 
c h g e  iiicreased tlteir disorder, aud at tlie same moiiient the 
two httalions o€ tlie fifty--second regiment, nttractcd by the 
fire, entered the line. Tlic ccntrc niitl Icft o€ tlio forty-thirrl 
wcrc also furiously engged, and tltcrc Bcckwitli, blood stream. 
ing fmm a wound in the riend, rode amongst the skirmisliers, 
praising and exl~orting tlie sollliers in tlie loud clieerfril tones 
of a mnn surc to win Iiis httlc. Thc bullcts Aew liowcvcr 
tliickcr and closcr cvcv rnoment, anrl tlie fig11t liccnmc very 
pcrilous, yet thc Frencli fcll rast, a scmnd cliarge again clemed 
the liill, ona of tlie liowitxers vxs takcn, niid 11ie Eiiglisl 
akirrnisliers mere clusely fcllloiving tlie ret ir i~g riinss to tlie 
low grmnd, mlicn smnll liodira of cnvnlry cnmc g~llnping in 
from al! pnrts n~ id  &ore tliern l>acIr on tlic mriin Iiodg, whidi 
iilstantly re-formed its line lidiind a low stone waI1. 
In tliis stnte of affairs, n rireiich squarlron of dmgoons, 
having ~urniuunted tlia nsccnt, iuide witli increrlible daring up 
to thc: wall, antl firctl ovcr it ii+itli pistnls, liut fi rolling vnlley 
laid ncarly the mliole lifeless on tlie ground. flieii a strwg 
columu of infantv ruslied up tlic Lee  of tlie Iiill, and enrlca- 
voured to retakc tlie Loivitacr, wliich was on tlie edgc of the 
desccnt and only Mty yards froni tlic wiiil; a vuiii utteinpt, 
no man could rcacli it and livc, so dcatlIy ivns tlic; forty-tliirtl'a 
fire. hIeanwlii1e two Rnglisl~ p n s  carne into actien, ancl the 
fifty-sccond, cliarging violcntly upon tlie flank of tiiis iiiftnty 
colmii, rrgain viiidicated tlrc possepsioii of tlic licigl~t. &ver- 
tlieless f i c& stluuilroris of c:~viilry, folluwitig tlie iiifuutry 
in tlic Imt attack, sccing tfic fifty-scconrl mcn scnttcrcd by 
thii cliarge, flew upon tlicm with peat lirislínesq rand caused 
somc disorder mongst tlie foremost skirrnislicrs bcfore they 
were scpulccd, Ileynier now put Iiis reserve of six tlioiismd 
íiifiiutry wilh c a ~ ~ d r y  2nd 8rIillci.y iii niution, outflau1;irig the 
Eritidi left and srcn~ing rcqolutc to storm tlic poñition; but 
tlic fifth division liad tlien ppasscd tlic bridge of Eal>upI, tho 
Britisli cavslry croivncd the Lills ligoad tiic Prench left, snd 
gcnertil ColvilIc's higade of tlic t h d  division, cnierging from 
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boldlg intcrposcd between Alnicida nnd thc Frencli brigttde; 
bnt thc proposed sncoour did not appcar, sud tlie Prench 
dvanued witliiu liall u mile of liis positiun ? Xutldenly two 
cnnnon ~liota werc lienrrl to tlic soiitliwnrtl, tlir: enemy limtily 
fomed squares in rctreat, and in ten minirtes six stiundrons of 
Britisli czvalry and a tmop of  horsc aitillery cnmc awccping 
over Glie plain iii tlie renr. 3IiIitary orrler nnil covlness markcd 
thc Frcncli rctreat ncwss tlic Turoncs, nnti tliougli tlie cannon 
shots jilougl~cd tvitli n fcrirfiil cfi:et tliriiligli t l~cir  mnsscq, and 
thc liorscm~n continually flanlíetl tlieir iiinrcli, tIiey gaiiierl the 
rougll ground, and finally esccped over tLe lQuuctln by Barba 
dcl Puerco, witli Ilic loss of tllree liundred nien lcillcd ivoundeil 
nnd prisnncrs. Trnnt ivas t l i t i ~  snvcrE iia it wert: liy n, rnirnclc; 
for acciderit lirid stopyed tTie EngIidi infnnti-y tnrircliing in the  
morning accmling to Wcllirigton's promisc, untl lie iiistantlp 
pusIied on tliis cílv:lliy. TIic prince ol Esling liad reaclied 
Ciudad Rodrigo two duys before, rintl Ft'clliii~tun riow stoud no- 
torious on tlic confinrfi of Porttigal, linving cffcctrrl ivliat to 
otlicrs appearcd incredibly rash auJ uscless to attempt, 
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M ~ E N A  enterd Forhrga? aith sixtj-five tliou~nnd men, and 
his rcinforcemeiits ivliile nt Sauttireiii were about ten thousand, 
he rqiasscd the froritier witIi forty-íive tlrousand; tlia invasion 
tIierefure cost Iiim tliirty tliousttnd men, af wliich fuurt~en 
thnirstiid miglit iinvc fnllcn Iiy tJic smord or hccn hlicn. Not 
morc tlim six tliousnnd wcrc lost dduring tlie retreat ; but had 
Wellington, itnrestralned by politial alnsnsirationq rittwked 
him vigorously o t  Ecdinhz, Condeixa, Cnsal KOTT~, and Miranda 
de Corvo, half tlie Prencli zrmy notdd b ~ v e  been clestroyerl, 
thougli mith g c n t  loss to tlic nssailmtfi: a mtrenting nrmy 
sboiiltl figlit nx Iittlc nii pnrsihle. 
mien the Ficnch renclied the Apeda, tlieir mvalsp detach- 
wcnts, heavy artillery, md convalescents, apain au,mcntccl ths 
acmy to more tlian fifty tlions,snd men, but the fatipes of tlie 
retrcat rrnd tlie want of prpvision~ wonld not suKm them to 
show a front to  tl ic alliw; whercfore, drnwiag tmo hunrlrcd 
thoirsrinrl ratitions fron~ Jtorlrigo, tlicy fe11 bacli t o  &lamanca, 
anrI TITcllington investcrl Almcida. Tlie light diviñiun then 
occupied MnlIeps nnd Bspcjti, the rest of tlie anny mas dia- 
posed in villages on both sidcs of the Can, and the head- 
qunilers werc tmnsferred to 'CTi1la Formosa, wliere colonel 
liTatcrs, who liad bemi tnkcn mar BeImonto during tho rctrenk, 
rcjnnincd the nrmy. Hc l i d  rcfiiscd liis pnrolc, nnd rvhcn 
cnrr i~d to Ciudad Rorlrigo, rnshhly consulted t l ~ e  8paninrd in 
whose house he wss lodpd abont cscaping; the mnn bctrayed 
counsel, bnt hig semnt Jetesting tlie treracbery sccretly ofleretl 
bis owtt aid,-FVatew told liim to get tlic rowels o€ his 
qurs sliarpened, iiotbing more, for his design was one of open 
ditring. He wns p l a d  undcr the guara of  four q m  6mes, 
and whcn nenr Snlamanm, thc cliicf, who rode the only good 
Rme of tlie party, alighted for a rnoment,, whereupon Waters 
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llOTSe of the party, alighted for a mO ent, hereupon ntcrs
gave the spnr to his own mare, a celcbratd nnimil, and gal- 
leped off! It mns an act  of incrcdiblc rcsolution rind harrli- 
hood, for he wwns on a i d a  plain, and beForc Iiim and for miles 
behind liim tlie mad waa covered witli tlie Tr'rench columns; 
his liat fe11 uiT, nnd thus marlced lie rodc aloi~g: t11e flank of 
tlie troops, tiorno oncoumgcd, otliers fircd at liirii, and ths 
gen.~-d'nmw mord En Iinud wcro almnya close at llis Iicels. 
Sutlrlenly Iie broke at full speed betrveen two of tlie columas, 
gsined a woodd hollow, and Laving thus bnfled bis pursiiem, 
cvadcd tlie rear of the enemfs army, and tlie fliird dap rcaclied 
hcd-qunrters, \vherc lord Wellington, lrnowi~ig Iiis resolute 
subtlc clinmetcr, had cnusctl Iiis linggngc to Iic Lirouglit, obwm- 
ing tliat lie mould not be long abwent ! 
ílfassena having n o a  oecupied Salmanca and communimtd 
AppnAix 2. witli BessiGrcs, scnt a couvoy l o  Euilrigo, whiclr 
coulll not be interrupted; for Wcllingtiiri could 
acnrccly maintain liis for~rrnrtl position. IQc liad liccn com- 
pelled, in defnult of money, to disl~and al1 Iiis militin at the 
momsnt when they were acquiring solidity in the field, znd liin 
apenttions wcre r e d u d  to a ~irecarious Ilockarle of Almcida. 
Iie even lnid two ternpurary liriJges over the Coa to secure a 
rctrcrit if prcsncd, wliidi mi& cm~ily liappcn : for tlic Portii- 
piese amp was in ii drendfizl state, snd the contiiiucd mis- 
conduct of thc regcncy, and tlie alisolute want of nioney, gave 
littlc liope of niiielioratiriii, Tlie grcat deliCtu were rc-estab- 
lislied nt  Laniego nad bim, on tlie Douro arid tlre hlondego, 
and mapzinm of consiimptian nt Cdorico, frcm wlicncc the 
mule-brigrtdes supplied tLc troops by Cutcllo Com. Com- 
inissrariat stations were tilso oominciicerl at GuwJa, Pena 
Macor nnd Castello Brmco, to bc supplisd from Abrxrites, and 
tlie tliree grmt r i v ~ r s  were t b u  rcnllcred siikcrvicnt ta tlio 
wnnts of tlic nrmy tip to tlie ncnrcst navfgalilc points; biit 
from tlience the lancl trnnsport was very rlifficult, and tliitt. 
coupled witli tIie cap~icious nature of the Aguctla and tlie Coa, 
rentlered it dmgerous to blockade Ciudad Bodrigo =id Almeids 
together. Tlie covcring army woiild have had bd giountl, 
and tliose rit-cm bchind it ; indccd 11Iineida ivax only bToclí- 
aded 1,ecause it was aupp'posed to hrtve but a fortnigiit'a pro- 
visions, and mellington was prepared to relinquish it if 
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pressed, becaune the F C ~ U C ~ ~ O ~  o€ it formed no pnrt of his 
pnernl plan. 
Ris succew having $ven Rtahility t o  t11e Tory cxbinet, the 
ministers now wishcd to ratrict tlie war to Porhical, antl rw 
- 
c d e d  many bnttalions to England; but offensive operations in 
Spdn occul~ietl tlie general's tliongl~ts, and tm 
Wellin~tun 
projech presented tliemselves. 1 O. Judging it to iod J , i v ~ h  
urould bc long cre M~sscnn couId rmume the f;f;,ag;it'lm 
invnsion of Portugnl, lic tlionght to lcnvc part of  
his form in Bcirn and mith tlie rernainder raise t11e siege of 
Codiz. 2 9  If Almeida mrrendcred to Iiis blocbade, to  besiege 
Eodrigo; or if Almeida di4 not jield, he mig1:llt in time 
beaiege and t ~ k e  both toplrier, and tlien marcliing into the 
heurt of Spirin, open a coinmunication witfi lrnlcncia ancl the 
EiigIish army in Sicily. TIiis mould dclivcr Andalusin ns 
certainly as a direct opcrntion, bccnusc ictrtdrid, thc principal 
Frencli depcit, would be taken, the norkhern and southern 
Prcnch armies sepriratecl; and n nem liase on tlie Mediter- 
raneau being obhined, tlre wliolc of  tlie allicd force-; wouEd be 
nnited, \i+lien a Iew general tiattlrs would decide tht. fute of the 
Peniua~liila. Witli tliis grcnt dwign in vieiv, whieli succcssfully 
cxccutcd ~ o u l d  lime riurpa~.wd &7nrlborougI.1i's mnrcli to Blcn- 
heim, he re9isterl tlie seciil of Iiis b;ittalions, dernandctl rein- 
forcements from Englnnd, ancl rcquirccl lmve tn mt; yet his 
seeret aspirations were cliecked by rcflccting on the arroganee 
bioken promimfi aad folly of the Spaiasds, upon tlie fou! 
practices af tlie F'ortuguese iwucy, arid npou the tiruid 
temper o€ tlic English cnhinct. Mlicr!reforc m\-olving thei 
lcnding pointa in secrct Iic wi~ited on circnmstnnws; nnd 
bath projects were necessarily conclitional; frir if Nrtpoleon 
winforccd liis armies riew combinatians would arise, and it 
wae esseiitial first to  recapture Endnjos, the loss of which 
affected tlie safcty of Cadix, and mcnaced Portugal by placing 
Xlvas in daver, Tliinlriiig now tliat 33asueria muld riot 
easily in tempt  tlie blockade of Alrneide, he Jeparted to juin 
EcrcsforrE in the Alemtcjo, lenvinfi Spcncer to direct .tfie 
northern opcrntions; and -as this was n-critico1 pcriod of the 
war, it is essential to  revicw tlic statc of sffaim in the 
soutb. 
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Soult had retumcd to Andalusia whcn Badajos fell, Ieaving 
Modier to  besicge C ~ m p o  hr'aq-ur. His prcscnco and tlie 
filme of LB succcsscs rcstorcd tmnquillity to tlie province, and 
Iiis tmops then recovcred from tlic rlcapondency Chicf oi 
Bndnecrs, caused by tlic bnttle of Piarclsn, wliich W- 
C R T ~ P ,  
Itiil~ll 2 5 1 1 ~  gwat tliat tlie worlrs of Arms, Lucar, Nedina de 
IiiWrccpkd. Siduriin, and A l c ~ l n  de Gaxuleu, hnd Iieen stopped, 
Ahériiet and fcnr mns prcvdcnt. But ghom nnd discon- 
O f  Mlliinrg 
r:miiortrii.om fent werc also pnrnmoiint in Carlis. Thc fa11 o€ 
Cad14 1811. Bndajos rnenncecl tlie city mtll famine: and though 
51 SS, tlie rcgency pretcitded nt first to inenace Victor 
with A nem zttack, Zaym wns fiiidly dwliatclied witli six thou- 
sanrl Infnntry nnrl four liundrcd c a v n l ~  to gnthcr pronttions 
in tlie CoiirIada (le Meilila, wl~ere Rdlcsteros bad stirprised ond 
diqperscd Remontl's troops. Tlic Frcnch wcre Iiowcver rein- 
forced, Z a p s  mntle no progrem, miiny of his men desertcd to  
Bnllesteros) and he witlidrew ; Blnke tlicn assurned command 
in tlic Condada, nnd Bnllerrteros nnil Copons wcrc p I d  nnder 
bis orders. Tlicir unitetl corps amo~infinp t o  clcvrn thousmd 
infai i ts  and t\velvc hiindrctl cnvnlry were cnlled the 'fourtli 
army," and tlic fugitives fmm the Oebora Iinving rnllied under 
IIeiidizalid at Villa Viciosa were d l c d  tlie 'fiith srmv.' 
Morticr liad menndile  tnlcen poncssion of Alliuqueque 
and V:ilencia d'~llmntam, and bwieieged Campo hlnyor, wliicli 
would liave fallen at once but f(ir tIic covrnge o€ major Tallaia, 
a Portupese mginecr. ?Vith only two liiindred men and 
five muunted p i i s ,  he com~ielled lfortier to opcn replar 
frcnclics, to bnttcr in hmnrii, to bornlinrrl tIic place, nnd to push 
liis snp to the crest of thc glncia Wlien a brcsrli w m  mnde, 
Tallnia, though ill-seconded by his g d s o n ,  repulsd one assault 
and olitriined a truce of twenty-four Iiours t o  wait for succour : 
Iioiie arrived aud tliis brnve man mirrenderccl tlio 21st DE 
PiTiii-di. Mortier then rcturnd to Bndnjns, lenving Latour 
M t ~ ~ ~ l i o t ~ r g  o cmove the s i g e  nrtillei-y nnrl $toree. It m in 
this statc of affairs tliat iteresford, who had qnit ted WelLngton'ri 
amy after the combzt of Foz d'Aronce, nrrived rrt Portalep 
wivitli twenty tliousmci infmtw, more than h a  8ious&d 
rnvdry, and efglitecn guns. His instructions were to relieve 
Cnmpo Mayor, and rctülrc Olivcnzn and Badajos: tho first had 
, aIrmdy surrentlered, 6iit tlic marslinl bcing only two rnamlies 
dishut, tliouglit Iie iiiiglit surpriso tIis Iiosicgiii, corps, and 
witll tliis view put bis troope in motion. 
CQMBAT OF CAMPO JIAYOR 
In tIie morning of the 25th tlie ac2variced partrd, consisting 
of o11 tlic cavnlry, supported by a clctnclirncnt of infuntry 
nnrlcr coIoncl Colliornc, carne siiddcnly npon IJRmpo Mnyor. 
Latotir Bfiiiiourg was then marcliing out with nine hundrd 
drwons, three bathlions of infantry, some horse artillcry 
antl tlic bnttcring train af skteen gui~s; bctt his troops mere 
In disorder, and dlic Englisli cavalry under general Long 
imrnediatately turned tha tomn by tlic lcft, whcrciipon tlie 
Frcnch ictrcatcd on tlie Rndnjas ronrl, and tlic allics f n l l n ~ ~ c d  
alnnp some gentlc slopes, gradnally forming a hdf cirde 
round tlie retiring tioops in tlie plain. Colborne mas stilt at 
i1 considcrablc distanee, y ~ t  coming tq-~ at a running pace, stnd 
follomd by the secoiid division; tlie Freucli infantry lialted 
and for~ned a square, pplnciiig tlieir borsemen before xnd 
hliinrl it, wliilc tlicir bngg~gr! mil giim liurried towarda 
RM~H~OS; tlicn Long, Iceeping dio licnvy cikvalry hnclc, ortlered 
Qie Biirteentli dmgoons iinrler colonel Hcntl, and some Por- 
tupese riquadnins undcr Loftus Otway to attack. Tlie 
tbirteentli, c1i:iging at a g d o p  received ttie iufantry Gre, 
and the Frencli ~IUSKRPS met tliciri witli loose reins; Ziutlk cume 
stron~ly to the slioclr and many wcre dismounkcl, yct tliose 
who kcpt thc snddlc pmscd ficrccly thmiigh oori 110th sides, 
re-formcd, and agin  charged in tlie siime fcttrf~il mnner!  
Dqerately thcy fought, but Head'a troopers riding more 
closely topetlier tlian their adrersaries, overkl~tea horse and 
mnn and íinxlly tlia FmiicTi disljersed. Tlic~i, giillopirig on- 
mards, tliccc gullant swurdsmcii ptisqcd the convoy, hcrvcrl down 
the gunneyñ o€ the bRttcPing trnin, and being joiiicd by somc 
of tlie Porttign~e, the Freiicli liiissars still figllting Iiare and 
there, rode fomard. Ttey naturatly tliought the Englisli 
Iiurvy dmgoons, tlie artillery and tlie i nfaiitry, some of wliicli 
was duoe up, ivould dispose of tlie eiiemy they wcre passiug; 
but Ecrcsford would not Iet tlic drngoons chrge, und whcn 
six guns migM baw opened lie mould not siiffcr more tLan 
two la play, antl tliose o~ily fur n rew rounds; Iiciice tlie Frcnch 
rccovewd tlieir bnttcnng trnln nnrl rctrcated in safcty ! Mcan- 
whilc t11c tliirteentfi antl tlie Portugime Iiwing renclierl the 
bridge o€ %rlajos toolr somc guns close t o  the fortress, bnt 
were repulsed by its fire. and lieing followed tiy Mortier in 
pecson, ~ n d  rnct by the retrenting iiltiintry and tlic reinuins of 
the Iienten m~ulry, Iost oomc men. Altogetlier onc liundred 
of the al l is  were lcillcd or hurt, aníl sevciity wcrc talten. 
Tlic Frcncli Iost tliree liundred mcn and a IioMtzer, and their 
tussar colonel, Gliamorin, was slnin iti  ~iiigle cornbzt by a 
pou~edul cwodsrnnn of tlie tliirteentli. 
% prqfit from w& opportu?~ifips, n pmrd nzust be 
aomhntly zc-lth t7u advaneed p a r d  in 7am c$Gmivc ~ieovmmi. 
Wiien tliis combat cornm~nccd, Dercsforcl wns uot in front, 
and haron Trip, a sstff-oilicer, tuld I i i rr i  tlie tliirtceiith liad 
becn cut oK The mnrslinl tfiercfore, nnnxiuus to spare his 
cavralry whicli coiild not be rrpTncei1, rcfiisctl to  £01 loiv up tlie 
1iIo1; saying t1ie loss of one regirnent was ctiougli; liut tlle 
regiment vas not lost, tlie muntry was open, the eriemy's 
force and tlie posture of artlirs easy to be discerned witliont 
tmisting baron Trip. Thc crrorri of tlic dny werc al1 krcs-  
fods ;  yet shen tlie Wseness o€ Trip's report wr~q discovered, 
the tliirteenth dragoons were severely repi-imniided for pur- 
suing so engerlj-? But tlie unsparing ndmlrtition oC tlie wliole 
army consoled them? 
Campo liayor W ~ B  rccoverd so suddenly, ttlirat tlic Frmch 
Ieft eiglit thonsand rations of bread in the magazines; and 
they nlso evacuatcd Albuquerque and Vdencia cl'nlcnntara, 
beitig infinitely disrnayed Ly tlie apliearunce of so powerful an 
army in tlie soutli: indccd so sccretly and proromptly l i d  it 
hccn aiscmblcrl, that its cxistcnct? wns firtit m d c  knom by 
the blow rit Campo Jhyor. But bo pmfit fiom tllis surprise 
it was eszential to be rapid, for the breacliea in Ddajm were 
not closcd, nor tiie trenches obliterated, nor tlie exlixwted 
rnapines  rej.cleiiitilied. Soult hnd carrid awny six bnttnliom 
and a regimeni of cavalry, four liundrd ncn l id been 
thrown into OIivenea, tliree thousantl into Radnjos; tlius 
Mtirtier, derfncting the losses austained during tlie oncrationa, 
had lcss tlian ten thousmd nicn, and lie could not hold tlie 
line of the Chadiana and collecf proviaions also. Bereefod 
sLouId have instantntly mader l  upon Mcrids, driven bnck tlie 
fiftli corps, aiirl opcned rt coinmuiiicztiun I1y Jemmerilia with 
Elvns; the fdl of Bntl:~jos woulri then Iinve 'tiecn iricuitalile. 
The conrusion occasioncd by the st~rprisc, rand tlic moml 
impression prodirrtd hp tlic ciinrge of the thirtcentIi> pmntxed  
the success of tliis march; lie rnigiit evcn linve passed n t  
Meridn bcForc Mortier coiild ascerhin bis olijcct. Neglcctiii~ 
tl~is opliortuiiiky he put Iiis troopu in quarters round Elvas, 
for tlic soldierri, cñpeciull~. tliosc of tlio foiirtli division, mlio 
lrad bcrn rnnrcliing inrpssnntly sincc tlic 6th of thu month, 
were harc-footcd and cxhaiistd. 
Wellmgtou's instructions were to tlirtiiv a bridge ovei the 
(I*Yatlian,na rit Jerurncnlia, pusli back hforticr, nnd invest 
Olivcnxa and Bridnj os. Tlie Port~ignesc go~ernmcnt werc to 
provide sonie of tlie mcans, anJ liad reliartcd tlint ~iroviaions, 
shoes, bt ter ingguns,  arnrnunition and traiispurt, ivere actually 
collectwl; tlint tIic G~iatliaiiri, nliriundcd in scrwiccnl-ilc cmft; 
thnt t~vcnty largc Lonts, fonncrIy liclonging to Ciicctl wcrc 
at Ehns, nnd xll other tliings .svould be scnt from Lisbon. 
Yet no inagazincn Iiad bcen prepnrcd, m¿i very littIe trms- 
purt providerl; ouly fivs of Ciicstris bunts were iu Elvas; 
tliere ?vas no servicenlilc craft. ou tlie river, and somc srriall 
pontnnns, scnt frnm T,idinn, wrrc uiifit tn hcilr thc furm of tlie 
ciirrent or to wi~tn i i i  tlic pnssajie of giins: t l ie  criuiitry fur- 
.nisIied no food and the gnrrison stores o€ mvns wcre telren to 
feed tIic orniy. Al1 tlicse tliings pointed out 3feridt~ tttie 
true liiie of opr:itioiis. Pood wns to be liad on thc left of 
thc Guadiaria, aiiiI to rcmedy tlie evils enuriieruteiI did nut 
scquirr: tFic prcscncr: of  nn nrmy on thc ~ i g l i t  burilí. Tlie 
want of ~ h o e ~  in the fiiurth tlivision vns iiidccd rin ol,.stacIe, 
yct tIiose cxcellc~it truopa coiild llave marlc an effurt, and 
miglit witliotit mucli sisk Lave becn left brliiud. Reresford 
prefcrrerl liriltirig fur Ilic nielrní; to crosc at Jcruineiili~~, aiid 
thuu cummenced in error tliiise liloody opcrations whicL 
mnrrrrl Tlr-cltington's grrnt conwptions for airrying the wnr 
into Xpin, niir1 detnilied tlic army morc tlum n yeiir on the 
fmtieis of Tortiignl. General Phillipon, one of the sblest 
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govemorri tliat ever dcfcnded la fortress, eniploycd the time 
tlius given to leve1 the trericlies o€ Badajos, restoro tlic glacis, 
nnd close the I-ireacli; and htour Ma~iribourg wlio hd m+ 
ceeded Mortier in command cavererl tlic country witli fomprs 
and filled the magazines. 
Afher some dayh a squadron of cavalry liaving passed over 
the Qnadizna by a decp ford to protcet tlle worknicti, n bridge 
wna cnd ;tt .Jcm.nirncnlin, by fixing trcstlm in tlio ~hrtliom nnd 
connccting tlicm with Ciicstm'fi horits. Xt wns fiiiislied the 
3rd, and t3ic nrmy assembletl nt night in tlie neigl~bouring 
woods with intent to crow xt  dnyliglit, Lnt tlie river roee 
suddenly, swepe away tlie trestles, and ~~eliilered tlie ford ini- 
pmsablc. No moro mntcrials for a solid pnssagc coulrl be 
immecliritely pmcured, and the Sp'1nid1 bont.4 rvere tlicrefore 
converted into flfing brirlgm for the cavalry anrl artilley, 
while tlie cngineer Squirc wnstructcd, witli ~iontoons and 
wks, a sligl~t bri,ridp fur tlie i n h n t s .  To cover tliiu opera- 
tion a hnttnlion wns nddcd to tlic sqi~ntlron on kllc Icft bank, 
gct it wna late in the niglit of tlic 6th cre the rimy crossed 
and took position on a range of ltills covercd by a swampy 
rivulet, Latour Yaubourg nTas so occupied aith tlie provi- 
siuns of nUrlyos, tliat liis forapen were cxtended fifty mi113 in 
tlto renr, and Iic took no notico of Beresford, a noglect 
~rivouring morc of Spnnish tlinn Frcncli n-arfrirc ; for fim 
tliousmd infantry, with giins nnd cavnlv, could, notwith- 
danding tlie p n s  of Jeninicnhn, htaw asiIy cnt off the small 
dctacliment of thc Britisli on tlie Irft bxnlr, nnt1 mmpletdy 
frustrnted tlie operations. Bcrcsfod slioulrl have passeil ovm 
nnd entreneherl a strong force to protect liis worl~men, insted 
of n, bntttilion nnd some cfivalry; hut Iii? tcmptcd, md Latour 
Mauboug negIcctcd fortiine witli cqwl pcrtiiiaeity. When 
tbe  allics had secured tlie left banlc, tlic Frcuch general, 
awaking, colleded tliree tliousand infantry f i ~ e  Iiundred 
wvitlry aud four p n s  at OIivenza, anii mnrdied at duyliglit on 
the 7th to cipposca ptissrqy wliicli had been complcted tlie dny 
beforc; hc liolvcvcr surprisctl s sqirntlron o€ tlie thirteenth 
dragoons, and kdvrinced so dose to tlie position as to exchanp 
sliots, yet he was sufered to retire itnniolested ! 
blendizabel now re-occupied TdcncEa d'Alcmtam and 
Alhtiqiierqiie witli tlic fifiii amy,  and puslied cmalry posh ta 
Ln nocm and hiontijo, Dallesteros rc-cntered Fregenal, mand 
CastaZoa, made mptain-gcneml of Estrcmtidura ns me11 as of 
Galliciu, arrivcd at Elvaa. He wav frieildly toivartls Beresford, 
hut liad a gmtlgo apinst BInkc, nnd pretended to  chief 
nutlioritp as tlic cldcr captnin-gcncrnl; Blalro thcn clnimcrl 
on tlic samc groiind lit~prriority ovcr Rcrc~ford. wllich Iic wns 
not disposcd to ridmit of. Ir;ist,aiios, m110 dislilrerl. a disputed 
autliority, and \vas fcarful tliat Rlnkc's prctensions would 
prevent Dercsford crossing tlie Gudirrnn, finnlly a,med that 
he wbo brouglit tlic grcatest force into tlic ficld sliouId be 
g-enoralissima. TiIalm wns tlius put aside, tbnd Beresforcl, tlio 
younger officer, cummandcrl in eliief. To protect liis b~idgea 
wliicli lic liad now rc-constructed in n substrtntial mxnncr, he 
employcrl tlic Elvm inilit,in to rniñe entrcndimcnts, and hilving 
p h e d  a strong dctaclime~it iti  tlicm advancerl. Latour 
3fiiubourg retiretl upon ~illiuera, and the nllics being joined by 
RIadden's cnmli-y siiirimoncd Olivrnsa; this 1va9 on tlie 9th, 
and it is certaiu that no dcfeiice mns expected, for it was not 
until tlic mrniiiens was rcjectcd tlint m:ijur Dicl<son was sent 
to Elvns tu prcrwrc a battcring trnin. Tllc! Angla-Portugucse 
Rn'tisli Groops tlien enh~npcd roiind tlie plnce, ond opened 
a communication ~ 5 t h  PzalIcsteros, wliilc Castaños entered 
llerida nntI puslietl ca~-alry to blrnentlrlilejos; but tIie French 
fell bnck to Llereua, wIiercu~ion Deresforrl Icft Cole to besiege 
Olivema with tliu hurtli diviniun imd Ndden's cavalry, and 
took post liiirisclf on tlie 11th at Albucrn. fllere, being 
in mnnexian witli Cnstniíns liy his Icft, Iic spread liis home- 
mcn t o  cut off nll communicntion wit,li Riirlnjos, annd ucnt a 
brignde to collect supplies at Talnverx Xlcal. 
On the 14tI1, six t~vcnty-four poundcrs being placed in 
httery, at Olivenzn, oliend a practicatlc brcnclt, nnd the 
garriuon surrenclered. Cele tlien rnarclled on Zafra, and 
Beresfud Iiwing rccdIed thc brigxcIe froin Tnlnvcra also 
mnrchcd on tliat p h c ~ .  Hiu object ivns to drive Lntour 
Xnuliourg ovcr tlic hlnrenn, and to cut off general Mrirnnsin, 
who hd, wlvlien Zuyas quittcd tlie Condada, ~iursiicd RalIeskm 
to Fregenal, l i d  clefeatetl 11im ttiere nu tlie 12tl1, nnd \vas now 
folloivi~tg uli Li victory ; an alcalrle guve Lb timely notice of 
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Morena. 3 O .  Castaños was to furnish thrcc battalions for the 
s i e ~ ,  and kecp tlie rest oP bis corps at Meridq to support 
tlie XlianisL cavdry. The Britisli army was t o  be ili aecond 
line, and Albuera, ccentridly sitiinted Gtli respect to the 
roads lmcling from dndduaia t a  hd:tjos, was t o  be tlio priint uf 
conwntrn.tion for al1 tlie nllicd forccs in tlie evant of n, lruttle. 
To attnclr Bridnjos tlie bnttcri ng trnin nnd sf orcs wcre tnizcn 
from the rarnpnrts nnd magazincs of Elvas; it m 9  thcrcfore 
neeessniy t o  ensure ttie safcty of tlie p n s ,  lest that fortxss 
should in .thc enrl be exposed lialf dismantlcd to ii siege. But 
tha Gtiadiana, rising tcn fcet 011 tlie 24tL, Iiuri t~ga i~ i  cnrried 
aivray the Lridges at Jerumcnhz j ~vlvlicrcfore Wdlirigton chnngerl 
the lina of cuminunicution, inalriiig it m n  by Merirln until 
settled weatlicr sl~oiild d m i t  of frcsrcsh arrmjicmcats, nnnd ere , 
tlint was cffcctcd political difficulties forceii Iiim to delay tlie 
~iiege. IIcndiznbil's t roop  had committcd exccsscs ia Portu- 
gal, their disputes with tlie inhabihnts were constant, tite 
Spankh general pillngcd the t o m  of Femando, and the 
Portupcse governinent iu rcprisd, resolved So sehe 01i- 
venen, \vXch h d  furmerly liclonged to Portug-d, Thc Spnish 
regcncy ptiblicIy dicnvowcrl Mcndixahcl's condact, fin8 11s. 
Stimrt's strcnuoiis representñtions detemd thc Por~ugucñc 
from pluupinp tlie tmtl counti-ica into a war; but tliia dair, 
joined t o  thc ~iatural slowncss nnd wogance of the Spaniards, 
prevcnted Caslailos and BIrake from immediately nssenting t u  
tlie Englisll gcneral'~ dcmands, Now $50 enme unoxpected 
intelligouce tliat BIztssenri \vas rqaiin on the Apuedq anll in 
force, whcrcforc, porrtponing tlic ~icge  unti1 tlic 
Appcnriix 1s. Spanish gcneruls could act in conccrh, or rintil pi,,. ir. 
tlie fa11 af AImeidrs sliould perrnit a British 
force to come down, Weliington repaired witli tho utmost 
speed t o  the Coa it1lc1 P v e  orders for the northern d i t i s  agiin 
to take tlie field. 
OPEItATIOKB IN TIIE HOitTE. 
Almeida liad iiiirlced been closely pressetl, and tlie nrmy so 
dispciscrl tn mi+, off nll comniunicntinn; hiit tlir! nlIics were 
themsclvcs ~o rIistrcsscd fnr prnvi~ion~ tjhhnt jircnt p r t  of dicir 
corn carne from t l i ~  ;ide of Lctlesms hcing smuggld by tlic 
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peawnts througli tlic Freiich posts, nnd pns~e(i O V C ~  t,he 
A p e d n  by ropcs, mhicL mere UJden smonpt tlie deep cliwms 
oi' tliat river near i t s  confluente ivitli the Douro. Massena 
liad twjce suplilierl Ciutlucl Itodrigu, nnd tLoiigli Spencer, 
momR4ing tlir: Agiictla ívitli ciglit tlioirsniid mcn, ~vcrtciol; nod 
surroiiiidcd tlic rexr-pnrd o€ tlie last convoy witli Iiis ~a\+a?ry 
on a plnin, it reaclied tEie place. Having tlius succoured 
onc forlress Iie h a r n e  iiitent l o  relieve tlic ulliei; antl Le was 
stroag enuuyh to do so by force. His rctielit tu Salaiuanm 
ivas nirrtly to rr~torc tlic orgnnizntion nntl ~rluiln~icnts nf his 
nrmy, wliicli lie coiilrl ii»t do at Phlrigo ~vititliout exlinristing 
tlie resoiirces of tliat pplnce, but Tiis c:tiitoninents wcre ex- 
tended froin Ldesnirt aiid Toro on tlic Doaro l u  San Feliaes 
on t.lie Agucdn, Iiy wliicll he still lcnt Iiis linnd to Alrncirla, 
Hi;i cnvti11-y wns irirIrrd in bnd conílition, anr1 liis gtins nearly 
nnliorsetl by tlie retreat from Suitnrcm, yet Fie orily mnited 
for aid from Degsi6res t o  retalce tbe offencive. Tliis he did 
not redily olitain, Bessihs liad iicglcctcd and ooiitinued to 
rieglcct f hc nrmy of Portiignl, coiitrnry to tlic cmperor's 
instn~ctions, nnd nom p r o f i r ~ l  remonstrnnccs nnd counscl 
instcarl o€ men nnd glins. Hc dislikccl the war in Spnin, 
condemnetl tlie niode of condiicting it, .nnd h a ~ i n g  his tlioughts 
fixerl more upon nrrssinn tlian l'enii~quh politics, gavc La 
opinicin tlilit a uortliern .rvlir must occur so opcnly, tlidt it 
rencli~l the Rnglish ciimli. 
Townrds tlit! cnd of h p d  the new orpnixntion, decreed 
mliile haasscna was nt Santarem, was ninlirig Iirngrcss. Tmo 
divisi011~ of the nintfi carps joinerl Yasscnx, and Jlrciuet with 
t he  remriining eleven tliousniid infiintry sntI cavzli-y nns 
jioing to rrinforcc nnrl tnlrr: wiiirnnnrl nf thc fiftli rrirp#> vhrn 
lie ws prevniIed upon by Rftisscnn, wliu lmd a t  last receivell a 
proinise of n~sistance from Ucssirrcs, to  aid in nii cffort to 
relieve Almeida. Witli tliis vicw tlie 'Frendi iirlriy ailvtlriced 
iii  the latter part ef Aliril, The Iiglit division immotlintcly 
rcsiirncrl i t s  oIrl positions at Gallegos and Espcjn, and the 
mvn11-y m s  disperscd, pnrt in observlttion towarrls tlie sources 
of tlic hzavri, part beliind Qallegos in support o€ t(l1e iiifantq- 
IR tliis stntc ol af l~ im colonel O'llenrii. aiid cidity rnen of 
tlie Irish brigiidc mere cnlitiired by Jiilinii 8 ~ 1 1 ~ ~ 1 ~ 5  tlie affajr 


leing, it nras snid, preconcerted to cnnblc tlie formcr to quit 
thc Yrench servicc. Soon aftcrwmls twa tlionsand infnnt,r~ 
and n, ~quiadron of rnvnlr~ coming from Rodrign, endcn.r.oitrcd 
to ~ieire tlic bridgc o€ Rfarinlva in front o€ Gtillegos, but it 
~ v s s  brxveIy rnaintnined by calitain Dobbs of the fifty-ssmiid, 
witli one hqonct company nnd some riflernen. 
On tlie 25tI1, hfnssena reaclied Ciudad Eodrigo, and the 
27th, his alJvanceJ g ~ v t l s  felt tlio ligbt division from Espejs 
to Mnriitlva Wcllinfion nrrivcd thc ZSth, and imaetlintely 
conoentratcd thc main body oP tlic dlics bel~ind thc 1)iina 
&as river. The b a ~ a  m 9  swollen nnd difñcnlt to fod,  
and thc cncmy continued to Tw7 tlic linc of outposts until 
tlie 2nd of J11i4; d e n ,  tiie wdem having siilisiderl, tlie Prciicll 
army cnmc out of CiiiJnd Rodrigo, and tlie liglit division, 
&ter ri di~llit  skirmieli uf Imrse at G:~lEc~os, cotnrnenc~t2 n 
rctrogr~lc mal-cmcnt, from tlint ~ ~ l n c c  mil from Eslicjn, irpon 
f i cntcs  Onora. Tl~c cotintry iminmliritdy in rcnr o€ tlinuc 
villages wos wooded as far as tfie Diiras Cimas, but nn opcn 
plnin, aeparating tlie tzvo lines of rnmch) offcred tlic encrny'fi 
powerfd cnvdry nn opcuing t o  cut of tlie mtreat; tliey 
neglected tlie opportuuity, and tlie separnted b ~ i p d m  r e  
rnained unmolcstcd in thc woods bordering the pluin nntil 
midnight, wlien thcg rcsurnc~l their mrch and crosacd the 
Duas Cnsas at F~ucntes Onoro. TIint vilIngc hall cacnpcd 
injury dnring the previoas varfare, altlioiigh oecupied alter- 
na t~ ly  by French and Englisli dnring a ~vhoIe yenr. Every 
farnily mas wcll known to the Iight di.iision, and it mas wi tli 
deel) regret and anger they found that tlia Dritish troops 
preceding Uicm liad pillaged il, leaviug only sIiells of lieuw, 
~vhere tlirrr! dngri bchrc n fricnrlly pop~ilntion I i d  bccn li\riiig 
jn comfod. TFik wanton rind rli-rnccful act trns felt so 
decply throupliorit tlie ttrmy, kthat ciglit thousand dollars werc 
aftcnvads collected fur tlie poor despoiled people, yet the 
injury sun1c deeper tlmn the atoncment. 
Lord Wellington Lv1 resolved not t o  r i ~ k  mudi for Iiis 
lilockade. hlcissena he l r nm could brin:: rIown sitlierior 
numhcrs; bccairsc tlie Portiipicsc troopfi continncrl to lie ~o 
ncglccted by tlieir governmenf tliat tlicy w c i ~  stnrvirig undcr 
aniis ; the idantry abnndoned thcir colours or di-oppe<l £rom 
~2 
cxhnustion by tliousank the clivlilry was entirely mine4 
aiid a generai dispersion was feared. Nevertheless, when tlis 
trial ame,  Lis warlike spirit would iiot le& liim go back; Lo 
muld not intlccd with only tliirty-two thnusnnd iiifrintry, 
twvclvi? lirindrcd mvfils. in b d  condidon nud forty-two guas 
fiicc linssena on thc plains bcyond the Duas Cwm; but he 
occupicrI a tpiblc-land lietween tlie Turoncs and Duas &as, 
tlic lcft at Fort Conception, the centre opposlto tlie village of 
Alameda, tlie rigIit befiind Puentes Ouuro. T1li.i line iw 
tive rniles long, yet tlie Duas Caaw, f luwiug in u Jeep mvine, 
covcrcd Iiis Cront; and tlic Prcncli dnrcd not marcli by thcir 
riglit OR Almcida liecmuse Ile wouId tlieu linve crossed the 
mtiw nt dlamch urid Puentas Onoro, aiid Iisve fallc~i on tIieir 
ffanlr; Iience to cover tlic l~lockade, it sufficed to llave the 
fiftfi division nenr Fort Conccl~tiou, nud tlic skth opposite 
Alameda: tlic first nnd tliird divigons rvcro concentrutcrl in 
mnqs about cnnnon-~liot Iieliind Piicntc?~ Onoro, wliere tlio 
tiililc-lunrl tiirned tinclc on thc Turoncs, hcoming rocky nnd 
harali as it approached that river. 
FIBST COMBAT OF FUENTES OKOBO. 
hlasscnis mn-~c up thrcc coIurnns abreast. Tlie cavnlry, tlie 
aixtlt corps, aiid Drouct'a division, tlireatened f icn tes  Onoro; 
tlio eiglith and stimnd corps nioved apins t  Alameda alid Port 
Cnnc~pt ion~  mcnacing ttie a1lics' lctt; tlic ligllt divkion, 
tlicrcforc, nftcr pnsaing tFie Diins Cnsns, rcinforced thc aixth 
division. Loison, without n-aiting for 3lnssenSs ortlea, fe11 
upon Ft~entes Onoro, ivliich rras occupid by five Iiattnlions 
gicked from tlie first aria tliird divisions. hlost of the housea 
were in tlie Iiuttom OS tlia rnvirie, but un old ctiapel, rind wme 
builclings on n crngAy cmincncc ovcrhnnging onc cntl p v o  
a 1)romincnt polnt for rnllying The low p r t s  werc vigo- 
rotisly dcfenrletl, yct the Golcnce of thc attack, and the cnn- 
nonde, mads tlic hitisli ribnndon tlie streets, and tliey could 
scnrccly iiinintuin tlie uplirr grounli ubuut tlie dlqicl. Coluuel 
Williums, tlie comin:riidirig cifficcr, fcll LiadIy wountEerl, itnd tlio 
fight mas criticnl, wlicn tlic tivcnty-fourtl~, tlic scvcnty-fimt, 
a:id the sepenty-nintli regi~uentq marcliing d o m  from tliú 
main pogition, chnrgcd rtiiigl~ly, nnd dmvc tlic Frcnrli qitite 
over tlie I3ws Cnsns. During tlit! niglit tJic clc'taelimcnta ivrrc 
withdmvn, snd tlie thrcc succouring rcg4nients were IeR in 
the villqj-e, wllcre two liiindred aiirf sixtj* of the dlies and 
8omewlilit moro of I l i e  Freuch l i d  f:illen. 
On thc 4th Mnssrnn, wcoinpnnicci hy Dt?asiErcs, who l i d  
hrouglit up fifteen biindretl eavnlg miii n hnttcry of tiie impe- 
nal guard, examined al1 tlie Eine and maclc dispositions 
for tlie next day, Eis ilesign w a s  ta linld the left of ihe 
dlics in clieek witli tlie ~econd c u r p ,  nnd turn tlieir riglit 
witli tlie remnindcr of tlie nmy. Forty tliou- 
santl Prcnch in fnn try, 3 r d  fivc tfioumnd borne, E , 3 P e ~ ~ - x 1 ~ 7 9  
with tliirty-sil liieces of artilleq-, were nnder 
ams; tlicy had slioivn in tlie action of t he  3rd tliat tlieir 
ooiirage wss not abated, nnd it m8 a very ~ndacioirs resoliition 
to receive tlieir battlc, Yic position, aB1.r os Frreutes Onoiw, 
ww indeed strong, Crce for tIie use tiI al1 arrns, nrid covered 
thc cnmmrinimtion liy tlic hritlp. nf C i ~ q ~ l l o  B m; Iiut on tlie 
riglltl tlic plnin wns ront~niicd in n secontl strppe toNnvnrl'Arcr, 
wliere a considerable L J I ,  ovcrlooking a11 tlie cotintr~; com- 
manded the roads lending to tlrc bridges oF Scqnirw niid 
Snbugal. Mnrrsena coiilrl tlrcrcfore, by a direct ninrcli froni 
Cindd Rnodriigo seize tlint hill, ~ilxcs liis army in line of tnttle 
upon tlie l-iglit flaiik of tlie iillitq, and attzick tliem wIiile 
entiinglcd hct,wccn tlic Dnns Cnsns, thc Tiirrincs, tlic Coa, nnd 
thc frirtrcss of Almcida: tlic liridgc oof Cnñtcllo Rnm nlonc 
woultl hwe hcen opcn for rrtrcnt. To prevent tl~is, i ~ n d  tci 
cover hia comrnunic~itions &h Saliugnl anintl Squim, 'CTelling- 
ton, yielding to Spcncer's ea.rnest su,gqestions, extwrled his 
riglit t o  Nava drduer, caiised Jirlian Smcficz to occiipy tlie 
hill, and supported Iiiiii mitli the wventli rlivision iinder grne- 
ral Houstouii :-tlius tlio litie of b:ittle was mtde seven miles 
in Iengtli, beaidas tlio circuit uf hloclradc, Tllc Diinq Cnqn~ 
still cnvcrcd ttlc froiit, ht~ t ,  nhovc Fu~ntcs  Onoro, thc rnvine 
wns grndiially obliternted, resolving itwlelf into n ñ\rninpy wood, 
nhicli extended to Poca Velho, a, villuge Iialf way t c t ~ e e n  
l?ueutcs and Nava d'hver. 
It ms Rl~sscnn's ii~tcution ta  colnmence tlic ntiittaclr nt dny- 
Iircok on tlic Mi, bnt R dclny of twii Iioiirs occurrctl nnd nll 
Iiis morements wcre rlcscrirrl. Tlic c i ~ l ~ t l i  corpri, witliclra~vn 
from Alxnicdq and sripportetl l?y al1 tlie Frencli caviilry, wiis 
sccn rnarcliing nLuw Qic villagc rif Poco Vcllio, ivliicli with its 
srvñiiipy woorl, was occnpiec? Ijy IJoustouds left, his riglit being 
tlirowii bnclc ic. tIie 1i2oi1~ tuwards h'5~1t JAvcr. Tlio sixtb 
crirps nnd Drouct's rlivi.siun took groiind t u  tlieir own lcft> still 
krcping a diviaion iii frtint of Fuciitcs Oiioro, rncnscing tliut 
poiiit,; at tliiq sight tlir: Iight divlsion nntI tlie Engli5h íiorse 
linstcned to thc mpport of IIoirstoiiu, while tIic first 2nd tliird 
divisions mnde a niovement liaralle1 to tliat of the sixth corpa. 
Tlie lattcr, liowevcr, rlro\-c tlie Eeft !vi%* uf ftlie sevciitli division 
frain tha villago of P o o  Vellio, and jt !vas € ~ S C  gniiiiiig ground 
in tTic wood nlso mlicn tlic riffcrncn of tlio light divfsinn nrriv- 
iiig tFiem rcstorcrl tlie figlit. Tlie Frcndi cxvitlry tlieii 1mcsetIFo~o 
Tdlio tind commenced fonning in ordcr of linitlc on tbe plain, 
htivecii the wootl antl the liill of hTnvz d'hver wliere Julian 
Sxucliea w:w ~iosted. Ee izniricdialely retircrl :icrosu the Tiimiies, 
partly in fcnr, biit more in angcr, bcci~usc Iiis licutc~ant, Iin~ing 
foalislilg iaidtlcn cEoac u11 to thc cnciny rnalcing mnny violcnt 
gestuscs, W:L~ misttilren for n Freiich officer znd sliot bga 
soldicr of tlie gxarJs hefore tlic nction commeiiccd 
310tittrlin accupieti liirnself ivitli tliis wcalr partida for rna 
lioui; nud wlicn tlic guerillz cliief ivns goiic, turried tlie riglit 
or tlir: scvcntli division, nnt1 cliargcd tlic Eritirli cnvnlry wliich 
hnd movcd tip to itri support;; tlic cornlint zvns iincqlinl, for by 
ni1 aliiiñe too common, so maiiy mcn liad bcen drnrvn froin tlie 
ranlis as ordcrlics t o  general oficcrs, and for otlicr purposes, 
tliut not more tlizn z hhonsand Eiiglisli troopcis wcre in the 
ficld. I'lic Fre~icll thercfure rlruvc iri al1 tlie clavidryuu~grurtrds 
nt tlie first sliocl<, cut o f  Rnmsg's bnttcry of Eiomc nrtillcy, 
nnd camc smccping in upan tlic rrrscwcs of mvtilry rinrl iilion 
tlie seventh di~ision. Thcir Ic~diiig sq~~arFrons, approacliing 
in a disorderly mnnncr, w c ~ c  pxrtially clieclred by firc, but a 
great co~uiiiotion wm obscrvcd in tlieir uinin body ; nien and 
liorses were m n  to closc ivitli confu~ion rmnd tuinult toivwds 
one point, wliere a tliicl: dust anrl loud mies, and tlsc sparIcling 
of hlndm, and Anshinfi of pistols, intlicntctl somc e x t ~ ~ o r d i -  
nary occurrcnce. Surldcnly tlic m~~ltittirlc Rccnmc violcntly 
agitnted, un EngIish shout pealcd liigli i111d clexr, tlie m a s  was 
rent asunder, and n'orinan Rnmsfiy bumi forth sword in hniid 
at tire Iiead of liis hbtery, liis liorscs, brclithing fire, stretdied 
lilre gmyhounds along the plain, tlie p u s  GountId Iicliiiid 
tliem Iilce t l i ing ol no ~veiglit, aud tlie rnoiinted gunuem ful- 
Iovcd close, witli Iicnrls l i c ~ i t  low snd pointed wenpoiis, in des- 
~icratc c-xrccr. Ca~itmin Brotlicrton of tlic fourtccntli ilrngoons, 
seeing tliis, in~tnnt ly  rrirle forth md-with Iiis ~q~iadron slioclrcd 
thc liearl of thc purming troops. and gcnernl CTitlrles Stewart, 
joiniiig jn tlie clinrgc, toolr tlie Frencli eolonel Lnmotte, figlit- 
ing hand to Iiaiid; Ziut tlicii tlie mtUn bocly uf tlie Frciicli 
ame on ~tror~gly and tho  Britioli c ~ m l r y  rctired beliintt Ilie 
liglit divisiiin, whieli mna immcdiatcly tlirown into squarea 
Tlie scrent,li ~livision, wliic!i mas mnrr nd\+nnccd, di11 tlio sitmc, 
br~t he Iiorscincn nTre rrpon thcm fir~t, nn(1 Fiome wem mtt 
do15-n. Tlie mnss I~o\i.cvcr stootl firrn, and tlie C1i:~sscurs- 
Britanniques, ranged behind a loosc stone ~ ~ a l l ,  pourd such e 
fire ihat tlicir Euc, recoiIcd arid seeiiierl Scwilrlcrcd. 
ll'liile tLcse lirilliant mtiuns ncrc passiiig an tlic rjg1:lit tlie 
Prcnch mntIc progrcsu in tlic \~-ood of  Poro Yellio, and as the 
Englisli rlivi~iionri ivcrc scpnmtcrl nnrl thc riglit ming tiirncd, 
it was evident tlie battic would soon be Yost, if the original 
mncentraterf position nbove Fucntes Onoro \vas not quickly 
repiusd. Tlie scvcntli Jiviairin ivere tlierefore ordered to 
c m s  tlio Turones, and movc down tlic lcft liunlr to  Frenada 
wliilc tlte liglit, division retircd over thc plnin; tlic cavnlry 
covercd tl~is movemcnt; nnri thc first and tliird divi~ions, antl 
the Portiigucsc wcrc s t  tlie snme time placcd un tlie stcppe 
of land before describe4 perpendicular to  the rnvine of 
Fuciitcs Onoro. Gvucml Craufurd, who h d  resumed il10 
coinsnaud o€ tlie liglit division, cuvercd Housto i i~ '~  prissitge 
acmss tlic Turoncs, nnd Uicn rctired slowly over tlic plniii in 
squares, fdlowed by tlie h n c h  hmemcn, w l ~ o  continunlIy 
butflanlíed Siit never dared t o  msttil him; Iioivevcr in ap- 
proacling tlie new line they subrcd come of tlie foot guartIs 
under colonel Ell, inaking tlish officer and fuurteeu mcu 
prjsoncrs, xnrl tlien coutinuing thcir coirrtic wcrc rcpillscd Iiy 
tIie forty-second regiment. Xany times hloiitbmn feigoed 
t o  charge Cmufurd's squnres, liut nlivqs he found thcm too  
daugervus to mcddle ivitli, and this crisis pa~sed williout. a 
disaster, yct thcrc was not during tlic wliolc lvnr o more 
perilms ll!ur. Por Rotistoiin b division wvns scpnmtctf from 
the position by tlie Tirrones, nnd tlie v ~ t  plnin mns c a ~ e r e d  
with commissarihk itnirniils and campfolluwcrs, with servants, 
letl horseq baggage, and country people, mixcd ivitli broken 
detaclir~ients aud piquctg returriing Eroin I hc  ivoodq nll in such 
confused ooncourse tliut tlie liglit division squarcs appcnred 
hiit ss spcclts; nnd closc behind tliose stitirging messcs were 
five thonsannd liorsctnen, tmmpling, borrndiiig, sliotiting for tlie 
word to charge. Fifteen guns werc uli mitli tlic French 
cavnlry, the eiglltli. corps wns iii ortler oE btittlc bcbind t l~em,  
tlie soods oa tlieir riglkt wcrc fillcd ivitli  Loii;oiiY~ ~lrirmisliera; 
antl if that geilernl, pivoting upon Fueiites, 11d comc forth 
witii thc sixtli corps wliile Drouet r i ~ ~ n i l c d  tlic villi~gc, nnd the 
mvalry b d  made a general clia~ge, tlic loose cromds of non- 
comliatants ~ndlirokcn troops would liave lieen violcntly dashed 
agninst the first division, ia intcrccpt its Tire m ~ d  Iiretik ih 
ranks, and tlie lirattle would 11ave becu lost. Nu sucli eKurt 
was m d e ,  the plniii wus swn cleared, tho JJriti di cnvralry 
toolr post h~l i ind tlic rfintre, ond tlic lidit divisian fnrmed n 
mcrve on tlie riglit of tlic fimt clivisioii, Eitwing its riflcmcn 
amongt the mcks to  conncct it witli TIoustoun, wlio liad 
reachcd Fr'rwinda and liocn tliere joincrl by Julian Sanchea 
At sight of thia new front, so deeply l ind,  the French stopped 
sliort and opened tlicir pns ,  htearirig tlie cIose 1ii:iciacc of the 
allim; lut twehe Eugliuli p u s  suun relilied so brislcly tliat 
flie violencc of tFie E'rcncEi firc abntcd, and tlicir en\-alry drew 
bnck out of mngc. h body of infiintry tlicn attcmphd t o  
glicle diiwn the r~vine of tlie Suroncs, Iiut tlicy wvcre repiilsed 
by tlie rifl cmcn nnd tlic liglit compnies of tlie gu-iinds, and 
thc riction on tLs sirle regolved itself into a unnonade. 
3ieniiwhile a ficrce Lattle was pirig on at h c n t e s  Onoro. 
There Drouet wwns to hnve cnrried tlic villqe when Yoni5 
Iinin's c m n l ~  Iind tiirncd tlic riglit of thc line; I I C  dclnyed his 
attack for tivo liourg aad thus marred the conibrnat,ion; bnt 
finally he assfled wihh sucli fierceness and t.igour that the tlireo. 
Britisli rcgimcnts, ovcmahl~ed in numbers and unaccustomed 
to the desultory figliting of Iiglilit troops, wcre piercerl and 
dividccl. Two com~ianies of tlie seventy-nintli nferc t~ken, 
coloncl Cameron of that regimcnt was mortally wouniled, and 
tlie Fowec part of tlic villnge was lnst: tfie uyipcr pai-t wns 
bowcver stiñly held and tlie rolling of rnus!retry \vas inccri~nnt 
Dad tha attack becn m d e  enrlier, and al1 Drouet's division 
khrown fmnldy into tlie figllt, mliile tlie sixth cnrps moving 
tlirougll tlie wood clwely turncd tlia vill:~ge, tlie passaga 
must have been foreed and the lcft of the rieiv position out- 
Annkctl. Rnt now Wcllington, hnving nll liis rcscrvcs in 
hand, detnclierl aonsider~l~le rnnsscs to tlie support of tlic 
regiincnts in Fuentes; and as tlie Frencli mntiniied also t o  
reinforce tlieir troops, tlic mIiolc of tlie sixtli c o y  nrid part 
of Drouct's rlivisioii were fiaalty elipged. At one time tlie 
fighting ivaa on tlie Iiauks of the stica~u annd amoiigst tlie 
Iower bouscs, at atlotlicr on thc ruggcd lieights md arounti tlie 
chnpcl, nnn Romc of  thc encmy's sl~irmislicrñ pcnctrntcd com- 
pletcly tlirougb townrtls tlre mniii positinn; yet tlic v i l l ~ p  
wna never cntirely nbmdoiied by tlie dcfciiderc, ,wd in one 
chnrge tlic seventy-First, seventr-nintb, and cigl~ty-eiglitith regi- 
ments, led by coloncl M'liinnon, troke a lieavy mass near the 
clia1)el and killert a grmt riumlicr of Frencii. Tliis figl~ting 
lastcd until cvcning, vhcn tlic lowcr pnrt of thc town mtis 
ahnndonarl hy botli pnrtics, tlic Eritisli rcmnining nt tlic clinpel 
anrl crrrf:.~, the Frcncli rctiring n cnnntiti diot from thc atream. 
After t h e  &ion u brigde of the liglit clivlsion relieved the 
rcgiments in the villnge, a slipIit demonstration mnde by the 
secund mrpg near Fort Conccption, wa,s cliecked l ~ y  a Jirit- 
tdion oE tlie Lusitauian legion, itnri l o t h  amies remitined in 
observution. Pifteen IluuJred men and oiticcrs, of nliich 
tliree Iinndred were prisoncrs, constitntcd thc loss of tlio allies. 
Tliat oof tlic cnemy was cctimntcd nt five theumnd, upon the 
erroncoiis snpposition tliat f o u ~  liundretl denrl rverc lying 
nboiit Fuentes Onoro. A11 armies rnnlre rash estimates on 
siicli occasions. Bnvlng Iind charge to bury tlie carcnses 
imm~liately about tlie rillage, 1 Iound onIy one l iu~dred and 
thirty hdies, one-tlird beirig British. 
During the battla tho Frexch convoy for tlie siipply o€ 
Alnieich Eixd remined at Gallegos, iind IVcllington now sent 
Julian Xanchex t o  menncc it, sntl distiirli Rf~sscnds coinriiiini- 
cation with Ciurlxd htlr igo ; this liad iio cffec'c, in(l a more 
dwiriive batittle being cxpcctcd on tl io Gtli tlic liglit division 
iiinrlc hrcnst-works nrnoii~st tlio c n t ~  of Fiicntcs ; tlie rnilin 
p ~ ~ i t i o i i  immctlintely Iirbliintl tlitit villngc wns nlso rntrc.ncIied ; 
yet Fuentcs Onnro ivns, in iniIitsry phr:isc, not tcnnble. 
A vooded tonric of lantl, ovcrlookiny at  Iinlf-cnniion diot the 
upper rrs ~vcll na tlic l o i i~r  pnrt of tlic villngc lxcltli iii fleiik 
arirl rwr, rvns too distn~it to bc occii~iicrl liy tlic iillies, Iiut 
hnrl h'cy liccn thcrc Irc wotild linvc crfi~~~ncd thnt rirlgc, nnd 
Fuciitcs cotild only Iinve liecn licld by ñirlirnitting t o  :\'liiitclicr-. 
On the 6th tlic eiierny sciit liis ivouiiclcrl to tlic rear and 
mnde no dcrnonstntioii of nttnclí; tIic 7th linsscil iii z likc 
jnnctivn arid tlie Rri t id~ critreiicliriiciits werc ~irrkcteil. SEia 
8tl1, Masscna witlirlrcw Iiis innin horly to tEic I I - O O ~ Y  l~liding 
iipori K F ~ I C ~ ~  nnrI Cnllrjios, litit -ti11 rnninhiiicil pnsts nt  
Alanr~ls  and Fuentcs. On tlie IOdi, witlioiit bcing inolcsterl, 
lie retired xcross tlie Agueda; tlic siatli aiirl eiglitli corps 
aiid tlie wvalry passod nt Ciitrlarl JtotIrigo, tlic ~ccond coqm at 
13nrba dc1 l'irerco, Bessidres thcn c:iwietl off tlie imperinl 
g~~nríls, 3fmscnn mna rcenllcrl to Frniicc, nnd JIarmont 
assuinml tlie comrnnnd of tlie miriiiy of Portiipl. Butli sides 
cIaimctI tlie victory. TIie Prencli, liea~use tliey won tBa 
passqe at Poco Vellio, clcarcd tlic ~vivoorl, turiieil our riglit 
flaiik, mtarlo tlio cav.viilry retire, ariil forccil tlic ariny to  re- 
linqiiisli thmc mi lc~  of grouiid nud rlinngc ita frnnt. Sho 
Xngli~ih, becxusc tlic villnp oF Fitcntcq ño ofkcn xttackctl, 
mas  xt~ccessfully dcfcndcíl, rind the liloclrmIe o f  Alinci(la m 3  
mnint:iincd. Yassciia at first ginerl grczt, it(Ivaatnges, ?Tapo- 
looii would h v e  ni:idc tlie~n hta l .  Yet with UIL overtvliclm- 
ing c~wdry, on snitnlilc gvund ,  tlic prinec mcrrly intlirntcd 
nq it wcrc the Englisli gcnrrnl'~. error#, nnd stoppcrl ~Fiort, 
wlicn he should hnvc sprring. f o m r d .  I:y somc t h i g  Lns been 
attributed to negligen~,  by otliers to rlisjiiist at hcing super- 
sedetl Iiy Narmont; but in t r u t l ~  discorrl liad ariscn to actual 
irisuliortlinution, SIio imporii~l prtrrls woulrl not c1iarge at 
liis orclcr4unot did not sccond liim cordiully-Loison &S- 
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regarded liis instrucbiuns-Drouet sought to v a r o  his omn 
divisions in the fight, nnd Iieynior rcmltiiied pcdcctly inrtctive: 
the mnchinciy of bnttlc ~vo~iil(l not mork. 
General. Pclet, hfnssena's first aide-de-mmp, censures Wel- 
Iington for not scnding his cavalry qainst licy~iier after tlic 
secund poition mas taken up: he asserts thnt d:liigcr on Iliat 
side wottld huvo formd tlie French tu retrmt. Sliis crjticism 
ia hsed  on tlle riotion tlint tlie ltllies liucl fifty tliousnntl irien 
in thc ficld, mlicrcris, inclurling Sancl~cír' pnrtirlia, thcy lind nnt 
t1iii.t~-fivc tlioiisnnd. IIt miay IE with morc jiistice 
objected to 3Lwsenaq t h t  lie did not lauiicli. sotne ~~p~~ 
of Iiis numcpous horscmen by the Seqtiiras or 
Xübugal Fiiidgcs, ngaiust Guarda ancl Cclorico, to  destroy the 
magwincs, cut tlie comrriuiiicatiou, and crtpture tlic inules anil 
othcr mcnns o€ trnnsport belonfing to tlie allicd nrmy. Tlic 
vioc of thc EngTisli gcncrnI's position woiiFrl thcn Iinve bccn 
cfcarlly exposd; for tliouglli tthe scconri Gerrnan liiissam were 
on tlie marel1 from Lisbon, they had not paqsed Coiliibrn, ~ n d  
could not Iinve protccted tlre dep6ts, nrar, liou~cvcr otlorticd 
11y splciiilirl strukes ol skill, iy eoinmorrEy a series OS errors and 
accirlents. Fey'a nliposition prcventcd Masricna's mar& iipnn 
Corin, wliicli wot1J.11 l ln~c scciirerl Rndnjas anrI h n p o  Mayar, 
nrid proliably ndded Elvas to tlicin. h t o u r  l~aubourg'g 
t;ircGncss wm Iilct? to cost RIortier a rmr-pard niid a 
batteriiig-train. Ccresforrl'x bluiidcr st Campa Yayor, and 
his iieglect of lile lino o€ 3Ieiidn, enaliled tlie Freiidi to 
secure Bntlnjus. At Xuiliugnl, t l r u  petalnncc of a stnfY-oficer 
ni¿irrcrl nn .dnrirrtlile conilnnution, nni1 protliiccrI n dangcrous 
coinbiit. Drouet's negligcnce p l m d  Almeidni nt tlic mercy 
of tlic allics. A mistaken notion o€ Jlassenz's suffellngs 
cluring tlie retreat inrluced WeIliiigton to undertake two 
opernlioiis nt tlio sitino tirnc, ivliiolz wnq above liis strengtfi; 
and tliis crror niiglit linvt: Iiccn his niin, for Xcssi+re~, \vhp 
oiily liroiiglit fi Ftecn hundretl mcn nnd six p n s  NriTidfon,s 
t o  rlia liattlc of Fuentes Onoro, could hwe bron~lilit ~ t n ~ ~ : i i  CW- 
ten tliousand nien and sixteen giina. In tlint w~~~~~~ 
liattle more errors t h  skill ivere oiiswvable 
un brith sidcs, nnd tlie train o€ accidents Jid iiot stop tliere, 
tllcrc w s  still anotlicr cxnrnplc of tlie uncertainty of wur to 
bo presented. 
Genml Br~nnier, maila pri~oncr nt  Pimiero Eiut aftcr\vnrr!s 
exrlinnp~l, vns governor of tliis fortrcss. During thc Iinttle 
his garrison, o€ fiftwn liitndred men, dti inis lred bold!y ~ 4 t h  
the blocknding force, and loud explosions, s u p p c d  to be 
signaltls of commnnication witli tlie rclicving nrmy, wcre F i e  
quent in the pIace. After tlie bnttle, a Prench solclier named 
Tillct, 4 t h  exhmrdiiiaq coumge nnd presenca o€ mirirl, con- 
trivcd to pcnctratc in  uniform, for  hc rcfwcd to lic n qw, 
through thc post3 of bTockntle, carrying an inddrr for Rrennicr 
to evacuate the fortress arid rejoin tlie army by Uarbnrta cld 
Piierco. Xassena appewed to ha-re cbnntloned tlie place to 
its fate, and Tellington havingpIacei1 the liglit division on its 
old position on tlio Aanvn, with m l r y  posts on tlic lower 
Aguectn, clirrctcd grncrnl Cnmpl~cll to rraimc tlic investmcnt 
with tlir mxtli division nnd Pridr's brignrlc, and orrlrrcrl sir 
W. Erskine to send the fourtli regirnent from Tal de 1Iula to 
Barba clel Tilereo. CampbclE disposed hia troops ncgl igently, 
Emkine sent no O K ~  to  tlie fourt'ti rcgiment, and Reiinier, 
rIes1iniring af succour fruni williout, rcsolved IiIíe Julian 
Es t rdn  at Hostalrich, to brcnlr tlirough tlie lilocT<atte, thuiigli 
an opcn country nntl a dotililc linc of post8 aggraratcd t l i ~  
dificulty. To rcntler tlie fortress uselms for the nllies, be 
mined tlie principal lin~tions nnd dcstroyed the guas by an 
ingeiiious cxpedient ; for alaays hc fircd scverai zt once ~vitli 
liezvy cli:wges, placing one twross tlie rnuxxle of anotlier, tlius 
ñamc shots flcw townrds tlic bcsiegers wliile otliem rlmtruyed 
thc piccecr withoiit nttmcting notice. 
On the 10th ntt midnight, he ~prung his mines, broke 
+hroiigh the piqiicts in ontl column, and stccred bctwcen tbe 
rescrves with a niccty preving at once his wolness antl previous 
olemation. Tack foI1llowcJ liim witli a few men Ii:irtily coi- 
Icctcd, and plicd Jiim with fire, but silcntly stmlily swiftly his 
colnmn glided onwnrd unti1 tlie rongh porintl Icrrrling to Ihirh 
del h e r c o  was gnined; there jt hnltcd for n momcnt, just as 
daylight broke, and Paelr sent an officer to ia viIlagc on the 
riglit to bring out some dmpons iipon tlie French ilank wliich 
accnsioncd a sltimisli md more deley. Campbeli's troops hd 
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p i d  littIc attention to the explosion of the mines, tliinkiig 
t.hern n repetition of Brennier's practlcc with the p s ;  but 
Pack'~ musl~et.ry had arouscd tlicm, and the tlirty-sirtl re& 
ment was nnow closa up. Tlie fourth regiment also, Iiavhig 
hcnrd the firjng at V d  do Jiuln, ms rapidIy closing on ttia 
Frencli right flflniilr, and Brcnnicr, Iinving bcnt off' thc drqoons, 
resumed his mnrcli; then the Englisli iufantiy thmwing otf 
thelr knnpqxclrs overtoolí his celumn just ns It wns descending 
tlic chasm of Enrba dcl: Rierw, lrilled rnnny, and m d e  tliree 
Liundsctl l~riseners. The thirty-sixth, excited by thc d o n ,  
very raslily pased tlie bridge, :,dliereupo~i Reyiier's corps 
whicli was thcrc, nwniting Rreiiniei.'~ arrim!, drove it bltcIi ivitli 
n loas of forty mca : hnd ilrskinc okcpcd liis ordcrs nhoiit tlie 
foitrtli rcgiment Rrennier woulil lrnvc becn loat. Stung by 
this cvent, nntl irritared by some previons examplea of uurlis- 
ciplined valour, lord Wcllin$on issiled this swere reliuke, 
as rrpplid%ble to mnny English writers as to tlie persotis 
& ~ ~ F C S S C ~  :-' fl!A 0fflc6T6 O f lh8 CWlWJ Wiy d€p7¿d U p R  d 
rlht t l ~  mcmy lo  w/wm Ilwy aro oppomd .is mt h a  p d m t  
t/an powcrf:ul. f l o8wZtk~hdZng  wl& J .  Iim NrateLL ia 
gazdfeq und w ) q a p r # ,  m I d v e  m w   en m l l  borlieri 
unmjy~oríkcl SZCCCN,$T~?J o p s e d  €o h y e ;  nw has 17ba v e  
&ce of any qfiw vmJized tJte storiev d i c h  dl iwve r d 3  
qf wl~ok miaies king drivcn &y a ?~a?z@d o j  riyjd itaJí@lai)g 
urd ~ ~ Y O L ~ I &  
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WKEK Mnrmont 11xd tlius reeovcrcd tlic: garrison of Almeida, 
hc witlidrciv mo& of Iiis forces to Salnm~tncn. Wclllngton 
then placed tlie íirst, fiIZIi, sistli, nnd light divisions and tlie 
czvalry on tlic Axnvg uudcr S~icncer, arid directcd ti10 tliird 
nnd ñcvcntli divisions nntl tlic ñccond Gcrmnn Iiiissnrs upon 
ñadnjos. On tlic 16tli, liearing tliat Soult, Iiitlicrto reported 
by Bercsford to bc cntircly on thc ilefcnsivc, \vas advancing at 
thc liad oF a pomerfiil a m y  into Estrcniratlurn, hc ivcnt in al1 
bnste tu tlist proviiiee, but ere he couId m i v e  a great h i t l e  
had Ficcn fouglit witli cxtrlinrdinnry f q  
Wliilc nwn,it,ing tlic nill~~qirin f thc: Spnnisli gcncmls, RC,WR- 
ford had Execl Iiis Iicml-qiiartcrs irt Almendrtilcjos, but htour 
bhubourg rcmrainerl at Guridnlcnnal, antl Iiis parties fomfed 
tLe most fertiie tracts lsetmecn tlie arniics. To clicck tliem, 
Penno Villamur ivau reiiifurcctf with Tive squadroiis, 2nd colonel 
Colborne wns dctmlieil ivitli a b r i ~ y ~ l c  o£ tlie sccond Jivision, 
twa Spnnislli gnns, nnri two ñqwndrons of mvdry, tn mirli thcir 
inrondq and girc coiifidence t o  tl ie pcoplc. Gollioim, liaving 
n fine tnlent far wnr, Ly rapitl mmnrdics tiiid suddcn clinngej, in 
conccrt sitli VilIainur, caiifuaed the encmy's parties, inter- 
ccpted sevcr:il runvog-4 antl forcerl tlie Preiich t o  quit Fuente 
Ovcjuiia, La Grnijjn, Axungn, and m u y  otllcr frantirr towns; 
nnrl lic irnpnscd iipon Lntour Rl;nirlioiirg mith so mudi acltli-em, 
tli:it tlic Iatter irnqining a peat  force W ~ Y  nt Iimd, fcll bxek 
to rl!nstuitino. R~ving clexrcd tlie countq on tlist side, he 
inde a sinplnrly bold atternpt to surlirixe tlie Eortifid post of 
Kcnclcnziir, Fur ridirig on to tho drawbridgc, with n fciv 
oficcrq in tlic p c y  o€ thc rnarning, lie ~~irnmoned tlio com- 
mnndnnt t o  wrrcnder aa a mcnnrr nf ~nving  l~irnscl f from tFie 
Spanisli arrny, nhicli wnq cloñe nt hmd nnrl woiiId @ve 110 
p a r t e r ;  the French o6ccr wits ainazed at tlie nppcarance of 
the pariy, L u t  toa reeoltitc to yielil, xntI Colborne, pcrcciving 
tlie nttcmpt h d  fa&<& gdlopcrl of under a feiv stitmggling 
sliot, znd then hking tu the rnountains, rejoined tlie arniy 
witliout any 105s. 
During hb absence Ilie S~ianisli generals liad aocetled to 
Wellington's proposition, Uio Guadinna liad subsided, tlie 
brid~w at Jimimerihn ~ n a  rcskorcd, rtnd on tlic 5th of 3tny 
William Stewart hbnving tmo sqmmlrons of ltorse, sis freld- 
piwes and tlirce brigndes of iiifiiiitry 11ad inírested Bxctnjos on 
the Ieft of tLc Qudianz; on tlie 7th tlie remainder of tlie 
infantry, rrinforced by ttwo tliousnnrl Slii~uiartls unrler CarIos 
d'Espailn, esicaii~pcd in tlis noocls near tlia Eurtrcss, Alatldcn'y 
Portugucse Iiorso wcrc iu otservation ncnr Mcridit, and n troop 
of hoirrc-ltrtillrry, corning from Lislilron, saR nto~mLclictl to tSie 
Engli~l~ envnlry ivhicli rcmnincd nmr 1x1s Rqntos nn(1 Zafra. 
Tlre flying bridge, mover1 from Scriimcnba, \ras re-establislied 
near tlic moutli of tlic Cap", pct wns sorin drarrn liaclr, becnuse 
tlie riglit bmik OE tlic G~iadiiiiin Iiciilg stiIl open somc Prcncii 
liurde liiir? ccirne down tlie rivcr. 011 Ilic Slh liowcvcr, gciicrixl 
Lumlcy invcstcd Cliriatrival with a briglidc of t l ~ c  second divi- 
sion, Soii r liglit ESpxiiisli Fin  s, tlir: sc~cntccnt~h I'nrtugiicse 
inhnt.iy, and tiyo squatlrons of liorsc dmfted from tlic grrison 
of Elvas. Tiese troolw [lid iiot arrive simultaneouslp at the 
poiiit of iasscrnldy, ivl iidi deln~c(1 tbc olierntion, nnd sixty 
Fraidi dmg-oons uiovirig urirler tEie Ere ol tlie place rnaiiitaiucd 
n, s h i q ~  s1:irrnisli bcyuiiil tlie wnlls. Tfiis >vas t he  Ent seriouri 
sicgc undcrti~l<cn by tlic EritisIi i n  tlic Pcniiisula, nnd, tu tlie 
Jivcrcdit nf tlic Eiiglish gnvcrnmcnt, no nmy snFi cxcr ivorsc 
providcd fnr siicli sil ciiterprise. The eriginccr oRccm wrc  
rcalous; and notivitlistanding sonie dcfccts in tlic constitution 
and custoiiis of thcir corps, tcnding rntlicr to mnke mgimentnl 
tha11 lnnclicd scictitilic uficeis, niauy of tlicin verc well versed 
iu tlic tlieoiy of tlieir Lirisincss: yet tlie i~lilest trcnililctl nt 
tlieir destitution in nll t l i inp  ncccscnry t o  rcal scrvioe. With- 
o i ~ f  a c n ~ s  of sitlil?crs nntl miiicias, witliout a privntc: solrlicr 
wvho kncw IIOW t u  carry on xn n~iproacli under fire, they werc 
eompelled to nttaclr fortresses 12cfcnded by tlic most wnrlibe, 
prnctiscd, nnd sciciitific troops of tfic nge; and tlie bcst offiecra 
aiid the íiiicst soldien sacrificed tlieinsclves in a lanicntatile 

and then Beresfod, having recaived intelligence that the 
fiencli army wris in movcment, nrrested tho pmgress of al1 
the works. On the 12th, believing tliis i~iformation prema- 
turo,  Iie direeted tlio trenches to be opened agni~~st  tlio wtIe;  
yet the inhlligenco wns  true, and being confirmed a t  twslve 
o'clorlr in thc nigllt, thc worlring partics wcro q n i n  drawn off 
md rneasurcs ta.11cn t o  rnisc thc 
Thi~i rnarshal had rcelolvcd to mccour Badajos tlie momcnt 
he he& oF Reresforrlk oppcrirnnce rit Ciirnlm Mnyor, nna hc 
rejoiced tliat the Iattcr'~ tardiness @ve Phillipon time to 
o p n i z e  a ggood defcncc, fiad himself a respite to tranquillize 
Andalusia, and arrangc mensures for resisting tlic aIlics in the 
Isla during liis akence. Mrith tliat objcct be iiad immb 
diately commenced s m d  dditionxl fortiíications in tlic city of 
Seville, and at tlre same time reneivcd tlie construrtion of tlioso 
wbicli lid becn ~uspended in other plnces by tlic btlttlr! of 
Baro.m: hc thus dcccivcd Rrrc~fod, wlio believcd tliat. hc wns 
fremhling for liia orn province. Xothing coiild be more 
fullacious. Tbcrc were ~cventy tliousand figllting mcn in 
Andiilusia; and Droiiet, who had quittccl Yassena immedintely 
after the Iiattle of Fuentes Onoro, was likewisc in marcli for 
that provincc by tEie \ay of Avila and Toledo, liringbg with 
hiin cleven thousaiid men, 
On the 10tli nf Ilny Snult quittcd Scville with tl~ree thou- 
mnd lieavy drngoons, tliirty pnrr, nntl tivo strong brindes o€ 
infnntry un(ler the commnnd of WerlE rnnrl Godinot. This 
force, dpamn from tlie first nnd fourtll corps aud Dcssollcs' 
reserve, entcred Olalls tllc Xltli, and miis there joiiisd by 
Maransin. Glodinot thcn marc11ed by Constantino to rein- 
force tlie fifth corps, wliicli was ftilling back from Guedallcaiial 
in consequcncc of  Colhorno's gemtiona. Tlic 13th a junction 
was eK~cted witli Lritous Nautiour,- who nswmed tlie com- 
mnnd of tlic 1 i e . n ~  cn\'nlry, rc~igning the fifth mrps to Gisnrd, 
who immedintely dvanced to Los Siintm. TIie 14th SouTt 
reactied Villa Franca, and beinp then witliin ttiirty miles of 
airlajos, caused his heaviest guna t o  fire salvos during tlie 
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night, t o  g i ~ e  notice of liis ap1)roach to tlie prrison. 
expedicnt failed, and tlic lTítIi, in the evcning, the P r e ~ ~ h  
army wm concentmted nt Santa Marta. 
Bereaford, as we have seen, perplexetl by Ziad intelligenca, 
did not r d ~ e  tlie siege until the night o£ tlie JBth, and then 
cuntrary to the earnest represc~itatioi~s o l  tlie cngineers, wlio 
promised to win the pIacc in tlirco dap. Tliis promise wns 
nonglih, nnd if it liad Iiccn goorl SouIt would yct linvc surpriacd 
him in liis trenchee : Iiis frrrnnew tliercforc amed the rarmy, 
and 1iis armngcments for carryjng off tlic s tor~s  wtre admii- 
alily executed. Tlia srtillery mtP pIntforins were removed in 
tbe niglit of the 13tEi, sud at twelve o'clock on tlie 15th, all 
thc guns end ~itorcs on tlic lcft bnnk wcrc ovcr thc Guadinna, 
the gabions and fascines burned, and tlie flying bridge removed. 
These transactions were ve11 maslced by the fuurth division, 
which in concrrt with tlie Spaniards maintained the inm~t- 
ment; it waa only by a sally on tlic mar-guara, in mhich the 
Portupesc piqueh wcrc rouglily trcntcrt, tlint tlie govemnr 
kncw tlic aicge was rxised, and oi tlic crtnse Iic wvm still 
ignorant. 
In n conference witli the Bpmisli generalc, held the 13th at 
Valverde, it  vas agreed to remive battle a~t Aliiuera. Balles- 
teros' anrf BEalre's corps being tlien nnited tat Unracotta, were 
falling back upon Almendral, and Blnkc cngngctI to  liave thcm 
at Albnera before twelve o'clock on tlie 15th. Rad~joa m9 
tlie centre of an arc, swwping tlirougli Valverde, Albuera, antl 
TsIavera Real, and BIake underhok to watcli tlie rmds ontlic 
riglit, while Bcrcsford alid llrndixuliel watclled tliosc in tlie 
centre, and hiadden those on tlie left. Tlie Uritish being 
chicfl y in tlic w d s  nmr Fnlvcrdc coiild rcnch Albucm hy a 
balf rnarcli, and no part of tSe tirc was more than four leagnes 
from Badajos. Soult on tlic L4tli at Los Santos eight 
leagues diatont, and Dereefurd, tliinking be couI(1 not be for* 
stalled on any point, kept tlie fuurtli divitiion in t1ie trencbes. 
On tlia 14th Colliorna cama in, Mucldcn retired to Ldavom 
Real, Blalcc rmlied Almcndrnl, nnrl the Ang-lo-Portiipeso 
mva1ry under general Long fcll baclr t o  Santa Marta, whre  theg 
were joined by Blake's dragoons. 
In the morning of the 15tli tlis Angla-Portupese army 
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occupied the lefh of the Albuera posttion, a ridge ritout tour 
miles loog liaviiig the Aroya Val de Sevilla i ~ i  rear, md tho 
Albuera river in front. The riglit was groIonged towards 
Almendral, tlie left towurds Eailizjos, tlie aswrit from tlie river 
wm ensy, nnd the gsound prnctic3Me for mvalry and artillery. 
In aílvance of tlic centrc wcre tlic bridge iknd villec O€ 
&era, the former comman(1ed by a battery, thc lrttter 
oocupied by Alten's Ckrmau Iirigade, BeI~ind tlie Germans, 
the second divkion iinder William Stewarb formed one line, 
tLe rightit on a comuimding liill over ivliicli the Tdverde rod 
pacsed, the left on the red of Btldwjos, bcyond ivhicli tbe 
ordcr of Iiattlc wns continucd, in tmo linm, by thc Portuguese 
troops undcr Hamilton and Collins. TEie righb of tlie psi- 
tion, stronger, higher, and broader tlinn any other part, was 
Icft for Elalce's army ; beczuse Beresford, tliinking the hill on 
the Tnlverile rortrl ta be the k g  of tlie position, ns. protecting 
hh ody line oT retrent, wras desirous ta sccure it witli the 
besi troops. Tho fourtli division nnd the infmtry o f  the 
fift,11 SplinnisTi nrmy wcrc still licforc Harll~jos; but Colc hild 
ordcrs to ricnd t , l~c sevcnteentli Portugtese regiment So Elvas, 
to thmw a Spprinish battalion into Ulivenza, to  bring his 
second brigadc, u-Tiich n-as hfore Cliristo~al, aver the 
Guadiana, by a ford abow? Badym, if przcticable, and to be in 
rcadiness liimsdf to march nt tlic h s t  notice. 
In tilis posture o f  affuirs, abaut tliree o'clock in tlie everiing 
of the Ititb, Bcrcsford bcing nt wome difitancc un tlie Ieft, tlie 
wholc mnss of thc alIicd enwlry, cIoñc1y folZometl by tlie 
Frcnch light horscmcn, a m e  in from Snnh hfiirtn, and 
fihding no infanty beyond tlie Albucm in siipport l i i i s s d  
that river. Thus tlie wood~ l  ieights on tlie riglit banlc wcre 
abandoned to tlie ciiemy, wliose force and dispositions mre 
thereby effcctually concederl, and tlie citrciigtli of tTie dlies' 
position wns already sapped. Deresforrl luinie~liately formed 
s te~nporory rifit wilig with tlis cavdry antl artillery, 
gtretched liis piqirct:ts dong thr: roarl to Alrncnrlrnl, tinrl ~ c n t  
officciw to h ustcn Rltilce'~ rnovcmcnts ; liiit tliat gcnerril, who 
hiul only a few milcíl of p o d  rond to rnarcli nnrl hntl pie- 
mised t o  be in lint at noon, did not ieacli the gronnrl before 
eleven at night, anrl his rear did not nrrive Sefore three iii 
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the morning of tlie 1Gtli. h~cznwIiiTe, m ttie Frencl~ army 
ww aolv cvi(lently in front> Cole and Rfdden wcrc culled up; 
the odcr  failed to rench tlie lnttcr, bub Cole brouglit the 
i o f ~ n t s ~  of the fiftli arrny, tivo squadrons of l'ortuguese 
cnvnlry, niid two iirigadcs of thc foiirth division, into lino 
htiveen cight nnd nine dcl!~nclc; I i i ~  tliirrl tirigntle, urirablc 
t o  pms the Guadiann nbavc nailajos, \\-as in marcli by Jcru- 
rnenlia. The Spanisli troops joiiler? Ulake on tlie riglit, the 
two Lripdes of tlie fourth divisiun, ~~ci. l !  dmvn up in culiuruis 
Iieliind the second divisiari, aiid tlic Portngucso squadrons 
werc scnt to rci~iforcc Otwiiy, ivhosc Iiorsctncii, of the aame 
nrition, wcrc puslicd forwiirtls iti  froiit of tlio lcft wing. TIie 
princip>d mmarss of tlie allicd cava1 ry \vas coiicciitratctcil Ixliind 
tlie centre, and Deresfod, dissatisficd ~vitll general Long, gave 
the cominaud to geucriil Lumlcy. 
TIiirty tliousliud infnntry, morc tlisn t ~ v o  t1ious::nrl cavdry, 
and tliirty-ciglit picccs o€ arlilIcry, ciglitccii Iic,ing iiino- 
puuldderri, were i n  lint, biit tlic Britisli infttiitly, tlic pitli oE 
hattle, [lid not exceed sevrii tliousand, nnd iilrciidy RlaIceH 
arrogancc was slinking Dcrcsford's mtliority. Soult Iind forty 
gum, ~ U U T  tlioueaiid vcicruri cuvalry, riiid niiieteen tl~ousand 
choseu iiiF~iitry, al1 of cirie Jisci~il i~4 uiiiiiiutcd by onc spirit 
niid nmply compcnt;ntcd for tlicir inkriiirity in iirinilim by 
tlieir fiuc organixation niid tlicir Icatlcr's cnlixcity, u~Fiicli waa 
Imnieasnralily gmutcr tliaii his ndvcrsary's. IIe liad cxainined 
tlie position witliout liindraiice on tlie evening of tlie 15th, 
and Iicuring tliiit tlie fourtli tlirirriciri wnu lcft at Dulajos, iarid 
Blnkc would not arriw I>ctoru tliti 17tIi, rcsolvctI to attnck 
nmt rnorniiig, for lio Iind dctcctct! tlir: wi:iil<nexx of ~rrcsforrl's 
dispoaitinns. Tlic Iiill iii t3ic ceiitrc, comrn:iridi~ig tlie Tdvcrrle 
m5d, was undoubtedEy the kcy of tlic position if an athclt 
was m.ds pnrallel t~ tlie front j Liiit Soult c ~ v  tliat on tlw 
riglit, u liigli roqh brokcn taLlc-lai~d trcuded Iiack tuwt~rtfs 
tlic Tulverdi! roiid a:id luoked iiito tlic rciir of Bci+csforrI's line. 
Hcnm, if hc corild suildcnly plncr! Iiis mxqt4.rer tlicre, Iie ~niglit 
rol1 up tlic allies on tficir ceiitrc ancl liush tlicm into tlie 
vaIlcy behintl; tlie Tnlverde road could tlien l e  scixed, t11e 
retrcat cuf n~id tlie strtirig Frentli cavulry ivould coriiplete the 
Yictury. 
Beresford's right znd Soiilt's left approxirnntcd, being only 
diridecl by a bill, abolit ciannon-sliot distnnce from either, 
which was separated from the dlics by the AIliuera md fcom 
the Frcnch by a rivulet cslled tlie Peria Tliis hciglit, 
neglelectetl by Bcresford, WM alily made use of by Soult, 
During tlie niglit hc placed SelrinrE it tlie greatcst purt o€ tlie 
artillery undcr general Itnty, thc fifth coq!a nnder Qirnrcl, t,he 
hcnvy mmlry undcr Lntoiir l i n u b o u r ~ ~  tlius conccnhting 
fifteen tliousanrl mcn xnd thirty q n s  Tvitliin ten min~niitca' 
rnxrcli of Ecrcsford'il riglit ving: yct that general eould 
neithcr see a man, nor draw a cound conclusion as to tlie real 
plan o€ ntbclc. Yie lig11t caaIry, tllc bripndes of Godinot 
nndWcr16 wi8i t e n p n s r e n i n ~ n d .  Tlieq-wercpIacetlin the 
wliods near tlio co11lluenrc o€ the Feria witli tlie hlliuem 
?Ter16 wm in reserve, Gvdinot ivas to attwk the bridge mand 
villn~c, to hrnr n p i n ~ t  tlic ccntre, nt,trnd, Bcmford '~  nttention, 
scpnratc his wings, antI Jouble up his rigl~t wlien the pfincipi 
attaclr dioiiltl be devefo~~ed. 
During thc night nnd rnorning, sixtccn tliousnncl adrlitiond 
rnen liad come i i ito linc untlcr l3Ialce and Calc, but so defectire 
were Bercsrord's dispositiu~is tliat Soult zdliercd to liis fimt 
plan, B M ~  a t  nine u'clriclr just before Cole arrived, Godinot 
emerged from thc woorE in onc h c a v  column prccetled by ten 
p n s .  Rring flnnlrcd by tIic light cnvdry, nnd fnllowcd by 
WcrlE, lie mdr!  for tlic bridge and mith A slinrp cannonaile 
and rnuskctry endenvoiir~l to force the pansngc. At the Carne 
.time gcner~l  Rriclifi led t ~ v o  Iiussar regime~its ftirtlier doiin the 
river to observe Otway's horsemen, and tIie Frcnch l n n m  
p ~ e d  tlie river above bridge. The third drquon prtr¿ls 
drove tlie lmccrs bnck t o  tlxcir uivn side, and Uickson'~i Portu- 
~ C S C  gnns, opcning from n rising grounrl &h,hnl~e tlic vjllnge, 
ploriglictl GorlinnP~i column, ivhicli crowdcd to tho bridge 
thongh t,lic rivcr wng fordiibIe nhove and bclom. R~rcsforrl 
obscrving Wcrl6 did not follow closcly, jiidgerl tlte chief effort 
woulcl be on the right, ~ n d  tlierefore ordcred Blaks ta form 
part of his first and al1 His secand line on the brod liitrt of tbe 
Iiillri at rjght nnglcs tao their actual front. Tlten drawing the 
Portuguesn infnntry of the lcft wing to tlie centre, he sent one 
brig~le to support Alten at tlie bridgc, antl directerl Eamilton 
t o  hold the rcmainrler ia columns uf battdions as a general 
reserve. Tlie tliirteentli dragoons he posted near the river, 
above bridge, aud sent tlie second division to support 33hk.e. 
Tlie liorse artillcry, tlie mvalry uiidcr LumIey, and the fourth 
division alfir, toolc ground to tlio rigiit, antl wcie poptcd, tlie 
lioiwcmcn nnd p n s  on a small plnin hcliintl tlic hoya,  tlic 
fourtli division in an oblique Iine Mf musket shot behind 
tiiem. Tliis done, Bercsford gnlloped to Blakc, for tliat 
general Iintl rcfused t o  ullanpe liis front, ond with g ~ e a t  lieat 
told coloncl Hnrrlinge, tlic hcnrcr of tlie nrder, the real nttack 
wm at tlie village antl bridgc. A sccond tirnc he mas cntreatcd 
to  obep, yct rcmnined obstinnte nntil Beresford arrivd in 
person, mil tlien only tissented becaiise tlie enemy's columns 
were nctivcIy menacing Iiis ilunk: yidding to tllis evidente 
be cliringed liis frorit, yet witli sucli pedautic slowness, tliat 
Bcrrsfortl impnticut of liis folly toolc tlic dircction in pcrcon. 
Qrcat was thc confusion rtnd tlie delay tlius ocmsioned, and 
ere tlie troops were completely formcd the P ~ n c h  werc 
amonpt them. Por scarcely hrtd Godinot cngnged Altea's 
brigde, wlien Werlé, leaving onlg a tattnlion of grenarliers to  
mpport tlie Eormcr, m d  soma squdroris t o  wstcli tlic iliirlceilth 
rirnpons and conncct tlie att~cks, oonntcrmarclicd nith the 
mnainder  of Iiis division, nnrl rnpidly gnincd the rcnr o f  the 
fifth corps as it \vas mounting the 1iilIs on tlie right of the 
alIies. The grent macs of 1igl:lit cavnls also quitterl Gorlmot's 
column, crossed tlie river Albucrn abovc tlie bridge, mcended 
tbe 1dL h k  at a gallop, aiid sivecpi~ig ruurid the rwr of tlie 
fifth corp~  joincd Lntour Mnubourg'~ dragoo s, who waa 
already fncing Lunilcy's squntlrons. Thus linlf nn hour bad 
sufficed to rendcr Bercsfo~l's position nearly desperate. 50- 
tbirds af tlie Prencli were in compact order of liattle perpen- 
dicular to  Lis riglit, niid Iiis arms corn~iosed 01 difereni 
nationa, was mdcing a disurdcrly c h a n s  of [ront. Vainly he 
t rkd t o  gct thc f$nnish linc arlvnnccd tu mdrc rnom for the 
second divisiun to support jt, the Prench guns opened, their 
infantry tbrew out a licavy muslcet y iire, and thcir cavalrp, 
outff xnlrlng thc front and menncing different points, put tbe 
Bpnniards in disorder : they fdl fast and went h c t ~ .  
Soult thought the mhoIe nrmy was yieldiug, he pnshed 
f o i ~ ~ ~ r d  his columns, hiti resemes monnted the hill behind him, 
snd generd Rut,y ppIaced al1 the Prench battaries in position; 
Eiut tben JVi1IUtm Stewart waclied tlie foot of t.he Iieight witli 
a brignde of tlie secuncl di~-ision under Colborne, whq seeing 
t l ~ c  onfufiion ubo~c, dcsircd tu form in ordcr of buttle previous 
to  ~noi~nting;  biit Stcwnrt, whose boiling coiirqc gencrally 
overlaid his jiidgncnt, Id itp in column of compmie ,  pps~ssed 
the Slianish right, rtnd attempted 'to open e line by mcceasioa 
of lmttalions as tlwy arrived. The eucniy's fire \mis found 
too dcstructivc to be borne pnssivcly, nnd tlie foremost troops 
clinrgcii; but thcn hcavy rnin obscured the vieiv, four regi- 
mente of Frcnch liuasnrs and lanccrs g~llopcd ia  from thc riglit 
rtt thc moment o€ advancing, nnd two-tliirds oF the liriprle 
went duwii : the 31at regiment on14; being an tlie left, formed 
squme snd rcsistcd, --hile the Frcnch Iiorscmcn, riding furi- 
ously abouG trampled tlic othci-s nnd captured six p m .  Tbe 
tumult was great, a lmcer fe11 upon ¡3sresford, who, being a 
man cif grcat strcngth, put mido tha lance and cnst liim from 
I i i ~  seddlc; nntl tlicn a ~ h i f t  of wind bloming mide tho smolre 
and mixt, Lumlcy pcrceivcd tlie mischicf froin the plnin below, 
and scnding fonr squxclrons up a<.pinst the shssggling Iancers 
cut many of tliem off : Pcnnc Villemur's Spxnish 
mmlry \vas also directed t o  charge the Prench Amp&ndix '* 
t 4. 
borseiiien in tlie plaii?, znd tlic~giilloped forwwds 
until wibhin n fcw p r d s  of thcir foes but then shnmefully 
f l c l i  
Diiring this fimt irnhappy cffort nf the second division, so 
great was the disorcler, tliat tlie Spaniard~ in one pnrt fired 
without cessation, thoi~gh tlie Bntish troops n-ere before them; 
in anotber pnrt, flying before ths lanccw, tliey would llave 
brr~keu tlirough tlie twenty-iiintli, tfieri advancing to succour 
Golhorne, liut wit.11 a stwn re~olution tlint regiment mote 
frrcn!ntla nnd foes without distinction in their onwlard prr>gress, 4 
hlennwliile hresforrl, finding the mnin body of tlie Spnniard~ 
would not atlmnce, seized m ensign by tlio brenst and bore 
him and his colours by main force to the fmnq yek tLe tmop 
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dirl not follom, arid tlie mward ran hnck wlien rclcnaed frmn 
the marslial's iron grup. In B i s  crisis the weiitlier which 
hd ruimd Golborne's brigntle swed tlic day. Xoult muld 
not see tlio \r.liulc fidrl of liattle, nnd lceyit liis hcmy columna 
jnnctivc wEicn tlic decisivc bIow rnidit Iinm hccn st.mck. Hia 
crivnTry iirtlccrl Legan to licrn in tlii~t of tlie allics, ycb tlie fire 
of tlie liolsc-nrtillery cnablcd Lumlcy, covcrerl as he \vas by 
tlie be11 of tlie Aroya and sttppartcd by the fourth rlivision, to  
checlc tlicin on tho pluiii; Colbrnc still rcrnniiied on the 
Iieiglit ivitli tlic tliirty-fiwt rcgimimerit,, tlic J3ritioli nrtillwy, 
irndcr JiiIius FInrtninn, wns coming fnst into action, nnd 
Williiim Steivnrt, wlio Iisd escnp~d tlic cliargc af tlie laiicem, 
WIW win mounting tlic Iiill with Hougliton's lirig>~dc~ ~vbich 
he brouglrt on witli quaI vclierncnce, but in ra jiistcr artlcr of 
battle, Tlie da)- tlien c.leared snd s dredful fire poured into 
tIie tliiclcest of tlic Frcuct. colurnus cuuvinced Soult tliat ths 
figlit mag yct to bc mon. 
Rougli t on's ~cgimcn ts rcaclied tlic hcight undcr x hcev  
cannonade, und the twcnty-ninth, aftcr hrcaking tlirougli the 
fugitive Spaniitrds, w s  clinrged in flmk by tlic b'rcncli lancers ; 
yct two cumpauies, wlieelirig to tlio r i~h t ,  fuilcd t h i s  ntttlck 
witli n dinrp fire, a11d tlien tl~c tliird tirigurlo of tlie swond 
tlivjsion cniiic uli on tlic lcft, nnd tlic Syiaiiish troops anda 
Znym and Rxllcskros at Imt morred formnrtf . Hartinan'~ 
artillcry wns now iii full l)lay3 aad the cnemy's i n h t r y  
rccoilcd, but soan recovering, rrcnewed tlic figlit rvitll greuter 
violence tlian b~fore. Tlie caniioii on Liotli &irles diwliwgqd 
sliowers of grzps rit lidf rdrige, the penls of iriu~1:ctry wcre 
inwssaiit, oftcn witl~in ~iistol-sIlot, ypt tlie closc formntion of 
thc Frcncli emliarrnsscrl tlieir liattle, and tlta nritisli line 
woiild not yicld tliem an incli of p u n d  or a moment of time 
t u  opcn tlicir raiiks. Tlieir fighting i v ~ q  ltuivever fierce and 
tlungerous. Stewait wris tivice wiiundcd, colond Duelrivod11 
wns slaiu, nnd t .1~  intrepid Hougliton, liaving rcccivcd mnny 
wounds withoiit shrinl~ing, fcll nnrl clicd in tlie vcry act of 
chcering on bis nien. 6till thc strugglc continued with un- 
nliateri Eiiry. Colonel Inglis, twetrty-two officers, and more 
tlinn Four lrundrcd mcn, out of fivo l i u n d d  nnrl severity wlio 
liad montad thc hill, fcll in thc fiftyacvcnth alonc; thc otlier 
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rcgiments were scnrcelg better off, not one-third were stand- 
ing in any: ammnnition failed, and M the Eitglilish fire 
slackened a Frencli column wm cshlilislied in advnnce upon 
the right flank. She play of the guns cliecked tliern n 
rnumeiit, but in tliis dreadful crisis Deresford wrivercd! 
Destruction stared Iiim in tlie face, bis personal resourcos 
wwe mlinustetE, and tha unliappy tliouglit of n redreat rose 
jn liis agitttted minrl Ha l i d  beforc broiight Rnmilton's 
Portupcse into n, situntion to covcr ra rctrogrndc movcmcnt ; 
he noiv sent Alten orílers to ~bandon the britlge and viIlnge of 
Albuera, and to hke, ivith his Germans nnd tlie Portiigiese 4 
arti l le~,  a position to covcr a retrcnt by t l ~ e  I;a\vcMlc road. 
Bnt while tho cammander mas thus preparing to rmign the 
contesb, coIonel Ilardiuge had urged Cole to advance with the 
fourtli division; and tlien riding to the tliird brigade of the 
second division, wbicli, urider the command of co1oiiel Ahr- 
crombie, hnd hitberto been only sIightly cnjiuged, diicctctl 
him d a 0  to p~rsli fnrivnrd intu thc figlit. Tlic dic waR thua 
cnqt, Barcsfortl acquiesccd, ~'lltcn remived orden to retake tlie 
villqe, and tliis tcrrihle bnttle ivns continuetl. 
Tlie fourth divisien was composerl of two tingades: one 
of  Purhguese uiider general Hnrvey; tlie otber, under sir 
William Myem, cconsisting of tlie aeventh anrl twenty-kliird 
rcfiirncnts vns mlkd tho fuzilccr tirigade: HRTYCY'A Portu- 
guem wwcrr. imrnctIiateIy puslierl in htwccn Llrnley's drqaons 
nnd tlic hill, where tlicy ivere clinrged hy some Frcneli mvalry, 
whom they beat off, and meantime Cole led his fuxileers up 
the conbsted beight. At thifi time six guns were in the 
enemy'a possession, tlie wliole of JTer16s reserveg mere ooming 
funuard to reiriforcc tlie rrunt column uT tlie French, the 
remnant o€ Hoiighton's brigde cwld no langcr mnintain its 
groainrl, the firld WRB Ilmpc(1 witll c r t r ~ s ~ ~ ,  tlie lznccrs wene 
nding furiondy &out thc captured artillery on the upper 
pnrts of the IiilI, and bel~ind all, IEamilton's Portiiguese and 
Alten's Germm, iiow witlrdrawing from the Iii'irlge, seemed 
to be in full retreut. Soon Iiuwwer Coles fuiileeru, ilanked 
by a Iinthlion of thc Lusitaninn l g i o n  iindcr coloiiel 51nwlr- 
slinwe, mountccl t h ~  hill, drow off tlle Ianocrs, recovcrcrl fivo 
of the captured p s  and one coluur, and apyearecl on the 
right of Houghton's brigde, precisdy m dliemombie paseied 
it on the left. 
Suclr a gullrint line, is~uing from tlie miclst of the smoke 
ancl mpidly ~icpnrnting ifself from tlie oonfuscd nnd broken 
multitiide, ritiartlcd fhe cnemy's rnmrx, wliiclr sere inmasin~:  
and preressing oiiwards as to an assured r lc toq;  they wavered, 
hesitatd, and tlicn vomiting fortli a storm of firc, hrastily 
endeavoured to enlarge tlieir front,, wliile a fcarlul disctnrge of 
grape from al1 t.heir artillery ~vhkt l~d tlirough tlie Britisli 
ninks. Mycra wea kiltcd, Golc und thc tlircc mloncls, Ellis 
Rlakeney and Hawkslialvc, fell wountled, ~ n t I  the furrileer 
batt~lions, struck by the iron tempest, rccled and stamred 
lilce sinking siiips; but suddenly and sternly rreovering they 
closed on tlieir terrililo encmirs, nnd tlien wus aeen witli ~v11at 
a strength and mnjesty the British soldier figllts. In vain did 
%ult with voicc siid gcsttire iinirnatc hia Frcnchmen, in vnin 
did tlie hmtlieat veterilns brcnk from the cromdccl oolumns and 
sacrifice tlieir lives to gain t ime for tlie mus t o  oren out on 
such a fair ficld; in vitin did tIie mass itself Eiear up, and, 
fiercely stri~ing, fire indiscrimimtcly upon fricnds and foes, 
whila the howcmcn liovcring on tlie flnak tlircntcned to 
cliargc t1ie dvancing link Nothing could stop that astonish- 
ing infantry. No sudden bvrst of undiscililined vnIour, no 
nervous enthusiasrn weakcnctl tlie sbbility of tlieir orcler, 
tlieir flasliing eyea were bant on the dorlr columns in their 
front, tlieir meuured tread sliook tlio ground, their dmdful 
vollcys swept awrn;e tFie Ficd of wery formahion, tlreir rleafen- 
ing shouts overpowered tire dissonnnt tbnt broke fmm rtl! 
parts of the tumultuous crowd, as slomly and with a homd 
carnage it was puulierl by the iiicessunt vigour of tlie s t h k  to 
the Lrtliept e d p  of tlio liill. . In vuin dirl tlie Frencli reserves 
mix i~it1i  the struggling multitude to susthin thc Aght, tbcir 
efiirts only incrmeed tlic jrremedinhle confiision, and tha 
inighty mass, h a l c i n g  ofF lilre n loosemed cliff, went l~cadlong 
clown the stecp : the rain ftoiverl ofter in streams disculouted 
with blood, and eigllteen hundrd unwouiided men, tlie 
rcmnnnt nf six thousnnd nncongucrahlc British soldiers, stood 
triumpliant on thc fatal Iiill! 
CIIATTEIl VII. 
Wrrrm tlio fuñilcers wcrc striving on tlie licight, tlie cavdry 
artd Rarvcy'g brigade continunlly advanocd, nnd Lntoiir Maii- 
boi~rg's ddrngoons, being also httercd by hfcbres  guns, 
retired before tliem; yet ski11 they theatened t!ie fuzitwrs 
with t h i r  right, and wjth their left prer~nted Lumley's liorse- 
mea froin falling on t l ~ e  defeatcd infantry. Alten's Germans 
had noiv retaken tbc villago witli some luss, and Ulake's firvt 
' liiie, wliiclli had not beeu engaged, was diected t o  support 
them; BmiItonH and Collins'~ Portupese, foming a mase 
of ten thoussnd frctih men, werc hroi~ght up tu wpport tlic 
fuzileers and Aliercromliie'pi liripde, and at tl~e snme time 
Zayag, l3all.~lestcros, and Eapaiia ad~anced. Nevertlic~ess, so 
rapid was t t e  exmution of tlic fuzileers tliat tlie enemy's 
infantry were never attuined by these reserves, which yet 
sdered severely; for Ruty got tlie Frencli pns  altogetl~er, 
and worlred tliem witk prodigious activity wliile tl ie fiftli corps 
still marle h e ~ l ;  and whcn Ulc &y m s  irrcvucably lost, 1ic 
rcgaincd thc othcs sidc o f  thc Alhucra nnd protcctcd tlie 
passllgc of  the brolren infantry. 
Beresfurtl was too liardly Iiandlcd to pursue. He formed 
a fresh line with Es Portupese, parnllel t o  tbe hill h m  
wlience So& liad advrinced, antl wliere the French wcre iiow 
rallying with tlicir usual celoriby; the action still continued at 
the bridge, Lut Oodinoth division nnd tlie connecting Iiattalion 
of grenadiers were soan nftcnvnrds wlthclmnn, nnd al1 firing 
censed bcferc tliree o'clocl~. The seriiius figlitin~ 1 1 ~ 1  cndurcd 
four hourn, and in thnt  time, ncxrly sevcn tliousnnd of the 
aUia and aLore eight tliousand of tlicir dveisnries were stnick 
do~m. Tliree Prench genei-als were ivounded, two slain, and 
eiglit bundred soldiera so badly hurt as t o  be left on tIie field. 
On Eeresford'q side onlg two thousand Spanimds and a k  
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Iinntlrc?d Gcrmxns and Portugueae wem Trillecl or mounded; 
hmct; it is riIaitin aith what a rc~olution tlie pure British fought, 
"Tr tliey h d  l u t  eiglitliteen buridred rneu lcCt shndirig ! Tila 
laurel is nobly won wben tlie ex!inust~d vidor rccls 3s he plam 
it on Iiis l~lileeding front. 
Tlie trol~liics of tlic French acre five hundred nnwoundd 
prisoners, a howitzer, anrt sevcral stand of colours. Tha 
British lid nothing of tliat 11iiid t.o bonst of, but tlic horrid 
niles af mcasses  iritliin tlieir lincs told ivitli dreadrul eloquence 
nko were t l ie  conquerurs; and al1 tli~t ~iiight ,l~e rain p u u d  
d o m ,  and thc rivcr nnd kl~c hills nnd tlic woods reoouiided 
with the dismal clnmour antl groans rif dying men. Tkre~foortl, 
compelbd to place his Portugucsc in tlie front linc, mas op- 
preased with tlie number of his wounded; they far cxceeded 
the aonnd amongst Tlle IIrilisli ~oldierq zrid nlicn tle piquets 
wcre postd few men rcmaincd to Iielp tlic suffcrcrs. In this 
cruel sitrintion hc scnt H a d n g c  to dcmand nssishncc from 
Rlakc; but with liim wntli and mortificd prirlc were predo- 
minant, and Iic refused, saying, it was customary with allied 
amiea for each to  take care of its own mcn. Morning carne, 
xnd both .liarmiea kqit klieir rcspcctive positions, ttie \vounrled 
still covering tEie field of battle, tlie liustile lines still 
mcnncing tlnd dnngcrous. TFic gcntcr niin~bcr lind fiallrn on 
tIie French sidc, tlie bcst soldicrs cin thnt F;f the allies; md 
tlie dark mxsses of Sonlt's powerful cavnlry znd artillery, 
covering d hia front, scemed nlonc aMe tu contend win far 
the victov. Tl~c riglit uf tlle Frcncli also appenrcd to tlireaten 
tlie Badajos rod,  and Rcrwfortl in gloom nnd doubt awaitcd 
mothei attacl~; but on tlle l'ith, tlic third brigde of ithe 
fourth division carne np by a forcerl marcli from Jerurnenha, 
mhicli ennbled tlie scconrl riivision to refalce tlieir forrner 
groiind lietwcen the Valverde md tlie M a j o s  roads, rsnd on 
the 18th Soult retrated. 
H B  left t o  Rnglish gcnerosity severa1 Lunrlred mea, too 
deeplp woundcd to be removcd; al1 thnt could trnl~el he had, 
in tIie night of the 17th, scnt by thc roya1 r o d ,  tliroiigh Santa 
Marta, LB Santos, and Monasterio to Xevillo. Noiv pmtect- 
ing bis movcmcnts with his Iiorsemen and aix bnttnlions of 
infnntry, hc filccl tlie army in tiic morning to its right, and so 
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gained tlic road to Solano; d i e n  tliis flnnk rnzich \vas com- 
pleted, Iwtoiir Mauburg cover~l the Teer witli tlie lieavy 
dmgooas, and Briché protected tlie mmch o€ the wounded 
men by tlie royd road. Soult hoivcver halted the 19th at 
Solano, desiging to 1ioId on in Estremndura, nnd draw rein- 
foroements froin Andaluain; for Iie kncrv wcll, tliough Beres- 
fud was no Iongeer in a condition to Iiurt Badajos, \lrcllington 
woald soon come down and frcsli cornbntg would bc neccssnry 
t o  anvo Ghnt foi"treña. ñ c  lind n? cnrly a9 tlie 14th commcnccd 
repairing tlie castle of Villalbn, a largc stntct~~rc b e m e n  
Almendralejos and Sltuh Ilrnk, mil now he aentiiiued the 
worlc, witli a viem to f o m  n l i cd  of c3ufonments, wliidi tlie 
allics slioukd be unabla to talíe befuro tlie French army could 
be reinforced. 
W-lien Bercsford discovered tliiu retrent, lie desputclied 
Enmilton t,o mnkr; a uhow of rc-inrcsting Rntlnjiiq nnd i t  wm 
cKwtcd n t  dayhrenk thc 19tl1, hiit on tlic left linnlr only. Tlic 
alEied camlry, siipportcd by Alkn's Germans, foIlomed thu 
l'rcncl~ llne of retrcat. Suult tlieu transfcrred Iik head- 
qunrter~ to Puente del blaestre, and the Spanisl cavnlry cnt 
off soma of liis nicn alid menaccd Villalba. Lord Welliqyton 
reticlicd tlie ficld of linttle t11e 6 ~ 1 1 ~  day. After cxaniiniiig tlie 
wtnte of zffiiirx, lie desired the mnrsliul to follow tlie eueruy 
autioiisly, and rctiirncd to Elvas himsclf, dirccting tlic tliiril 
nnd scventli divisions, wliicli wei+c dready xt  Cnnipo BInyor, 
to  complete tlic re-investment of Badnjofi on the riglglit bnuk. 
Deresford. dtlvanced by the Sdrino r o d  to Almendralejos, 
wliere he found soine rnorc wounded Frencli, anrl his furtliei 
progress WM xiot oppiised. The niimbcr of ofioers ivlio Iiiul 
fallen in t l ~ o  Prcncla amj; togetlier with tlic privatiotis 
enrlurcd, liad prerlirccd dcspoiidcnec nn d discontcnt ; tlic 
grirrison nt Vnllcalba wns so Eittle disposcd to mnintnin tlie 
custlc, thnt Roult cvncuatcd it, and coritinuctl Iiis own rctrcat 
in tlie direction of Llcrena, t,diiere he assumed a pocitj~u on 
t h ~  23rcl, placing Iiis cacdry riear Ksngre. This abandoniiient 
of tlie roytil roati to SeviUe wns za wclI-conaidcrcd moveinent; 
thc country tlirougli ~,liicli  Iic pnsricrl ivns merc fruitfuI nnd 
opcn, nnd he coiild rlrnw ~ e a t e r  nrlvantnge from Iiis siiperior 
mvalrp; the mountains beKnd him ivere so strong he had 
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nothing t o  fear fmm an attttack, nntl by Belnlmznr nnd N- 
dcn, he could mmmunimte witli La Manda, from whence he 
expected Drouet's division. Tbe ronrl of Guaddcnnnl ww in 
hi8 mar, by wWl~ich he codd draw rcinforccmenta frum Cordoba 
und from tho fourtIi corps; and as t hc  allics dnred not expose 
their lefb flnnlc by mmarching on Xorinstc60 he effccctiially 
covered Andnlusi~, 
From Llerena, a detachment w a s  sent t o  drive w a y  a 
Spanish partida itlfcsting the communications with Guadal- 
cauul, aitd Lutour MuuLourg wa8 directd tu  scour tlie country 
bgoiid Usagre. Tliat telvn, built upon n hill, anrI eoverd 
townrrls LOS Siiintos hy n rivcr wit1,li iitecp nnd ruggcd bnnks, 
Iiild only tl~e onc outlct by tlic bridgc on thnt side, nnd alicn 
Latour 3huboug approltclicd, Lumlcy wlio mas tliere retired 
across the river. The Frencli light cavalry then innrched 
along t l~e rig1.t lisnlt, rnmni~ig to cross lowcr dowa and cmer 
the passage of the heravy liorsemen; but l~cforc tlicy conld 
cffect this objcct, gcncrrll Bron mlily prasscrl tlie rivcr with 
two regimenta of clmgaons, and drew iip in line just beyoncl 
the bridge. Lumley was lying close beliind a rising ground, 
and whcu tlie Frcnch had sdvanccd a suficicnt distance, 
Lefebrek p n s  opened on them, .md tlie thid dragoon p a r d a  
and fourtli drqoons  chnrged &cm in front mliitr! Jlndden's 
Porh~ipcse fcll on tlicir flank. ?71ry ivcrc ovcrtlirown rat the  
fimt slioek and flcd towards the bridgej wliich wae however 
chokd by othcr cavalry coming on to tlieir sitpport; the 
fugiti~es then turned to the right and left and endea- 
v o u d  to save ttlieruselvcs iii sume g d e m  on tlie banh of 
the ri~er, but thcy mcrc pursucd nnd subrcd nntil the victots 
wcre checkcd by a fire of cnrhincs nnd ~rtillcry from the  
opposite bank Some wounrled prisoners were tnken and 8 
perilla band, mhicli had not joined irr the attaclr, suddenly 
niassacred tliem. Forty kiUed in fair figlit, and more thrin a 
liuridrd wounded, attsfited the vigour of Lurnl~y's conduct 
in this dair,  wliich tcrminntcd Bcresford's apcrations; for 
thc miseraLle stntc te w1iFch the regcncy liad reduccíI thc Por- 
nipese  m y  imperatively cal1ed for the marslial's presa@ 
elsewliere. General LIill, hzring now returned to l'ortugd, 
re-assumed the comniund of the second division aniidst the 
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rejoicings of Ehc troops, aand lord Wellingtoa dimcted the 
rencwed sicge of Bndnjos in pcrsozi. 
No gcncd evcr gained so grcnt a battle mith so littIe 
inmme of mllitnry rcpntation ras mnrslial Rcrcsforcl. 
pcmond intrepidity nnd strengtll, qualities so attractive for 
tlie multitutle, were conspicuousIy <lispIaycd, yet the brentli 
of his own a m y  withcred hk  laurels: Iiis triumph was dis- 
put.ed by tlic very soldiem who follo~ed his w. Tlieir censures 
I ia~e been reiternted without clinnge nnd witliout alwitement to 
tliis liour; and a close cxxmination of hi4 operatious, wliile it 
dctects many ill-fouuded objections and otliers tainted with 
d i c e ,  laves Iittle doulit tliat tlie general feeling waa right. 
Mqrcn 11c ~inssed t.hc Gundinna nntl ilrovc tlie fiftli corps 
zipcin Gnndnlranal, tl~c dclyed inrestment of Rrirlajos wm 
attribi~ted to him unji~stly; for he only obeycd lord Wellinp 
ton's orden, founded tipon the tardincss of the Epanish 
genernls. But when tlie timt. for action arrived, tFie want of 
concert in the invcstment and tlie ill-matured attack on h n  
Christoval lielonged to liinlself ; anci Iie is especidly respon- 
sitile in reputation for Liotii, liecnuse calitiiin Squire 
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enrnestly wnrned Iiim of the incvitttlile result, nnd 
his words wcrc unhcctlcrl. nt~ring thc ñicjic tlie want of 
corrcct inteIlipnce, or a blunterl judgment, mislcrl thc mar- 
ahrtl; di it was rcmarked that ht a11 times he too readily 
believcd tliose idle tales a l  distress and difictrlties in tlie 
Freiich amies, with wliich the spies generally, the deserters 
always, interIarded tlieir infomntion; Iic mne incredulous of 
%uItls enterprise, and that rnarslial ilas nctually over the 
Morcna Iiefore tho ordcrs were given to  comnience tlie inain 
attaclc of tlte ctrstle oT Rarlaju~. Howsver, the firmness with 
wliich Beresford icsistctl tha importunities of tlie engineem to 
continue thc sicge, and thc qulck nnrl orderly rrrnoval of thc 
&ores and battcring-train, mere nlike rcmerkable and pmise- 
wortliy: happy would it Iwe h c n  if he hnd siiown ns much 
rnagnanimity In what followed. 
When be met Blake and Clistarios rrt Valverde, tthe alterna- 
tive of figliting or retiring beliind tlls Guadiana wm discused 
The Spanisli g c n c ~ l s  dcman(1ed bnttlc. Eldic, wllo conld 
not rctirc tbe m y  hc liad nrrivcd witliout dan-pr of having 
his rnnrcli intercepted, was prirtictilarly carnest to figbt, saying 
his troops, drendy in a miserable stnte, woiild disperse 
entirely if they entered Portupl. Castaños hcll the aame 
opinion. Beresfonl, equallp for iigl~ting, arped, that it was 
unwiac t o  relinquish tlie holie of talting Biidlijos, uugenerous 
to dcscrk 'tlic pcople of EstrcmntFurn,-tlint n rctrcnt ivonld 
endnnger Elvr~, lq open tlle hlemtejo, mnd encouragc the 
enemj* to  pusli his incursions furtlier, wliicli hc couId srifcly 
(lo, hnving Badajos witli its bridge ovcr t l ~ e  Guadiana, in iiis 
rcnr,tlint ri bbnttIe must tlien be fouglit in tlic Alcmtejo ivith 
f c w r  troops znd nftcr u clin~iiriting rctrcnf,-tfint tliero wns a 
grentcr scntcity of fnod in tlic Port~igir~o tlinn in tlic Spnnish 
pron'ncc, - tlirat thc wentlicr \vas mcnilcing, tthe Giindisnx 
migl-lit a s i n  rise bcfore tbc stores were crirricd ovcr, rind the 
lattcr miist then Iic alianiIoncd or tlie m y  cndiingered to 
protect tlicir ~ias$age. Tliesc pl~usiblc reasous aere a rnask, 
lie wus puslied tu fight qaiiist Iiis judgment Iy tlie irnpatient 
femper o€ Iiis Briti~lili troapa. Konc of thcm linr? fouglit in 
the lote battfes nntlcr lVellington. At Riianco tbe foirrtli 
division was icllo on tlie left, as tlie scconcI divicion liad bcen 
on tlie rig'tit, while tlic xction was dcciderl in thc centre 
Iii M a s s e n ~ ' ~  rctreat ncitlicr lintl bccn undm fire, e,d tlie 
cumtiüts of CwIirignI nnrl Fucnteo Onoro liad been p i n d  with- 
out tliem. Thiis a Surning tliirst for Rnttlc wns gcnwated, 
and Rcr~sFord hñd not tlic nrt of concilinting, nor tlint of 
exnctiiig the confidente of liis troops; if Iic Iind rctrcnted, a 
violent and unjust clamour would havc becn raised against; 
bim:  and tliis wns so stningly and nnccrcinonioiisly repre 
serited to liim by t i r i  aficcr un liiu v~v i i  stull'tliat Iie p v e  rvay. 
Tlicsc are wlint mny lic tcrmed thc moral ob~tnclcs of ivnr. 
Snch mcn ns lord lVc?lin@on or sir bolin Moorc can strirle 
over tlicm; t o  secontl-rate ininda t l i l  al? inrnilicr&ble. ht- 
tice and ctttdy mny mnke a good general as to tlie handling of 
troops nnd tlie designing ti c~inliaipn, but tlic ziscendanq of 
spirit wliicli Iclids tlic wise ivliile it controls 1Le imulence of 
EuIly, ia a rure gift uf nature. 
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Beresford yielded with an unlinppy flexibility, for the reso- 
Iution to fight mua unwarmtlible on any sonnd mi l ihq 
principie. TIie taking of Eadajos mas a chimera; neither tbe 
rneasurm nor tbe ineans promiaed success; the siege would 
lrave died away of itself in default of resources to carry it on. 
Tho true qnestion tiFtts, not whether Estreinadura aliould 3ie 
rle~erted or Un(1njos nhrindoned, hut whether JVcllington's com- 
binations, his grmt and well oonsidcred dcqign for the deliver- 
ance of the Peninsula should be rnined and cIefaced at a blo~v. 
To say thc Ncmtejo could not have been defended until the 
comrnraiider-in-chief amived from the north with reidore- 
menta wris mete trifling. soult, with twenty, or everi tliirty 
thousand men, dared not attempt the siege of Eivas in tlie 
face of twenty-four thousand men sueh raa Beresford com- 
mztnded. Thc bnttIe of Puentes Onoro wns known in t1ie 
English and in tlte Fmch cnmpa hcfore the alIies broke up 
from Bnd~jos; hencc Beresforrl w ~ s  certain reinforcmnenui 
would auon come to  the Gwlians: the tlirci and seventh 
divisions were wtually at Gnmpo ,Mayor the 23rd of +May. 
The dmgei to the Alemhjo rvas thcrefore sliglít, the necessity 
of a liattIe by no m e w  apparent, md it remains to malpe 
tlie chnces of auccess. 
It was h o w n  that Eoult liad twenty tliousand vetemn 
troopb and n ,mat supvriority b cavdry a d  artillery, tlie 
coiintry hing  peculiarly suitod for thmc m s :  the m o r M  
chiimcter o€ thc man wnn nlso knom. 77ic nllies had moFe 
infantry by ten thousnnd thnn t he  Frcnch, bnt s p k i n g  
varioua tonpes, annd the Spanish part ill-anned, shming and 
wom &h. fatigue, had becn reccntly defeated by tIie very 
troopa they weee p i n g  to engagc. The French force, coni- 
prict and swLFt of rnovement, lvns inured to war, and under 
one able ancl experieuced cliief. me allied a r m ~  was nnwieldy, 
cacli nation mi~tmskd the otliers, and tliere was no nnity of 
hope or apirit, or discipline or oomrnmrl. On what ihen 
rezited tlie hope of suocess? Tlie British troopk They were 
t.herdom t o  bc freely u d  'EVm it the time to risk two 
mperb division~, nnd court a, oerbin losa uf men, whosc value 
tlieir genera1 fixed when be looked fo  them donc for victaq ? 
Albucm ~ B S  tlre point of eonwntrat.ion. Colhornc's bripnde 
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did not nrrivt? un ti1 the 14th, and it mna dniibtfirl if it muld 
foresta.11 tlie enemy. Blnlre did not come until tbree o'clorlc 
in the rnorning of the 16th, Cole carne a t  nina o'cloclc, after 
the action l i d  cominenced; Kemmis's fine brigndc, and Mad- 
denk cavalry &d not come r~t  The whole plan wm faulty, 
it was ~ e i d e n t d  thfit a force suficicnt for hnttIe wns m- 
wmbled. Beresford was behind time, and liis pcrse~ering 
investmcnt of Badajos, though laucloble in one sense, wavia 
an error j it wna only an accrasory, yet the success of the 
main object was made subservient to it. If Soult, inshcd of 
moving by Villa Frnncn, liad puslied strmight from hs Smhs 
to Albuera, he wauld h v e  nrnvd thc IIrith, when Beresford 
had about half bis force in position; tlle priint of concentra- 
tion would then have beeu Iost und Cbe alliw smttered. If 
SouIb lid even continued his mmli by iyolano in shd  of 
turning upun Albuera, he could Fiave eouimunicated with Bada- 
jos, ~i~nless Rcmforrl hnd foiight, witlioiit weiting for Make, 
and without I h m l s ' s  brigarlc. Why did the Frcnch mmhal  
turn tlius to seek a battle in preferente to attaining hls object 
without one? Why did he not operate by bis Rght m left 
until the unwioldy allid form gcit into disorderl Becaus 
Beresford.~ dispositionv werc so dcfectivo no worse error muld 
be expecterl, and therc wns n, fnir chnncc offcrcd for a victuy 
which would more tlmn counterbalrtncc Massena's failnrcs. 
Soult knew on the 15th that only half the allied army was in 
h e ,  aníl success appenred sure. 
Bercsforrl had studied bis own fiald of battls a month befon 
the nction tnok plnce, t~nd yet o c q i c d  it so 1b.4 to render 
defeat dmost  ccrrtain; his infnntry wcre not in hnnd, Iiis infc- 
Gority in guns and cavaIiy was not compensated by entrench- 
meizts. I Ie  had snperior nnmhers of infantry on a position 
whicli. mas contracted to thrce miles; pt ten thousand never 
fiwd a shot, antl three times tbe day wmas lost aud -ivon, tlie 
allies being alwaya femest in number nt thc docisive point. 
Rldze's conduct wiis undoulitedly perplexing, and WiEliam 
S t m r t ' s  vehemence annihilated ta brigade, nnd paralped CM- 
borne, a man apable of deciding tlie turn of a battle with 
fewer troops than were swept from Bim by the French cava1~; 
Iiut tkere alao the los  is imputable 'bo Beresford. because 
general Long, expting such a charge, d v i s e d  the placing of 
Spanish crtvdry to meet i t  and was disreprded. The neglect oi 
the isolated hdl bctween the two armies wrm another error; so 
also wris the suocession of attacks by brigsdes, and the besita- 
tion a h u t  brinh.ing np the fourth division. There was no 
promptness at m i t i d  moments. It was Eardinge wlio caused . 
Cale and Abercrombie to win the victory; it way t te  a s t o d -  
ing valour of thoir troop in afcnce, thc mtoni8hing firmness 
of Houghton in dcfence, that stavcd the dny. T h c  p m o n  of 
the general-in-zliief waa seen everywhere> a gallant aoldicrl 
Tbe mind of the great commander nowhere. 
Master of the field of bnttle, Bereafod codd not take 
Badajos; that prize WM obtaind by other efforts, and deeper 
combinlttions on tbe part of a far -ter man; neither did 
he clear Estremadura, for Soult maintained his positions from 
Llerena to Usagre. VJliat diri he pinP The power of 
sirnulatirig a renewd of the siege, ltnd keeping on the le& 
bnnk o€ thc Guadiana; sirnuIating only, for if the third and 
mvcntli rlivisions h ~ l  not nrrived fmm Beira, ewn the i n v e s  
mcnt coulcl not have heen completcd. These illusive advnn- 
t t q e s  mem purchased at fhe pnoe of seven thou~ltnrl men. 
Witi~ gmaller loss Wcllington had fougllt two genernl and 
aeveml minas actiona, baffled Jlmsenn, sind turned seventy 
thousnnd men out of  Portugal I Wbat would b v e  bcen the 
msult of defeat? There wns no retreat gave by the tempo- 
rary bridgc of Jerumenha; and had Soult won tlie aontested 
hill, the Valverde m d  would have been his, md the line of 
retreat out. With four tliotisand victorious French cavnlry 
at bis heels Beresforci cuuld never h e  patisd tlio Guadiana, 
Back tlicn must hnvc come the army fmm the north bo 
rernxupy the lines of Li~hon- ficnch force n-ould have 
Gern ~shblislirid 8011th of the Tqua-Spin wouId have been 
niined-Portugal prostrate- England in dismap. CouId 
even the genius of MTellington have reoovered such a state of 
affairsl: And with these resuIta in prospect the terrible 
balance trembled for two hoars, twice Ieaned to tlie siniskr 
side, and oaly yielded at last to the superlative vjgour of the 
fuzileers. Ths battle sliould never have been fouglit. Tlie 
siege of Badajos could not liaw been renewed without re- 
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inforcements, mind with them it could hsve been renewed 
ivitliout an action, or at least without risking rsn uneqwl 
one. 
Conld the clny hnve hcen snvcd cvm by 13ritish soldicm if 
the French general harl not nlso c~mrnitted p a t  errom! 
H ~ R  nttttck, up t o  tbe moment when the Spanjsh line feU back 
in diaorrfcr, cannot be h mucl~ mlmired; after that, tthe 
modo of fighting in den~e  columns Jieing followerl beyand 
rcoson, lost the f&irest field cver offerctl in Spain to tlie 
French ams. Had the fifth corps opened out while tliere 
wns time to do so, tliat is, betñreen the falling back of the 
Spaniards anrl the advance of IIoughton's ririgade, what m l d  
bnve savd  k m f o r d ?  T3ie fin of tlie Fmnch mlumns 
d~stroyed f,wo-thiwls of tlie Rriti~h ímorooyis, tbe fire of lines 
would bave s w p t  away all! W has lieen =id Latour 
Mnutmarg and Ootlinot did not second 60ult witll vipur; 
and tbe latter cerbinly clill not dlsplfiy mucli energy ; but he 
wxs oppowl by Alte128 Germans, good aiid h d y  trooph 
hnckctl by s great body oí' Portnpcse. Lntanr Knuhourg's 
nowments do not seem apen to cenaure. He took R ~ X  p n a ,  
sabrerl many Spaniardq and overtlirew a British lirigade, 
without ceasing to keep t l~e  ailid cavalry in check Ue liad 
enprior numtiers, ht Luniley hndled the allied sqnadrona 
wikh ~kill  antl courage, using al1 the advmtages of his pwi- 
tion, nnd in the choice of t hn t  position nonc can dcny nbility 
to Remford. r17is riing p u n t l  bchind the borsemen, tho 
betl of tlie Aroya in their front, the dd of the home artllley, 
the mipport of t,he fourth diviaion, mere al1 circwastasicea of 
strength, and well comliined. Tliey dictatd Lataur Mau- 
liourg's ~iroceedings. Xf be liad charged in mass under tlie 
fire uf Lefebrc's p n s ,  hc rned hevc b n  thrown inte con- 
fusion in pnssing the hed of the h o y a  at the rnoment when 
the fourth divigon, dmncing along the slopes, wmld have 
opened s masketry on his right flank: h m l e y  conld then 
bnve chntged, or retired up the bill, accodng to circum- 
Etances. G m t  loss might thns have been sustained, and 
nothing decisive pincd, bemu8e mnlry, if anal~Rtained by 
infmtry and artillery, m n o t  make a gerioue impmsion 
againat the three arms mited. It wns thereforo an e m r  in 
Sonlt not fo have joincd some ~ T I S  aand infanfry to hia 
mvnlry when he prmived the enemy h d  done ao. Ten 
guns, and haIf the infantv welessly sbughtered in columiis 
on the lieight a b o y  would have kurned the acrile of hattle 
bdow,-for when the fuzileers carne iip the bill, ñoiighton's 
bripde WM quite exhaustcd, iind the few men stantling were 
witliaut ammui~ition: if t i  Prencli bahterg and a Ziody of 
infrintry had been with their cavalry the fweileers could not 
have moved. 
Aa Latour Maubourg was not so sLreehened, a repulse 
miglit Lave been lbtal, not only tu kiriself but to tlie iufautry 
on the MI, whwe left would tlien liave Liwu expused ta Bie 
allicd cnvalry. If he h d  stretchcd awt~y to hia own Ick, Iie 
wnuld, in like manner, hnve exposcd tlic Rank cif Enult's 
infnntry : thc movcmcnt would Iiave bmn ccccritric, and, the 
t r oop  on the hill bcii i~ hmten, dcatrnctive for the retreating 
nmy. Ry lreeping in mass on tlit! plain, nnd dcbcliing 
qudmns h m  tima to time, as favonralile oppertunities 
o f f e d  for partial charges, L a t m  Mttuuourg p ined  
advrin*s and kept hís troopers in h d  for t.he decisive 
rnornent : f i d I y ,  Iie covered tlie retrent of the beaten infantry. 
Still with such mperior numbers, Iie sliodd have more closely 
pres~erl Lmley. 
Wlien tlie battIe oeased, eacli side was exhauded. Hero 
 vas tlie grdest fniilure of tlie Frencli co~nmmder. He liad 
lost eigl~t husand men, but he liad still tifteen thousand, md 
his ar t i l l o~  anll mmlry wem comparatively untouched. In 
tho allicd army only eighhxfi huntIrcd Britkh infnntry wcro 
left dnnding, md al1 tlic tmops wiffering fmm fnmine; the 
Spanish infnntry mcre feeding on horasflesh, ~ n d  so rattenu- 
fLterl by fatigue and misery, thrtt previous to the battle they 
deserted even to the Fmnch, hoping thns to get faod: iinder 
such a general m Blake, and enduring such privations, it was 
a great effort ta 6ght 3 all. Their rmishtce, feelle com- 
parecl to  the desperate d o n r  of the British, was not weak Ui 
itseIf; it %as natural that mer? exhnnsted ttnd ill-managed 
sliould &ve been nnmowd by the rrppeals of Deresford, a 
strange general, whose exhortations tliey hardly understood : 
when tlie fortuna of h e  day changed they foIlowd tlie fuzí 
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leen with alamitp, arad, with exception of ViItcmur's can1 y, 
at nno period gave wap with dishonour. But tliey were not 
equal to a second ~truggle; a renewed athck on the 17th 
must have ended in favour of the h n c l i ,  Beresford consciuu~ 
of tliis, wmte in the evening of the 16th to lord Wellingtan, 
saying he anticipated a ruiaous defmt next day, and wonId 
not survive it. The resolation with which he maktained 
the position notwithstanding, was tlie stronpst iodimtioii of 
militaiy talcnt ha gnve during the wholc uf bis operations; 
h ~ d  Soult held his psition with equnl pediriricity, Beresford 
must have retired. It mm a greab; mishke not to have done 
so. h'othing ia more essentid in wiir tliai a coafident fmnt, 
u g e n d  ~ l ~ o u l d  never acknowlerlge bimelf vanquislied; the 
fmnt line alwap looks formidblo, and the adversar~r cnn 
fieldom know mhat is p % i n g  b~hirid. T h o  importante of 
this nmim i s  finely incliicated in Xjvy, who relates, that afkr 
a drawn battle a god d l e d  out in tlie night, that the 
Etrusrrtns h d  Iost one man more tlian the Ilornansl IFhere- 
upon tlie former retired, and the latter remaining on the field 
ptbered oil the fruita of a red ~ictory* 
BOOR THE THIRTEENTR. 
THE sicge of  h<lajos was now resnmed, but the transactions 
in Spain dunng Massena's invañion of Port.ugal must first b 
noticed ; for i t is not by following one stream of action that a 
just idea of tliia war can be obtained. Mang oE WeUington's 
proceedings would s e m  m h ,  othera timid, if taken sepmtely, 
yet viewed as pnrts of a plan for delivering the whole Fenin- 
sula, they will be fonnd discreet or daring, as circurnatances 
wnmnted. No portion of his campnigns rcquires t h i ~  wide- 
h ~ e d  consideration more thaii liis cnrly siegcs, which wero 
instituted contmry t o  the rules of nrt, and unsuccessfuI, or, 
when ~uccesaful, att ended with su& a mournful slaughter, M 
to @ve occaaion for questioning his gmt. mXiliry qudiki-, 
mhich were, however, tben most @nally displayd, 
Gallicia afkr the f&lure of Renovales' experEitian and the 
shipmeck tliat fullowed became torpid; the junta disregarded 
Walker's exfivrtationa, and, dthough :he furnistid vast supplies, 
the amy, nominally twenty tliousand ~trong, mustererl only 
iiix thoamd in the field : thcre mas no caval,lry, 
Ab3& thc infnntry k q t  in ehe mountnins &out VilIa awncrd 
Francn, and a wenlc French division occupied the ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ; m .  
rick plebins of Lean. Mnlii rehsing t o  combine 
his operationa s i th  those of tlie Angla-Portuguese m y ,  was 
thought disaffectd, and at the desire of the Eritish authoritiea 
removed to make way hr Alhquerque: he was 
AMraGt of 
however immediatelp appointed by Make to con- ~ T T .  w,ues- 
mana in Murcia, despite of Mr. Wellesley's remon- ~ ~ ~ h D ' x g S  
strances, q h e n  Altiupuerque died, Gllicia fe11 
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and iD urein, dcsjlite of ~r. ellesley's re on-
strances. Whell luuquerque died, allieia fell
to Castafios, nnd whilc hc waa ncting witli Rrrcsford in Ee- 
trcmdura, SmtaciltIes aqsumed milibry autliority; it w a  
tlien Cafarelii's reservc entered Spain, that h t o n a  m 
fortificd, and that Respieres nsseinbled seven thousand men iit 
Zarnora 
I n  the Ashriae, Bonnet wea harassed ly tIiri pnrtidag from 
the Leibafíe mountains, antl on the coti4 by tlie Engli~li 
frigntcs; hut he hclcl Ovieclo, maintained liis comtnunicntions 
with the Frencli in h n ,  and in Novembcr, 1810, tlcfenterl tlio 
insurpnta. General San Po1 Lo& eatried on opcrations in 
concert mith gmtidns dnring December nnd Sana- 
-* ttry, yet he failcd, and in Fcbmary lvitlidrew to MSS. 
tlre X~via; tliis gave tLe Gdliciiins sucli alarm 
that he w a ~  fmed  to advance md wns ap in  driveii bnck. 
Xonnet then di~persed thcpnrtidns rand prcpnrcd t a  nid 'Bc~i&rcs 
qpinot Gallicia. Wellington's nrrival on the Co% in pumuit 
of Mas%% having stopped tlizt project, Bonnet ~cmred tl~c 
coast aad s e i d  al1 trie Spanish stores of Eng1ish arms and 
clothing. The war jn tbe Astur i~  was indwd so sliglit, that 
in Mny Xantlinder \rw evacniated, and al1 t l ~ e  ~avtiIry of Csstille 
and Leon joincd Mns~ena t Fucntcs Onoro, yct the hllicinn 
rtnd Asturirin regular armies g i n e d  no arlwintage. Tlic pnrtidas 
ivere more active, Porlier, Campillo, Lonp, Amar, and Merino 
cut off mal1 parties in the Montafia, the Rioja, Bismy, trnd the 
hs ton  deLaredo. Theymight have been detitroycd byoomliined 
movernenb, but those were han3 to mnke from tlie littIe accord 
amongst the Freneh generals. Campiuo wm next 
I n k p t e d  
icttpr,r F-,. to  Porlier in powcr. Hie hranntR mcrc the ml- 
Hnrthclcmy. Icyg of Mena md Carnnxa, md lie ooncerted 
1510. MSS. 
expetlitiom with Barhma, Honejas, and CnrilIas, 
petty chiefs of Discg. Sometimes he ovewun the valleya of 
Gnrieso, Soba, Carrado, and Jomndo, to mise recruits and 
coiitri1iutions, but his chief aim wvw to i i i t r r ~ q t  des~iatclies 
lietwcen Bilbao m3 Brintander. For khis purpo~c hc infcscsted 
Licntlo betwcen O ~ ~ i r a  and h e d o ,  which he coiilcl more snfely 
do, because Barthelemy, the governor of the Montaña, wna 
forced to watch Liebanz on the side of Leon, which wm tlie 
stronghold o€ Porlier. That chicf, who vexed the vtillep of 
Cabuerniegrr, Bio Nauza, Giezn, md Bueliie, forced the people 
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to fly with thcir effc~.ts to the mountnins whenever the Fwneli 
approxclied, md in Licbrsxia thia was popular, it was eisewhero 
disliked 
'1'0 ruin Porlier rquired p t  eombinations, and it wm 
neceasary first to seixe Espinozr, not tliat of Monteres, but a 
villiige in tho Liebanli, frorn wlioncc tlie vulleys dl descended 
as from a point. Whcn Drouct had tlie 9th corp Isrl. 
on the nppcr Douro, Bnrthelcmy propoacd a com- 
hined rnovement of this nature, which mas feebIy executed; 
Licbana and Santaniter continued te  be disturticd, and tlie 
cliain af partidas was unbroken tlirouqh Bisay and the Riojit 
to Navame ~vlvliere Mina w r i e d  on the war. cl~ief lid 
on tlie 22nd of Mny dcfeuted uh tlie Puertn de hlabaii, near 
Tito+ twclve hundred men, eacorting prisonera mrl trcnsureh 
Fmnce; the m c w s  WILS aIIoyed by t he  dcath of tmo hiintlred 
af the Spanish prisoners killed in the turnult, and horribIy 
striined dso  by the cold-blooded mnrder, after M, stmmi, 
the figlit, of si9 Spanish I d i ~  attached t o French 
offieem. Nasa~na, wliose baggago was hken, was t o  have gone 
witli ttik convoy, but dislikisr tlie disoipliio of the eacort lie 
rern~ined nt Titorin nnd so esa@. 
This par%isan madrtre, the rlcscenb on the comt, the wpect 
of affctirg. in F~tremadnra, the rlenudd stnte of Cestille, now 
m e e d  by htocildes, and an important e ~ e n t  to be noticed 
Iiereaftcr, induoetl BmsiEms to cantrmt his position. He 
o d e d  Reille uid Caffadli tu WOUF Bkay, and Jme, iu June csused Bonnet to Sismantlti the coast bat- 
teries, send hia nick md M e  te  Si~ntnnder by sea and 
abrandon tlie Asturjm Santncil(1ca wns then rnnncing As 
torp wíth thirteen tbonaand rnen, and thc Frencli evacnated 
that place also, after mining mrne of the works; but &m 
and Bwnet were unlted on the Esla, and being snpported bp 
t h c  tilousand. rnen from Ilio Seco, skirmislled the S3rd nt 
Puente Orvigo witli Santocildes, yet tliey h d  the worst, ayid 
gmicrd Vnllctaux mns killed Lord WcTlirqtonk opcrations 
in Fatremdurn soon drcw the ntkntion o€ t11c Frencli to tlint 
side, and Arintocildea kept Astorga until Aupst, but mean- 
while twa tliousand Frwch were piit into Santona, and 
general Eopet, eoniiq from B q o s  with a division of tlie 
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yonng guara, nade  another froitlws attempt on the Liebmana 
This d a r e  though hamsing, proved tkat GalIieia and tlie 
Asturins were not to be relied on as auxiliariea by lord Wel- 
lington. Giillicia with its lordly junta, regular army, fortified 
toivns, mggcrl Fcatnc~ws, numcnius populiition, and con~tnnt 
supplicn from England, hndhhcen af Iess wciglit in the contmt 
than five fhouartnd Portuguwe rnilitin concliicted by Tmnt and 
Wilson. The irregular n-arfare was al- producing barl effects; 
the tree though gcafkd in patriotism hore st- fruit. In 
Biscay the m e d  pasantry often fouglit in bhe ranlrs uf the 
Appendi 7, enemy, and on ene ocwiuii attwked tlio boats of 
9 1. tlie Amelia frigte to save Frencli military storesl 
OPERATlONS Iñ THE EMTEUN PROViKCES, 
It will be rememhered that ituchet, afkr the fall of Mequi- 
nenza, mas to besiege Tortoza wliile Rracdonald marclied 
against Tiiragona. 31msena waa then coiicentmting his m y  
against Portugal, antl Nnpoleon dcsigned tliat Sucliet, aftw 
t ~ k i n g  Tortorrn, ~houId rnerch ~6th lialf his corps to support 
the  prince of EsIing. Tlie rerlriction of Tortoza proved how- 
ever a tediow taslc, and as tlie Frencli armies of CntalonLa 
and Aragon hud new a cornrnon object, their sitiultion and 
iesources sliall Le conlpared with those of tlieir advemay. 
Sudiet was master of Areun, not more by force of arma 
than by the inffuence of Iiic atlministration; the provincc wm 
fertile, rind RO trnnqiiil thnt his convoys tr~vcllcd itnrler tlio 
m e  o€ Spanidi commisslrries and conductors. 13ut Mina was 
in Nnvarre on his rai, and communic~ted on the right bnnk 
of the Ebro with the partidas in the mountains of ñloncilyo 
and AllinrncXn. Thcse lnst were occasiondly backed by the 
Empecinado, Duran, und otliers whose utrorigliolds were in tbe 
Guntlalnxura, and mha from thcncc infested Ciicnce and tho 
vicinity o€ h ldr id ;  anrl fsom Alharacin, Trilla C~mpa con- 
nected the prirtiexn warfare mith thc Vnlencinn amy, which 
l i d  also a line of operation towards Cnenca. Minn remived 
supplies oF all lciiids from Coruiiz tfirough tlie English ships ; 
and in like mnnner tlie other end uf t11e cliaiii \vas supplied, 
by the EngIish consul TupperJ from Valencia Thus n line 
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was rhawn m s s  the Peninsula which it waEi nseless t o  break, 
the retreat being swure at both ends, and the excitement to 
renewed efforts constant. 
On the other flank of Eucliet's position, the higlj viilleys of 
the menees were marmfog with srnrill bxnds, whicli forrned 
tha link Iietween Mina and a CatuIoniari division liolrlmg Seu 
d'urgcl, ra fortifiod cnstle clotiing thc passap leading from tlie 
plain uf tbat nnmc to the Cerrluiin. Tliis division, acting in 
con& with lbvira, and other pmtisans, extended the irre- 
gular marfare on tiie side of Olot nnd Cnstclfollit to tlie Ampur- 
dam; and the whole depended upon Ttbragona, whivh itself was 
suppwted by the Euglish fleet in thc Meditemnmn. Aingon 
wns thereforo like an invested furtrcsq wliich tho BpnnianIs 
thouglit to rduco  by famine, by assault, md by mciting the 
population againsk thc prrison; hut Suclict mndc mch 
nrrangements that his convoys mcrc fiecure in the interior, and 
al1 important pointa on the frontier circle were fortified and 
connccted with Zarag07~ by rninor forts radiriting from that 
common centre. Leridri, Mequinenza, tlie plain of Urge1 in 
CaCsMonia, nnd hforelln in Valencia were his; and by fortifying 
Temel and Alcznitz he secured the chief passages leding 
tliwugh thc mountains to the latter kingrlom : he could thua 
invade eithcr Catalonia or Valencia; rand from Mequinenza 
could, by water, transport stores for the siege of Tortnzs. 
In Cutalonia affairs were diffwent. Maotlonald, who ssaumed 
command at tlie moment when Napoleon wished bim to 
cooperate with Suchet, was inexperienwd in ttie pmliar 
warfwe of tlie province, and unprcpared for extended opem 
tiuns. HIR t r o o p  wcre hh01it Geron~t and Hostnlrich, the 
bounds af the French conque& nt tbis period. Barcelona 
was a point 'lieyond their ficld sptem tn be maintained by 
expeditioiis, the country was exhausted of provisions, snd tho 
ariny could only be fed by land convoyri from France, or 
. ouwters wliicli, eluding tlie vigila~ice of tbe Englisli cruigem, 
mulJ r m h  Itoclis, St. Filieu, md l'alamos. Barcelona like the 
1 ~ 0 1 o c - ~ ~ c ~ i  continiin~ly m i ~ d  for more; the inh~hitnnta m welI 
as the garrison depended on the convoys, wliicli were enor- 
mous with reference t o  the limited mems and difficulty of 
moving. Tlie distan% between Hostalrich and Barcelona was 
unIy forty miles; but tlie rod ,  as far aa Gmnollers, mas a suc- 
ces~ion of dcfiles nnd cros~ed by scvcral rivcrs, ofwhich tho 
Cungosta nnd the Tordcr~ ITCYC consid~rnble obstndcti, and 
th e nnturc of the soil wr~r cInyey anrl lieavg, especially in tlie 
defiles of the Trcntrs Pasos. It \vas kherefore diflieult far 
3lacdonald to operate from lus base of Geronn; andas s tom 
for tlie siege of Trrragona were to come from Trance, Iie could 
~ o t  until they arFived do more thaa make sudden incursiuiis 
with light linggage, tnisting to tlie rHources still to be found 
in thc opcn mnntry, or to  ho g~thered in the rnountnins lig 
detmhments wliicli had h fight for eveq rnoloel. Thia then 
waa the condition of the Frendi nrmtes, that starting from 
separate btbses, they were to operate on lines meeting at Tor- 
toza, ivhich it was far more diflicult for MBOCTollald th for 
Gucliet to  reacli. 
ACter ths Iiattle oE %rgaIef, IEenry O'Donriel rennitd his 
wnt tcd forccg and h ing  of a stcrn unyiddin~ dispaition, 
not. only rcpresscd tlie disconknt occasioncd by tliat def&, 
liut forced the reluctant migueletes to fill Iiis rtmk~ anrI subrnit 
to  discipline. Aesisted witli money and tlms by the Britisl~ 
agents, nnd liaving communicntioii by 8.38. with 
Cadiz, and &finorca, he was soen enabIBtl t o  reorganize liis 
army, to oollect TIIS~ magrzzines a& Taragotiia, and strengtlien 
tltat place by new worku: iu J d y  he l i d  twcnty-two thou- 
snnd mcn exclusive of  partidas and somatcncs. One division 
unrler Campo Verde wns in the higlier rall~yfl, havinp a 
detdment at Olot, snd it w ~ s  upported by tiic fortified 
w t l e s  of Seu d'Urgel, Cardona, Solsona, md Eerga; a second 
divimon was on tlie Llobregat, watcliing tlie gafiison of Dar- 
cclona, and bving detacliineiits in Montserrat, Igualda, 
and Manresa, t b  cornmuiiicnte tvitli a m p o  Tenle. Tlie tliird 
diviaiun, tlie reserve and the cnvaly mere on tho hills nfioat 
Tarngona, asnd tliat plwe anrl Tortuxa had largc grimisons. 
By thig  disposition of Iiie force, O'Donnd occu- 
Doylda and 
Grmn% mr- picd Fdcet, the Col de Balaguer, and the Col del 
~ ~ ~ ~ d e i l c ~  Alba, passagea Ieading to Tortoza; the COI de 
' 31bP. 
Xbas and Xomblanch, mmmmding the roada to 
Lerida; San Culona de Quemlt itnd Igualda, t h u g h  which 
Lis wnnevion with Campo Verde was maintuined, Ths two 
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Frenct m i e s  were tbercfom sep~rated not only by fhc g r e t  
spinnl ridgea'descending from the Ppenoes, but by the posi- 
tion of tlie Spaniards, who Leld al1 the pases, snd coiiEd 
rh will wneeritrate and attacEr either Xucliet or hfucdolilild. 
TRe Catalonian system m nom nlso connected with Tdcnci~i, 
wlierc, excliruive oF irrwlars, therc werc fiftccn thousand mcii 
nnder Bmsecour. That officer harl in June occiipied Cuenca, 
yet, being 3 vrariance with his officers, coulcI do 
Abstrnct of 
nothing, and was clriven from tlience by troops M, Welle.+ 
from Jiarlrid; he returned to 'CTalencin, but blio I c Y ' ~  Ucs- 
pntchrs, ISS.  di~puteu continud, and exkntlirig to the junta 
tlie gen-cral : nevertheles~ al1 partiea being now insiblo thrit 
Valencia should be defended at Tortoq Eaassecour prepared 
to mmch to its sucoour by the cmat road, ~vliere he liad seve- 
ral rortified poeta. Thus ~vliile Suchet xnd Mwdonald were 
o~mbining to cnisli O'Donnel, the lattcr was coombiiiing witii 
Ihsftecour to p s s  upoli Suchet; and tiiere wati nlwrays tlio 
English mwitimc foree at iumd to  &id attnclcs or facilitate 
mmpe. 
In  tliis expmition the natire armics are n m d  ufter tlieir 
pvincesi, but in Deoember, 1610, the whole militnry force 
being re-oqanizerl by tlie regency the armies had been desig- 
nated by nuinbers. The CLitalunian forces, f m l e r l y  called 
tlw m y  t l a ~  rZgRt, was now cnllcd tlic fi& m y .  Tlle 
Trdeaciws, Trilla Cunp's ddivision, and thu partidas of tlio 
Empminratlo and Duran, mcm cnlled bhc s d  m y .  Tlie 
Murcian force, tlie thi5-d m y .  Tlic troops rtt Cntlia, at AIp- 
siras, and in the Condo Nicbía, thc f&Fb m ~ y .  The remnarits 
of Romana'e Ga lEih  rtivisian shicli escnprrl the slanglt~i o11 
the &hora forined the ~ ) J L  amy. The new raised troops of 
U i c i a  and those of the Asturins wcre callctl the siid* mmy. 
Tl~e partidas of tIie north, tliat is to ~ x y ,  líinala, Longnk, 
Campillo's, Porlier'~, and 0 t h -  srnsller Liaiids, fornied tlic 
8&h amq. 
Such wias the stnta o£ aflilita when hapoIeon's order t o  
beeiege Tortoata amived Suchet was d y .  More tlian fifty 
batkring pns, sclected from those at hLen.de, were quippctl, 
his depots were estublishcd at Yeqninenza, Caspe, and Alca- 
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nitz, and al1 the fortified posts were prohioned. Twelve 
thousnnd men undw Mnsnier, destined to seciire A-on, werr! 
disposed et Huescn and otdier minor points on the left Iiniil; 
tif the Ebro; nnd &t Dmrnca, Tenrcl, nnd Cdatnyurl on thc 
nght b ~ n k .  TLie troopfi for tha s i ~ g e  assembled at JAerida 
and Alanite, nader Habert and Lsvii1, their provislons being 
drawn from the newly conquered distnct o£ Urgel. From 
Mequinenni, B e  principal deliot, there was ~rahr-ctirriage; but 
the Ebro Iieing crossed ab aaven~l points by rocky b q  aome 
o f  which wore only passnble in fuIl water, thc communicntion 
m a  too nneertain to  dcpcnd upon, and Suchct sd workmcn to 
re+pen an ola iond, thirty miles in lcngth, whieh bad beeii 
made by the duke of Orleans, duhg  tl~c vnr of the succes- 
sion. It pierced the mountains on tlie right hi lk  of the Ebro, 
pussed through Batea to XoraJ and from thence by Rnhel ta 
Torbzn, mnning thmngh tk celehrnted defilc d e d  indifferently 
thc T.igmImlaa, nnd thc Pmsqe of A m. 
When tliese prelimlnary arrangcmenh were mnde, Hnbert 
assembled liis division at Belpuig, new Lerida, fcigning t o  go 
to~varrls Iinrcelwq but suddenly tuined to his ridit, and 
penetrnting through the district of Gawiga, reaclied Gitrcia, on 
tlie left bank of  tlic lower Ebro, thc 5th of July. Lawl tilao, 
from Alcrinitz, made a feint ton-ards VaIencia 2, y Morclli>, nnd 
then tiirning to  h i ~  Iefk, r&me so unexpcctedly upon Tortorn, 
by tllc right hank of thc Ebro, thnt he surprised some of tlic 
outposts on the 2nd, and then encamped before the b r i d p  
head. The 4th he extended his line t o  dmposta, seixed tlic 
fev-bozt af the great road from Barcelona to Valencia, 
and posted Bouaoard's cuirassiers, with n battdion o€ infunty, 
and six guna, at E idecon~  on tho Ccnia, riper, to observe Rnslsc- 
conr's VeIcncinns. During thcsc opcrations Suchet fixerl his 
own quarters at Mora, and u the new raarl was not fini~hed, 
Eie occupid Miravet, Pinhel, and the Trincheras on its intendd 
line, plnced flying bridges with covered worh on tlie Ebro at  
Mora and Xerta, and made those ptaces his de@t of siege. 
He aeized the craft on the Rver, est3iolished posts at %pita, 
near thc m0ut.h of the F,hro, nn(1 nt Ampnsb, and n?adc n 
fruitlces attempt to burn the h t  bridge of Torbxa with frre 
vesseh. Following Napoleon'a order, Mdonald mhould at 
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this time have been before Tmgona; but on the 9th Xuchet 
learned h r n  a spy, that tLe seventh c o r p  was stiIl at itrona, 
and tbus found bimself exposed alone to  the cornbined eiTorts 
of the Citalans and Valencims. Tliis made him repent of 
having moved from Amgon 80 Eioon; yet thinking it would 
be bad to retire, he resolved to blocl~oda Tortaza, hoping 
t o  xesist both O'Doanel and Bmecour nntil Mwdonald wuld 
advance. 
The Rpaniarda, who knem hi situation, sallied on tbe rigbt 
bank tbe 6th and Bth, ltnd on the f 0th his outposta on the left 
b m k  were driven in at Tivisa by a division from Falcat, which, 
the next day, fe11 on bis works itt Nora, but waa repulsed. 
The 12th, genera1 Paria pmhed back the Spanish lioe while 
Eabert took post in force at Tivisa, by mhich he covered tho 
roads t a  Xerta end Mora O'Donoghue, who eommanded 
Rsseconr's advanced p r d ,  now menaced Morellit, brit genetal 
Montmarie being detached to Its succour, drove him awg.  
The 30th O'Donnel brongbt up fresh troopa t o  Falcet, m d e  R 
fejnt with ten thousand men q i n s t  Tivisa, and then mddenly 
entered Tortozlq from whence mid-day, on tlie 3rd of 
Aagust, he passed the bridge, and fe11 with tlie hyonet on 
hval's entrenchments. The French gnve way at first, yet 
soon ralIied; and the Spnniads, faring for their communica- 
tions, rcpined the town in disorder, huving lost two hiindred 
priaoners besirles ZriIled and wounded. This operatlon wax 
concerted with general Caro, who had superseded O'Donoghue, 
and was moving witli the \'alencirtns by the coastrroed towards 
Uldeeona; whcrefore Sucliet, Judging tlie Spaniards desibmed 
to Eorce him from tlie lower Ebro Iiefure 11.lacdenalrl could pnss 
the LlobregBt, resolved t o  stnlEe a sudden blow at tiie Valen- 
cinns, and then turn upon the Ctntnlans: in this vicw ht- 
unitor1 nt Udecona, on tlw 13th, eleven bnttalions mith cight 
Iiitndred horsemen. Caro wns then in a strong po4;itinn 
covering the two grcxt routes to Valencia, but when thc 
French, after driving in his adranced pd from Pinaros, 
carne np, his Valcncians wouId not stand a battle, and being 
folloñ-ed beyond Penkcola separated and retrexted in disorder 
by diferent roads, Suchet then returnd to Mora, where lie 
found an officcr of hlncdomldyg nmy bringing information 
that tlie seventh corps msy in the plRiflFl of Xeus, and its con- 
muniwtions with the thirri corps open. 
OPERATIONS OB THE ElEVEXTB CORPS. 
When l f d o n d d  snccsded ~litgercaii lie foiind thc tmop 
in a shte of inciubordinatioa, mcustometf t o  pluii- 
June, 1810. der, and excitd to ferocity by t he  cruelty of the 
Cntnlans and tlie mnduct of hia predecessor; thcy nyre 
witliout rnqminw. or regular subsistente, and lived by exac- 
tions, while tlie people, driven to despemtion, mere moro like 
wild liensts tlinn mm. 11113 m r  saa repidsive t o  him in dl 
itri fcnturcs. It m 4  onc of shifta nnd devices, nnd hc bcthcr 
iinderstood metliodical movemcnB; it WBS one of pluntler, 
und he wns a severe discipliiinrian; i t wñs full of cruelty on 
a11 da, md he m of a bumane and just disposition. Eo  
severely rebuked tho tmup ror their b d  discipline and 
cruelty, nnd endeavoured to  sootlie tlie Cablaer ; but tieither 
were softenetl; tlie mutual injuries wero too horrible nnd too 
reccnt to bo forgiven. The soldiera, drri~vn f r ~ m  different 
countcies, were witliout a conirnon ni~tional feeling, and were 
irritatd agninst a general, irho mnde them pzy f o ~  wanton 
d ~ q e s ,  and punished them for plundering; and 
Vncani. the Qtalans, attribnting his conduct t o  fea 
because Iie could not sntirely restrnin tho vioIence of hia men, 
still flerl f r m  tlie villages and m w r e d  l i i ~  stragglers with 
unrclcnting bnrhrity. 
While rcforming this sptern Macdoniiltl could not hkc tho 
field, becaaae, without magazines, no army cttn he kept in 
diie discipline; wherefore he rernained a h u t  Qerona, h w i n g  
with great lnbour nnd pGns his provisions from Fmnce, anrl 
storing up the avcrplus for liia future operations. OR the 
10th of June bowever, the wmts ol Bwelona Ld become so 
serions, tliiit leaviiig his bagpgo uuder a strong g-uarcl nt 
Grona, nnd l i i ~  recruits hntl cnvalry at  Figwerns, he mrarchcrE 
witli ten thousand men and a convoy to its ~elief, by the wng 
of the Trenta Pasos, Cardedien, and GranolIers. The rmd 
was heavp, the d&lea narrow, the rivera swollen, the mtinner 
of nitlrch too pampoue for the nature of tLe war; for Mac- 

rcsolvcd at last to co-opcrrttc! with SiiehcL Instnzcted by ex- 
perience he moved this time with less formnlity, and hnving 
reaclied BarceIona, deposited his convoy, appoinkd hfaurice 
Jfathieu governor of tliat city, md then forcing the pasa o£ 
Ortlitl, reaclied Villa Franca with sixteen hhousand men. 
O'Dunnel, stiIl smarthg Erom tlie affair at Tortoza, rctired 
befora him to Turagoa~, without SigIitiiig, but d i k d  Campo 
Verdc t o  l w c .  a bodg of troope undcr N.irtincz in t hc  monn- 
taina about Olot, nnd t o  movc Iiimself througli Montsemt to 
thc rliirtrict of Gnrriga, wliich lics bctmwn Lcridn nnd Tortoza. 
The ser;eiith mrps then passed by Rrnfi5n and Tulls into the 
plain of  bus, and opened tlie commwnIcation with Suchet, 
h t  to bow little purpose sLdl be shown in the next cbapter. 
As the Spnnish p n m d  Iínew the French couid fina provi- 
sions for oiily n Few duyñ at Reus, I I C  witlirlrew I i i s  divi~ions 
from Fiilcet; imrI ivliile C m p o  lTrrde uccnpied tIie paoses 
behind tlicm, nnd olber traops were placcd in the defileri 
between VJls and VilIa Frtlnrn, lie held bis mmy concentrated 
a t  Tnrngom, to fa11  irp pon hIac<2onnld whenever he moved. 
MncdonnId cnred Iittlr: for tlic viciniky of the Catnlnn t,roopn, 
hut he hnd not yct formctl ~iiifficicnt mwzinerr nt Bnrcdona 
to commence tlic IiicLp of Tlirqonn, nor coulrl hc, as O'Don- 
neT liad foresecn, pronirc more tlinn a fcw days mpply about 
Reirs; he tliere€orc relinqnishcd dl idea of a siegc and p m  
powd to aid Suchet in the opcration ag~inst Tortom, if the 
latkr would feed the swenth coips. Pending Suchet's deci- 
aion be resolved to remove to Lerida, nntl Im~ng seven 
liundred siclc men in Eeus, m d c  a fcint apinst thc COI de 
Bdqwrr: but thexi. clinngiiig direction marched upon Mom- 
blanclii nnd tbe COI de Tcil~as. His rear-pard, composed of 
ItaIian t~oops, being oveibI<en neltr Alwver, ~t tlie bridge of 
Goy, offered Iinttlc, ivliicli tlie Spaniiirds declinedi and as tticy 
alsa neglectcd tlia Iiaglits on cncli sirle, tlie Italians turned 
the error to acceiint, nnd mada their wny safely Eo Pixa- 
rnoxons. TItcy wrre lio~vcvcr pursncd, ~ n t l  Sarsficld corning 
from thc Lerido sirlr: rliaputed t.hc pnssqc of Pixnmoxrina; 
wlicreupnn Macdondd, Irwpiiig ti10 troops from Tarqona in 
check a rear- f l~~d,  n p i n  ~cnt  liis ltniians itp the hilla 
on the flanks, while hc puslid his French troops againgt the 
front of tlie cnemy, ftnd tio sucrecrled. For the Italiana 
quiclrly carriorl thc Iieights, the rrnr-gxirarrl wt~4 slightly p m d ,  
the front ppas unopposed, and in tivo hoiirs tlic xrmy reaelied 
Nomblanc'ti, whence after n short bdt, it demnded into the 
~1,laiag of Ugel. 
o 9 
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CHAPTER 11.
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Suchet, informed of this rnorcli, carne from Yorn t e  confer 
with Macdonard, and they agre~d the seventli corps shouId 
have fur its subsistencc the magaxincs of Monzon, and tbe 
plnin of Urge!, mhich M not yct delivered its contributiona. 
In return ~Iacdouald lent tlie Neapolitan division to  guara 
Sucliet'a oonvoye domi tho Ebro, nnd promised tlie divisions 
of Sevcmli and Soulmm to covcr tlic operntions diiring the 
siege, by drnwing d i e  attention of thc Cntalzlnn gcnernIa tn the 
side of Cardona. Tlie seventh corpa WRS then &artered ribout 
Tarcga, Cervera, Gui~ona, and Agramunt, and Severoli wm 
detaclied with four thausrind rncn ovcr the Begre to enforce 
requiaitions about Talani. He drove four Iiundred X~viss 
irom tho bridge o f  Trcmp, and axccuterl l i i ~  mis- 
Vacani. 
sioii; but with such violcncc, that ,th peupIe, 
bccorning furious, assnsciinntcd thc strn~glcrcr, nn(1 lnid so mnny 
auccessfuful schemcs of murder that Macdonald was forcerf to 
renew tha execiitions nnd burnings of his predecessors. Inded ,  
t o  fecd an m p  forcilily, mill, when al1 tliings are paid for, 
nea te  soreness in a poor and mountainoiw countm because tlie 
tliings talrai cannot w i I y  be replacd, and mitli requisitions 
aeverity js ahsolut~ly necewary. In ricli plains the inliabitants 
can nfford t o  supply troopa, nnt? \vil\ do so to avoid hcing 
pluntlcrcd, whcrcns mount~inccw Ziaving scnrcrly unyt.liing 
besides food, and littIe of tliat, bcconie dcsperatc nnd must he 
treated art enemies or Ieft in quiet. 
While Scvcroli ww ravaging Trenip and Talarn, genernl 
Eupiie marclied with anot her 1tn.Iiri.n dctaclimen t towards 
Cmtelfollit wliicli bad a Frcncli. garrisoii, and 3fctlonnld 
removed Iiis own qiiartcra tu Cervera O"Donnc1 tlien re- 
placcd I division at  Falcct to  obscrvc Suclict, and distribuid 
hia crthcr forccs on a lime tlirougli San Colomn dr! Qiicrault, 
Tgniilad~, B lon t~emt ,  nnd Cnrdonn; Iie tlins cut off RII con- 
nesion lietmecn Macdonalil and the Arnpurdnm, and cnaliled 
Qmpo Verde cioseIy to frillom the ol~rations o€ tlic sevmth 
corps. Ti~at general first menmcd tlic hentl-qtiarters at  
Clervera, and tlien maicliitig agaiiist Eugcnio, was by 11im 
repuked n w  CastelfulIit; Eugeriio, d i s t i n p i ~ h d  nlilce by lirs 
vdour nnd ferocity, retunisd witli liis hoty sofcly to A p  
munt, and afterirartl ~poiled and ravagcd al1 thc district. of 
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A rumour of Swnrtz's clisnster reaclied tlle marslid, but licing 
incrctlulous hc rcmained in tlic plain of Urgel, and D n ~ + a g u a ~  
d'nilliers, wlio nw unablc to do more tlian protcct Iik oim 
coiivoys from Frnncc, ivould llave been in peril if O'Donnel'n 
nctivity Eiad coritinued; lirt Iic liad becu severely wtiuntled, 
tlic Brinni~li vigour rcl:ixed, und Pu'upoleon, nlways wutcliful, 
scnt gcncral Conroux, iii  tlie lnttcr rnd of Octobcr, ivith n 
convoy antl reinforw.mciit of  troops from Pcqiiji~nn to Grrona. 
O'Donnel thcn crnl~,rltcd, aii(1 C a p o  Verde sent a part of tlie 
mmy to Tnrngonx, lcaving Eovirn, Claros, n ~ d  Manso, to 
nourish tlie insurrcction in tlic hmpurdlim. Talíing post him- 
self at IIanrrsa, he menaccd Jfxcdundd's posts nt Cnlrif, bis 
real object beii-ig, Iloivcvcr, Iimíik up t1i:it road, rvliicli ha 
effcckrl, aud tlicn paasitig siiJJculy tlirougli Eci-:~ and Car- 
donii ta Ptrigcertl:i, rlrovc tlic Yrciicli det,uclimcnt, wliich lind 
cnmc to forngc tlic Ccrdnfin, unrlcr tlic guns af  Fort; Louis. 
Ma~~rtlonnld ieing noiv appriseil nf Sir-i~rtx's niisfortiine, hopetl. 
to rcpnir it by crusliiiig Carnpo Ycrcle, tnkirig Cnnluna, and 
di.spersing thc local jtirita of Upper Catnloliia, ml~icli Iiad 
assemliled izi Solstinn. On tlie 18th, lic put Ks troops in 
motion, passed tlie ntounliiiiis of Portdlas, nnd entcrd 
Salsonu; liut tlie junta iintl ii11iabil:liits csc:iped to Gusrlona 
nnd Eerga, and up tlie vii1l~j-s of Oleasia arid Urgel. 31ac- 
dondd tlicii scnt. coliiriinti in rill rlircctions, tu eoIlcct provisions 
and clime tlic Spnnisli dctnd~rncnf~; lic tlius forwd Campo 
Vcrde £o abliantfoii tlie Certlnña \vl)irli was irnmedintcly fnmpd 
by the troo~is froni Fort Looi~;. Cndona temaincd and tlie 
French mnrcl~eil npinst  it, but Campo Verdc arrived before 
tlicm, and  as iii odcr a€ Lattlc d i e n  tliey carne up. 
This towo st,auuds at tlie foul uf U ri~ggcd liill, wliich is 
joincd liy a liog's-back ridge ttu tlie g r c i i t  muuiitnin spine, 
dividing cnstcn from ii-rntc.ni CuLalunia, Tlic Enrdiinm rivcr 
mnsl~ed tlic malls, B castlc of strcnqtli crowncd tlie lieiglit 
above, anrl though thc works were; wealr, the Spniiidi nrnhj*, 
cevering 211 the side of tlic hil1 bctivcen tlic toivn nnd cnstle, 
appemcd so formidable tlisl Mücduiidd feared to engage. 
Bis Prench rind Italian troop, however, marched separately 
nnd Eugenio wrriving first attaclced c a n t i q  to his orclers. 
Ro soon found his Iianrls too full, nnd tlie batlle n-as neces- 
ritarily continud by tlio other rlivi~iun, t u  bring Iúrn off; but 
B m p o  Verílc drnve both French nnd TtdEantna down the 
moiintnin, nnrl f o l l o ~ ~ i l  tlicm brid~ly to Solsonn. 
Mmdonald ~vho h d  lnst many men retitrnetf to Gtii~nna. 
Eíc hnri now hccn tmo months from tlic Ampriirlnm, nnd l i d  
Ettmck no usehl blow, nor much aided Siichet's opcmtions. 
For the Catallins continuülly hansseíl tEm& general's convoye 
from the ieft of the Ebra, while tlie seventh corps, besides 
wffering severely from msnssinatians, had been rr~iulsed 8% 
Cardoiix, l~ad  oxcitcil tlir? ~ieople of tlie pIaiii of Crgel t o  a 
atate of rzbid imurrection, and had lost its orm communick 
tions rvith t,hc Ampurrlnm. IR that district Slvnrtz Ilnd been 
dcstro~cd, Filicu nnd Falnmos talrcn, nnd the Cntnlnns mcrc 
cvcrywlicre inorc powcrSu1 nnd clatcd. Enmelona ~vm ngain 
in distrcs~, and tb convoy from Pcrpignan deetined for ita 
rclicf. dared not pass Hostalilrich. Macdonald thercfore 
resolved to return to Gcrona by the mnrl of Manresa, Noya, 
nnd Granollcrs, and liaving ctimmunicated Lis intention to 
1Sucitci, and plawd Iiis Iinggagc at Serida, mmmenced bis 
niarc2i tlie 4th of November. Campo Parde plctting know- 
ledge uF tliis resolved to fight liim in a pasu uear Calaf, Iiut lilB 
hcort fnilorl nntI tlic Frcnch rcnclicd Mnnrcsn the 7th. hrtiea 
wcrc immcdinklg ~ r n t  nwrird~ liicli m 1  nthcr plihccfi t n  mia 
lend k11e Rpaniaxls, wlíile the mnin botly moved by the Gnriga 
puss to Qranollem, whcrc Dar.ra~iiriy d'ñillicrs w s  t o  mect it 
witli the convoy for Earecloiis; Ilc did not come, and Mncdonald 
returncd by tlie Trenta Pasos to Gerona tlie 10th and sent bis 
convalesccnts t o  Pigueras= 
Tlie vicinity of h r o n a  m 3  exliwsted antI tlie troops were 
to be fed by convogs From Frnnco nrliilc the posts in tlie 
h l n t r d a r n  wcrc rc-cstnlilisl~ccl and tlic d i~ tnc t  re-or~nixcd. 
The miistcr-rolls shoivcd tcn thorisnnd nicn in Rospitnls, six 
thousand in Enrcelona, antl sevcral tltlioiisands di+trilititctl along 
the post nnd limes of communicntion, leaving 5iI)out thirty 
thouwnd for fielrl operations. Of thcse foiirtaen tlinusand 
were under Baraguay tyGLiillicrs in the Ampurdum, and 
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Xacdonald marched wikli tlie remaining sixteen thousnnd for 
tlie fuurtli time to guccour Brarcduna. Sbuliam nnd Pino 
canirnanded bis divisioilq for Severuli lind beon remdled to 
Italy to o r p i a e  reinforcemeiits, arid tlke march wns w d e  ras 
bcforc in one mass; the defiles werc broken up and the bridge 
oycr thc Tortlcrn dcstroyed, but ETtwdonnld in dx Iiours opcned 
nem roads ovcr tlic Iiills right m(1 lcft of thc Trcnh Pncinri, 
and so rexched t11e more open countrp ltbout GranoIIers, 
Campo Verde rctired to Tarasa and Caldas, ~iid t2ie French 
marslid moved onmards to  Da~celonh yet so resolved to  rrvaid 
a defeat, lie mould not s u k r  Pino to i~nprove a 
favouralila rnoment for cmliing t11e C~taIuns in 
Yis front; nor would he pursue Campo Verde to  Tarasa us dl 
hia pncrnls adviscd. Rraviiig delivcrcd his convoy und acnt, 
liis mrk hack to Prwbnce hc movcrl to t l~c  IUobrcy~t, Icnving 
Soutam and Piuo discontented at Barcelona, and giving their 
divisions to Frere and Pontanes. 
Macrlonald h d  m design of besieging Taragom He 
inarclicd witliout artillery or wheel-carririges, anrl Gbc Spaniads, 
seeiiig tliat hc woulil return t u  Leridn, ~iustcd their rnltin budy 
at Montscrrat und Iguiilwlu; he disreg~rded tliem, dwve 8 m  
ficlrl fram Arbos nnrl Tcndril, nnd turncd tomardrr tho pnsa uf 
M~riarbones, fvhich lcxds through tlie range of Iiills scparating 
Villa Franca from tlie district of Valls. The Catalana had 
brokeii up thnt and the pase of Christinx Ieding to tlie Gaya, 
but the Prench genera! made new ways, and tlie 30th spread 
his troops over tlie Panedn or plain of Taqona, tlius diuwing 
lioiv uselwia it is to clestroy roads as a defencc, irnlcm men are 
nlso thcrc t o  figlit. Instead of ocm~pying Rcaa oni bcforc, 
Madonnld non* took post &out Momhlnncli, 11nving ilig rcnr 
fo Lerirln and leriving the pnsscs from Taragona to the Ebro 
open. But in this position he could not f ed  liis troops, nor 
stop thc Catnlans fiom succouring Tortom; Sor Campo Verde 
enwmpd nt Lilla aliovc tlie defilas betwccn him md Tar& 
gom, und O'Donnel, wbo still directed the movenients nltliuugh 
not nble to tnlcc tlie field, scnt pnrtics into tlie rocky CnlFiga  di^ 
trict licliind thcir riglit, to intcmpt Mndonrild's foqm nnd 
harws Sucliet's mter  communicntions by the Ebro. Fmm thc 
heighta af Wlla tIieCatalnnti mlled on theFrcnch soldiers to come 
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up and fight, and thcy woirld hmc done se if hhdennld would 
haw siiffcsetl thcm; bnt nfter ten d q s  of inactivity Iiedividctl 
his troo~is into many coliimns, and in ooncert with Abbé's 
brigade of Sucliet's corps, wliicli rnarched from Xertn, endea 
vourcd to inclase and dcstroy the deiacliments in tlie Gaii* 
The Spanianls immediately dispersed in tlie rnountains, und 
the French army only gained sume inules and four tliousancl 
slieep and exen; with tliis spoil tliey iuiited again on the left 
hnk of the Ebro, and were hmediately disposed un a liae 
extending from Vinebre ivhich j s  opposito to Flix-to Mtwos 
wbicli i s  oppositc t o  iifora-and from thcnce to Gnrcin anrt 
Gnieatar. Ruchct ww t l l ~ s  ennbletl t e  concentrate his t m p s  
rtbout Tortoza, and fhe sicge of tliat place was immediately 
eommenccd. Ris opcmtions during tlie five rnontlls he liad 
been waiting on tlie slow movemerita of Nwdondd shdI now 
be related 
When he rcsipned the Urgel, and liis rnwxines at Monzon 
ta Macdonald in Xeptembcr, he deprivd' liiiiiself of the 
rcsources ou tlie lclt liank oE tlie Ebro frum Mqcluin~nxa to 
Tortoza, and waíi forced to fctcli yruviaions from Zaragom, 
TerueI, and 0 t h  pwts a liuridrerl miles frum his wmp. 
hiacdoiiald by going tu C d o n n  lid cxposcd his wntcr- 
carriag-e to nttnclrs from tiic Spnnimds stationed bctween 
Tu.rag:ona, Mornblilanch, anri Fiilcct; and thc diffi~qilty of 
getting lii battering-trdn down tlie rivm became more diffi- 
cuEt tlie sinking of the water exposecl tlie bars and weirs 
imperling the nrtviptiou. He bnd licilvever taken arlvantake 
of an accidental flotid to bring down tiventy-six pieccs, wliicli 
were escoritd by hlacdonald's Neapolitnn divisio~i, before that 
rna~hal  marclied to Cardona, When tliut marcli occurred 
Habert was at Tivisa, and a reserve occu~iicd Mtis clo Muru. 
And as isval  died aliout tlh time, liis division was givcn to 
HnriBpe, n general JrIistinguished tliroughout tlie wnr by 
ability, courqe, anci humanity. Tiic Valciicians tlien pre- 
pmcd rtgain to diskurb tlic lilocktdc of Tortoxn, mlicrei'ore 
Suchct strengthened l3oussrarri's detahment at Uldecann, ~ n d  
gave tEie commmd to BIusnier, who ivm replncerl at ZxxWza 
by @@;eneral Faris. Af the a m e  time colonel Kliski was sent 
to commmci tlie rletaclimcnte on thc side of Montdvan, 
Teiuel, Darocn, aiid Calatayud, wlicre a partisan warfare was 
co~itiiiuerl sitli  uridiminislied nctivity Iiy Tilla C u n i p ~  EB 
Iind opsned sccrct coinrnunicntions, nnd cxcited commotions 
evcn in Zrirngnzn, nnd on the 7th of , l r i g i p t ,  Iicding n f ~ ~ q -  
ing cletackrncnt nexr Ciicvas, I-iad rec:ipturctl six tliotisnnd 
sliccp, and at Andorra hnd hken botli convoy and e~oort: 
on the side af hravarrc nlso, Mina coming clorni into tlie 
Cinco Villas destroycd somc dctachmcnts, antl iinpcdcd the 
f o r q i n g  liarties. Tlius tlie tliird coi-ps also b c p n  to s d c r  
pi.iviitiuns, and no progrcsa wus mcldc Fowartls tlic conquest of 
Cntulonia. 
In Rcptmnbcr, Villn Cnmpn with inwrosrrl forrcs, dmnccd 
so ncar Suiucl~ct thnt Hd~crt attncltcd nnrl rlrovc Iiini nvcr tlic 
fronticr in clispcrsion, rccnptiiriiig ,111 tlic sliccp licfore lost. 
Sucl~et tlien broirglit doiipn tlic rcmziiicIer of tlie bnttcring 
train, aiid storts for the sirgc; but as tlic i~atcrs  of tlie Ebro 
were loiv, tIie new ruar1 \vas U S C ~  for tllc COUYOYS, wl~icll t h u ~  
c m e  ~lowl y and \\uilli 111a11y iiiterruptions and co~isidcrulrle 
loss; cspccinllp un tlie 17th of Scptenibcr, r,vlicn n ~uhole 
Ncnpolitnn linttiilion sufcrctl itsclf to  bc tnlirn without firinn 
a sliot. Tn thiv manncr rifhii.; rfraggcrl on until tlic 28th of 
Octoher wlien 3I;icdonnld rcturned to Ccronn, antl Sncliet's 
hopes of  commcncing tFic sicgc mcrc ngaiit IirimctI. At tliis 
time tLe assemhling of tlic Cortes Irarl git-cn new vigour to 
tlic resistrince in ISpin, and tlie rcge~icy's lil:i.ii cif scriding 
mccrct juntas, to orgmire aiid rcgiilatc tlic ~)artid:ix, bciiig lmt 
iil executiou, the activity ot' tliosc 1 ) a t i d ~  became ~iruporltiuiied 
to tlic siipplics nnrF promivrs convrycd to  tlicm. Oiic o€ 
tIiosc accrct juntas, eiimyoscd of clergy nnd niilitnry mrn 
having property or inihiciiec in Aragon, ei~rlca~ourcd to rcncw 
thc insurrection forincrlp excited by Blakc iii thrit province; 
thcy seiit cmissarics to nll quitrtcrg concerted operntions 
witli Miua, and diligcntIy fullon-4 tlie plan of sccrctly draw- 
ing olr provisioiis i'rom Aragon to starvc tIle Frc~icli. Cm+- 
bnjal, one of the junta, joining ViIla C a m p  iissuincd commnnd 
on t h n t  sirlc; ml~ilc tlic EngIisli naval cnptnin, Codrington, 
carried n dctnclimcnt by srn to PciiiseoIn, wit,ti jntent t o  fa11 
on Siidietk flanlc if lie slrmltl mnrch hg tlic coiirt r o d  
w~inct Trülencia. And wlien Maciloiiald rcturncd to the 
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dmpurdnm, tho Amgoneso nlso l~cr~rnc unqnict, tlic pnrtidm 
from Nuvam nnit tlic district of hhoritilllrnn niitl Cnlnttmyurl, 
closed in on Siiclict\ cornrnunictition~, tlic V>ilcncinns carne 
up tomrds Uldecona, xnrI Garcix Nnvnrro muving Fiom 
Tairagona ix-itli a division, again took tlic poeition of filcct. 
To clisperae tliese gitbcring cIoutls Sticlict 8trucli tirst at 
tlie insurpnis. Clilo~iisbi wns seiit witli s strung furce 
against Cwliajijrtl, and defcated l i i i i ~  at Alvciitozx. Villa 
Campn rallillied tlic Iic:rtcri t r u o ~ ~ q  an .t.lic ~nountain uf Fiicnte 
Santn, rccci~cil rcinforccmcntri, niid rcucwrtl tlie projrrf, of 
insiirrcction; tiiit Clilnpislti ngiiiii dcf~ntcd Iiim on tlir 12th o€ 
Novembcr, rantl drovc Iiim to tlie rivcr TAiZ)rrsrc, ivlicre t11e 
Ziridgc brolrc ~ n t l  niany Spaninrtls wcrc drowiied : tlic PrencI~ 
lod it I~lusirlrctl mcii, niid CIlilol>islri rcturncrl to Tortoaa lcaving 
Kliski mitli t~vtlvc Iiundrctl to wntcli 7'illa Ca~npa. N o w  
tlie Ebro rosc, nnd tlie rciiiaiudcr nC tlic baltcriiig traiu ~ n d  
storea, being e~nbxrlccrl rrt Bicquiiieiix:~ oii tlie 3111, dropped 
duw~i tlie streurn; liut tlio cruft outstrippecl tlio eacvrt, und 
tlic coiivoy bcing assnilcd froin the Ieft Imnk, lost tmo bonts; 
tFio otlicrs ~roiiiidcil on tlic right bfink, aiid ivcrc tlicrc d e  
friidrd Iiy tlic eannoirecrs, itntil tlie escort carne up on the 
onc sidc, and on tlie other general hlib6, wlio liar1 lieen sent 
from Gunrdin t o  tlieir succoiir. Tlrc ~\-atcr~,  Lowcver, sud- 
dcnly subsidetl, and tlie coiivoy was iii Jauger until Sucliet 
rcinforced Atilih, d i o  vas tlriia ennbIctl l o  l:ccli tlic S~iaoi:ards 
a t  bny, ~wLile  Hnbcrt, with fiftccn liunrlrcd mcn, m d o  n 
diversion by nttuclting tlic citrnp nt Ffilcct. On tlic Ctli, tlie 
rivcr rnsc npin, and tlic b o n t ~  ir,itIi Iittlc 103s rendied Xcrta 
nn tlic 9th. Al1 Ghing.9 were tiiereforc reatly to commerice 
the sicge, bitt. tLe ssventli wrps still kelit doof. 
Suchct \vas perplexed, Sbe povixions lle lrad witli sv 
much paiiis collectell from tlic most distant 11;~i-l~ oi  hngon, 
werc ríiliirlly \viistiug> fuiage wvm ticcotliing scarcc, anrl ss the 
plain of Urgd waw givcil ovcr to tIio scvciitli corps, tlio 
Ertxtcr Iind bccomc A burtlicn to  Iiim in~tcnil  nf nn aiiirl. He 
Iiatl since tlie beginniiig of tlie ycnr airpplicd Iiis nrmy entirtIy 
from t,he rwources of Arngoii witliuut lielp from France, and 
liad in six months used up a ltundrcll and twenty thonsand 
~heep and twclvc huutlred Lulloclrs, Anxious abouf ihe future 
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consitmption he ca?Ied the notnbles and hearls of the clcrgy in 
Ampn tu his head-quartera, and with their advice se-orgnn- 
izetl Lis interna1 adrninistration ITe removcd many absud 
restriction~ upon iiidustry and trade, plaoed tlie municipal 
power nnd police cntirely witli the mtives, nnd tlius obtaincd 
p a t e r  suppliea sitli Icss discontent. And he wns wclZ 
served and obeyed, botli in matters of administration and 
poIice by tlie Amgonese, whose feelings he was careful to 
sooth, piliowing himself in al1 thigs a slire~+d gavernor and 
an alile commander. 
When RIncdoadd mnrched from Barcelona t o w d s  Tmn- 
gona Suclict nttackcd tlic Spnnish troops nt Falcet. II~bert 
msailed their camp in front while detaclimcnta tiirned it 
by both flnnlrs, and the Catalans Red, leaving Garcia Navarro 
and tliree hundred men in tlie hands of the victors. But 
wliile Suchet operated on tlic sirle of Falcet, the Talencian 
h s e c o u r ,  tliiuking he wuulrl be detnined by Navarro on the 
left bnnk of tlie Ebro, resolver1 t o  surpriso Muanicr at Qlde- 
m n ~  To nid tFiis opcrntian, rb f f ~ t i l l ~  from Peniscola, attncked 
h p i &  nnnd otlier smalI posta on tlie coast between the Cenia 
and tlie Ebro, and tlie govcrnor of Tostoza mcnaced Ampoata 
and the stations at the mouth oE the Ebro. 
Bansecour moved in tliree col~mns ;oue, following the coa&. 
road tow-ards Alcmar, turned the French leR; ailotlier passing 
leliiiid the rnouiitaina touk post at Las Yeiitallu, iti rew of 
Nusnicr, b rmt tiim off from "Ibrtozm; tlie main I i d y  moved 
agai~ist liis front. In thc night o+' the 26th the Spanish 
cavalry fe11 upon the French camp outside tlie town, Eiut tbe 
pards checked the attack nntil the troop carne out of tila 
town nnd fornied in order of battle. At dayligltt, the Spanish 
army covered the liills in front, and tliose in rear also, fur tlie 
detmcliment at T7cntnllns was in siglit: the Frcnch wcm 
titus surroundctl wlicn tlie nction cornmcnccd. Thc Valcncinns 
in front mew Iiowevcr benten with loss of sixtcen hundred 
men, anrl those in rear mads off' to the mounhins again. 
h s e c o u r  witlidrew behind the Cenia, Musnier surprised him 
there in ihe niglit, nnd sending tlie cuirassiers by tlie route of 
Tinaros cut of hib: retreat, ~vhich was m d e  with such haste 
and cLisorder, that tlic French cuvdry Ealiing in with the fugb 
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tives near 13enlcarlo ItiTled or took nlne hundrcd: 
the Spmish general sxved hrmself in Peniscola, t f z I -  
and thitlicr also the flotilla, liaving fniIed nt rrsicys 
&pita, returned. Suchet thcn scnt his prisoners 5 9 ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ '  
t a  Franec. by Jacri, and directed a convoy of pro- 
visions, neivly milectd nt Mequinen74 to fa11 ilowri thc Ebro 
t o  tlie mnpsines ut Mora. Fcaring t i lo currcat might ngain 
carry tlio boats fnstxr thnn thc mcort, hc dircctcd tlic lnttcr 
to  procecd fimt, and scnt AbbE tn Flix to mcct the  vesscls, 
biit the Spanimls in the Gmiga placed an ambuscade near 
lf~quinenza, and athclred tbe eraft beforc they ooulrI come up 
with the escort. The boats were then run ~ h o r c  on tlio 
rigIit side, and sevcnty men from Menqninenza carne down 
thc left biink to tlieir nid, whicli saved t11e ieonvoy, thongli tlie 
succouring dctnclment was cut to pjeces. h a n  after this 
l fndonnld took poat on tIie left bnnk of tIio Ebro, whcn tbo 
TURTOZA, wivith n popuIiition oT ten tlionsentl souls md a 
gmrison of frorn cidit to ninc thouennd rcguiilar troope, mas 
j113tIy consirlcrcrl tlrc principnl liiiliviirlt o€ Catnlonin nntl 
Valencia ; tiit it mas comrnaiirlerl liy Lilli, contlc d'AIarhr, a 
feeble man, whose only cInirn was, tiiat lic Iintl sl~own less 
incapacity tlian otliers beforc tlie battle of Tudcla in 1808. 
Tlie Xlianiards outside, cconficling in tlie strengtli o€ tlie plwe, 
let tlie zthck tidvnnce fur sre any intcrruptiuii ~ v m  contcin- 
ñcit Iinve hccn cxecuted, Ziccausc rliscord rngcd arnonpt the 
Spnnisli cliich Campo VcrrIc dcsircd to siipcrscdc O'Donncl, 
hsecour  lield iinccasing dispiite ivitli his own officcrs, and 
with tlie membcrs of tlie Valencirin congreas, and Tjl ia 
G m p n  rcpellcd hotli Carbajal ttnd Rassemur. At tliis critica1 
time tl~erefore J1 was s tzgan t ,  except tlie English vmsels, 
blocltading Eosnñ. Darcelona, and thc nioiitlis of tlie Ebro. 
Watcliing from certnin liead-Innds they pounmd upon the 
enerny's corivoys as thoy crept from port; to port, tlirew 
proviuions, nrnmririition, und stores itito Tarn~rina nnd Tor- 
twrn, arid wcre gcncmlly sirccessful, yct at t k e s  inct mitli 
distlstcrs. Thus, cqtitjn Rogm of tlic Kcnt, Iimving ~vitli 
him tlie Aj~ix, Camhrian, Sp~rrow-liawk, and JTinstrel, discm- 
barkd six liundred mcn md two ficld-piecm under captain 
F u e  at Pnlamos, where they destroycd a coiivoy intended for 
Darcdonn, but re-ernbarlcing in z disorderly manncr, the 
Prerich took or l~illcd t ~ ~ ~ o  libiidmd, Fane beiug aniongst the 
prisoners. Tlie Catalan arrny was thirty thou- 
Abstract sand strong, iincluding prrisons, and in a better 
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lesFcy'~ s h t e  thau it Iied Iiitlicrbo been; the Valcnciiiris, 
1)rapatcbeq 
MSS, nltherrgh ifiscournged by the detht at Uldwona, 
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vinwd t ha t  auccoured or unsucco~~red tlte place mould not ftill. 
O'DonncI, mcatcd conde de' Uispd, wm so disahled by ,ywounds, 
thnt hc rrsigned the cornmand, nnd C m p o  Ycrtlc R-as by the 
voicc of tllc pcoplc riiisccl in liis stcad : for it w a ~  tlieir nntura 
always to iielicvc thnt tlie mRn wlio marle mnst noise was the 
fittest person to Iiead tliem, and in tliis jnstance, as in most 
otllcrs, tliey w m  rnistalwn. 
Tortora, sitiiated on tlie left of tlie Ebro, commrinicated 
aitlr tlie ri$t Xiaiil; by a bridge of boats, wliicli was the only 
Sl~anisli tiriclgc uu Llie rivcr frum S~~r:igom, t u  tlie mn. Iielow 
auil. aliove tlie 1)I:ice tliere ivas a pluin, so nnrrowed by t l is  
juttinbq crf tlie mountniiis wliere tlie town wns kiuilt, t h t  
whilc aomc houscs wcm dosc to tlic wntcr oa f lnt  groiind, 
atlier~ stood on bluff rocky points ~ l io t  from tlic IiiIIs ubove, 
and aprcarctl to tic tlic rnountniiir, tlic rivrr, nnd tlic plains 
togotli:;~. Fivc of tlicsc slioots ivere tiikcn in by tlic rnnipxrta 
and oiitworlts, Onc, soutli of tlie town, was crorvncrl by the 
fort of Orlcans, and oti thc nortli anotlier m= occupicd by a 
fort mllcd the Tenaxas. To tlie east a horn-jverk IW niised 
on a tliiid sliuot, wLch lieing prolenged, aiid rising sudclenly 
ap in  betn-een tlie suburbs nnd the city, furnislied tlie site of 
a mstle or citsdel: tliit 0 t h  twa, and tLe deep ravines 
betiveeu tliem wcre rlefendcd by ttlie r~inp~irts, wlijch were 
extremcly irrogulur, and strong from situution, ratlier than 
eoustruction. 
Tlicrc iiTcn: four £ronh. 
1". Tha wrt7m,  &Jending metliud. Tliia fronf,, biiilt 
on tlie plnin, wns so emkdded between tlie Ehro, tlie horn- 
mork, tlie citndel, and tlie Tennxas, tlint it could not even be 
approaclied until the latter fort wm talcen. 
83 TJLe aastern. Ezhdimy fmm t l ~  7wmmwk do t7a 
ht.iwa of Sm I ' h .  Iterc tlic deep ravinca and tlie roclty 
ground, whicli wm nlso ovcrlooksd by tIic citndel and Ruukeil 
by tlie liorri-work, rcndercd aiiy attack very dificult. 
3". YYLe souli'¿-easlBm. From ILs L u 8 . f ~ ~  uf Sm Peco ¿o 
#te bmliun of Srsm.tcs C w .  Tliiu lront, protecled by a deep 
narruw rtbvine, wm a p i n  covered by tlie fort of Odeuns, whicli 
wns itself co~ered by a second ravinc. 
40a ".te rioutfmw. Frum &a Sarda C m  lo llrs.Eh, The 
p u n d  O€ approach here was flnt, the soil ensy t o  work, and 
the fort oP Orlrnns not sufficicntly sd~ranwd to  flnnlr it witli 
any dnngerous effect ; mhercfore against this Front Xuchet 
resolved to conduct bis attack. 
A risialg p n n d  opposite the bridge-head on the right baiik 
of tIie Ebro, called tlie Xoquetta, was Euttified and occupied 
by tlirce mgirnents; und on thc 15tIi, 8uclict crossd tlie Ebro 
hy Iiis own britlgc at Xcrtn, witli ciglit hotfnlions, tlic~nppcrs, 
and two squntlrons of husanm. Hc marcltcd bctmccn the 
mountnins nnd the rivcr npon tlle fort of Tcnnx~q, mhile 
Blihwt, witli tivo regiments nnd tliree liundrccl liussarri, moving 
irom Perillo, nttaclred a Spanisli detdiinent cnczmpcd on tlie 
Col cllAibn. WlienSncliet'8 colutriri urrivcil ir i  sigEit of it, tlie renr, 
nnder Hnrisp# filing ncmss tlio ningcd shooh, swcpt ronni1 tlie 
pllim, lcnving in cvcry ravinc md on emry ridne m dctocliment, 
unti1 tlie balf eircle entlcd nn tlic Ebro bclow Tortom. The 
investmeat vas perfcctcd an tlie IcR bnnk by tlie troops from 
h q u e t t a ,  nnrl $ IIabert w11o entered the line of investment, 
sucitc,,3 d r iv iq  ticforc Iiiin sis Iiuildred mcn fram thc Col 
Mmuim. SAIlira. Tlie cornmunicatiou wross tlie water was 
Mr. Wcl- 
Icalry. tlicn cstnblishcd hy tlircc, nnii riftcrwnrds liy four 
MSH. fl ying Iiridgcs, plnccri nbovc antE hclow tlic town; 
s matter o€ ñome dificiilty aníl irnportancc, becnusc nll the 
artiIlcrj nnd stores Iind to cornc from Tlocquetta across the rrnter, 
wliicli wns tliere tmo hunrlred yards wide and in certain winds 
very rough, 
M~cdunald fiiiding iio fornge sent Iiis mytl1ry hnck to 
Lerida by tbc road of Larrlecans, and marclicd from l l n s  do 
Mora R C ~ O F . ~  thc liills to Pcrjllo tu cover tlic sic?; 11is patrdcs 
disco~cred a Slmnish divjsion netir thc fort nf Pclipe dc Bala- 
p e r ,  yet he woiild not attocIr them, and tliinkiing lie could 
irot rcmnirt fm want of ~irovisions, rcturned on the 19th to 
Grricstnr. Tliis retropade movcment was like to have exposed 
tlie iiirnting tmops to a rlisaster ; for as the seveiitIl corps 
rctircd, a second Fpnnisl'li divisioii coining from Reuc reinfurced 
tlie firct; but Mncrloniilrl tlien plnced Fm'a division of six tliou- 
snncl infantry and a rcginient of  cavrilry xt. Sucliet's dispnsal, 
on condition tlint the latter sbould feed tliem, which he eould 
wcll do. Tliese troops were stationed behind the inmsting 
DEC. 1810.1 BOOK XIXL- CHAF. 3. 209 
force on thc road oE Amposta, by which the Spaairards from 
Taragona could most eaaily approach; the remainder of the 
seventh mrps encamped at Gniestsr, a strong pmition covering 
the siege on tlie side of Faloet, and onIy fifteen miles from 
Tortozn. In this situation it could be fed from Lerida, and 
mitli gra t  er frtcility send detachments up the Ebro, t e  protect 
tlie conroys comiiig from Mcqiiincnxa. During 
these mn~emcnts onc division of Cntnlans took 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ' s  
post on tlie Llobregat uncler Caro; another under 
37mnro at Momblanch ; a t h i d  u n d ~ r  Cnmpo Terde in obscrv- 
rition of Frere's aovering division. O'Donnel l i d  prexiously 
sent two convoys to  Tortoza, whlch from the rapidity of the 
investment fniled; he then proposed combjned movements 
to raise ti10 siega, whan h i ~  wounds forced liim to resign, as 
Jicfore rioticed: Pmnzo sl~ould ha\-e succeeded him, but tiie 
popuInt cry gave tlie autliority to Campo Verde. 
San Pedro, a haIf bnstion situnted in the plnin cIow to 
the river, wm the first ohject o£ attuck; and to provent Fort 
Orlenns inoommodíng tlic trencheq t,lic npproacli w n ~  t,raced 
in a slanting directinn, refu~ing the right nnd pushigfamard 
the lcft. To covcr thc fianke, Fort Orlcans wm maslrrxl by a 
f n l ~ d  n t h l r  on onc side of t.hc Ebm, and trcnclics opencd 
yainat tlie bdge-head were brouglit down close to the water 
on tlie otlier side. The 19th the posts of &he haieged were 
driven in, nnd ian unfinishd work in advance of Fort Orleans 
was taken possession of, In the night a dcceitfd fl+g sap 
waa commenced one h~mdred and skty yarda Erom the fort, 
upon an exteut of three hundred and sixty yard~~, but tlie 
following nig1:lit tlie true attack was openerl in tiie plain dunng 
a storm; and as tlie 8pnniard9 bad placetl no guarda in front, 
the French worlrcd. witliig a hundred nsd fifty ynds oF tlie 
San Fdro. Tlieir prarnltcl was fivc hunrlrcd ynrrls lona, 
~xtcndhg from tlic f n l ~ c  snp d o m  to the bank of tha rirwr; 
two communic~tiona wcre also bcgun, nnd gmund was liroken 
an tlie left Zimk w i n s t  tlie bridge-head. 
At dayliglit, the SpanIards, ~erceiving the works, oom- 
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menced a heavy fire and mde a sally. 'Rey were over- 
whelmed by musketry from the Mse atta& of Fort Orlems, 
and tlie trenches on the right bnnk o€ the Ebro; and in the 
night, the wmmunication wag extended to Saurteen hundred 
yarda, ninc batterics wcre cornmcnecd, nnd b a p  of eartli plncetl 
along the erlge of the trcnchcs, wlicnce cliosen mcn shot d o n  
the Spanish ~tillery men. 
On the 23rd, a ni@ d l y ,  m d e  from tlie b~+dge-had, ms 
iepulsed, and next d y  the second parnllel of tlie tme attack 
war, commenced. In the niglit of tlie 25tli, ~eparate sdlies 
were a p i n  made and repulsed, and tlie wurks were advenced 
to witliin. twent y-five ynrds of tlio palideS ; a kn th  battery 
WM dco commenced, iand when dny hrokc thc Spnnish gunners 
rliiailed under the nim of the chosen marksmen. Tn tlie niglit 
of  tlie 2bkl-1, the besieged overtumed the head oE the sap and 
ki l ld  th sappen;, but were finnllp repulsed by tlie reserve, 
and tbe approach was immediately pushed formrd to the 
plum of arme. Tlius, on tlie seventh iiidit of open trenchs, 
tlic besiegers were lodged in the coverert way before a ahot 
htid been fired from cithcr hreuching or oountcr linttcriefi; a 
rempirkeble iiistnnce of ~ctivity and holdneas, and n signd 
proof that the defence w s  illconducted. 
During the nigl~t of t t e  27th, the works m r o  enlarpd as 
much raa the fire of the place would permit; wlierenpon the 
Spaniards, seeing tlie batteries ready t o  opcn, rnadc a general 
snIly througli the eastern gates agninsk the false attwTc nt. Port 
Orlenn~, nnd throtigh thc ~outhern e t c s  qnins t  tlie wnrks in 
tlie plain. Habert drove them bnck with slertghtcr from the 
formm point ; at the Iatfer thgr mon the covcred may, reached 
tlie secontl padlcl, burnt the pbions, and did much darnage 
ere tlie reserves could repulse tfiem. Next niglit tlie baiteries 
were amerl with forty-five pieces, ~erentcen beitig on the right 
hanlc, to tnirc thc works ~t thc niniri nttsck in rcuersc and 
break tlie bridge, At daybreak al1 tlt1iwe giins opened witli 
success ngainst tlie demj-bwtion on tlie left bnnk of tlie river; 
but the 5re from tlie castle, tlle bridge-lied, the horn- 
wurk, and tlie quay, 01-erpowered trie p n a  OII the rig1,lit Lrtink, 
and dthough tlio bridge IVW injured, it wna not rendcrerl im- 
pwsalJlc. 
On the 30tl.1, the Spanisli fire ww overporrered, the bridge 
mae lirolcen, and in tlie night an attempt was mnde to pxss 
tlie ditcli at tlie true uttticlr, but h o  guns, stilI nntouclierl, 
dcfeated ibis effort. Ho\vevsr, the Spariiads abandoned tlie 
Iiridgeliead, anr? tbe  Frcndi h~tteries oii tLe right h n k  dis- 
mounted tlie two gyns ~vhich Liad Jefenrlell 8nn Pedro. Tlic 
besiegers tliea efcct~1 tlic pwsqc of tlie ditch wvithorit diffi- 
milty, nnd tlic mincr bcing nttaclied to the ~carp: worlred iiito 
the wsll wllilc tlic bnttrrics opcncd a brcnch in tlic crihin.  
A lodgmcnt m s  thcn mnrIe in prcparation Eor ni1 atrsrialt, bnt 
at ten o'clock ~ I I  tlie morning tlie besieged displayed the wliite 
flag: the ncgotirationa for FL surrentler wcre, liomwer, pro- 
longed una eveniq by tlie govcmor, without any resiilt, anrl 
the miiier resueied Lis work in the ni&. 
At seven o'clock on the 1st of Jnnuary, two practicable 
breaches, besides thnt in tlie curtain, mere opened by the arta- 
lery, and the mine was rendy to explode, wlien three white 
ffnp were seen t o  wave from different parta of the fortress; 
ncverilieless the diaposition of the garrison wss mistmsted, 
and Xuclict rlemxnded as a preliminary the iinmediate posses- 
siun oT one of t3ie f o r t s , ~  nccessary premution, for disputa 
arose amongst tFie liesiepd, and Liili intirnatd f.o Suchet, tliat 
Iiis own authoritp rvas scmcely recognised. In  thiv critica1 
moment., tlie Frendi general gnve proof tbat he was more 
tEmn ra mcrc soldicr; for riding up t a  thc gatea with a con- 
uirlcrnhlc stnff, nnd cscortcd only by n compnng of nvcnntlicio, 
hc infomied tlic Spnnish oficcr on gurcrd, tltat hoatilities h r ~ l  
oenscd, nnd tlien, lenvinfr Iiis grenadiers on tlre qot ,  desired to 
be conducted to the gorernor who was in tlie citadel. LiEIi 
was jnst yiclrling to thc r~monst~rrnnecs of tlie oflicers ahoiit 
Iiim q a i n d  a surrender, wlien tlie French general tlms siid- 
denly aplmred at Iiis couiicil board; tlic Spanish p a d  begran 
to stir, but Xuclict m~umed an arrogant tone, spolre o€ tlic 
impatient ficrceness of tlie Frcncli troops, and even menñcctl 
militnry execution if furtlier delay occurrerl. Diuing tliis 
extraordinary soene IInbert brought in the grenadicrs from 
the @e, antl tlie stupificcl goveriior after sigii~g a ghort 
mpitulation gavo over tlie citadel t u  t1iern. Tliis went 
beirig n i d e  known, tlie Spimisli troopa assaillilsd, and 
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Alaclia, in presence of Euchet, odered them to lxy down their 
arms. 
Pour Iinndred Fmnch and fourteen liundred Spaniards had 
fallcn during tlxe siege; many tliousxild prisoners, nine 
ptandardm, one hundred picces of nrtilles; ten tlioiiesnd 
mu&cts, and irnmense mrrgnzincs cnhancetl thc value o€ tho 
conquest, which by some was attributed te Lilli's trmchery, 
by otliers to  his imbeciIity,-tliere seems reason for both 
c l i q e s ,  and it wne it heavy treason. Por tIie fall of the plnoe, 
besidea opening tlie westeril pwsage iiito Cataleni4 arid cnt- 
ting oR tlie ccimrnanicntíon Setwecn tIiut province and Valencia, 
rdnced thc Catnlnn nrniy to twcnty thousanrl mcn, includhg 
tlia garrisons o€ tIie t o ~ m s  still in thejr possession. Campo 
Terde irnmcrliately retired fiwm Fdcet to AIomblranch, and 
Sucliet, always prompt t o  malce one guccpss the preliide tu 
ano8icij endcavoured iri the first moment of coiistcrnation and 
surprise to get possesvion of tlie fortti of Peniscvla nild San 
Fdipa dc Bakqucr. Nor was hc dcccived with rcspcct t o  th 
Imt, for t h d  plxce, in wliich wme five giins nnd a hnndred 
mcn, waa trrken on tlle 9th hy Habert; lmt at Peniscole Lis 
snmrnoris wras disreprded, 
hlennwhiie IXacdonald, leaving the NeapoIitnn Iirigadc still 
nn tho Ebro, passetl by Falcet ta  Reus, wliere Iie eiicumped 
thc Iltli, as if to invcst Tampna; yet witliout any renl 
intcntion to tolo so, fnr hia cavnlry nnd fidd nrtillcry wcre lcft 
at Tderida rtnrl Tortaxa, tlnrt lils nctuxl forw did not sxcced 
twelve thousxnd men. Campo 'Crerde, who h d  retrerited before 
him, tlien posted Sarsíield witIi six t11ousnnd men at Vds, 
from wliencc 11e rnrntIe incursions qainst Mmdonald's foragcra, 
anrl also surpiissd nt Tarega, ou tlie otlier sirlo of tlia tnuun- 
hins, a. rcgimcnt of Italilinn rlrngoons w1iicIi he ivould hnve 
dwttmycd hiit for tlie succonr of rt neighboiiring post. 
On tlie 14th Ir~donrilcl rnarched towartls Vnlls, Smsfield 
retired to Ph, md mas pursued by Eugcnio witli two tIioitsand 
Italian infantry. mis ofiicer, headstrong and intractahle, 
pushed iuto tlie plain oT PIa, conttvry to hiti ortlers, nnd lvns 
ncnring thnt town, ~ h e n  a strong body of cuvnlry peurcd out  
of iit, and on encli sidc thc Spuniah infnntry wcrc secn rlcscend- 
ing the hills in order of battle. Eugenio attacIced the Srat 
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tLat entemi tbe plain, b~it  fe11 mortalIy weunded rand his inon 
rctrentcd figliting. The firing bcing heard at 
ValIs, Fdonibini mnrclictl t o bis assist~noc, but ;T,"liEs, 
m s  himself bcatcn and throm into confusion; 
Sarcfidd, at the head of the Spttnish boa ,  wa~l then preparing 
to complete the vjctos,  wlien the Prencll colonel Ddort 
comfng iip with some squadrons cliarged w i t t  great fury, and 
so brougllit off the Italiana: Delort himself !+.as liowever 
desperately wounded, antl tIie wliole loss was not less tlian six 
liundred mcn. MacdomId would smrcely suRer Pnlombini t.o 
6UCCOUr Engenio's troops, and rlid not move Iiimself; a great 
error, for Snrsfield !vas so eager in pursuit as to cotne within 
two miIes of Valls, and beiog on operi g m d  iniglit Iiave 
been mshed in turn. B e i q  unmolested he retiirnett to tlie 
pasa of Cubra, leavjng his cavrtlry as before iri J'la, whence 
through byc-roods they communicaterl with Ta-ona 
A fcw dayg nfim thk, Enrsfield mme out again in order of 
hnt.tlc, and nk *,he samc time Campo Verclc nppenred with n 
diviaion on tlic bills in rcar o£ Valls. hIacdona1d ww tlius 
wrrounrlrd, biit Pnlomliinlk brigndc sufficed to scntl Citmpo 
Vercle h c k  t o  Tnragonñ, and Sñr~ifidd refuserl hnttle; tlien 
tht? Frcnch marshd, ~vlvlio had resolved t o  p to L e r i d ~  yet 
wisbed to malre without fightrng, broke up from Valla in the 
night, and with greiet order and silence pawsed by tlie road 
of Fiiencalde, betireen tlie defiles of Cabra and Rjbas; botli 
ivere occcupied by the Spaninds, yet hi movement was not 
discovered unti1 next day. From tlienm he marclicd by 
Momtlancli upon Lerida, where he arrivcd tlie 19tl1, and 
tliree days ahemrcla spread hii troeps over tlie plains of 
Urgel, t o  collect provisionq money, and transport, tind to 
watch the defiles of tlie mountrtlnti. But tlie Cntidan generaI, 
hving receíved stores and arms from England and Cadiz, 
cnlled out al1 the miqeIrtes and somatenes of tlie 1iilSs round 
tlie pFnin of 'l'rgel, and n n i t d  them at Santa Coloma de 
Quernult undcr Br~ficld, while ths  reg-ular army apsciinliled 
%t bt~giinlr~la an~l Villa Franca. Tl~c Spnninsds thus occnpicd 
e conccntintcrl poaition nnd cut off MnotlonnlrI from Barcelona 
and thc Ampnndam, which ivm then harnased by Em1eh 
Rovirn, ancl thc brigade of Mnrtincz 
Suclict being d e d  by the exigoncics of Iiis governinent to 
Saragoxn, cnrricd one division tliere, nnd distrilutcd nriotlier 
tindcr Ifiisnicr nt TcmcI, Molina, Alcanih, nnnd MorcIla. 
Ee nlso withrleew Iiis troops from Cnmliril, whtch IIabert bad 
mrprised on tlic 7th of Fcbruary; but he lcft tliat general, 
~i~i t l i  a divjsion, in commnnd of Tortoxa, liaviiig two bhousmd 
men at Pcrillo to connect the city witli &ii Felipe de 13ala- 
mero These tliiligs giive importunce h b  tlm auccess ngxiinst 
r:iigenio, for the Span ind~  nttrihrit,cil tlic srpnnitr, rtrtrmts of 
tlie Fr-cncli corps to Fcar. 3litccloiinld'~ movemcnt hnd thc 
sppearance of a fliglit; but while gatttering provisiuna nt 
Iierida, he repaired tlic worlrs of RaIagiier as n pivot for the 
troops crnployed to forage the couiitry \yatered by thc 
Noqera, Cincn, anrl Lcgu rivem. 
It intby appeitr extrnordinnry that the ivar could hnvc becn 
contiuu~d untlcr such rliRcultics, hut tIic rcsourcca 
Appnax7r -were still grewt. A junta Iiarl bccn f m e d  in 4 2. Cntdonia to  procure provisions, and nlthough tlie 
Englisli orders of council interhred with tbe trade oC neutd  
vessela bringing gain, Irrcnd could Iic liliuglit a t  t.he rate OE 
lalbs. to tLe tlollur, wliilo witit Wdlili$on's nrmy in Castiiln 
it oftcn cost hdf n dollar n poiind. Whcn thc Frciicli forq-  
ing partics cnmc out from Xifrcclonn, tlieir mmch coiilrl 1% 
alwap tt.nccd by t l ~ e  swnrms of bosk, loaclcd with paople and 
pro~isions, sliooting out from the coast-tomq tc tover for a 
wliile un~ler tlie protection of tlie English vcssels, auCE then 
retur~i wlien tlie danger wtrs over: tuid tlie cuenjy did never 
rneddle with ttiese bonts, b s t  tliey ~lioirld rcinove tho cover ta  
thcir own supplics. Siiclict also larmcd Ri~pita and otlicr smaIl 
placa at the moutli of the Ebro, with ti view to nffoorrl clielter 
to the aipled craft, whicIi watchcd provision-vessels sniling 
from Valcncia for Taragona, and aidcd Freiicli vessds cngagcd 
in a like cuurse coining froin France. To fwrl Barcelona, 
Jfnurice Matliicu at timcs ocmipied thc licritLlnrids from St. 
Filicu to Rlnnw, whilc smii11 convoys crcpt nlong sliorc, and 
a fleet Ioded mith proriaione miid pnwder and escorted by 
three frigrates, entered it in February. A continua1 supply 
wm like~vise kept up by sailing-boats and smnlI vcssels, mliich 
could not bo asdy detccted tawid~t lie numenius c r 4  Iielcng- 
ing to the people ~ilong the comt t; nnrl t he  claims of hnnger 
are psmount  t o  al1 others, it WBS necesaary, for the snke of 
the inlizbitnnts, to perrnit prorision sometimes t o  rcach Dar- 
celona by land. The Spanish generals winlred at it, aad 
Milans and h c y  bave emn been charged with permitting 
corn t o  pamr Into tliat aity for private profit. Yet by these 
and like expedients the war was sustzined. 
No Mportant event occurretl after Eugenio fell, until tlie 
3rd of Marcli, wlien tlie garrison of Tortoxra being 
oit. Wel- 
weakened by the dehcJiment a$ Perillq tlle l,l,yg 
Spaniards endeavoured ba cut tlie latter o& intend- 
ing if succcssful to assauft Tortoza itself. They 
also attaclccd tho fort of San Felipe, y& faifed, and the 
FrencIi n t  Pcrillo effected their retrmt with consideroble loss. 
ThEs attempt mas fo1Iowcd by a more importnnt effort. On 
fhc 19th of Mmch, Cnmpo Vcrrle aqsemhled eight tthousand 
mcn at Molinos de1 %y, four theusitnd at Gniriolcr, and tliwc 
thousmd nt Ignalarla, to surprisc thc Mty nnd forts of Bnrce- 
Ion% for he liad, as he thonght, corrupted the tom-major of 
Montjuic. He sent eight hundred chosen grendiers in the 
night lq the llills of Eospitalette, to enter that fort, and they 
descended into the ditch, where Miurica Mnthierr, apprised of 
the plan, in an instant nverwhelmed them gt11 fire. 
gap leon  now clinnged tlie system oE the mr. Al1 Cata- 
lonia west of the upper Llobregat;, and from Tpnlada by 
Ordal to tEie sea, including the district of Tortoza, waEi plitced 
undw Suchet'~ mvernment ; nnd seventeen tliousand of B l a ~  
donald's troops kere united to  tlie third carp, wliieli wrw bhus 
au,pented to forty-two thoumd men, and took the titla ot 
the A m y  of drqm,' It w n ~  destined to  besiege Tnrngona, 
wIii1c Maedondds forcc, reduccd to  twcnty-scvcn thouannd 
undm arms, including fiftccn tliorimnd in p r r i ~ o n  and in the 
Ampiidam, was rcstrictcd to thc nlipm- part of Catalonia. 
His ordem were t o  att~ck Cardona, Eerga, Seu d'Uigel, w d  
Montserrat; and to war down Martinex, hfaneo, Rovira, and 
other diicf~, in the mountnins betmeen OIot and the Cerdaña. 
Five thousand men, chiefly componed o€ nationd guards, was 
algo ordereri t o  rtssemble at Mont Lonia, to mt in the Cedaiía, 
and on the rear of the partisane in the high valleys who had 
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even penetrated into France and burnt somr ~ U w  thm. 
TEie line af operations against Cstalonia Ww4 thus altered 
from France t o  Amgog Lhe dificulties were leaaend, and 
the scveath carps, reduoed in numlrem, became the seconday 
kmy; fin~1Iy bXadonalcl'8 formal method wns cxchanged for 
the livcl y vigorous talent OT Sucliet., Bnt tlie delay alreudT 
~ U R M ~  in the siege of Tortoza could never be compensated; 
SncZlet had been kept on the Ebro, when he sliotild have been 
on the GuadalaPiar, and this enabled tlie nfurcians to keep 
the foitrtli corlis iii Grenada, iy1ien it slionld bave baen on the 
Tagus aidtng Mwsenu. 





DURl:lm tlll~ siege of 'l'OrtOUl, Villa. Campa and otllers wa~ed
active war agaiust Aragon. Stimulated by the secret juntas,
and supported by English sUllplies this warfllre was now from
experience more ably conducted. The Ellglish squadrons Oil
the northern coast combined their operations better, and the
}lartillu!I tllUs sU!lported acquir('d R more solid military orga-
nizlltiolL. 'fhey were not equal to the delil'erauec of their
country but were useful auxilill,rics, a.lld the iuterruptiull they
gave to the French correslKmdcu(Xl was certainly l:u.utaIllOUII~
to a. diminution of forty thousaud troops, without reekollill~
those wlJO were necesl>urily employed to wutch and pursue the
buuds. The lllol'lll effect produced ill Enrope by u struggle thus
maintuinoo wus ulso vcry considernblc. Nevcrtheless the SlIme
number of mcn tl1lder good discipline would lmve been more
efficaciolls, less onerous to the country people, less subversive
of social order. WllCn the regular a.nny is completed, all
that remains in a country may be turned to advuntage as
irregulars, yet thcy are to be valued IlS their degree of orga-
nization approaches tlmt of the regular troops: militia are
better than aoned bodies of pcusantry, and these IllSt, if
directed by reb'lllar officers, better than sudden insurrectioIl.'l
of ,'illagers. The Spanish armies were never. completed, never
well organized; when tbey were dispersed, whicll hllppened
Ilcarly us orlen as they took tbe field, Ule war wust ha\'e
ceUllctl in Spuiu, had it not Leen kept alive uy the partidas,
and it is there wo find thcir moral vulue. When the British
urmies kept the field, the partidall harassed the cllemy'6 COD1'
mUllicatiolls, und this constituted their militur.y
vulue. It is liOwcver certuin they DCyer much
excecded thirty thou9lln<! in number; au(1 they
could uot have long existed ill anI' numbers without English
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suppliwi, anlcgs a spirit of oder  and providence, differcnt 
from anykliing witncescd diiring the wnr, hd nriscn in Spdn. 
Row a'tisiird then to revemc t he  order of the resoiirces pos- 
sessed by an iinvaderl mtuitry, t o  confound the moral with the 
rnilitary means, to plnce tbc irreglar rcsistance oE the pea 
stiiits first, and tli:it of tIie soldiers 1st. in tbe scale of physicai 
defcnce. 
Tliat mtiny partirle chicfg bccnme Xcss nctivc, after t h g  
received regular rank, is trire; but this wna a conscquence of 
tlie inveterate abuses whieh oppreqsed the T ~ E O U ~  of the 
resdar armieu, and necessarily nffeeted the partidas when they 
becnme a constituent part. o€ tl~ose armies. Many persons of 
wciglit .wcrilicd to this bestoml of ranlc on t t ie  cliiefs, tha 
scknowIedger1 aRw innetirity oof thc portidas. Xt irc however 
prohable t l iat  a lifc of toil nnd danger, repeated dcfeaka, tlie 
scarcity of plunder, and genera1 discontent at tlie cxactluns of 
the chieffi, liad nliated the firc of patriotism; i n a c t i ~ Q  was  
mther tlie sign of subjcction tlian t1io resuIt of nn injudicioua 
interference Iiy tlio govcrnmcnt. During thc sicqc of Tortoza, 
thc eoncentrntion of the third and scventli corprr cxposed 
Arngon md Catrilania to desultog enterprises, when the par- 
tidas, more nirmerons and powchl, were also more ardent, 
because the nssembly of the Corten scemed to acknowledge 
tho people's tmportñnco in tlie stnigglc. Henca no better 
test  of thcir renl idnence can inc foiind tlinn their exploits 
during thnt period, whcn two French n.rmies were Sixd M it 
were t o  one spot, the attplilica from F ~ a n e e  neor l~  mt off by 
natural difficulties, ths district immetliately round Tortoza 
cornpletcly sterile, Catnlonin gcnenlly exhausted, nnd a project 
to create a rictitioiis smrcity in tlio fedile pmts of Aiagon 
diligently nnd in some sort succcssfully purmcd by thc secret 
jiintas. Tl~c number of Freneli foraging parties, and the 
distxnces t o  wliicli t h q  vere sent wete thcn peatly increased, 
and €he hcility of cutting tliem off proprtiomhly au-mented, 
y ~ t  nnotling important was effected by tha pnrtirfas. 
YiUn Campn's opemtions during the bloclradc hnvt: bcen 
alreatly relntcd, hut, dtliough sometimcei wcees~ful, tlie results 
were rnosely dverse to liim; and d e n  aRer tlie skgc was 
actually commenced, lie Gamo d o n  hivads tlie side of 
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Unroca, liis cavnlry wns r n i r p r i s d  hy colonel Klifilri mho mp- 
tured or lcillerI onc hundred ancl fifty in tha villqge of Blaninens. 
Then he retircd, brit Irieing soon after joined by the Empe- 
c indo from Cucnca, he returned In dnnriary to tlie frontier oE 
Amgan, md took post bctween Molim and Nharacin. At 
tliis period Tortoaa liad surrcndercd, and Musnier'ri division 
wiis spread along the westem part o£ Arqon; wlierefore 
Suchet detached PanS witli olie column from Zarwxa, aand 
AbbB with another from Teniel, to  cfiase tlicse two p:irtirlas, 
Near BfoIino, Piiris found tliu Empecinado, wLo joi~icd Villa 
Cmpa, but tlie French general: furced Fiotli frum tlicir nionn- 
tain position near Frias, ond lieing joined bp AbbB continucd 
tlzc pursuit for severnl days, until the fugitives tuo l í  diffcrcnt . 
routm. Pnris tlicn followcd Villa Campa, aud AhM pursncd 
tlio Einpccindo tSiroiigh Cucncn, from wliziicc CnrhnjnI nnd 
GIic secrct jiinta immerliritcIy flcd. Pilris ftilcrl to ovcrtalralrc 
Villa Cnmpa, but entered Releta, Colicta, and Pnmlcjos, dl 
thce containing manufactorics for m u ,  whiclf he destroycci, 
and t l~en returned. Thia expcditiori I ~ t e d  only twelvc dnys, 
p t  the amaller bmds in Arngon, had taken ndvnntage of it t o  
cut off a detachrnent of fiftg mcn nmr Fuentes : aad on tlio 
side of Nerañrre Mina entered the Cinco VilIas and ciit to 
pieces one hundred rtnd íifty gm+d'amw near S~ada~a.  
EIoreever Chlopiski piireued him so closely, that lris band 
dkpersed near Coseda in Navame 
During this time tlie Valenciana, ttl~tbys swnyccl by fnctiuns, 
displnced Brissecour and nppointcd Coupigny in Iiis stend. 
The notnhlcs rniseci money for rccruits, h,ut Coupigny would 
not tnlcc thc command, bccauso tFio hiiircinn nrmp wrss not also 
givcn to liim; and that arrny, dthoiigli numeroiis; m s  in n 
very ncglected stntc, and unnblc to undcrtiikc any semim, 
Wben Tortoza fell, the Tnlencians merc frightened. Tlicy 
rcpaired and gamsoned the fort of Oropesa, nnd some srnxlIcr 
posts on t h e  const, along which ruiis the only artillcry-road to 
tlielr capital; they commenced fortifying BIurviedro, or mther 
tLe rock of Sagnntum overhanging it, rrad tbey scnt fifteen 
Iiundred mcn into tlie hiUs about canh~icja.  Tliese last mero 
disperscd on the 5th of llpril by a oolumn from Teniel; and 
on the 11th motlier body having attempted to surprise Ud+ 
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cong which mas wmkly guarded, were also defertted and 
sabred by the French cnvnlq-. Tliese cvcnts, wpecínlly the 
destniction of the gun-m~nufactoriee, represñed the rcfivity of 
the partisana, nnd fjuchet went to Leridn in the latter end o£ 
Narch, to xeceive the soIdiers to be drafted from the seventh 
corps. 
Mncdomld, dwirous t o  reraci~ Bnrcelonq. was forced to take 
an mmrt of asven thoushnd mcn, rtnd marchcd, not by 
Iplalatta, whlcli w m  occupicrl in foice by Snrsficlri, birt by 
the circuitous way of Manresa; for neitlier he nor Enchet 
mished to e n p p  rien dcsultorq. nctions witli tlie forces destined 
for tlie siege. Sa~irsfieId, tiowever, passing by Calaf with his 
own nnd Erolcles' troops, wnited on 3Iacdun~ld near tlie Cw- 
rlcnem iivcr, whilc a dchchmcnt, hnrricnding thc bridgc aE 
3fanresn, opposed him in front. Z?ie bridge ms cnmicd, and 
tLe t o m  being nbrandond, tlie ICrilian soldiera wantonly aet 
fire to it in tlie niglit; an act immediatcly revenged j for the 
fiames, seen to a grmt distance, so enriged tlie Cutdans, that 
in thc mornlng al1 tlie mmed men En thc district, t,rg~~lnw 
migneletcq and somxtcnes, asscmlileíl on tlic n~igliliuui-ing 
hills, and fe11 $th infinite fury npon Riacdonalrl's renr as it 
passed out fram the ruins of the burning city. The Frencli 
tlien pushed for t i e  bñrlge of Villrtmam ovcr thc Llolii+egab 
which was tlvo leagues distant; liut tlie country lretween tTie 
rivers wos one wst  rnol~nhin, nnd En~~ficld, mcing thc French 
reay halting to reccivc tlie momatenefi, whiIe tlic front still 
dmnced, thought to place his division iietween, by moving 
along tlre heighta wl~ich slcirted thc roarl. Macdonald, Iiow- 
ever, Gnally p w d  tlie Llulircgat, but with diiriculty and 
the loss of four hundrcd mcn, for liis marcli wns continudy 
undcr Eursficlri's firr?, nnd somt! of his troops wcro fowcd to 
cross by a ford. During the nigl~t he collccted Iiis scllttcred 
men, and moved upon hbadel, wiicnce he pughed on alane 
for Barcelona, and Enrispe returned by the J,lornlilctnch rond 
to Leridit wihh t t e  escori. 
Tlic invasion o€ Catalonin wns now dividcd into thrce prtrt3, 
encli acsigned to a diatinct army. 
1 O. Xuchet, with that oof Aragon, was t o  tnke T m p n a  md 
subdue the lower part of the prlivince. 
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2'. Madonald, with that prt of tlio seventli corps wlled 
the active amy of Catalonin, mas to break the Iong Bpankb 
l i e ,  exte~iding from Taragona tlirougli Montserrat to the 
Ccrdaña, md ndtlie Iiigh mounhinins about Olot. 
3". Brrrway d'Hdliem, Iiiivhg his head-yuarters at Gerono, 
mns to Iiolcl tlie Ahpnrdam nnd co-opernte with Macdonnld, 
under whosc orders he still rcmnined. The five thousnnd men 
collectd neer Mount h u i n ,  ant t he  cnhncc of the French 
Ccrdaña, werc to act an tlic rem of the Sp~ninrda in tlic 
mountains, mhile the d h e m  attacketl them in front. did 
tlie sucwss appear ddobtfuI, fer the hopes nnd rnenns of the 
grovjncc wcre sinl~ing. Tlie 10% cif rnen at Tortoza and 0 t h  
places, tlie reputntion of Suchet, the failure at Barcelona, 
PenIlo, and San Felipe de Ealngucr, the incspcfty of Campo 
Vede, now generally felt, and tlie consequent desertion o€ the 
migueletm> rrould Iiare Ulsorerl success for tIie French if tIiey 
had not been suddenly thrvmted by Rovira, who surprised t1i.e 
grmt fortress of Feriland~ (le Pipcras, the key of the Pyrenees. 
TFiis, tlie lroldest a i d  m o ~ t  important enterfise effeckd by a 
partida chief Juring the wliole war, merits a particular detnil. 
Guillo4 govcrnor ol ilie place, enforced no military disci- 
pline. His guwds wera wmk, the soldicrs used vamt, 
tlie pnlisacles for fueI, nnd tha gnrrison oftan mada " ~ 1 -  Icalcy, incur~ions tri n Kitanca The town, situatcd cnmpm], 
helow the hill, upon whieh tlie p e n t  fortress of 
~ ~ ~ ~ ? B t o i i ,  
Fcrnanrlo stands, hod bcen mmomcntnrily occupicd stl~nrt,  
by tlic Itdinn gcncrnl Pcyri, wlth six hundred M". 
mcn dcstincd to join Mndonnld, and, tmsting t o  thc forhrcm 
above, thcy wcrc iic:lijicnt; thc prrison nliovc mns still more 
EO; for Gt~illot hnving on thc 9th acnt l i i a  bcst men to d r i ~ c  
same somatenes from tbe neighbotiring hiils they rcturned a& 
night fhtiped, md heing to go oout -in next day s 1 g t  wliitc 
gntes wem confided to con~nlsscents, or men unfit for duty, 
and the ramparts werc unguaded. 
There were in the fOrt two Catalm brothers narned Pdopos, 
anrl: a man edled Juan, tinder-stowkecpers, wlio being gained 
by Rovjm had obtnined from the hend of tlieir departrtment 
tlic 1ceq.s of tlie magazines, and of a posteni under one of tlie 
grites. Things merc in this state when Eavira came down from 
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St. Lorenzo de Muga in tlie night of the Dtli, and ~emetly 
renclied tlie covercd wxy mjtli seven liundmd c h e n  men of 
liis own partirla. &fiirt.inez followed in support with t h e e  
theusnntl miv~clctcs, and tlic htalnn brotlicre opcncd thc 
posten for R.ovim, who immedinteIy rlisnrmad the guarrl and 
set \vi& tlic gnte for thc rmerve. Some shots being fired the 
garrison took arms, but Xrirtinez cnme in so quickIj- no cfec- 
tual resistaiioe could bc mntle. Tliirty or forty men were 
k i l l ~  or rvounded, tlie rnngmxincs were seined, the pvernor 
snd sixtccii liiinclrcd soIdicrs nnd cam p-follo~vcm were hlzcn in 
thcir qunrtcm, nnil in fin hour Rovira sa*, mnstes of onc of tlie 
strongcst fortresscs in Europe: tliree cannon-sliot mere tlien 
firwl, as a signal t o  tlie somatenes in tlie surrounding moun- 
tains t o  briiig in pmvisions na rapidly as possible. Tepi 
alarmed by tlie zirlise in tlie hrtrees nnd guessing tlie musa, 
had collcctcd tlic troop, l~iaxpge, sick men, nnd storcs jn the 
tom hclow, nnd scnt noticc to Gcronn; h~t hc m ~ d e  no 
attcmpt t o  retxke tlie plncc, and nt dnylight retired to Bwam. 
He hnd mountcd tlie hills $ring tIie night, t o  obscrve liow 
mattcrs weut, nnd ttiouglit nokliing could be done : tliis opinion 
mas coiiilemned at tlte time, aud during tlie confirsion of tlle 
firvt surprise, it is probable a brisk attempt by six liuriJrcd 
frmh mcn miglit Iinvc rcco$-crcrl tlie fortrcss. 
lit Bnscarn, fivc hiiiirlrcd mcn dctnclicrl from Gerona on tIie 
spur of  tlie occasion, met him with ordera ka re+invest the 
plncc, and Iinrnguq d'Hilliers promisetl to FoIolIow with all liis 
furces. Then P e l i ,  riltliougl~ Lis trooli S, many of mhom were 
uiily nztionnl guardq were fearful, returried to Figuernq drave 
tlie Spaniurds out of tlie tom snd took post ia front of th 
fort : yct hc could not prc~cnt llnrtinez frorn rccciving men 
nncl lwotisions from the somatencs. Rovirn's exploit sprcacl 
witli inconceivzliIe rapidi'cy througl~out he Pminsiilq anrl its 
exliilanting inffucnce flected even tlie Aiiglo-Portuguese 
nrmy, thcn not much givrn to  crcdit or arlmirc tfic exploits of 
tlic Spnninwls. FIawcvcr T??raimpiiry d'FTilliers invcsted the 
fort with six thoiisluid infan try mtl five liirndred cavalry, and 
tliis so quickly t,llnt tbe Spaniards bad not time to rcrnove sk. 
teen tlioiisand muslre€s wliicli were in tlie fort. 
Mtlrtinez remuincd governur, &vira weut tu the mountains, 
and al1 Critdonira, animated by tlie Promethenn touch af tliis 
dlief, swmed to be uiovi~ig ttt erice upou Fjgueras. Campo 
Vcrde cnme t o  Vicb, dcsiping to rclieve it, anrl in conccrt 
with the hgl i sb  and Epauish rcssola to blocknde Roses by 
land and sm. &vira collected a convoy of provisions ncw 
Olnt. Cnptnin nuIlcn with tlic Cibmbrian und Volontrtiro 
frigntcs, sccing tiic Frcnch troopfi withdmivn from Gcrom, 
drovc out tlic garrisons of San FFiIiou and Pdamo~i, destroyed 
thc bnttcrics, rmd rride sail t o  join cnptoin Codrington at 
Rosas. A Spnnish frigate with a fleet of coasting-~esscls 
loadcd with supplies ancliored at PPdamos; Francisco hfil~iip, 
after beating a detnchmenf near Arens de Mar, invested Hos- 
trslricli; Juan Claros hovered &out Gemna, and Eroles and 
Manso coming from Montserrnt reduced Olot ancl Cmtel- 
follit. Siirsficld re~nnincd in tlie S i l  d'Crgel and directnl tlie 
mountaineers to mhblish themselves at DaIagiier, Sut they 
were drivtrn away with p c a t  lvss by n detacliment from 
hrida.  
On tlic 3rd oof Xny Qmpo Terde, having dram Milans 
frem I-Xostnlrich, innrclicd ivitli tleven tl~ouunnd nien froin 
Aviotiet and Villa Fan inipiust E'iguerae, hoping t o  draw tlie 
Frcncli general to t h t  sidc, wliilc Elovirn,   dio se convoy wns 
at Besdu, forced a ~~r ia l l  cump nezr Uers un the opposite 
quartcr and entered tlie hr tres .  'frie circuit oE investment 
mns wide, mggd, and tllinlgr gzrnished witli men; but sume 
worlrs harI becn raiacd, and wIicn tlie Ctltnlnns rippronclieil, 
Bnpupriy d'EIillicm, rcinforcing thc m p  at Llcrs, mn~clicil 
i~it l i  four thousaiid mcn agninst Campo Vcrrlc d i o  wm alrcdy 
in  tbe Fi~ucrns vallcy. E c  hrtcl d r i ~ ~ c n  b ck tlic Frcnch 
mwalry, niid Iind liuh onc lmttdion in Iris frrint whcn this 
colamn toolc Fiim in flntilr, nnit a t  tlic anmc tima tlic disperscd 
mmlry rnllied an(1 cliargcrl, wliereupon he retrmtetl with thc 
106s of fifteen hundrcd rncn. His confidcncc lind been S,? 
p c n t  tliat he kept tlie aheep of tlic convoy h far behid to 
enter tlie fort mhile the way was olien, nnd ths  succour was 
eonfined to x few artillerymen some tobacco ancl medicines. 
Chphiii Codrington by agrecment ninde a siinultan~ous attwk 
cin Ilosns but it produced no serious effect, anil Fernando was 
left to its e w  resources; those were Few, for the French 7ntli 
a stmns ncgligcnce bd nwer stored thc place. Mnrtinez 
who liad fonr tliousand men was therefore drivcn to a rigid 
economy of food, but in bearing sueh privatioris the Peninsula 
race are unrivalled. 
Macdonalcl setting mide his own plam, now ariiestly 
djuwci BucZiet to suspencl tlie siegei of Taragona, and restore 
him tlie trooprr of the seventh corps, Naurice b,latliieu also 
wmtc frem Bnrc~lona in o lilre strnin, thiriliing the pmwasion 
of nppm Cnhlonia dcpendcd npon ono powcrfid cffort to 
recover the lost fottress. h t  Suchet, mho bad no immedibte 
inkrest in that part of tlie province, whose hope of obtainiug 
a marshal's staf  rested on the takiig of Taragoq liis pre- 
parntions bcing al1 made for that siego,-Suchet nrhoss judg- 
rnent wus unclouded, and miIitmry talent of a higli order, 
rcfusd evm to dcIny for a momcnk liis marcli ug-ainst Tnm- 
gona. Ris Iiattalions, he ñnid, wero scattcrd in senrch of 
supplies, he could not reunite them snd reaeh Figrieras under 
twentpfive dnys; in that time tlie enemy, unless prevented 
by Baraguay d'Hilliers, could gather provisions, receive rein- 
forcemenk, and secure tho fortress. A simple Wockde might 
bo cstablihcd by tlie ncnrcst troopa; t o  accumulete iiumliem 
on such n ~tcrile spot woulrl not furwnrd tlio rccnpturo, but 
would create infinite difficultica with respmt to sulisiFtence. 
It ww probable Napoleon hacl received information of the 
dismter and giaen ortlers for the remedp; anci i t wouId be 
unwisc t o  renounce Zhe attaclr on Saragona, the only remain- 
ing bulwark af Btalouia, at tlie rnomenlt of exemition, bemuse 
of thc lo~s  of a fad. In  Taragona thc grcatcst pnrt of tlic 
Cntalnn forees woulrl he shut np, and it wes only in micli 
situations the-y canid be made prisonm. At Lerirls, Mequi- 
nenzz, and Tortoza, eigliteen thousand men and eiglit hundred 
officers liad been captured; and if ten or twelve thousxnd 
niore could be faken in Taragona $he strength of Catalonia 
would be entirely brolrcn. If tlie Spaniarrlm failed in revic- 
tualling Femndo, thnt place wonld, by accupying their atten- 
tion, Iicoomc more Iiurtful thnn uscful to thcm Campn Bcde 
weuld pmbablymarch to its sliccoiir nnd tliusweaken Taragona, 
which was a, xeason for hastening rather than suspending the 
investmcnt of the latfer; wherefore, notwitlistanding tZLe 
sepamtion of bis battnlions and the incomplete statr of hEs 
prepnrations, Iie would move down immeditlteIy and com- 
menee the sicge.' A wise deteminztion anil justifying his 
reptntion as a general. 
MacdonnId wes now fain to send al1 the boops he could 
safely dmw togetlier, ta reinforce Baway d'Hilliers; a de- 
tacliirrent from Toulon and some frontier ptards arrived at 
Figuorns in Junt?, and Aftecn tliousnnd mcn being thus u n i t d  
he took the commnnd in person. EstnMi~liing m rigorniis 
bloclrndc, he ~varlred day and nidit on wnrlrs o€ cimimvnllxtion 
snd .oontmv~llntion, and his lines, six miles in length, crom- 
ing the tops of mountain~ antl ainking into thc deepest 
valleys, sliouvii rvliat prodicjous labours nrmirs are capablc of. 
Witli thesc works nntl inccssant ndccfrrlnerrs Macdonald 
recor~ered tlie place, but at a lattc! perjod in tlle yee*; and 
d i e n  Sucliet's operations lid quite clian,d the aspect of 
affairs in Catalo~iin~ 
&ter tlie fa11 oof Tortoza, tliat general lind been so clrligent, 
tliat whcn the rtiege of Turngonü wns confirlcrI to him, Iiis 
mnszincs at Lcrida nnd 3lorn werc full, and his battering 
tmin formcd nt Torl;nsn; tjo mliich p1wc his tools, plnt,forrnc, 
and othcr mntcririls, fabricntctl nt %nm=;o7& wcrc dso con- 
veyed. Fiftecn Ilunrlred drnft liorses, with rirtiilcrymen and 
engineers, and ten brattnlions of infantry were thexe collectd, 
and from tlience uhot and shclls werc continudly forwardcd 
to Enn Felipe de Bdquer; tliis mFas a ftnc npplication of 
Czsnr'e maxim, that wnr should maintain itsdf; for al1 tlis 
money, tlie guns, provisions, end mxterhls, col lec^ for tliis 
siepe, were tlie fruita of former victories; notliing iras derived 
from France but tlic incii. It is liowever curivus t h t  Sucliet 
prniws the English rriiuisters' finnucitkl aliility, cxern1ilifierl by 
malting Sprtin pny J1 tlie cxpenpc of tlic wnr, and nevcr pcrmit- 
ting Knglish gold to cirmtlntr in f i c !  Pcninanln ! Rc sna ignn- 
rnnt that Spain nnd Portiijinl livcrl iipon RnglantF, antl tJint tlic 
Enq?isli ininisters' lmpcr systcm hiid lcft thcm no Engliñh golrl 
M send. 
Tu nvoid dificultim, tlie Frencli artiuery moved by the 
carriage rond of the Col cle Ballaguer, but the pravisions and 
stores passed from Mora b~ Talcct and NomLlanch to Eeus; 
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Mora was itselC supplied from Ztlragoaa, Casge, antl Mequi'- 
nemm, sa,nd dtlie folloming gencrnl prccautions wcro ndoptcd:- 
Cejas-d'wae~ nnd fronticr pardq,  Jefiocnrling tlic lii$ ~ i i l l e y ~  of 
hragon, occupicd tfie cst lcs  of Jaca. nnd Tennsqiic. Ilie grent 
line of coritspondence with Prance was c h g e d  from Pempe 
luna, to run by Pnu snd Jaca, t o  Zrtragozri, being partleiS by 
four or tive thousand troops of al1 arms, s l io  wittclied tlie 
partidas of  tIie Monwyo mountnins and Ntiv~rrc. Gerieml 
Pnris occupicd D u m  with four bnttalions, somc cavnlry nnd 
gunri, nnrt his con~mnnt? cxtcntlcd to Mnlinn, wliicli w m  nnrmed 
and gnrrisoned. Abb4 having five bnttalions, 'clirce liiintlretl 
cuirasaier~ and tivo guris at Tcrucl, watchett Villa Campa and 
tlie Taleneian army. dlmnitz md hIorclln, grilirded by fifteen 
bundred infnntry, furnislicd a sliort passligc tlirotigh tlie moun- 
iains intoTalencia ; from tlie fomer,tl~e liiie toCaslie, aiid down 
tlie Ebro from Meyuincrixn to Tortozq was protccted by twdvo 
hunrlred mcn; two hnttnlions wcre in Tortoxn and four hun- 
dred mcn in h p i h  
This linc of defence wns from riglit to left fondeen 
snrclies, bttt tlic fortitiwl posts enabled tbe troops to protect 
it. The Valencian army, Villa Campa, and tIie partidas of 
New Caskille. and Namrre, inclurlig 3Ena nnd tlie Empeci- 
nado, w m  t h  Leld in cLeclr by twelve t,Iiuus~url Frcncli on 
a lirio of ono Iiundred md fifhy miles. Covercd only 1"J' thnt 
slight curtuin, Suchct procccdcd to liwicge a stroiig city, 
hnving a powcrful prrjson, nn opcn liarliour, md rica commu- 
nications witli Catlix, Valencin, Gibrnltw, and tlie Xnlenric 
ishnds; detnchments from tlic army of tlie centre did, indcctl, 
at timeg, duchase the partidas frum the line of  defence tlius 
traced, but at tliis period, that armp, froiii circumshnces to 
be lierenftcr noticed, waa nearly paralped. 
To woid using up tlie slieep and cattlc of Arngon, wliich 
would haw nlicnntcd tlic pcopIc nnd nnnihilntcd his o m  
future supply by dcatroying thc brcedina flocks, Suchct con- 
tractecl for his meat in France; and so entircly liad Iie pncified 
Aragon, that none of the contr&rs failcd tliougli tlieir lieds 
rtnd flocks passed through that province and wcre paid for by 
Aragonese contrilutions. Tllis resource Iiriivever, not lieing 
hmetliate, mand the scarcity of ment great, incurcions \rere 


mnde he)-ond tlic fronticr of Arngon and in the higher vallqs 
of the Pyrences b ohtnin cattle. Tlils mm tlic &te OF affaiiri 
when the riurprisc of Fiperas took place> biit tlicn Ruchet, 
fearing Mina ivoiild intwcept his communicntion with France, 
detaclied ChPopislci with four ht~ndred infnntry and tmo hun- 
dred Iiua~am to wntch tliat chief only; and be besought tha 
emperor for troopa from PrtmpeIuna and tIie army o£ the 
north to  relieve his posb at Saiiguessq Soriq xnd Calatapa. 
Titen, Iiwing ieeovered Iiis Soraging detaclirnenta froru tlle 
high vnUeys, he r e ~ e w d  hia army, issusd a months pay 
and six rations t o  cach soldicr, Ioadcd many carrirgm m d  
mu'lca with floi~r, sp rcd  n rcport that he wna going to 
Figucrnr, nnd moved by lvromhlnnch upon Tarngona. 8omc 
migi~clc'ccs entrcnchcd in tlic pass of Itibas werc dispcrncd by 
ñni l sp ,  snd tlie army deccentled the hills to AJcovcr; but 
four htindred men mere Ieft in >fornblnnch, whcre a post wtls 
fortified to protect tlie commtinication witb hrida,  and pre- 
vent the pwtisnns on that flenlr tmitbling the line between 
Mora and Iteus. Tbe Spaninish outposts mere soon driven over 
tlie Francnli, the artillery moved by the Col de Ralaguer, md 




Iy 'l'nragona, t1lere was fI. sem·eity of money and ammunition;
and so mallY men had gone to succour Figllcrns, th:l.t the garri_
son, comm'Llldcd by Oonlales, was \lot more than six thousand,
including twelve ll\ludred armed inhabitants and the seamen of
the port. 'rhe town, elleum!Jcred with defellsivc works, most
of them ill-constructed, irregular, lInd without convenient
places for making sallies, was uuilt UpOIl rocks, steep Oil tllo
north-cust luul south, uut sinking gelltly on the south· west lIud
wcst into low ground. 'J'he lIIole llarhour could receive ships
of the line, tmd beyond tl,at there was a roadstcad. The
upper town, surrounded by lllleieut walls, crowned the rocks,
which were again cnclosed by a sccond rampart with irregular
bllstions ruulling roulld the whole city. 011 tllC cast, aerC'ss
the road to Daredou:l, was II clmill of rcdouLt.s counocted uy
curtains, with liill.:h lOud cOI'el'w WllY; Ilud uchintl this line
wW:! /1 rocky 81lal."lJ calleu tilo Milngro, opclLiug uetween thc
body of the place /1ud the sea. 'J'he lower town on till) WC>lt,
scparated [I·om the upper by the ramparts of the latter, W,IS
protected by three regubr and Some irregular bastions witll a
ditch. A square work, calleu lCort RoJal, formed a species of
citadel between the two tOWll8, ami tllC whole oflcreu u.t
irregular oblong figure, II"hOl>e lcugth, lying pal'Ullcl t.o the SCIl,
WllS auout twelve huuured Jtlrtk all the we:;t uayouu the
wlllls, a nowly collstructeu line, Cluried alollg the const to tbe
mouth ef thc }'I'aneoli, ended in /l lurge redoubt built to secure
HCC(!SS to that riycr when thc ancicnt aqucllucts which fur-
nished thc city with water should be cut 1.1)" the French. This
line was strengthcued by a second redoubt, called the Prince,
r-..iscd between thAt lleAr the Ff<\ueoli ami the towu, Ilud it wall
sUJlporled by the mole, whieh being :lrmcd with batteries, Ilud
neurly in a Ill\ralld dircct.ivu, fOl'lIlCJ as it were u sec<md sea-liue.
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On tht? Frrinmli aido thc npproncli. wns Icvel, md exposcd to 
thc firc of thc Olivo, a vcry 11nrge oiitworlc which, on the nort?~, 
crownctl n mclq tablc-lnnd, cqunlling bhe appei town in hciglit 
but dividcd from it Isy a ravine ncarly half ib milc wirle, yct 
nnited by a doubIe aqueduct. Of Irregular construetiou, the 
Olivo was four liunrired yards long with e ditch twenty-fout 
deep and forty wide; biit tlie covered way was incomplete, and 
the gorge of the work anly closed bj. an unfinished loopliolcd 
mslI, bscause tha steepness of tlie rack and tlie Tire of tlie uppcr 
tewn scemed aufieient fur i ts prutcction. Oo tlie left., une 
bnstion ivns cut ofr by a ditcir nnd rarnpsrt from the rest of  the 
worlt, nnd on thc right WM ta small intcrjor rcdoiibt of refuge, 
Iiaving a I l i ~ h  myalicr from wliich t h m  p n s  ovorloolrcd cvcry- 
thing nrouiid. Tlic ordinary prrjson was frem twclvc to 
fiftrcn hiintlrcd men, anrl i t  conttuned fiftg oiit of  tlircc hiin- 
rlrcd p.iccc(i mountcd fw tfie d~fcnce of Títrngonn. 
The naknrc of thc ~ o i l  combined w i t h  t,he pecitliíarities of the 
worka d e t e d e 4  Suchet'a line of attmk. On the nortli and 
e a ~ t  side the ground was rocky, the fronts of defence wide, the 
approaches unfa.~ourab~e for breaching batteries : and as al1 
the gons md &ores mould lime f o  be draggcd o-rer fLc hills 
on o, great circuit, unlcss tlie Olivo nas tsrst taken, no diíñ- . 
culty could be avoided, TIie Iawer ton7n was therefore chosen, 
riltl~ortgh tlle artificial defeiices ivere them accumulated, and 
Slie gruund Iictween tlie walls u-ud the Frnnmli token in reverse 
by tlie Olivo, which rendered i t neceseay fiiwt t o  retluce tlirit 
aiitworlt. Rnt, thr: soil w n ~  drcp uní1 rnsily mowd, tlio d e p h  
md pnrh close nt hand, tkie ground-plot of the worlrs eio 
snlient they coi1111 he embrnced with fire, and the nttack, itwas 
sripposed, woiild depri~e tlie gnwison of fresh water. 
Qn the 4th of Mny tlie Prench, passing tlie Frmwli, drove 
jn the oiitposts, took possession of two small dehclied redoubts 
situated on the nortliern side called the forts of Loretto, aud 
iiivested the place. The Epaniards, supgorted by tlie fire of 
fbe Olivo, kii id ancl wounded two hundrcrl nien, nnd the next 
day rnride e fruitless attempt to rehice the lost grountl 
Captain Codrington, having three EngIish ahjps of the Iine 
three fripies and sevemi Spanisli vessels of war, aided the 
ddence by cannanading the Prench right, ancl liarnssing their 
cunvoys eoming by tlie c o s t  road, but tiie investnient was 
completed. 
Haberl's division an tho rigllt txteniicd from tlic sea to tlie 
Froncoli bridge. Frcrc's division conncctcd Habcrt witli 
ñnrispc, wlio wna bcforc the Oii~o.  Tlic Ttnlinnq prolonged 
Harispe's lea across tlit Barcelona rontl to thc conct, castwa~d 
of Twagona. A trestle-bridge \vas coiictructed on the npper 
Hiancoli; the parc, establislial west of tliat r í ~ c r  at Carionjn, 
coiitaineil sixty-~ix bittlering guns ancI niort:~ra, ~vitli seveii 
Iiundred rounds of ammunition, ztnd tliity-sis field-pieces; fwo 
tl~ousmd artillcrgmen, scvcnhundred siippers aari mincrs, four- 
tccn hundsed cxx~~lry~ nnd fiftcen thoiisnnil infniitry wcrc prcsent. 
Head-quarters were ~t the village of Constanti, whlcii offered 
a atrong covering p i t ion .  Thc depút at Ecus wr~s ccrircd by 
fortified convcnts; Nora by a strong detacl~ment,; antl other 
troops from Palcct watchd ovcr tlie comiuunicatiuiis, wliich 
wen! algo protccted by tlie escurts oE Qio corivoys. The nque- 
dacts Icading from tho Olivo to thc toivn mcrc. mt by the 
Frcnch, but the  aiiter, ivhicli ~n~i  aa ncccswry to tliem as to 
the besieged, liad its gouice twclvc milcs distant, and tlle 
somatenes cut it olf again, which foreed Suchet to gitwd bhc 
whole course during tlie sicge. 
Cainpo Verde aftcr liis rlefeat ait Piguerns sent Sai'sfield 
and EroIes to Ilicir oltl posis dout  VuIIs, Mumlilancli, nud 
Iga ldn ,  arid weiit liirnsclf witli four tliousand 
*Ppenaix lnen to Tramgona, wIicre tha condcriiation nt 
5 1. Sucliet'a spliearancc was grmt ; biit wlicn Campo 
Verdc carne witli men, and the English ~gent Qrecn, brouglit 
from Catliz fifby tlioucnnd dollara nnd tivo tnnqports laden ivitli 
arrns nnd storcs, apathy eusucd and militrtry inensurcs were ncg- 
lected. Bqund tlie wulls indeed, au attaclr \i.m rridc by tlie 
migueletw un ;\Iumblunch, and tLe somutcncs mscmlilcd vajnst 
Rcus, but witliout sneccss at citlicr plncc; Frencli pntrolcs 
were tlieii pudicd ovcr tlic Gaynto Torre-rlcrnliarrn, mlit-re some 
Spapiards rcinainecl under the pratectioii o f  8t. Cyrvs con- 
vention with R~ding, by which wmndcd rnen wcrc t o  be 
plxd in tlie c i d  liospihls antl taken care of without being 
n i d e  prisoners. Tliis compact, strange t o  tiay, was ncver 
~iolated, whiic bcyond tlic liospitnls the titmost ferooiky ivaa 
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¿iispla?*cd : hnt tbere is al~vays some point of hononr reserved 
even by tlie morst men, whiclr Lf rightly touched may be 
del~ended upoa. 
BIEGE OF TARAGDh'h. 
SarsfielrI's arrivnl near MombIrandi menriced tlie French 
cornmuiiication~ mitli Mora, nnd a VnIencinn column, ricting in 
wncert with caphairi Adain of tlic Iiivinciblc, ettacked &pita 
uiid Amposts; tlie first wus abandoncrl, but n Frcncli rcgi- 
insiit siiccoured tlie second iind defeuted the Vzlenciuns. 
SucIiet, unwilling to ncnken his force, mnulil not restore 
lhpitri, o ntE immrdfntcly mmmcnrcxI opcmtion~i ngainst, the 
lomcr t o m  of Tnrngona; hut fim lic constnicted n h ~ t  rsnd 
bnttcrica on thr. ri~ l i t  of  tlie Frfincoli, nenr tlie &ore, to kecp 
off tlic trliips of mnr nnd thc gn-bonta ivliich coiild othcmise 
hnve Tooked into his trcnclie.. Tliese works begiin in thc 
niglit of tlic Ytii, ivcre siicccs~.hFly continued under tLe firc of 
the sliips, and a trencli lined ivitli musketecrs w3s also carricd 
up tlic bank of tlie rivcr to tlie bridge. The Spnninrds how- 
ever liarassed tlic cnmp and tlie investing t rogs  from witliin 
aild without so incessnntly, tlirit a brignxle pos td  near tlie 
Olivo was conipcllcd to  T U ~ E ~  a ranipiart, al111 yct lost fifty or 
sixty mcn daily in skinnisl~cs; btit i n  tlic niglit of  tlic 13t11, 
du~iiig n tcmpcst, tlie l'rcncli ha~ing stormcd tmo arlvanccd 
enti~cticlimciits nrnr thc Olivo turncd tlicm rigtiinst the be- 
sirgcd. 11 vigorrius nttempt. to rttnkr: tlicm lvns i*cpulscrl with 
a loss of  nnc hiintlrccl men ; nnd on tlic Fmneoli sidc, a srilly 
sripportcrl Fiy the ~liipliing fxilcd Fn conwqucncc 
of tlie cownrrlice of some Bpanish officeia. On *pprn&& 
§ 1. 
the samc dny, the gnrrison camc out from tlie 
Barcelona &te, and sir liirndred somutcnes fmm tlie TJpper 
Gaya fe11 on tlie p%troles of tbe ICalinn cliviriion, ~liereupon 
Piiloinlsiiii scourecl tlie country on tlic 15th as Far as Arl>oa. 
0ii tlle 1Btli a liowcrful ~ l l y  ivns made frum tlis lomcr 
tuwn by Gournlm. Covered by tlie fire frem tlie rampnrts, 
thn Olivo anrl tlie flc~t, lie pnsgcd the lirirlgc over the Fmricoli, 
and prcssed ITnhrd, hnrtl, rintil hcltct pushing thc reserves 
lict~vecn tlint riircr nntl tlic Olivo mcnnccti bici rcar rtnd forccd 
bini to  rctire. On tlie 20th tFirec otlicr silllics from the 
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Oli5.o wnd tIie uppcr town were maJe on tlls Barceloua side, 
md likervias repulsed. SmsfieEd now cumrj dewn wi t t  twclve 
huncIrctI mcn to o high rodc ncnr Alcovcr, lmd mcnacd the 
depAt itt bus; he was didodged by gcneml Rroiissnrtl with 
la loss to tlie Frenct of one Iiunrired men; get three days after 
he appeared at ?iXomblzncli, and it requii-ed t n o  brigdes to 
drive bim oí'? Divers attempts werc also m ~ d e  on tlie Pdcet 
linc, espwinlIy at Grntkallo~les, wherc tIie SpanisI~ coluncl Vil- 
lamil was rcpulsed by Moroeinski, a lble,  witli tlio Limvery 
inhcrcnt to Iiis Iicroic natinn : n nntion whoñc glory ~prin~gs 
likc an in&sf&mcs from the corruption of Eiirolicnn honoiis ! 
These repeated nttmlcs n-arned Stichet that Iiis fmee rvas 
too meak for tlie cxtcat o€ coinmunlcntion, and lie nbandonerl 
'?ifomblanch, retui~ring only Palcet and Felipe de DJaguer. 
Tt was lime to coilccntrato, for Dlake, Iiuvirig goiie to Vuleiicitl, 
liad got from Carlos O'Uonncl two tlioussntl infmitq and s 
hundrd ciinnonccrs, and rctiirned witli tlicrn on tIic 22nd to 
Taragana. Two tIiousand stand of arins were i~ return giveii 
Ziy mphin Codringtoii t o  O'Donnel, t o  cquip fresll levies, rnd 
tl~us t w d m  thuusanrl figliting men were in the fortress; h i t  
tlm ricliest citieeiis had rcmuvcd with their hiiiilies znd cffectri 
t o  Villu Nueva de Btjcs, aiid tlio ~ieo l~ lo  were dispiritd. 
Bnchet Iirrilre puuud befort: the Olivo in tlie n i ~ l i t  o€ the 
21 st, I i i s  nppronclica liciii:: mnrlc frum liotli cnds of the 
S~iaiiisli &trcnclinicnts scized on thc ni& of  the 23th. 
Tlie engineers aimell at a a ~ m d  liill, closc to  tlie íuorb, 
on wbcli to plant their first Lreacliing linttery; they crowned 
it tlic ZSiid, but ivitli niuch loss, beirig oliligcd t o  carry 
earth up the llill iri baslicts, under contiiiu~l iuterniption from 
sal lics. Tlirce countcr-buttcrieu werc llvwever com~itetetl, and 
nrmed on tlic 27th witli tliirtccn picccs, of i~liicli ~ i x  tlircw 
shells. To cffect tliis, the rtrtilleq liad been dmggcd over thc 
rmks iinrler a lienvy tirc of p p e ,  and ín despite of a sdly jn 
Suchet, wlJcli gened &he wae Itilled. Tbc contest 7w I O I I ~  doirttitil, bttt was finnlly deciJetl for the 
Frencli, and on the SDtli, a Iireuch being formcd, tbc nssault 
was orderetl. 
LTpon tlic gucccas of this nttaclc Suchet fclt his chnnce of 
tnlring the t o w n  w~iil(l dq.]irnil, fm l i i ~  urmy WIM too feebIe 
to liexr o, scrioua clicck. Wliercfore, Iia~ping foimed his 
columna, he pcrsotidly encounged them, antl ilirectml the 
troops along tlic aliole line of investmcnt to advance simul- 
taneously and inenwe every p& of tlie toivn. The night 
wns dark, t11e Sprtiiiarrls lmcxpectant of  rin attack because noiie 
of tlleir guns liad been silenced, but thc Frc~icli, ful1 ol liopc, 
eagwly ~vahlisd for tlie slbqinl: wIieu tliiit wnti given, tlie 
ti.oul~"on tlie Praiiooli, and thoso un tfre Baweloita side, made 
rt tiutldw discliarp of miislretry, lieat tlieir dnims, nnd loudly 
~liouting npprciuchcd tlic bwn nt oppoaitc quarters; the m- 
1mb wcrc i n ~ i t n t l y  covcrcd wltli fim from tvitliin anrl fi-orn 
mithout, tlia sliipn ii i  tlio ofiiig trlircm up mclccb, nnd amidst 
tlie noise of four Iinndrcd guns t!ic storming enlumns rushed 
upon tlie Olivo., Tlie strongest one mnde fiir the brcnch; a 
sccon<l, tiirning tlie work, got bct~een it znd tlie to lvr  j t ~ s t  m 
fiftecn Iiundred men, sent to rclleve tlic ,p-rison, wcre entering 
tlie gata : tlic Frcnch instxmtly fcll o11 tlicir rcnr, Suchet, 
md liurrying fomard, entered with it before 
Tncani. 
the gata could be closed. Thirty sappers ende* 
voured t. cut Jown tlie door wliile Pnl~igr~ay~ k11eir officei-, 
cIimbeil tlie wdl, liut the Spzniwds Billed Iiiin and niost of 
tlie s:rppertr; the utlicr troo~ir; pIunte4 tlleir laddeis, and break- 
hig tlic s h k w  abovc, opcned tlie gi~te.  
At t l ie main attuck ri, narrom Iircnch w i ~ i  h o l d l  nssailcd, 
yct tlic ditcli mnc fiftccn fcct d c g ,  tlic Spnnir~rti~ Rrm, tlie 
AFC hcavy, nnrl tlie Frcncli were xxvcring, ~ l l e n  tlie liiqtorinn 
Vncani, followect liy some of liis c o u n t r y n ~ r n ~ i t  is a strñngc 
error to tliiiik tlie Italians have not a bmve spii-it!-fnrccd 
somc paling, bl oeking a, subterrancan aqueduct, a d  t litts 
got iuto the cLTtch, and after**ads into tlie fort, The 
Spaniards, altliough driven from the mpart s  to the little 
~vorlcs of wfuge rt emll end o l  tlie Olivo, contiiiued to resist 
until the resmes aiid a tliirrl columii u~ider Harispe c m c  up, 
aud with a terrifile slnugliter er~ded tlie contcst. TweIve 
Iiilndred men pcriahed, sorne escnpd a thousnnd were tdcen, 
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enter with them, but were quickly repulsed witb a loss of 
fifty men. Next niglit a Iiattery of six pieces  vas cou- 
structd in tlie ruins to silence tlie guns of Llie moIe, whicli, 
togctlier witll tliat of the li'tzioe, endsavourad ta cii,erwlielm 
the new lod,ment wjtli sliot. In tlie niglits of tlie 8th rtud 
Otli, under terrible dischnrgcs from tlic upper nnd lower town, 
the sccond pnmllcl wns 11rolnngd to fnrt Frnncnli on tlie 
right, nnd on tlic Icft carricrl to mitliin scvcnty ynrrls of thc 
h'rink bbrisan. OR tho l Xth Srirsficld, in a snlly, killed some 
men and retarded the works, but Finally thrce spproaclies by 
the srap were con<lucterI against fhe Nun's bestion wherc the 
hesirgers cromed thc glacis, m11 rrgninst the lialf-moon o€ tlie 
King md Prince. Fresh biitteries rvere Jso  constructed, 
wlioso Tire embraced tlie whole front frorn the Prince to 
tlio Nnn's bnstion. 
On tlie morning of the 16th fifty-fonr p a s  opcned frorn 
the French batterie~~ and tlic Sliniiiartls, p1:iciug sa~ibbags 
dong t I ~ e  ~iarapett?, endeai-ourerl t o  l d l  the gunnew, who were 
rnucli cxposed; ralI the cnnnon whicli codd be directed upon 
tho trcnclics wcrc ernployed to cmxh t>l~e limtterics, nnd 
hwibrd~ cvcning. this fire rnnstcrcrl thnt of thc hwicgcrs, 
destroycd tlic centre of  Qieir secoiid pari~llel, and silciiccd 
a hattcry on their right : tlie loss anri darnagc ivas Itowcver 
great on botli sides, for two consumption rnrtgazincs cxplodd 
in the town, nnd tbc Nun'a bastion WRS brenched. TIie 
Prcnch cngineers now obtiscrved that tlie ditcli oE tbc Riiice 
was not crirried ruuiid to tlie sea, and Suchet wha feared a 
continuzition af tliis murrteruus artillery h t t l e  resolved to 
&om that point u t  once. WliewFore at nine o'clock t ~ t * o  
columng supprted by u raerve, issued from tlic trcncl~es 
nnd ~Fter a sliort mist;tnncc cntcrcd tlic worlr Iiy the gnli of 
the ditch and by escclndc; yet tlre garrison fo~iglit ivell, wnd 
a fem escnping to xnotlicr point enrlenroured to dcfcnd tbern- 
selvea, h i t  being unsupported were put to the sword like the 
rest: the lod,mcnt thus made wns included i11 t l ~ e  trcnchcs. 
During tlie night of tlie I?tIi tlie ola bntteries were mpaired 
ancl a, new oon, to breacli the h i i  Carlos, m s  liegun upon tlie 
Iialf-nioon o£ tlie Prince, a lodpent \rus eiTcctcd in tlic wvered 
iwy of th0 Sun's hastion, and tlic thirird ~ittrullel w:ia coni- 
mcnced; liut on thc right of the trcnclics tlie ~vtirI<rncn mcre 
stnppeíl by vater. Hoivcver, on tllc 1 Stli thc tliird pnrdlel 
wns complc.tcd ~ n d  tlic dmccnt of the ditch  EL^ tlic Nun's 
bastion was commenced by art udcr-ground pllery; yet tlie 
fire from the uplier tomn plungcd into the trenclies, md 
tliirty-seven sliells tlirown T e q  esiictly intu tlre lodgnent 
otl tlis coiinterscarp rlclayed tlie o~ierstions tlicre. The gun- 
boats, hithcrtu of little service iu Bie dsicnee, were noiv put 
undcr tlir: Eritisli nnvy; yct. t l ~  cncmy siiffiacd IittIo from 
tlic vrsscl~ of mnr, hcyond tlic intcrn~pt~ion sornctimcs evcn  
to tliek convoys on tlie Col rlc Bal~gner oad. 
In the nights of tlie 19th ~ n d  20th al1 thc Frencli wotkti 
were dvanced, nnd tlie rnorning of the 21st the new Eiattey 
in tho Eince opened its fire apinst Bnn Carlos and was 
followed by al1 tlie otlicr bdtcrics. Tlie explosion of an 
expense egxxine aileticetl tlio Frcncli iinttcry, birt the 
dnrnnge wns rrpniirrl, nntl xt four o'clock in thc cvcning, 
the Spanisli fire lieing nearly xbatctl nnd tFic brcaclres cn- 
Inqerl, Suchet re~olvcd t o  storm tlic lomer town. But pre- 
Fious to describing this terrible evcnt, tlic proceedings mithin 
anrl witliout tTic place must be noticed, to @ve s just idea of 
tlre state of affairs. 
i%I~~donald liad LilocMsd Figucrm TN~ unceasing vigi- 
lenrc, tlic hrst of thc inigiiclct,es wcrr! shut up tlirrc, tlie 
dcfcnt of Cnmpo VcriFc sprrnd constcrnation througliout the 
province, and the cforts to s ~ ~ c c o u s  hfürtinez wcre confined to 
Rovira, Jlnnso, and other chids. Francisco hIilnnc had been 
lcft in tlie IIostalrich district, and being popular was cnabled 
to keep up nn irreguIar force; but Iie soiight to lie insde 
Cnpt:~in-gc~eral of tlie province, and tliis, or some otlier 
motive, led Iiim t o  favoitr tlie towns of his district at tbe 
expcnsr: of tl:c gcncrml cnusc: Mnttnru nnd ViIln Niicvta de 
Sitjcs trnficlrcd in corn with Rnroclone, nnd sccrct convoy 
was dctcctd at a later pcriod pnssing tlie outposts 
* p P d i x  '1 nitli &Pilansl nTitten nut11ority. Ec  pnt t l~e men 4 4. t o  death who permittcd tlie convoy to pss,  but 
did not rcmove tiie suspicien of corrulition from IiimselE 
This trnfic wns YO dvuntugeuus to tlie Rcncli, thnt Mriurim 
Nathicu, who hcd rcccnttr siiffcred in n akirmisli at Mattnro, 
vas unwilling to disturb it, and maclc no rnorcmcnt to aid 
Suchct, mliicli Ite mmiglit hzve done by oceiipying Villa Yueva 
de Xitjes. 
In the weskrn parta af Cxtxlonia, Sarsfield Eroles and 
Caro liad formed from tl~c iiew le\~ies an armg of Beven or 
eiglit tlionsmnd nicn, nf ~vliich one thousand undcr Cnro ivere 
cnvnlry: tlicy miglit Iin-re done miicli if Cnrnpo Ycrrlc, a man 
of wcalr clinractcr, hnd not mntiniinlly clinng-cd h i ~  p1m.s. ht 
thc opcning nf thc sirgc, S n d r l d  hatl soine miccrns on tlic 
~ i d c  of hfomliliincli antl Reiin; tiut when he w s  ~ c n t  iiito the 
lowei town, tlic active nmy, rduced t o  Erolcq' division nnd 
Cnro's cnvnlry, ooiild only wntcli tlie Frcncli convoys antl posts. 
Campo Vcrdc fixed Lis qirartcrs at I ~ ~ a l n r h ,  scnt rlchch- 
mcnts to the Gaya nnd Villa Franca, tind liuldiiig Villa bTuevn 
de Sitjes as Iiis post of cornmuiiicatitin witli tlie flect, de- 
inandcd ascislniicc froiii Miircia and Tnlci~ci:b but i i i  Tnrngriiia 
Iiis proceedings .sverc dislibcd. Succours cainc liowever iroiii 
various qutirters. dfter c:i~it;iir~ Codringtou Iiud ltindtul tlic 
rcinfvrcernents from Tra!cnciu, stores of powtIcr and mortnrt; 
wcrc ~ c n t  Troni tliat ppIacc siid from Cndiz, and more mcn froni 
Miircia; yct witli incxlilicn'tilr! foI17, tlicsc soldicm ivcrc dc- 
pri~cJ of tlirir nrms bcforc cinliarlring, altliriugTi thcrc ivcrc 
alrexdy tirn t1i riirsnnrl inen idtliout rnuslmts in 
tlie fortrcss; tliis  ir.^ attrilxited by somc to tiie "ppcndi" *- 3'. 
ICurcinn authoritics, by otlicrs to thc military 
agcnt Roclie, and t l ie  confiision did not cad tlierc. Wicn 
Codrjngton embarked tlic Valcncian reinforccmcnt Iie gtve 
four tliousan(1 muskcts to O'DoiineI for tlic recruits wlio wcrc 
to silpply tlie place of  the mcn lie cnrried away, nnil tn  eiialile 
TiIIn C:~inlin and tlie Knipcciuado to resume opcratioiis : 
th i t~  wliiic zrmc ivere eent nlr-ny fmm T ~ n g o n a  
to Valencia, troops mitlioiit arrris ircre bcing con- "ppeUflx i 1- 
~ c y c d  to Tnmgona. Tlic p r i s o n  wna thus 
augmcntrrl noiriinnlly to scvmtccn tlioiisnníf mcn, yct not 
niorc thnn twclrc tliouanntl wcre nvnilnblc; for Ilic Murcinng 
were necesenrily wnt to Montscrrnt t o  rcceivc nrms, and tlit! 
hospituts wcre full. RverytEiieg 1i.n.: confused and Jieortlerly. 
Sorernl coloncls and other officers, feigning sick- npprt of 
ncss or ti-itli open cowxrdicc q i t t i n g  tlic lilacc, c0'1'mra 
left tlieir regirnents undm subordinate officers; tlic genei.a! 
of artillcry wns nn iincnpnblc mnn ; nnd Contrern- itnknown 
ta the inhabitnnts and unacquainted witli tlie place and 
its rcsourccs, \vas liliewke vacillntin,rr and decetful to tl~ose 
m d  was ut vuriuncc ivitli  Cairilio 'CTertle outsidq nnJ jcalotis 
of Snisficld insiic the fortrcm; in tlie Acct tlie Spiiiiish 
captains of tlic Dinnn 3n-d Pruclin wcrc riocuscd of ~ m s s  
miacouduct, and disputw also arosc bctwccn tlic Engliah 
captains Codrington zn<l Bullen. 
Carlos O'Donnel atid his brothcr Henry ~t thc desire of 
Cdrington, nom permitted Four tl~ousnnd o€ the bcst V;rlciician 
troops to emliari undcr generad Miranda to join in  a gnnd 
sally frum Tar:tgoile; but they exacted a liledge froin Lim to 
Ziriug h c B  tlie ~urv ivor~ ,  of tliis tlreir secoud iletncltment rvlien 
tlic nction ma dctcrmincd. Tlicy l~nrlcd $lie 1Stl1, and the 
next &y Mirmtlo iiistead of making the sally, went, at  
Campo Vede's order, by sea, to Vilta Xmra dc Sities. Fr'rorn 
thence ha marched to meet z detachment of cavalry coming 
fiom Villa Franca, and being joined an the 15th by two othcr 
aquadroiis wliich Iiad brolren out of Turagona by tlie Barce- 
lona gate, 110 nnited witli Campo Vcrdc at Igualada. Tliis 
movcinent wns in piirsiiance ~f a IICW plan to siiecour Tnm- 
p n a  The junta, aftcr quitting the place on the fa11 of the 
Olivo, liad repnired t o  Montsemt and from thcnce m d c  tlie 
Peninsulia ring with their clamours, and they M reccived 
promise of aid from O'Donnel and yill~ Campu, and from 
the partida cliiefs. On this foundutioii, forgcttiiig the salFy, 
Cainpo Vcrdc proposed tlint thc English fillips sliould tan- 
nonarlo thc Frcncli convoys bctwccn tllc Col dc h l r t p c r  arid 
the place; tlint troops should take post at Ordxl in observa 
tion of the BnrceIonz garrison ; and tlic rernainder of the Rrrny, 
wl~icli, including ~ir;nd;ls nien arnounted to  tea thousand 
iilfaiitry nnd a thusand cavalry, sliould occupy a position 
ncar Reus. Bis dc~ign was to cominunicate witll tlie fleet, 
to rivoid nny scrioua actioa, nnd by opemtitinp ivitli smnlZ corps 
apinst the Frcnch linc of siipply cornpcl thcm t o  mise tho 
siege, or come out of thcir entrcnchmcnts nnd fight liim In 
strong positions. Contreras treated this with contempt. Re 
said it would csuse the losa of the place and the army; tbe 
Fmnch would not rnisc thc a i e p  exccpt for n gcnernl bnttlc, 
snd tlie hcst modc of  fighting tlicm woulcl be in conccrh witli 
the prrison; wliercfnri? he desired the gcneral-in-cliief to 
iittncb tlicrn in C O D ~ U ~ C ~ ~ O ~  with himself, and the juntn, 
hating Campo Verde, bncked this proposal, 
Neitlier plan \vas sound. If tlie gcnerds couEd have 
depetitided upon tlicir troops, Suchetas ffurce was so reduced 
onlI his in~estment so extcnsivc it would h v e  been casy to 
brmk tiirougli; yet, uiilcss lie wus entircly rou td ,  wliich was 
unlikely, no great advanhgo wouId limve fullowc& because 
tlio c~inmul~ication was alivurly open by ,ygea. Cmlpri ITerdc's 
pInn w t i ~  oiily propasrrl thc 13t81i, nntl worild Iinvc liccn too 
slow for tlic criticiil nnture of tlie m e .  Tt woiild 1iar.r: heen 
more in accord with thnt grent m~xirn o€ wnr, which prc- 
scril)cs tlie at& of un m ~ n y ' s  wcalrest point d t l h  tlie p a t a €  
pouBiLb n~cmliws, to bwe ninrcherl witli bis rvliole forcc tipon 
llorn, or upoii ~ C U S  to bcat tlie tmops tlicrc and destroy tlie 
dcp8~5; and tlicn scizing some strong posts on tlie hiIls close 
te tlie besieger's lines to ha* entrcnchd it ancl operatcd 
daiIy and Iiutrrly against tiicir renr. I f  ciitber oE tliesc depSts 
h d  f.~,Ilcn tlie sicgo inust Lave lroen mised; nnd iE he coulrl 
not beat two or tlirce thous~nlid inhiitry at thoso placw, he 
could net Iiopc, oven mitli the assistQncc of the prrison, to 
destroy sixtecn tliciuwnJ of  nlt nrms in the cntrcncliinents 
hcforc Tnn~pnn.  Siiclict did not fcnr n hnttlc on tlu Frnn- 
coli i i ~ e r ;  biit so tender wns Iie o f  the depfttg, t l i ~ t  when 
Ctimpo Tertlc sent iin o$cer to mkc the soinntcnes nboirt 
illora, he called 1lbM with tliree thousand infantry frorn 
Teruel. And that gencrnl, active tand experienced in peri l la  
opemtions, soon dispcrved Gllc Spanish levies aiid Goolr tlieir 
chef wihh inaiiy otlier prisoiiers, aftcr wliich he joiiied tlie 
hesieging wmy, Sucliel; reclnired tliis reinicircenient. He 
Iiud lovt n ge~ieml, twci liiilidred iiifenor ofticers, and two 
tIiuusnnd five I~uutiJred meri during thc aicgc7 and hnd not 
morc tlinn twclvc thousnnd infmtry fit for diity. 
But Villamil, s partisaii of  Campo Verde's, Utking adran- 
tage of Alib6's absence, m.wched with n tliousnnd men to 
attack Mora, atid beinp beaten on tlie 16tli n-as mniccecdd by 
Erales, who a m e  mith lis mkole division to Falcet on the 
20tIi, and cnptured a con~oy of loaded mulea. TLe deaign 
wlis to tempt Sueliet tu send a strong dehdiment iii pumuit 
of Eroles, in ivliicli m e  tFie Iutter ivaa by a mpid rnarcli to 
rcjoin Cnmpe lrerde ncnr Alcovcr, alien tho whele nrmy wna 
to  attnck Suchet t h i i ~  mcnlcened : tlie Frcnch gcncml did not, 
liorvcver, move, and his mligaxine~ at Rciis tvere atill ao full 
that the Ioss of the con\-oy wns little klt.  
Such was the situation of affairs on the 2Ist of  June, when 
the ordw to rtssault tlic loiver town \vtts givcn to an anny 
ama11 in nu~nber but full of vigour an3 confirlent of ñuccas; 
wliilc in thc plam, confusion frilsehood and folIy mcro mrk-  
ing. Gntrcrns nctcd n shxmcfiil linrt. Snrsficld lind prurlciitlp 
ooncerted tliat iif tlie lowcr town m s  stomcd, the ~hilia of 
war siiould come close t o  tlie mole, and tlic garrison dtoulíl 
retire there instbd of going t o  Qie upper town. Bc~rcely 
mas klltliis se t t ld  wlien Cninpo Verrle recalIetl Iiim to flic active 
army, iiitentling tlint Veluscci slioiiIrl rclilace him; Iiut tlie latfer 
did. not anive, thc, breachcs wcrc open, tlio assau1t momen- 
tari1g expect,r?d; and sct Gnntrrrlis oiltlerr~l SatrifioIrl to cmlinrlc 
insknntly, falsely a~pcrring tlint ta hc Cnmpo Verclc's peremp- 
t o ~  commaiids. Trdnly he remonstrñted, slaying 
Appndix the trüops would be lef~ to rin iiidñcient siiborrli- 9 1. 
nltte, he wrag compclled to cmbark, tthc ~ s a u l t  
toolí place, nnd Tclusco, wlio rnme rr fcw Iiours Inter, fuund 
only tlie dead bodics of hia prrison: Contrcrris tlicn nscured 
Corlrington niid tlic jtinta, tlint Snrsfidd hnrE gone witliout 
ordcra and betiq-ed Iiis pust ! 
SMRXlSC OF TElE LOWER TOWN. 
Tliis criJrimitouti evcni liiippcned in tlic ~vcning of t l ~ e  21st. 
Two brcliclies E~ad bbeen marle in tlic 1)astions nnd one in tlie 
fort Iloyal; tliey wcrc not ivide, nnd s fcw S~iaiiish gans ski11 
afiswered the Frciicll fire; rievertlielcss t l i e ~ s a u l t  Valitnin 
Qrlriiieton, w1i9 O ~ ~ C P C ~ ,  xnd nu somc ~iipposc, b c c n u ~  Suclict 
MSS. l i d  ~ccrct  intc1li~;rnec if Snrñficl:ld$ rcmowl nntl 
t he  conqequent cotifusion. Pifteen liitnrlrerl penntliers as- 
sernblerl iiildcr Puloniliini in the trenches; z accond column 
was to support tlie stormers and repel niiy salFy from tlie tlpper 
town; autl wlile tiie urraripwineiita were in progrecs, tlie Eir.nch 
guns thunclercd incessantly, and the shouts o l  the infnntry, 
imptieiit  for tlie sipal, were licard lietrveen the salvos, 
recIoiililin,rr as tlie shu th rd  waIls gave way. Soon Earispe 
bcgm lo menace the cihy on the side of Rt~rcelona to distriict 
the nttention of tlie besieged, nnd tlien Xuchet exliorting liis 
~oldiem lct thcm loosc whilr: it mfis ,st,ill day, nnd in nn instnnt 
the brenchcq wcre crowned, anrl tlic nssail~nts awamcd on the 
ktionfc, tFie rnmpzrts, and the fort  Roynl. The Spnnind~i, 
without x lender, and falling in henps, brokc and fled towards 
the port, fou,artls the molc, antl tomnrcls tlic iipper town, ivliere 
epen a rmcrve stationed undcr ~ F I F  2wnlls w.w ovcrtlrroiva: 
some of  tlie fugitires running tmartls tbe molc wcre sxved 
by the Englinh ltuinches, othei-a escnlicrl in to  the upper town, 
and a few were made pi?soners, tLe rcst were slnughtered. 
At eight o'cloclr tlic lower town was won. Filteen huiidred 
bodies, insny of tliern citiaem, wero strdclied upon tlie plaoe, 
and the rnereautile mnguziner, o€ tlie ~ m r t  lieirig set uri fire, tlio 
drtrnes finislied mlixt tbe smord bad b e p n .  When the cnrnap 
cenad, worIring pnrtics wcrc formcrl, antl era tlie eonfusion in 
the uppm t o m  bncl ~uhsirIcd, tlia hcsicgcrs wcre npnin hiddon 
in their trenches and burrowing onwnrrla. Refore tlicm m s  a 
front of four hwtions nith curtninn, hiit no ditch. Tire hnstion 
a£ SL Paul was opposite their lcft, that of h. John opposih 
thek centre; tlie bastion of Jesus vas opposed to their riglit, 
but thut of Cervantes, whicli covered the lancling ~Iracc of 
the Nilapo, being somemhat retired, wns not emlimced 
by tlie attack. hliollow piece of gronnd, ~ ~ G i i z  t s a trencli, 
ennbled tlic French engineem to establish their Iek on a side 
bastion of a, waU connecting tlie upper witli the loiver towii, 
and t h ~ i r  iglit wns strongly protected by soiuc houses lining 
t11e rr+ fur between tlle two pnrts of tIie city tlier~ were four 
hundred yards of open gzrtlcn-ground intempcrscd witli single 
howcs. A bnttcry mna constructcd to plny iipon thc lunding- 
placcs of thc 3fila30, two rnortni-S from tlic hiIl of fnrt Loretto 
c o n c u d  in tllis ol!jcct, nnd thc ligbt trnops iwre puchcd eEosc 
 p. At daylight howevcr, the diip of war pnssed tIic port 
delivering tlieir broaclcides in succcasion, Contrems d~owerl tlie 
henda oP columm as for a saIly, and the French slrirmisheis 
retired. 
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The men ssved by the sliips diiriiig tlie nsqnrilt ivcre noip 
re-lanrled in tlie upper town, and tlie sccond reinrorcement 
from Murcia arrived, but agñin withoirt arms, t h u ~  IIdding to 
tlie confusion nnd difficulties. RevertIiele~s, ns tlie Frencli 
lid lost six liiiudred, anrI tlie Spauiards ody two tliuusttnd, 
Crintrerns liad ctill nine tliousand figlitirig mcn, n numher 
ncarly cqiinl to tlic wliolc infnntry of bi;clict's nrmy; and fnr 
from quniliiig, Iic would not even roceivc n R a g  of trucc aent 
to offer Iionoirwtrle contlitions. Siichet.'~ position wns indecd 
very embnrrassing. Re bad delivcred foiir nssaults, liis force 
was diminislicd ncarly une-fiftli, znd the menb strcngtli wari 
spent witL Eaboiir on his prorligious works; liis line of com- 
muuication witli Lcrida w:is iutercelited, tliat wif i  hlum inter- 
ruptd, :ind lie liad lost a ll~rgc C U U Y ~  of 11rovi~ion~ tvgcther 
wi8i tlie rntdcs tliat cnmicd it. Tlic rcsolution o f  tlie Iicsicgcd 
sccrnctl in no mariner nhaterl, xntl tlicir conimiliiicntion with 
tfie sea, nltlioiigh partiiilly iinrler the Frencli firc, was still free; 
the sen itsdf lvns covered with sl~ips o€ war, overivlielming 
reinforcemeiits miglit arrive nt any moment, and Campo Terde 
with ten tliousxnd men was daily meiincing bis rear. Tlie 
Vrtlencinn iurny, Irilla C;i~ripa, tlic Einpecinrido, Uuran who 
htld dcf~aterl a Fmnch detacl~ment ncnr Mirando dcl Ebro, 
Mina wlio hd juñt tlien takcn tlic convoy ivitli Rlwscna's 
baggqe nt  the Yuero de Arlnbran, in fine, a11 tlie partid- of 
thc mountains of Albnmcin, Rloncnyo, a ~ c l  Navarrc wcre 
in motion, and meuncing his position in -4ragon. TLig 
rendererl it daiigerous to cal1 up riny more troops from tha 
xight of the Ebro; niid yet U single cliectc migl~t introduce 
clcspoiidcncy amongst liis snlrlicrs, mcn of tliffcrc~it notions, 
nnd stiinc hiit Intdy come unrler Iiis commnnrl: indccrl tlicir 
latoizrs and ílangerc aere  so iizcessant rtud ivenritig, tlirit it is 
no small proof of the geiieral's tdent  and tIie mcn's spidt, 
thnt tIie confdence of Lotli was still iiiisliltken. 
Ou [he 24th iiitelligence amived, tliut tlie Spmisli army 
waR coining duivn tlm Gayn rivei t o  figlit, t l ~ c  giimison was 
seen to get untlcr nrriis, anrl an active intcrclimingc of signds 
toolí place bctrveen tlic town and tlie fleet. SucLet leaving a 
support for his trenches, marciied at once to meet Campo 
Ve1 de. Tliat general Iid reiiiquislid Lis oun plan, r e d e d  
Boles, uuited hk army at Xomhlanch on tlie 22nd, and 
rnovíng by Tillradoñn, dmcendcd tlie Iiills hefmeen tlie &ya 
and tlie Frlincoli; Iie mns moring- to deliver battle and liad 
di~ect~ed Contrerrrs to make a sdly; h~t Miranda, mho com- 
manded his rig11t wing, found, or pretended t o  fin4 Borne 
obctacles and Lalted; whereupon Campo I7epde relinquislied 
the attack, nnd retired to Vendril. The 25th hc a p i n  pro.. 
mised Gontreras to rnake a dccisire attack, znd desired t,hnt 
tliree tliousmd of tlie gwrison eliould be ssnt t u  Vendril, 
and tlie remainder held reurly to cut, tlieir way ttlirough the 
encmy's lincs during the action: Iie ~ n i d  also tliat four thon- 
finntl EngIi~h were coming by sea to nid in tliiq project. The 
hrcnching httcrim hd not thcn opcncrl t?hheir firc, thc m11 of 
the p7me was conreqiirnfly untoiiclied; ten thoitsund infmtry 
and a thousand ctivalry untler Cxmpe Verde were witliin a 
fea miles on the Barcelonít  irle; eight tliousnnd men accus- 
tomed to fire were still under arma witliin thc d l s ;  and on 
tlie 26th colonel FSkerrett appcarcd in the roadstead, not witli. 
four tliousand, but twelve 1iiiiiJretl British soldiew, scnt from 
Qdiz and Giliralhr to sucmtrr Taraguna. Tliis force, tha 
increase of sliipping, nnd tlie promisea uf Cnmpo Verde, misd 
the spirits of thc Spnninnls; nnd tliq wcrc more eluted mhcn 
Skcrrctt nnd l i is ñtnff ,  accornpnnictl by Doyl~ ,  Codrington, 
and 0 t h ~ ~  diacmbarlrcd to cxra~ninc t11c menns o€ dcfcnce. But 
thcy were xtrucl~ mith consternation d i e n  thcy 
hearrl the British commeinder, liccauw his enginews 
thouglit the wall would @YC way dtcr  a fev salvos, Appcnaix 8. 
had resolved to  keep Iiis troops on board, idle P 1. 
spechtors of an mmult on tlie place they liad come to aiiccaur. 
Contrerns, disap~iointcd un sll aideq and witFlont delien- 
dence on Campo Verde, resolved, if thc Frencli rlelayed tFia 
a t o m  rintil tJhc 29tli, to mnkc wny hy snlly on tlic Rnrctlon:) 
rontl, nntl ~o jnin thr army in the field : mcnnwliilc to atanirid t hp  
aasniilt if forti~ne so willed it. And he \vas not withoiit 
means, for tliough therc was nritl~er ditdi nor cocered msy, 
the appronch to tlie wnlh ww high and nlirroiv, znd a 1ierIg-e 
of does, no slight ohtttcle, ,gew at tlie foot o€ tlic brenchcd 
rampa*, ~~~l i ic l i  was cut dso oíf from tlie t e m  nntl side worlrs 
by sn interna! dikli  and retrencliment. l3el1ind this tlic 
houses of the giat  atreet cnllerl tlie B a d a ,  wcre prejared 
R a 
fur defence, furnislung a seeond lino o§ resistance; and altiiough 
the cuts on tlio fianlrs hindered the making of  sallics in forcc, 
the rerhccd numbcrs o£ t l ~ c  Frcnch ~ Y B  good liope thnt cigbt 
thonsand brwe men would resist them deetiially. Still the 
predomhiit feeling was t o  break out on tlie Bnrcelonn side, 
the fleet aiid tlie active army ticing to co-opcmtc Eroles 
was t t o  enter tlie place and lead the salIy on tlie 29th, Ziut 
SucheR liatteterics opeued oii ttie 28th mitlr crushinp cfect, a 
mtig.~aine exploded in tlia Cerviliitcs, thc guns of St. Paul 
wcre dismouuted, tIic mrnpnrt fe11 a11~ily ili Luge f r ~ ~ m e n t s  
before tlic incessant droke of tlic bat.tcries, nnd frvm tlie 
Olivo and thc old trcnchcs, guns anil mortnrs showered 
hullets and she1ls h t o  the town. This fire \vas well returned, 
and tlie slioulders of tlie brelicbg battencs were bentcn d o m ;  
but tlia rrench gunners stood to their work, tlic rnus1;ctry 
rattled iound tbe wulIs, the men on botli sides crowded for- 
~vard, nnd wliile opprotricins lvords a ~ d  defiancc pnssed bctivwn 
thcm, tlro pncrals, mitliin hcaring of each other, exliorkd tl~eir 
soldiers to figlit mnnf~tlly. 
At $ve a'cloelr in the evcning tlic French firc filicl~lcnIy 
ceoccd, and fiftecn hundrstl men Icd by Llab.liert, 
suchb passing out from tlie parallcl, wcnt at full speed 
Ragn3at. 
up against tlie beacli; twelve Iiuudrcd ni ida  ' 
Vacmi. 
Bdrinpton, Ficutier foIlowed in aupport; lluntmaric led a 
MBY. bripdo rouiid tIio lcft, to  t .1~ bztstiori of Rosario, 
witli a vicw to bmnlr tlic gntcs tlicrc rluring thc 
assriiiit, snd thlir* trirn tlie intrrior dcfcncc of tlic Xüinblri; 
Unriqpe took post on tiie Rarcdonn T D ~ ,  fo ciit uff nll retrelit. 
The columns liad to pass m opcn space of a hutidrcd yards to 
reacli tlic brcadi, m d  witliin tweiity yards of it, tlie Iiwlge of 
aloes forccd tliciin to turn to tha riglil and lee, tinder a 
tcrrihlc fire uf muslrctry ond af gtrpr, wliicl~ tlio Bpaninrds 
p ~ ~ r e d  iipan them. Tlic dcstniction u7ns grrxt and tFic Ficad 
of tl ie Trcncli gave Eiaclr anrl n a s  bcginnitig to Ay, wl~en the 
reserves lcd by a ccowd of officcrc nislied up in n body. 
Suddcnly, one Biiineliini, an ItrtIian soldicr wlio 11iad denlxnded 
leave to join the column as n voluntcer, and wliose wliite 
clotl~w ami& tlie blue unifurm of tlie French p v e  hi s 
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aupern~tud nppenrrincc, is~ued from the ranks and gliding 
silently nnd sternly np the brertch reacli~l the fop nnd there 
fe11 deud witli mxny wounds. Then his cornrades bonnded 
fomard with n siiotit, the Spnniards Ad, md the rnmpnrta 
were darkencd by tlie Eollon,ing inasses of tlic Prcnch. Moilt- 
mane's mppers had cut away the pdisades zt Rosario, and his 
liglit troeps linding a ropo hanging froin the wall mounted 
by it at tlie mornent wbcn the brw11 was mrried, rrnd the 
wliole pourecl iuto thc town Iilrc a devnstating torrent. In 
thc Rnmbln n momentay utnnd wns d e ,  hnt the impulue of 
victory wlis t o o  stron~,  nand n drendfril sccne of tila~~gI~.liter and
violenm ensttcd. Citixcns antl soldicrs, rnaddcnd witli fm, 
fled, some by tthe 'Barcelona pies ,  otliers, throwing tliemselv~ 
over the ramparts, mnde for the landing-places of the Milagro ; 
but tltnt way nlso had been interceptcd, and numbers leaping 
frorn tlie stccp roclrs wcre dml~cd to piecea, wliile those wlio 
gaiuerl tlie shre were still exposed Eo tlie aword of tlie enernp. 
Tlie multitude flying liy the l3arcelonn. gate were met by 
Hnrispda mcn, nnd gome being Iiilled, tlie res$ tlirae thou- 
sand, wcrc mndc pfisonm. 
Witliin the t o m  al1 w n q  horror. rSouiics were in f l a m ~ ~ ,  
Gonzales fighting rnanfully waa Iiillerl, Contreras, wounded 
witli hhe stroke of a bayonct, was suved by a French officer, 
and tlioupli the hospital$ wcre respeetcd by the soldjcrs, in 
every otIicr part thcir fury Irvas unbounded. The ship-launches 
liad come closc into tlie Xilgro and iiow  ved mino of t l~e  
fugitiva, Iiut tlicir grins swe~i t  he open spxe  beyonrl, killing 
friends md eilemics, as mised togetlier they ruslierl t o  the 
dlorc; nud tlio Frcnch Orngonna, passing througli the flaming 
Rtrcet,s at f i  ttotJ rorlc down rrpon %hc fiigitivcq ~ahrcing thorio 
wlio I i d  outstripped tlia in?~inkry. In every qiiartcr there was 
great rage antl criielty, and tlioiigh most of the women and 
cliildrcn Iind bcen previously removerl by tlie English shipping, 
and the ricliest citixens Iiatl gone to Xitjes, tliis nsault was 
mcmornIiIe as s day of blood. Seven or eight hundred mise- 
mblc crcnturcs, principally soldier~, wmprd on. bourd the 
vessclq nina thoirsand iiicluding aiek m13 mouiided wers m a d ~  
prisoners, more tlian five tlio~~snnd persons were slain, and s 
grcat p n ~  of thc city m s  rcduccd to ashea 
CI3APTER VI. 
XUCEEF lost in lcilled and wountled diirjng tlic sicge bctwem 
four and five tliousaud men; yct scnmely Iiad tlie necessary 
oders to eiracc the treilchcs, securs tlic prisoners, and wta- 
IilisFi ordw in  thc ruiiierl town bcen giveu, tlim he was in 
rno~cment te disperso B m p o  3"crdc's force. In tlie night of 
tlic 29th Frcrc's division tnnrclicd upon Villa Frnticn, Harispe'~ 
upon Villa ?iTucva, folToned by Suclict witli Alib6's bripde 
and tlie bcavy cnvdq. Qmpo Veide aliandoned Vendril, 
Ilarispds coluinri, altbough canno~inrlcd 1iJI tlie English squa- 
dron, reachcd Villa Rfueva, ivhere a g e a t  multitudc, dittarg 
and otlicra, rvere striving to  crnliwk; t l ic liglit cavdry snbied 
srimr, and m d e  iiftcm liundrcd prisones iucludiq tlie 
woirndcd mcn wlio had been cnrricd tlicrc from Tnrngonn 
- 
dusing thc sirge: Frerc's coIttmn in like rnanner clíspersed the 
fipanisli retlr-gunrd at Vendril and Trilla Frnuca. & m p  
Verrlc flcd with tlic mzin body to Igualrtdit, Sucliet pushed on 
t e  Barcelona, mime kie airanged with 3Iaurice 3Ii~tliieu a p n  
to prevcnt tlic Vrtlcncian divisien froin re-emhking or 
mamliing to  nid thc blockade o£ Yi'iguerns. 
Di~ tn~s t ,  confusion, nnd discortl prcvnilcd amongst the 
Catdans. Tlie people were cncaged agai~ist G m p u  Verde, 
the junta demanrlcd Infantatlo for cliief; Jlilans pioposed 
himsclf; and Sarsfield, whose clivision was thc on?y ono in any 
nrder, ivaq ah varinnce with Eroles. Tlie comtry 
Apmn3;x peuple desired to have tlio Iatter marle cnptain- 41 % S. gcucrul, and a junta of oRccrs nctunlly nppointcd 
him; yet he wodd not accrpt it aliile Csinpo Tcrtlc rernained, 
and tlint general had drcady rexhed Agramunt, wlieuce, over- 
wlieliiied willi l i s  misfortunc$ he ineaut te ff y towxrds Ara- 
gon, Being perswded to retura to Cei-vera and m11 lls comciI 
uf wlar, it WU8 proposcd to &handon Cntlilania and cmlirark the 
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amy; and this disgracefiil resolution, nltlioiigh opposed by 
, 
Smficld, Santa-Cmx, nnd cvcn Campo llcrdc hiinsclf, wm 
arlgtcd by thc council, fina sprcnd univcrfial constcrnntion 
Tlie junta rcmonstrated luurlly, biit al1 tlie troops who wcrtj 
not Catalrans depertetl, malring principnlly for t.he Xegre and 
Cincti. rivcrs, in hope tu piiss tlirough Ara~on into Nem 
Castille and so r p i n  tllcir own lirovinces : every place WEIS 
iilled witli grief and clespair. 
In this conjuncture miptaia Codriiigton rernsed to embark 
any Catalalis; biit Iia~~iug promised to take back tlie k l e n -  
cinns, althoirgli tlie conditions of Lis ngreement bnd been 
grossly violntcd Ily Cnmpo VtarIc nnd Mirnnrln, hc pcrfnrmcd 
Iiis conf;rnH,: crcn tlh WBR not arrangd mithout n con- 
t c d  betwccn him nntl noyle on the one side, ~ t i d  ?ilirnnrln nnd 
Caro on tFic other. Grecn, instead of remnining at the Spac 
nish hesd-qunrters, returned to Peniscola with al1 the money 
and arma under Iiis control; and the cnptain of the Prueba 
f igate,  having rinder Iiis command several Epanisli vessds of 
war loarled aitli >~potindcd mcn, Ilic arcliiv~s of tlie munici- 
pdity, ammunition, stcires ttad money, al! bclungirig to Cata 
lonia, set sail for Mnjjorrcta undcr such suupicious circumstanms, 
that Codrington tlionght it n c c c m q  to send n diip to  retch 
him hnclr by forcc. In tliis nflieting disordcr Suiuelict lirouglit 
iip l i i s  troopa to Eiireelonil, nntl Ma~iriee hlxtliieu dispmsecl a 
amnll body of men tlint E r o h  had collecteti aG hfntnro. Two 
thousranrl. four hundrcd lralcncian infantry, havíng cscapcd to 
- h.9~ de Mar, got on board tlie English vessels 2nd were sent 
back to tbeir o ~ v n  countq; but tlie cavall, unailling t o  part 
with their liorses, woiild not embark, and mcnnced their gene- 
ral Caro, allo fl ed from tlieir frirj-- Eroles rnllied tliern, and 
baving gathered Borne stores nnd nioney frorn the smnller 
depots, marclied inlwd; Campo Verde thcn cmlinrltrd pri- 
rntcly ln tlic ninna ta  nvoid tlir. vcngimrfi of the peqle, md 
gencral h c y ,  wnl hnd rlrihived from Cadiq toolc the command: 
Iie would howevcr hnve lwcn disrpgded, if Erolrs had not 
set the esample of obeclienm. Sucliet immeditltely moved 
against liim, and first scouring the vailg of the Conpsta and 
that of Vicb, spread his colurnns in a11 directiona, nnd opened 
a cominrtnicatian lvith Jlacdonald at FFigemri ; thus p r e s d ,  
Lacy collected the mmlry nnd n. few scattercd Cataloliran brit- 
talions remaining about XoIsona, Canlonn, and Eeu d'Urge1, 
ancl took rcfup in the Iiills, while Erolcs tlirew himself into 
>Ioiitcerrat, wllere Iarge mugnzines lid Iieeri prcviowly formed 
Eut Sricliet rcsoI~cd t,o nttnck t1ib cclcbrnted place, and in 
timt vie~v, lmving Prcrc and TTaricpc et Ticii and TiEoyn, with 
ordcrs t o  move a t  o given time, returned witli the rescrve ta 
h s .  Eere dcspatclics from Nnpdcon conveycd to hi the 
title of rnarslial, nnd ordcrs t o  tnke Bfontserrat, destroy the 
worlcs of Tfiragoua, ivitlt tlie exceptiuii of a c i ~ e l ,  and 
finnllg to mnrcli njininst Tralcncin. Hc tlicrrforc pmscrvcd tho 
uppcr town, ruincd thc rcst of tlie works, enrricrl t?ie artillety 
to Tortoizn, nnd rnarclied agninst 3Iontserrnt on tlic 23nd of 
JuIp by tlie way of Rioml-ilancli Ran Coloinrt and Igiialda: 
at the samc time TIarispe and Frere moved by Xanreslt, and 
1Tturice ñhtliicu entered Esj~arnpuera witli a ~iar t  of the gar- 
rison of Barcelonn, 
This stronghold l r n s  occripicd by foiirtecn or fiftecn hiindred 
mipcletes antl somatencs, and Eroles was riaily raising recniits 
and rtrlrling worlrs to its nnturnl stren&li. It would soon 
bmvc bcen im prcgnal-ile, for the uliproacl ies were tlirough 
stceps and preci~iices; and liigli u p n  ti natural pIntform, 
npening fo tlir cmt and ovcrloolting tlic Llohrcgnt, stod the 
convent of ' ~V~~9brn r%iorm dd dOnfm~t,' n grmt ~crlifice, 
nnd once fiill of riclies, but tlic wary rnunltq liad remo~eci 
tlieir ualtiables to  Jfinorca enrly in tlie war. It ivm now me11 
stored and nrmed, aild ahove.it Iiuge penka of stone aliot np 
inta tlia clouds, sn mdc, so ii:ilred, BO dcsolnte, tliat, t o  use 
Sut!lict's, citprr~sivc sirniTc, 'It Tvns l i l a  tIic drclcton of n 
mountain.' 
Vime wcre tl~rce w a p  to reacli tlie convent. Fmm 
I p ~ a l n t l q  by Casa 3hnsana on tlie nortli, one wovnd between 
~b perpendicular rock and a prccipice, autl ivm Jeiended by two 
bniterics in wcccesion, nnd Sy a rctrcnclimcnf. in front of tbe 
cdifice. Tlic other wny~i wcre n foot-pntli Icntling t a  Colhto, 
and a narrow road mnning by NonistroE on the ast; but 

their knowledge of thc country they wily  avoided Eahpe'g 
rnen. 
Erolcs and othem nttriliused tlic: fnll of Mnntscmt to Green, 
bemlse Iie had carricd off tlie moiscy destinctl to fortify it. 
Tlie loss was deeply fclt both in a military vicw, and from 
the reIigious reneriitiun in ~vhich it ñ.ns held: ~everal t o n  
and iiiany villages then sulimitted, and fenr of  Suclict sprcad 
over Rpain. IIorvever tlie Catfilrin~, a ficrce and consttint 
ruce, wcre n u t  yet coiiquered. &fi.ic!iief mas irideed nt wukk 
fjir iind nidc; tlinsr, ~lvlio iniglit hrtvc rcskarcd nrrier ii~crcnsed 
tlie confiision, nnrl tlicir bml cxnmplc infi:ct~d tlic aiithorities 
of a11 the pllices immediately connected with Catalonia. 
Cuesta now governor of tlic Calc~rcs, J~assccoiir at Cuenca, 
Palncios, just appointed cnptain-general of Valencia, dl failed 
to  act i u iU~ vigour. Gliesta, \i,lin lirid berore iieglectn~ to send 
froni Ninorm the guns wantcd in Catfilunin, now ofered to 
cxclinnge the prisaiicm nt Cnlirrrn npins t  tlie mptivea of 
Taiwpna ; a prai~civorthy aet, i f  as Suelict kqserts, it r a s  lin 
inipulse of huznanity; nor \vas it ill-jurlged in itseff, because 
tlie Camla,n soldicrs were tlie best in Spnin, and tlie French 
prisoner~ were brolreii in constitution by tlrcir liard cnptivity. 
But it waq at tlik tima vicwerl willn susyiiciun in Cutilloibia as 
t c n d i n ~  to iiimense tlie Prench fiircrs, nnd Mr. Wellecley, 
jnvolving tlic Rnglish in t l i is  sliramcfiil eruclty and Lircncli of 
faitli towaríh tliosc rniser~tli7e men, so wrougEif witli tbe 
regency tbat it was pcrcmptorily forbiddcn. Cucsta then 
refused to receivc nny more prisoners at Cabrera, nnd this, 
wliatcver the motive, >vas B meritorious act ai~d t l ~ e  last ini- 
portant one of liis lifc, for Iic soon aftemnls tlied. Tlie ' 
prisonow tlicrcfnrr: rcmaincd n rlisgmcc to Spnin itnd to 
Englnnd; for i f  lier envoy inteflcrccl to p re~cn t  tlieir releme, 
slie wes bonnd to insist, tlizt thouswida of men wlime 
prolonged ciiptivity mas tlic resu1t of Iier interfercnce sbould 
iiot be exposetl upou a barren ruck, mked ws 
7z tlicy wem liurn, nnrl figliting for ench other's 3 4. 
rniscrnhle rritions t o  prolong nn exiatcncc incon- 
oeivaliIy mctclierl. 
This untoimrtl state of nfhim in Bt.nlonia wris ngpamted 
by the English, Spaiiish, aníl French privateers, who taríig 
advxntage of the times plundered the peolile along the coa& 
in coucert; and thcy were al1 engagerl in atnuggliiig tobacco, 
tlie monopoly uf wLicli wüs the principal reveiiue. Yet tliere 
wcrc many considcralilc rcsourccs Icft to thc Catalans. Tho 
chicf to.ives hnd fallen, lsut ttic mountainous distrlcts liad bccn 
marcely croascd by thc Freiicil linm of invasion. Thc goma- 
tcuea were numeroiis, more experienced, and rea<ly t o  come 
forwnrd under ra good generul i f  arms were providcd for tliem. 
English squxtlrons iiFerc alwliys at linnd to aid; admira1 Keats 
Iirouglit tlirce tlioitsnnd niiislrcts from Gibraltar; sir E. Pelle~i-, 
who hnd succeetled to tlie command wf tlie hleditcrra~can 
Asct, nM ntixioirs t o  succour t l i ~  provincc, aud Xiririrca was a 
p e a k  dcpGt of giuis, stcires, iind even ruen. h c y ,  Erolw, 
Bovira, nnd otbcrs, ruiscd frc& 1cvIcs; nnd w11ilc the blockade 
of Figuerns Iccpt ithcdoniilrl'cr nrmy rmplnycd, thc Cntnlans 
oprrntcd portiiilly on thc siilc of Rcsdu nnd Rispnl nnti cFen 
in thc Frcncli C c l ~ d a í í ~  wliich being unprotccted waa ininrnded 
by Lncy. 
Suclict, whose posh nom extended from Leridn to hfont- 
serrnt on onc side, and on tlic other from Tar~gona to 
hfcquincnxa, fforemw that a new and troiiblesome Catdonian 
war w~ propuring; yct Iie was fomd to return t o  Zaragoza, 
purtly to preparo fur the invasion of Buleuciu, ~inrtly to restow 
trnnquillity in drngon, whicli liad bcen disturhcd by tho 
pmsage of the sccctlcrs from Campo Vcrrle's ~ r m j - ~  Tlia 
Valencian ca\rnIiy alxo hnil, wlicn Ernl~s tlircw liimgelf into 
Nonkseriwt, cndenvouwd undcr tlie contliict of Casca to p s h  
tlirough Aragon towards Navarre; and although tIiey ivere 
InterccpteiI by Reille, and foIlorved closcly by Ctilopiski, they 
reachd Valencia mithout much Ioss: tlie rest cif the fugitives 
pined tl~c hfoncyo rnountnius and after~verds joiued Mina. 
That cliicf tvns in 3, low ~ t n t e .  Hc Iind been defcated hy 
Clilopiski nnrl XcilIe on the 14th of Julj* rtt &ipessn, md 
tlie reinforccm~nts tlicn pouring into Spnin, prcvjoits to ?tlm- 
R C ~ ~ ' S  iiimqiun of Partugl, enablcii tliose general9 to l,mt 
Iiim nt Kstrclla the 13rtl, xt EorIatln the 34tl1, aiid nt Val de 
Hnygory tlie 25tli. Fíe finally escaped to Motrim on the 
Bismy coa&, where lie rmeil-cd frcsh nrms nnd stures from the 
Engris11 vmscls, but ivas once morc defeatcd by Cdarelli, and 
finally driwn for refilge to t11e Liebana, where, however, the 
soldiers Ayiiig from Tarapna and Figueras joined hirn, 
and he Boon re-appeared rnure fierce md powerful tlmn bt+ 
fore. 
Villa Camp, ~vhose division hnd hecn rc-cquippcrl from tho 
supplies given by Cotlrington, mnccrterl oper~tiona with tbe 
pnrtida chiefs Dumn znd Campillo, and their cornbined f o m ,  
eiglit thousand stson~,  aarlmncetl frorn differcnt quarters on the 
riglit bank of t l ~ e  Ebro, invested Cnlatayud, and sought h 
carry off grain wliicli m.3 now very scsrce. TEiis de lgcd  the 
invnsion of Ydenciaj for Snchet wouId not unrlertnke it until 
he had ngnin ~ccurcrl tlie i'rontier of Aragon, nnd ninny of his 
Iinttnlioria wcre tlien ecorting the prisoncrñ t o  Fmnoe. Whw 
they returneil he direeted numcrous co1umns agninst the 
partidas, ~vliilc Frencli troops from the a m y  of  tlie centre carne 
domn by iyIeatIina Celi; tlie Spaniards then retired to tlieir 
fstiiessea in the mountains af Soriz on one side, md  to tliose 
of Albamciri on tlie other. Four thouvand af the Valwcian 
army l i d  mcanldiile marclierl agriin~t Itnl~ita nnd Anipofitn, 
the formcr post having becn re-estahlidied aftcr the fa11 of 
Taragom; and tliough Bnbert, marcliing out of Tartoxa, de- 
feakd tliem mith a, considerable loss, tlie ernbnrrassmenk of 
the tliird carps were not remaired. Por the CataIans began to 
liwass ilie pusts between Eeridtt znd M u n l ~ c i ~ n f  o~rd on tlie 
Dtli of August tlie ~omateiies fe11 oon some Italiims plucal jn 
hlonistrol rtnd werc with ditiimilty rcpursed; a fcw clrty~ nftcr, 
a convoy coming from Ipnlarlti, t a  Montscrrat was n t t d e d  by 
fiftecn Iiuudred insurgcnts, and was anabIe to proced until 
Pitlombini nrriverl wit11 n Iiattnlion antl rIisEodgcd the Catalans, 
yet he Iosh more t h n  a liuudred of  liis Dwn iiien in thc nction. 
Siicliet, ccci~ig tlien lio couI(1 not safcly withdruiv frrim Catalonia 
uiitil tlie fa11 oT Figuerns sliouId 3ct loosc thc army of tlie 
trpprr proiincc, sent frcsh troop to Montm~~at ,  nnd onlered 
Palombini to aid YacdonaId in tlie blodcarle of Femmdo, bnt 
tliat place had ficlded before l'alombini passd Rarcelonii. 
Martiiieq after manp vain efforts to break tlte line of 
blor~rndc, and linving usctl nll cdilile substmccs, hnd prcporcd, 
tlie lF th ,  to  rnalrc a f Ind  cff'ort in concert wrtli Rnvirn, but 
an ofiiw deserting fmm tbe gmriaon betrayed the project, 
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and Rovirn mas beaten tlie morning before tlie garrison 
sallied; ncvcrtheless Martinez etroae to  mt liis way thruugli 
on fhe side of Rosm, but wns clriven b ~ I c  ivith o loss of 
four liundred men. Thrm days after, tho plnco aea givm 
up md t h e e  thousnnd Eamisliing men werc made prisoncrs. 
Thus endcri tlie faurth g c a t  cffrirt of tlic Catdonians. The 
success o? t he  French T V ~ S  not mithout nlloy, more tlian a 
qiiarter of the blockziding troopa Iind died of a pestiIent di+ 
temper. Macdonalild himself waa too ill to hold cornmnnd, 
and his wmy so wealrend, tliat no furthcr active opemtions 
could be undert~ken; Suchet \vas still wcupied in Aragon, 
nnd Laoy thus obtained time and rneanB to re-orpnize troops 
for a fifth effort. The persons who had origirielly Iietrnyed 
the place to Rovim ivere sliot, add tbo comiriaudarit wl~oss 
negligcnce liad oocabioned tho xni~fui-tui~e WBS condewned to 
dench. Uut Napolcon, so fouliy misrcprcscntcd as n snn.guinary 
tyimt, Nnpuleo~ who liad rommuted tlic ecntcnct: of Diiport, 
now pnrdoned Quillnt: a clerncncy ili I-ioth cmcs rcmnrlínble, 
sccing tlint tlie loss of nn Rrmy by onc, nnd of 5 prnt  fortrcas 
by the otber, not only tended directly niid powerfi~lly to tlic 
deñtriiction of the ampcror's projects, bnt wcre in tliemselv~ 
p t  crimes. Yo otlicr EOX-creign in Eurupe could havc Bis- 
phyed avch a merciful gentneas of m i u b  
1'. Tile cmpsror was rliscoiikrited witli Macrlonald, wlio 
secms fo have rriistdten tlic nzlure oE r~iountain mnrfai-e iii 
general, and tlint of Cutalonin in particular* Tlie 5rst rcquires 
a, pcrsevcring netivity in seizing commnntling posts on thc 
flnnks or rcnr of an ndvr~~.uy; and ns the SUCCCRR depend~  
upon rnpiility nnd Ilgour, tlic troops sliould be cxcitcii by con- 
tiniial cnterprisc, nnd noirrislicd by coinmcndation and rerr?ards. 
Mncdonnld, if we msg: bdicvc Vacani, an eye-witness, did 
ncither gain tlie confidcnce of his soldiera nor dierisli their 
ardour; and while be eraetcd n morc rjgid discipline tlinn the 
composition of Iiis troops and tlie ridiirc of the war would 
henr, let pass im~iortant olipoitunities o l  musliing his cnciuies 
iii the fielrl. Bis iiiteat was to rciluce the fciricious aud 
iiistiliorrlinat,~ dispo~iition of 117s mcn; hiit tlie peculiar date of 
feeling on both sides c2id not perrnit this, and Iiis rnarchm ap- 
pmrcd ratficr proccssiona and cercmonies than warIike opera- 
tiona. De won no tolm, stnrclr no important blov in the 
field, @ve no turn fo  tlie public feeliug, and lost an importmt 
fortrcss, whidl witli inliaite painu and troublc he conld 
scnrcclg rc~diu.  
Al1 tlie Frencli genrrala had n c t d  on di fferent plans. St. 
Cyr remained qiiiet iintil the Spanindsi pthercd in such 
numbers t h ~ t  t e  could cmslt tIiem in general battIca, but tlien 
he lost the fruit of Iiis success by aafter inachivity. Aiigereau 
neitlier f~iigl~t 'Lattles nor mnde ~xcursioris with ~ l c i l l ,  nor 
fulfillcd thc po1it.iml hoyics mliich Iic ha(1 cxcitcd. Mmdannld 
wna in constnnt movemeng yct nvoidcd hnttlcr, nltlioir~h iin 
every picvious irnportant attaclc tlic Cntalnns hnd heen benten, 
whethm in strong or in wenk positions. 8ucliet cornhined 
skill, ~ctivihy alid msolution, and tlie success wliich dis 
tinguislied his opemtions i s  tlie bcsh comnient iipon tlie 
prnrerdirip of tlio ot.Ilrrs. Tt is in vnin te nllcge that he 
was in a bcttcr coiidition for oflcnsive opcrntionti, and 
thnt tlie emperor reqltired of tlic eevcntli corps cxertions 
which want of provisioii~ prevei~td it from nialiing. Na- 
polcon migl~t h w e  bccn deceived as to  the rcsourcee at 
first, mcl llave tliua put it tipon enterprises beyond its 
means; but after tlvo yelenrs' experience, afier rceeiving 
tlie rcports of a11 thc gcncrals cmliloyed tIicrc, hnd liavfng 
tbc mmf cxnct informntinn of  n1F nccrirrcnccrr, it is im- 
po~sililc to imagine so consummntc n captnin mould harc 
urged imprncticnblc operritions. Nor did Mi~ricdonald give any 
convincing proa€ fhat his own views were sound. It wonld 
se presumptuoas t o  doubt die merit of a man wwlio in so 
inany ivnrs lias mairitxined a nolile rcpntation, amirlst iunume- 
mble dangers untl peiit politien1 convulsion~, but BIn~lonJCs 
militnl tmlcnt Rccins to hwc  hccn n t  h i l t  in thc wlirfiirc of 
Catalonira St. Cjr anrt other Frencli writers llave enden- 
voured t a  sl~oiv indccd tliat Napoleon was tlie onIy mnn wlro 
did not uiidcrstaiiit the nxturc of tlie war in Spain, nnd that 
the Frencli nrmies were contiiiiiuIly avenn:atclied, Tlih criti- 
cism is cusily rcfiitcd. Aftcr Bnylen, tlie Frcnell nrmics never 
lost a grcat battlc exccpt to tIie Englisli; they took evcry 
t o m  tliey bbesiegecl, and siiffered no reverse from tlie Spaniads 
wliicli cannut be distinctly ti-aced to thc cxenitive oficms. 
Wbere tIien wns Napoleon's errar P 
3". Tlie surprise of Figuerm has liecn desipqted n misfor- 
tane to tho Spaiiirnrdg) bccnus~ it shut up rn Itirge boJy uf the 
bcst niiguclctes wlio fcll witli the plwc; nnd tccaus~ it drew 
Cnmpo Vcrilc from Tnmgona nt a mjtical prriod. Contrnst 
the ndvanhtgcs, liowvcver, ilnd apnrt from tlic vigoiir nnd cntcr- 
prise di~~pInyctl in tlie exemition, na mean liclp to tlic cwse at 
the time, it will be found a great gain. It a~ri.ied 3Iacdondd 
from Darcelon& nnd tlius tlic fall of Sfontserrnt mas deferred, 
and grent  danger of fuilure incurred by Suclict nt Tnragons; 
a fnilure inlallilile if tFic ndverse gciierals had Lehaced wilh 
ski11 or cou~*agre. l t  einployed all the Frencli iwrny of U pper 
CntaIoriia tlie natiu~iul gultrds of the frontier, und even t r o g s  
from Toiilan in a Iiloclcntle, cFuring dl ich  tlic smord ond siclc- 
neoa dcst,roycd morc tlian fuur tliousnticl mcn, nnd tlia rcmain- 
dei. mere so ivcaltwerl ns to  be incapable of ficlrl servite for a 
long tirnc: mc~~nwlrile Lacy re-orgnnixed fresli furces, nnd re- 
vived tlie aar, wliicli he cuuId ncvcr liiive clone if tlie sevcntb 
corps liad h e n  disposaliIe. Campo Vercie \vas incapltbIe of 
handling lnrgc masscs, it is douttful if lie could llave recisted 
or retnrded fur nny lime t l ~ e  invcstinciit of Taragonn; but i t 
is certtiiu tlie liludcatle of Xl'igucrus gwe un opportuuity for 
rccoveririg tlic! 1uxq nf Tnrqonn, nnd it farccrl Siiclict) In~tcnd 
o€ Bincclonnld, tn tdíc AfiinGcrrnt,, twliicli disscminntcd thc 
formcr fomc mnd retnrdcil tlie in~nsion of Valcndn YFlicrc- 
fore Ro~irn$ dnring tr~ivrise nnrI hfiirtincz' resofiite mninte- 
nance of Figueras were uscful and glorioua. 
4O, Diu-ing tliis campriig, rcsolution, perscvernnce, and 
tslent were cvinced Eucliet in al1 liis opmtionq but tlie 
success \vas In a grent memure duc to tlic faulb of his cippo- 
nents, ainoligat w-1i;liicli Skcrrett's conduct was pruiniiieiit. Cap- 
tain Codrington and olliers agreed intleed in t l ~ e  rcsoliition 
not to  land, there wns n Iieavy  su^, nnd the engiticcrs pre- 
rlichd t k t  tlie wall wciuId suon be bcaten dowri; liut tlie 
question aliould Iiwe bccn vietved in motlicr Iigllit. Taragoii a 
WEB the bulwnrk of the princil>nlity. tlic stay nnd hoye of tLe 
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wnr; it waci tiic city of Spnin whosr: importante mas ncxt b 
Ciidix, nnd bcforc i ts malls tlie seeurity or tlie niin of Val cneili. as 
well a3 of C<thlonia was to be founrl. Of tLe French ~carcely 
fourteen tliousand infantry w r e  undrr arms, and exhraustet! 
with toil. The ul~per t o m  was still unbrcachcd, and nttacked 
only upoii otia very iinrrow front, and beliiiid it tFie Rambla 
orered a more piiwerful liiie oT dcfciice. Tliere wcre, to ase 
tlie governor's expression, witliin the walis ' &g?$t thm8and of 
tlie w m t  wmIi7e t roop in Spain,' and thrrc mnFi n succouring 
army withaiit, equnl in nuniber to the wliole i n f an t l  of the 
besiegcrs: hencc tlie stoute~t aqssilants might linve been 
repulsed, and e severe repulse would liuve been fatal to the 
Frencli operations. 
5". Cqtain Cotlrington ~ n y s  tllat in the ~lrirrnishes beyond 
tlie witlls tlie vnloiir of tlie gnrrison wnfi emincnt: tliat lie tirnw 
a poor raggcd fcllow endcnvoiiring ssieli wna liis liumriaiity and 
greatness of mind, to stifle the burning fuxe of a shell with snntl, 
tliat some women and cltitrtrcn miqllt Iiavcvc time to escape. Feel- 
iug and cournge, the springs of inorril force, were therefore not 
wariting,but tliicvirtuc of tliepcople was rliininislicd andkl~cqirit 
of tlle soldiery overlaid by tGe Iiiid cuiitluct o i  tlicir leadeni. 
Tho ricli citixens fied early to Villn Nuevn, antl werc followed 
by many supcrior oficcrs of rcgimcnts; Contrcm~i, jcalous of 
Snrsficld, forccd liim to qriit. his post at a criticnl moment, and 
then rcprcsented it to t l ~ c  g~mison M il desertion; the Valen- 
cians were carrictl off aftcr being one da7 1ii tlie place, and the 
Riurcian~ carne wihho11t arms. this confusioii snd miscbd 
bcitig pdpalile, t,Ilie poor Spnnish ooldiera cuuld nnticipte uo- 
tllirig but fuilure ir left to tI~emsdvcs, suti it \iras prccisely for 
tbnt reason tlie Rritidi sliorild I i n ~ c  bccn 1nntlc.cl to restore 
confidencc. Waa thcrc notliing fo br: allowcrl fol. tlre inipo- 
ttioirs fury o€ nn EngIiali mIumn hrealting oiit o€ the place at 
tlic moment of nttack Z A scventy-fmtr, convoying t.he trans- 
portq hari ariived witli Skerrctt, and sucli urw tlie nuiiibcr of 
sliipsi thwt x tkiousan[l ~eamcnrtnrl marincs rnight ha~efieen added 
t o  tlie troops. Wlio Uien cm Lnelievc tliut tliree or four tlion- 
~ a n d  Frencli nnd Italinns, thc utmost nblc t o  hcnr in musa on 
onc point, nnrl thnt not nn ency point, tlic brerach being 
narrow mil scmcely practicable, would have c m i ~ l  the place 
ag"nst eight thnusmd Spaniniuls nnd two thousrand Eritisli. 
Rnt  tlien the snrf and thc cncmy's shot at tlic hnding-plnoc, 
anrl the opinion of Doylc ana of Corlrington snd of tlie cn- 
gineers? The enemq-b shot could not at nighf havc stoppcd 
the disembsrlration, and thc engineers only reporterl on the 
mlls, wliich toucliccl n o t  tlic moral considerntions. mslen the 
h m a n  Pompcy mns djured by Iiis friends not to put ti) sea 
during a violcnt atom lie rcplied, IIE i s  messamj to s a i U  
& not n e c ~ s q j  to iive.' l t  was alsc necessary tc save Tara- 
gona! ?Vas no risk to  be iucurred for su grcnt sil ohject'l 
Wris. RU uncertriin dt~nner to bc wcigl~lied apf~is t  mcli o, loss tr: 
fipain? Vas tiie BritisIi intrcpirlity to Iis set at nouglit? 
TVere Britisli suidicrs to bc q u i d  sliccltltors, d i l e  Spaniniurtls 
mtood up in n firflit? Iii thnt fdsc liut common dodrine: !;so 
dcgrniling ta .qoldirm, tlint hrick-nntl-innrtnr scntimcnt, thnk 
the coura~e nf fhe prrisnn i~l i lot  o be takcn into nccotint, to 
he irnldieitly followcd? TVliat if ttic Spaniards had heen snc- 
ccssfd l TIie resiilt wns most pninfttl. Tnstigonn ñtrongly forti- 
fid, liaving Iind at diffccrcnt periotls fiftecn tliousantl meii tf~rown 
i n h  if mtJi an open Iiarboiir knd free cominnriication by sea, 
wm takcir by lcss thna twentp tliousanrl Prciick nnd Italinn 
infantry, in the fzte of a S U C C O U T ~ ~  a m y I  n nritisli brigde, 
tznd a BritiñIi A o c t ?  
6'. Suchct's cniclt~; and tlie fct-ocity of Itis soldicrq linvo 
Iiecn dwdt upon Ijy sscvcml \writ,crs, Iiut Iie Iios viutljcztcd 
his o m  condiict, md it i9  nnnccwnry I I C ~ ( :  t o  in\-csti3t8e fnds 
wliicl: havc hccn distnrtcd, nnrl rrnñni~itig wliicli 3ins limn 
misnplilicd. Tliat mery hnrbnrity romrnonly tittcntlpiiit iipon 
f8bc strirming of towns \ v ~ s  prncti~erl rnv Le s ~ ~ p p o ~ e d ;  tliere 
is in tlic nii!itary institutions o*' E~~ropr iiofliing ealeuIated to 
arrest snch atrocities. ,SolrIicr.~ of cvery natiot~ look "pan thc 
m demstation of a toim talren ?y assnult ns their riplit ; and it 
m d d  be unjwt to lluld Sucliet rcsponsitle for tlie vivIence of 
an army, com~ivlictl af irten fruni difirent countrie. cxosperated 
by !,he ulistinncj* uoi t11e Jefcnce ond a cruel wnrfiire: iri S~,mlitili 
t o m a  algo tlic pcoplc gcnerally fomcd a pnrt rif t1ie gurn'soii. 
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TIic trai~slictions rn tlie iisst of tl~ese provinces have Lcen 
üotioed; tliose i i i  JIurcitt ivere uf littIe hterest, fur tlie defent 
of PiIakc at Cullnr ia Novcmlicr, 1810, nrid tlie Fever wwliich 
ragcd at Cartdiagcna, togctlicr witli tlie fi-equeiit Jitingc of cord- 
maiiders, and tlic ncglcct of tlie LQ%-eriitneiit, Ii:id cunipletely 
ruiiid tlic 1Iumi:lil army. Tlic iiuinlicr OS irieii w ~ s  coiisider- 
&le, arid tlie fuurhli cor~is, weulieiicd liy Jruuglitc: unrl m e n n d  
by tlic Enrossa cxpcdition, couIrI iiot olipouc iiiorc tlian five or 
six thouaarnd mce Iliircin liad not Leen touclicrl by the 
Frendi, yct in Pcbruniy, IS11, Roche, the military sgent, de- 
scribed tlie ~vliole anny as ' rcady tu dispci~e ori tlie 6rst 
appearanca ot an cnerny ;' 2nd iu tlie rollowilig Jurie says, ' d t e r  
licing lcft to thcmsclvm for tlirec ycurs, thc ~Iurcian troops 
are abaolutely in n, worstr .stritc tlinn tlicy wcre n t  tlic com- 
rnencemcnt of tlie revolutiori. Genera1 Freire, at tFic Iiead d 
sixteen tlioumnd iiifantry znrl tlircc tliousand crivuliy, will not 
iitt:tcIr tlie six tliousand Fi.eiicli Iicforc Iiim Iest liis inen sliodd 
disperse; znd fliey tliink :is little of thsir gancrul os lie does 
of tlicin. Inilolcncc, Iitcisitudc, nnrl e~otisin prrwil in dl 
pnrts, the cstr~blislimcnt of tlic Cortcs h~ provcJ x wry sliglit 
stimulus tu withusiasm, and tlie most itgcceable t h g  In 
thc world to the Spniiiards, would he to rcmniri neutcr wlzile 
England nntl France foixglit the battle and puid nll the expen!nseVq 
The Jfureian force --as inc rwsd  aker hl;tiii'~ :irrival to tiventy- 
two tliousnnd mcn, liut rcrnnincd inactivc until Augwst, wlien 
Elakc msumed tlie eommnnd. 
In tlie moutli OE Crenada snd rlndalusia littlc passd wortk 
notice, for during Elalce's nbsenm in Estren~dura the war wu 
principnIIy coiifiiied ta  titc Ronda, wliere tltc Serranos, nided 
at times by t h  troopa fronr L41g:csiras, anrl by succoum from , 
Gibraltar, wwr: ulwuys in nrms; yct evcn tlicrc, tlic cxt,mme 
arrognnct: of tlic Spnnish gcncrals so vcxcd tlic Scrrnnos they 
wcre liardly prevcntcrl from mpittilnting in f o r m  with the 
FrencEi: and wliile Soult continued at Zierenii, aftcr the 
h t t l e  of AIbuera, tlie cscopcteros and cir-ic guarJs srifliced to 
koep the partidas in elieck. TTlius the Moclrstle of the Isla 
rcrnuincd uiidisturbcd fmm witliout, and Cdu ítsclf, tlle seat 
of dl intrignes and follies, was fed by English fleets amd 
defended by Engli~h troopg. But the narrative of sccondary 
operations being now completed, and tho fate of Spain pro~ecl 
to depend upon the Eritish general nlono, it will be proper 
ths next book to takB a view of political &irs, s l iowhg how 
strongly they bore upon lord WcIlingLon's dricisions: and if 
such nn intemption of thc militav atory slioulcl be distasteful, 
&e rcadcr must rcflcct, that ivnr ia not so much a series of 
Ziattlea ~iti n series of iifficuities in the prepnrukiom to figbt 
them with summ 
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A ~ E R  tlle conquest of Aiiddusia, the intrusive rnonarcb 
pmued Ls o m  ~ i o l i g  with more cqcniess than liefora Ha 
.Torueph'~ publislied amilesties, graiited lionours uid relvtlrds 
fiPcrd, t o  his follomcr.g, took mnny of thc oppositc pnrty 
ñrss. into Iiis scrvice, md trcntcd tlie pcople generally 
ivit11 mildnecs. He ms Iiowever p i d e d  generally by liis Spanisli 
iniliistcrs, who, tnintcd mitli thc nationd wcxkness, m?, 
cspecially Orquijo, coiitinunlly makiiig exnggcrr~tcd rcports, 
iutriguirig ngiiirist thn Frcndi geiierals, and titrivin~; some- 
times witli, somctimeii witliout justice, to inccnse t l i ~  Ir+ 
winst them. TtGs courric, wliicl~ rvns perl~npa 
Appnarxs* iiicvitnble, excitetl angry Qclings and produced 
41. , 
constant dispiites; and in tlie conquered pro- 
vimes, Joscph's civil sgents sought more of  tlie spoil tlim 
cornported witli thc w n t s  of tlie armies, wlierefore liickerings 
lietii.ccii tlie Frcncli and Spatlislt autlioritics were m uuiiceaslng 
m tliey wcrc violent. Tlic prcfcets, roya[ cnmmissnricri, nnd 
intcndnnts moiild not ~ c t  unrlcr rnilitnry ortlcw mitli rnpcct to 
thc supplies, nor would tliey furnish siims for tiie military 
cIicsts. The generals often scizcd tlic Iíing's rcvcn&, raised 
extrmrtliaary and forccd contributions, disrcgardcd Icgal 
forniq and tllreutclicd to arrcst the roya1 xgc~ita \vlicn tlicy 
rcfuscd com~iliit~cc with tllar wislics. Xor 
'P.tmrt, JosepI<a coniluct; alwnyri frce from violcncc; in MSS. 
t l ~ e  lntter part of 181 E. he compelIcd thc merchant~ 
of Haclrid to druiv bills for tivo millions of dollers on their 
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fOflllS, lhrcalcll t rrest t r l a nts whe the
du~cd pliance it thei i hCII, N r was
J sc h's c lld et al a s frce fhl i le ce; in
the l ttcr rt f1811 lle t e r ants
~f dri t aw ill t,w illi lla u t i
elllTcs cnts iu d , t eet a f rce l a , li con-
atantIy complained to the emperor that the niggadIy allow- 
ances from France, the exactions of the generds, and the 
misery of thc coiintry left km no 1nean8 of existente 8s a 
monarch. During the gen tes t  part of 1810 and tlie liegin- 
uing oE 1811, h u t a  Ffi, Almewa, md Orquijo, mcceeding 
eaclt otlier as nmliassatlom a£ Fans, hliad angry Jwephg 
negutintions upon tliis snlijcct,and upon the cession Pnpem, 
of tlie Ebro provinoes in exchnge for Portug.d. "". 
A,aaiin~t tiiiti projcct Joscph protectcd ns a vinlntion of the 
constitution of Bqonnc, lilccly ta rrlicnatc thc Spaninrrls, 
d~gnitling t o  himscl!lf, nnd unju~t as m brtrgain ; ficcing thnt 
Portugal ilwas neitlier so Gch, so inJustrious, so pIcnsant., nor 
so well affectetl t e  bim as tte prorinccs t o  be kIrcn a w g  : and 
the wcIF-lrnown Latred betwcen t l~e Spxniards and Porhguese 
wouId never allow the latter ta he quict subjacts. 
Nnpoleon ans~~ercd ivitli hici umd force and dcarness of 
j u d p e n t .  IIe said 1Iie cost of tlie war liad draiued tlie 
Prench cxcliequer ; lie 114 employed nearly four h u n h d  
tliousnnd mcn for tIie liing'a interesf nnd ratlier tlian incmase 
the errpcnses lio x-oulrl witlidra~v Borne of tlis troops. Re 
rcpronclied Joscph witli tlie fceblcncss of I i i ~  opcrntionr, the 
waste antl Iuxury of Iiis murt, Iiis ill-jutlged sclicmcs of con- 
cilintion, his cxtrxvngant rcw~rds, bis too  grcnt gencro~ity t o  
the oppositc party, nnd his raising, mntrnry to the opinion of 
tlie rnarshals, a Spnish army ~vliicli would deqcrt on the first 
revcrsc. Tlic constitution of Bayonne, hc said, wric rendercd 
null by the war, nevertlielass he liad not tzlíen n single vil!age 
from Spaio, and he liad no wisli t o  scise thc provinccs of tlie 
Ebro, uuless tlie stak of the contest oompclle<l Llm t o  do so. 
IIe required incleed a pmantee for the repaymcnt of tFie 
money France Iincl expended fur tlie Spnisli crolm; yet tha 
renl wislies of tlic people wcre t~ he a~ccrhincil lwforc nny 
cession of tcrritory could tnkc plncc, nnd to 6nllc of Portiignl 
bcforc it wnsi conqucrcd mru foily. As this Iwt obscrvntion 
was Joscpli'n own argiimcnt, an cxplnnntion P.RAIIE(~, whcn it 
appeawd tlink AIrncnara, tliinlcing the seimiire of thc Ebro pro- 
vinees a cettled plan, liad, of his own accorrl, a 4 ~ 1  for Portngal 
ns an Intlemnification; ri fwt cliamcteristic of Spanish poli- 
ticians. Nnpoleon aiso assured the king thcrc must be a p n t  
deal of monep in Spain; for, Ziesides the mmfi sent from 
France, tlie plate oE the suppressed convents, anrl the silver 
rccrivcd hy tlic Spnninrds from Amcricn, tlierc wcre the sub- 
cridics from Englnnd and t he  enormoiis expcnditurc of lier 
tmps .  Tl~e~i  tlie s e i m  and sale of national domuns, md 
of confiscrtted colonial produce, mere to be taken into calcula- 
tion, :ind if h e  k i q  wanted: more, Iie ~nust cxtract it from the 
country; France ~\~i.uuld ouly cuntinuc 11er sutisidy of two 
milIions of frnnm rnontlily, the crnpwor h d  nlways supported 
his wnrñ by the rmources o€ the territory in wliicli it 1i.a.9 carried 
on, antl thc l i i~g migbplit do the =me. 
Joseph replicrl t b t  his court was neither lumrious nor 
rnagnificent; tliat Iie reoomlienserl eicrvices, by giving liills on 
tlie cuiltingcrit mlcs of nationnl clomains, wliidi cuuld not h 
npplicd to the wnnb of thc ~oldirrs; tliat hc codd scarcely 
kecp tbe puhlic scmntq  alire, and liis own expcnses were not 
greater tlim tlie splendour of the crown required. Many of 
tlic best gcnerala approved of ]lis ruising a S p ~ s l i  army, 
Jcscrtions from it wcre lcss frequent tliau wus imagiiieil, rind 
wcro daily dirninisliing; niid tlicsc nntive troopa semed to 
g h s o n  tornis wl~ile tlic Frcnch wcrc in tbe ficld Hc wished, 
Iic artid, to nhtnin I~rge lonris rntlier tlian srnoal gifts from t l ic 
Prcncli trcnsury, and dcsired tliat the contiscated property of 
tlie Spnnisli noblemen who had been cleclarerl traitors in 1808, 
sihould bc paid to liim; but with regara to  limsli measnres, 
the peolile coidd not pay tIre cunhriliution~, md tlie proceed- 
ings of  u king with Ls subjwts ~honld not be Iikc thosc of a 
forcign gciicrnl; lcnity mns ncccsfinry to trnnqiiillixe tllc pro- 
vinccs sitliduerl, and as nn exnmple t o  tfiose wliieli resisted. 
!Ciie fint tlting wns to conciliate tlie pcoplc's affections. The 
plate of tlic suppressed convcnts mas iiot so vduable as it 
uppeared ak a Jishnce, tlie greeuter part ol  it \vas dready phn- 
d c r d  by tha guerillns, uiby tlio Prencli tioops. Tlio Frencli 
rnricshrih intcrccpteil lila revennucri, disrc,gnrtled h i ~  ~ r i l ~ r a ,  
insulted his govcrnnient, and opprcsscd tlie country. He waa 
degrnded as ts mmonarch and would endure it no Ionger. He 
Iiad liceu apliointed to tlic tlirone of Spain witliout liis m n  
oonsent, ond altliougl~ hc would iievetb oppuse Iiis Lrotlier'e 
will, he woiild not l i ~ e  a dcgradcd king, and was thcrcfare 
seady tn resign, nnless t l ~ o  eniperor would come in person and 
remcdy thc! praswt evils. 
Xapoleon arlmittcd the reiw..;onnhlcn~m of some nf tlic lting'~ 
stntcrncnts, hiit still jnsistcrl, wit,h prqririety of arpmcnt ,  tlmt 
i t mRs necegsnry to R I F ~ ( ~ I I C  the pcople lieforc tlicy 
cwld be condiated. T e t  to prcvcnt w~n ton  h p ~ c n d k Q m  5 a. 
abwes of powcr, he fixcd the cxnct sum wliich 
each person from the general governors duwn ta t l ie  Iomest 
aubriltern mns t o  rcceivc, nnd be orrlered ereiy persor* violat- 
ing tIiia reelat ion to he dii.rnissed upon tlie sliot, aiid a report 
of tlie cireiim~tance seut to !?:tris witliiii t.wanty Felrninry. 
hours aftec. Ewsi?res, ackn01vIe(3g~d Iiy u11 to be 
ajugt itnd tinild mnn, hncl hccn srnt t o  rcmcrly t,hc miñchicf 
~ a i d  to havc bepn rlonc by Kcllcimnn nnd ot,Iicrw in tllio nortJirrn 
provinces. In rrspct of concili:ition, tlic empcror rcmnrlrcd 
Iiehd Iiirr:eelf, nt fimt, intcndcd t o  oyen aecret ncgotiationa 
irIth tlie Cedes, but on finiiing rvliat m absciire mbldc tliey 
were, Iie had desiated. He therefore recommenrled Joseph to 
assemhle at Jfadild n countcr-cortes, composed oE 
npfii, 
men of lnflupnce nnd rcpttt:itioii, mlicrein adrert- 
ing to  tlie insri1ence of tlie Spn~iiards towardv tlieir colonies. Le 
uiight by Jiscussing renlly IiIirrnI in~ti tut ir ius,  nlid exlirising 
tiie bd fnith witli mliich t l~c  Englisli cncoiimged tLe Arneri- 
mns, iinprovc put)lic opinion, nnrl concilintc thc Slinninrd~, +tli 
hopcs nf prcsc~ving tlis intcgrityof tlic cinpirc, so rudcly slinlcca 
by tlic rerolt of tlie solonies. 
An additionnl subsidy was pcremptorily refus~cl, biit the 
emperor finally conwnted to furnish Joseph ai th lialf a million 
of francri monthlp,fot thc prirticirlar support of bis court; and it 
is wortliy of notice, as illüstrnting the diaracter of dppendIx 
Yapoleon, tliat in tlie course of t,liese diqputes, 
Jouepli's friencis at Paris relientedly ad\-ised Irim, tliat tlie 
diplvmatic atyle of liis Ietters incensed and hardeitcd tlie 
emperor, -,hereas Lis familiar style ns n, Zirotlisi alwliys 
stiftened and dispoced Iiim t o  concctle whnt m 
nZny. 
demnndcd. Joseph wnuIrI not homcvcr cndurc 
the dccrcc for- cstñlilisliing tlic militnry governmcnts, by n-hich 
the administrntion nna placrd cntircly in thc linnd~ of the 
gmerals, and tlieir reports upon thc civil anci jitdicial arimi- 
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nistt-ation referred entireiy to  tlie emperor:-it was a measurc 
wsniling nt  onca liis pridr, lis powcr, nnd I i i ~  ~iursc. His 
rninrl, tliercfore, hecarne dnily more embittcrerl, and liis pre- 
fccts nnd commissarics, cmboldcned by liis apinioiis, absolutely 
refuscd to act under th Prciich marslials' orden. Many o€ 
tliese com~ilaints, fuuuded on the reliorts of Lis Spitniah 
~enrmts, wcrc untnte nnd otl~ers distortcd. Tlie habitual 
exnggcrntlons, niid rlo~*nrigIit fiilscf iootls o£ t l ~ c  juntris rind 
the rcgency, tli~~artcrl t ie Englisli gclieml's opcrntions, and 
tlie king, as well as tbe  Prcnch gcncmlc, m s t  have en- 
countered a like disposition in tlie Spauisli tniiiisbrs. Never- 
tliel~as, tlie riature of tIio war rcridererl it ItiipossiWe Lut tliat 
niucli b~ountl o f  camplaint sliould cuist. J oseplib penonal 
scntimentc;, nlistrnctcdlg vic~5-crl, wcrc Iiixh-niitirlcd nntl Iicne- 
volcnt; ljut tlrcy sortcd ill rvitli llis sitiiatioii ns nn iisurper. 
IIe had neitlier liaticnce nor 1)rofunelity iu Lis polig,  aiih lit 
3mt, guch wrts iiis irritntion, 1iiiYinp dra~tivn up s privatc but 
formal ilnu~lciatioii of tlio cruwu, lic toolr fin cscort of fiva 
thoiisnnd mcn, nnd nbout thc pcriotI of tlic bnttlc of Pueiitw 
Onoro, pnssctl out of Spain nnd rt.wlilirc1 Pztris: tlicm Xey, 
'?fasscna, Junot, St. Cyr, Hcllerm nn, Aogercnu, Loison, and 
Sebnstiarii were nlso assei~ililcd, al1 discontented witL the wnr 
and mitli each otber. 
By ibis proceeding, the intmsiw goverrinieiit wcs Ieft witli- 
out u, Iieod, and tlie arniy UT the cr.iitre wns rciidcred nenrly 
uaclcss nt tlic criticrrl moment, iv11cii Soult, cnpgcd in tlie 
Albuern opemtiona, liar1 ii, rig3it to  expcct firipport f m  
Ndrid. Tlic northern m y  also was in a grent mcasure 
pnralysed, and tlic nrmy of Portugal, bcsirlcs Ii~vilving jtist 
failecl at Fuentes, was in a11 the rli~or~wizxtioil rr~tori.rlniit 
irpon tlie retrcnt Ermi Sliiitarcm, and upon a clinngc of com- 
mlandcrs. Tliis WM tlir: principal cniifio wliy Ecs9ii.r~~ nlinil- 
donetl tlie Asturica nnd concciitmtcd Iiis forccs iii Lcon ancl 
Castille on the communicntions x-itli Frnnce; for it belioved 
tlie Rench generais cvcrywliere to Iiold tlieir tiuiops in linnd, 
and to be on tlic dcfensive until t l i ~  emperor's rcsoliitiun in 
thig cxtrmordiiiiiry cunjuncturc sliuuld bo itnown. Napoicon 
mtoiinderl at tlie king's prccipitntion, complaincd, tlii~t Iinviny: 
prorniserl not to quit the country without due notice, Joseyili 
had fai'ted t o  bim, both aa rt monarch and as a general: h~ 
ahould a t  Iwt  hava better diosen liis timc. If he lind retired 
in Jlanuary, wlien the armies were al1 inactive, klie evil \vonlrT 
llave lieen les#, as the emperor might thca Iiaw: tibnndond 
AtitlaIusie rind concentriii,ed SouIt's and 3fassena's troops on 
tlis T a g ~ s ~  whicli \vould llave been in accord witli the policy 
fitting Iv~ tlie occasioli. Rut now wlieri tlie armies hatI suITered 
reverses, wlien tliey were widely sepnmted and in pursuit of 
differciit ohijccts, tho mischicf rrns grrnt, ~ n d  t,hc Iring's cnn- 
duct, not to  hc ju~tificrl ! 
Joseph rts~rted that he lind hken  good meaiires to pm 
vetit confirsion during hiti zlisencc, aiid tlien reiterating hia 
compl ai uts and declaring his resolution to lvtire ? nto otiscn- 
rity, finished by obsei~ing wltli equal truth md fii~plicity of 
mind, tliat it wo~ild be betkr for tlie emperor tliat Le shouId 
do 90, iiiasmuch as in rrance he wauld Iris a good subject, 
liut in Spnin n b d  king. h'ctpoleon'tr inkellect waA Iioivever 
too ~iowerful for his brotler. I'artly by rcnscin, partly Iiy 
nuthority, pnrtly by conccssion, hc induectI Iiim tu retiirn in 
Jnly, tiirnislicd with a. spccica of privtitc tronty by wliicli the 
army of tlic centre was lilwcccd cnti~cly at bis diqnsal. H c  
was cmpo\vcrcd t o  punisIi delinquents, tr! cliangc the organim- 
tion ,anJ remove oficers who were offensive to Iiim, eíren to 
tila cliief 05 the stzff, Bclliarrl, who Iiad been rapresentetl by 
Orquijo as lnimical t.o tIie system. h d  if anp oftlie 0 t h  
armiev sIiould by tlie cliances of ivar amive nitliin tlie district 
of tlie centre army, Lliey nlso wliilc tliefe were to be w d e r  
tlie king; and nt al1 times, evcn iii tIieir own districts, wlieri 
he placed liirrlself at tlisir Iie:icl. Tlie army of tlio nortli was 
to remrtin witFi its actual orgnriization and undcr o iriawliul, 
bnt Joscpk liad libcrty to clinngc Bcssicrc~ for Jourrlrtn. 
To prevcnt tlia oppression of t'tic peoplc, especinlly in the 
nortFi, Nripoleon rcqujrcd the Frencli militnry autliorities t o  
scntl daily reports to the lcing of al1 requkitinna rtnd contri- 
bixtions m c t e d .  Be a d ~ i m d  his brotl~er alsso t o  keep a 
Spnnish cornmissary at tlie bad-quarters of eacli 
army to watch ever ZSpankIi itikercnts: promising p l p n ~  $1 
tliat wlienever rt province sliould have the means 
and the will to resiat tlle iucursions of thc partidas, it should 
revei-t entirely to tlie government of tlie king, and be suhjected 
to no ~!llbrge~, s a ~ c  tllosc nmde by the Spnnisli civil autho- 
ritics for get.nerñI pcisoses. Tlie ariiiics uf tlie south and of 
Arapn ivere placeci jn II like ~itu:itioii on tlio sanle terms, 
and Joscph wns t o  rmiw a qunrtcr of tlic contri1mtions from 
ea&, for the wppoft o i  his court ~ n d  o€ t1ie central iamy. 
13ut tlie entirc commancl of tlie forccs in Spain the emperor 
woulri not giunt, obscning tlitrt tl~c mnrshd directing from 
Madrid as tnnjor-genera!, woulrl ri:iturtllg clliiiii tlie glosy as 
mcll w tlic rcsponniliility rrf nrrnnging tlii? operations; nncl tlie 
o t h ~ ~  marslials, frntling tlicmselvcs in rcnlify rintlrr his instead 
of the king's cornmanrl, wouId ohey b~arlly or not at d. 
A11 tlieir reports and the intelligcne~ ner4vssns t o  the under- 
stantling of affairs were tliereforc to lie addrcssed directly te 
Rertliier for tbc r?ni1ieror1s iriformatinii. Piirally tlio h d í  
iiiillinn nf h n c s  Iiit,hcrt,ri ~ i v r n  mont,lily tn tlir. Iciiig mrfi.ns to 
lic iiicranscd tci a million fur thc ycnr 181 1 : aiitl it \m9 
expected tlint Josepli woullF immerliately re-erpnize tbe nmy 
of tlie centre, restore its discipIine, annd mnkc it, ~ u l ~ x t  it hd 
tiot ycvet been, of meight in t11e contest. 
Tlie lrhg xftenrxrils olituiiierl sornt. furtlicr sonce.qsiuiia, 
tlie nicist irnportlint Lieing thc ernployrn~nt aiiil aswmliling tb 
Spnniards xccortling to 3iis emn dircctions ~ r . d  plans. This 
arraugrmcnt nnrl thc impnrtrince given t,o do~rpli's return, for 
by tlie cmperor's orders he wae rectlivetl a3 if Ilc liad only 
been t o  Paris to eoncert a great plan, produccd a good effect 
for a sliork time; but after tlie fa11 of Fir~crns, Yapoleon, 
f d n g  tu trrist f i p ~ n i ~ h  civilinns, extcndd tlie plan, Iiitlierb 
eonfincd to Cntnlonia, of employing h n c l i  ii1ti:iidnnts in nll 
tlie provinws on tIie left of the Rliro. I l lw the k in i s  
j d o u s y  returned, and the bickering betn-een hirn snd the 
mnrsl~ds revi~ed. But tlie politicaI situalion oE Fmncc deter- 
mincíl R'apolcon's ~iroceedinp, Par tliougli in 1 El 11 I i i ~  
poiver over tlie continent, au fi~r ns tiie frontier of Russi~, mm 
nhonlutc, nnrl in Prnncc intcrnnl proopcrity wns cnjopd witli 
externa1 g lo l ,  t l~e cmpcror of Russia, ñtimiilated by English 
diplrimcy, and personnl discontcnt, in drenrl alvo of Lis 
nobles wha were impaticnt uiidci Iosses infficted by the con- 
tinental ñy~tern, was pl~tinly gposed to Frencli ascendancy. 
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h'lpolcon thcrcforc clcnrly perccived tlie coming of  a more 
gigantic conte~t  tlinn any lic had Iiitherto eng3gec1 in, and 
would no longer la~L4i rnoncy ~ n d  soldiers on the Spmisl~ war. 
He hnd indeed poured men continudly into tlint muntry, but 
thesc were generally conscriptg, while in tlie nortIi of France 
he was forming a rcscrve of  tivo Iiundrcd thoumnd o3d soldiers; 
yet witli sudi tirt tliitt it was doubtful wlietlter tliey mere 
intended for tlie Peninsula or for ulterior objecta, bcing ready 
far eitlier, eccorcling t o  cirmmstnnces. Tliis stiite oE aihirs 
prevented liim from hlcing those clccided xtcps in persori with 
rclation to Spain, which Iio woul(1 Iitivc done, if tfiat war liad 
heen tho only grcnt mattcr on liici linnrls. Tlic a~pcct  of 
Frciich p d i t i c ~  in Spain nnd otlicr phccq wnr tiiemfore 
favournliTc t o  Iortl Wcllin$ods vicws. nnd a Riisxi2tn mar, 
sooner or Intcr, m n ~  one of the principd clinncci iipon w1.1ich 
Iia restcd liis liepes of fin$ sueccsa. Ris anticipntions ivere 
however dnshcd mith fcars, for the sitiiation of the Spanisb 
and Portupese governments, nnd their nrmie. anri tha con- 
dition of  llre EngIish goveimwt, wmc Ziy no mransi so 
favoiirnble to  liis plm& 
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IT wns elrm thnt mercTy tn defenrl Porttrgnl witli enormous 
loss of tknqure antl of Iilaod would be .a ruinous policy; and 
t o  redecm the Seniusuln, t . 1 ~  Spaniarda must bc brought 
to act more reasoiiably. Tbe nitiatial i!iur;icler and tlre 
extreme ignorante of pulilic businccq rnilitary md civiL wliidr 
distineislicd tlic! gencrnh nnd sti~t~rsnicn rentlcrrrl tliis n very 
ditriciilt tnsk : yct Wcllington, finrling tlic Rii,$islili pomcr w c ~ k  
te control, its influcnce as mexk ta sway tlie councils of fipain, 
lioped by industry, pnticiice, and tlie glory of liis successes to 
acquirc s liersonal aacendaucp wliicli ~vould ciiablc Lim Zo 
diwct the rcsowces oT tlie wIiule Pcilinsulu towards s conirnon 
object. Tlic difficulty of  attaiiiing i h t  usccndancy can, Ilow- 
cvcr, onlp bc mrtdc clcar by a rcvicw of  tlrc intcrcoiirse 
betivecn tlie British govcrriment and tlie Epuni~Ii aotl~oritieq 
fmm the first burst,ing ant of tlic Insurrcction to tlic pcriod 
nom treated of: n. review ~vliicl~ will disclose tlie utter wfib 
ncss of >Ir. Camnning to cotiduct g e a t  affairs. Por heaping 
timisure, storcs, nrms, flnttcry, upon tlioso d o  wcrc unnlile 
t o  hcnr tlic lnttcr or usc thc forincr licne.ficinlly, hn ncglcctd 
al1 persons mlio were cnpntile of Forwartling tlic cat~sc. dnd 
ncitlier in ttie choice: of 16s ngents, nor iii liis instructians to 
tliem, nor in his estirnxtion of the vnlue of cventq did lie dis- 
covcr wisdom or diligeiice, dtliougti lie wvercd his miscon- 
duct xt t11c moment by liis glittrriilg nrntory. 
%%en thc S~inniñli dcpiitics first applied for tlic assistancs 
le08. of Englmd, Mr. Cliarkes 8tuart, wlio ivaa the 
only regular diplomatist scnt to gpain, c a i ~ i d  
to Coniila G U L ~  a su1 as macle up ivitli previous suhsifics one 
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million of dollam for Gnllicin alone. Tlic dqutica fmm 
Asturias lind demmdcd five millions o€ dollnm, nnd onc wns 
pnid in p t  of their demnnd; biit wlicn thia m Itnom, two 
millions more scre dernandcd for Gailicia and not refuscd: 
yet the first point in 3Ir. Canning's instnictions to hfr. Stnart 
mu, to & imto no pTiticd enpgenaents.' hfr. 
Dug consul st Cadiz, also arried out a million 
of dollnrs for dndalusiq tth junta asked for three 
or four millions more, aud tlie deniands of Portugd althoiigh 
less extravagnnt I P C ~ B  very great; thus above ~ixteen millions 
of dolkm nrcre cravcd, and more tlian four millions, including 
tlic gift to Portugal, had besn acnt  The rcmnlndcr wns not 
denid, and klie mount of arms and stores givm m y  bc 
cstimntcd by thc fnct, that cigh,hltrro picccs of artillcry, 
nincty-aix thousnntl muskcts, c i ~ h t  hiindrotl thouannd flints, 
six millions nnd rt hxIf of brill-clirtridss, seven tlio~ismnd Et*e 
Iiundrccl bxmls of  p o ~ ~ l c r ,  anrl fhirt.y tliouiiand swords and 
belh l i d  bccn scnE t o  Conina and Cadis. Tlie mpply to tlie 
Asturians wns in proportion, Mr. Canning's instnictions 
to Mi. Diiff and otlier agents were still tlie samc 'Bis 
~najmby 7ucd m de& to un= any conditks to tiw paunby 
asktance wha'c7~ IE fumts7derl i o  Spain.' 
IIr. Canning said he considcred the amount of money ar, 
nokhing! yet 110 acknowlcdged specie was 80 scarcc, tliat it 
wns oiily liy a direct. and scmet unrIcrstandinp witli the fvmcr 
governmcnt of Spain, undcr tlic connivrtncc of Francc, tlint 
mg considcmblc nmount of rlollnm Iiarl becn coElcctcd in 
Endnnrl. Ench pmoineo of Spnin,' ho said, lind mndc its 
own particular application, nnd tlic whole ocazsioned a mlI for 
qecic  ~ticli ns lid ncvcr bcforc bccn mxdc lipon England at 
Any perlod of it.i exiñtrnce. T h ~ r e  was a ri\*alry between thc 
provinces mith rcfcrcnce to tlic amount of sums demnndcd 
which rendcrecl tLe grestest cantion nccessary. And the 
more so7 that the dcpntieo werc incompctent t o  furnish 
either iriformat.tion or advice iipon tlie stnte of affaim in Sp-in;' 
yet Xr. Ditff mTas comman.nded, by the man rcpresenting tbese 
actounrling tliings to the junta oE Xeville, 'tu avmd m y  ap- 
pearmce of m &TB to wmoh t7w h f  a d  ~ d w  af IIte 
d i m  tlm di769 by Gr.& Britmin im fumw of IJM 
Spnkh n d k ,  OT to lny i?a g r d s  for restrffiini~ op 
¿im&ng tJ,hs~! P ~ R ~ P  wz.'tF~i~ amy 0 0 t h ~  Iimnda tlmn time 
~J¿k!h W H Y  p ~ & e ~ l  h~ th 0f #M ~ t d  M 3 3 8  O f € h  
country.' h proof of  &fr. Canuinp's sincerity upon this Iimd, 
he aftcnvarrls sent thcm two aillioas of dollars by >fr. Prm, 
wEii10 tlie h i t i sh  army \vas mrithout any furids at al1 ! ñfor~. 
over tlie mipyilics, so recklcssly grantert, b c i n ~  transmitted 
tlirougli auIiordinlitcs and irrcsponaiblc pcrsons were absurdly 
and uncqualilly distrihted. 
This olisequious extravagarice producetl the utrnost a- 
gance on tlie part oi t,lie Spanish l d e r s ,  ivha t rex td  tlie 
EnglisL rriiuister5 humtiIe policy witli tltc insolente it courted. 
Wlicn Mr. Stunrt rcndicd Mndrid, aftcr tho cstuhlishrncnt of 
tlic mpreme juntn, tlirit body, rrriising its demnnds npon 
England in proportion to i t s  superior irnportance, required 
h thc most percrnptory langnage* adclitiond auccours so 
enoriiious as to startle even tEic prodigality of tlie Englisli 
government. Ten millions of dollars instantly, five limdred 
tlioiis~nd ynr~ls of eloth, foiir millicin ynrrls of lfncn for sliirts 
and for tlie hospitals, t h e e  llundred tlroiisnnd pnir of show, 
thirty tbousand pair of Iioots, t~rrelve milIion of cartridgq 
two l~undred tliousnnd muskets, twelve tliousrand pair oi 
pistols, Lity thoiisnnd swods, ono l~undred tliousand arebas 
of flonr, Iiesidt~ salt nieat mid fisli! Tlic~c mcro tlicir 
demnnh, anrl d e n  Nr. Stu~brt's rcmonstrnncc cornpcIlcd 
them to alter tIic insultilig langunge of tlieir note, they 
insisted the more stmnuously upon 11aving the mccours; 
observing t h t  Englend had as yct only done enough to 
set tileir Eorce afloat, and that she miglit naturdly m@ 
dcma.ncl6 ZZke t 7 ~ e  pawt lo fd lw  t l ~  f i a t .  Tliey rlEsiretI 
nTso thnt the moncy slioiild bc furrii~11ed nt oncc by billv 
on tlic Rritish treasri~,  nnd at the Ramc time rcquired tbe 
oonfiscation uf Godoy's property in the Eng.lisli funds! 
Xuch WRS Mr. Caniniiing's openinp policy. TIie seqitcl vas 
worthy of tlie comrnencenient lIis proceedings witli respect 
t o  t,hc Erfmth proposrtls for pmc, Iiis inj~idicious cliaiw of 
Mr. Frcre, Iris Iclivlng of &Iri Stunrt witliout instructions for 
tlircc montlis x t  the most critica1 pcriod of thc insurrcetiou, 
and his munligement of uffuirs in Portrigal iu1d at Ca& during 
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sir Jolin Crndocs command, h n ~ c  hccn nlrcntly noticcd : nntI 
thilt hc wm not mislorl by nny mrrioiis ~cmrdi~nce in tlie 
reports uf llis ngelits is c c h i n ,  for lic \va9 earlg and con- 
stnntly informed of the red s t ~ t e  of afairs by &Ir. Stuart. 
Tbnt gentleman rvns thc accredited Jiplomatistj mil in dl 
importnnt poirits liis repork were very exactly corroboratorl 
by t.Eia letters of sir JoLn Moorc, nnd by ttli runriing c o m e  of 
events; yet Mr. Caiiiiiug neitlier nccted ripon tllern nor p u b  
lished tliem, dtlioiigl~ Le wüsiuetl al1 tlie idle vannting 
xccounts of suhrdisiale civil aiid ini1it:try q e n t s  with com- 
placericy, and pullislied tliem witli ustcnktion : tlius en- 
cuuraging the niisrepreuentations of ignuraiit men, incrmsiq 
ti10 muglilice of tlie SpeniurJs, deceiving tlle Eii~lish nation, 
and ns fur as he was ablc mislcading thc Englifih gcncral. 
Mr. Stunrt rcacheci Coruña in July, 1808, nntl on thc 33nd 
of that montli informcd lir. Cntining tliat tlie reports of 
euocesses In the aozith were not to be depended upon, seeiug 
they Increased exaetIy in proportiun tu  tlie difficulty of com- 
municsting witli t t e  nlleged scenes of action, and d t l i  the 
dcartL of crents, or tlie recuriencc of disasters iu the nortliern 
par&. He tcIsa nssured bim tlie numbers of tlie Spanish 
armies withim lii Irnowldge were bj* no nicans so great as 
they werí: representeil. 011 tIie 2Gtli of July he gave a 
rlctailed Iiiutury of the Galliciati inuurrectivri, by wliicli lie 
1iIaiuly ~lioived tlwt evcry spccics of Y iulerice rlisorder in- 
trigue and dcccit wcrc to he cxpmtcd f r ~ m  tlic Icntling 
peoplc,-that thc jiinkls ohjcct ivns t~ sqi~rntc Gallicia from 
Spain,-tliat sa imp~iropriatc wac tlic rtffccted dclicacy of 
ebstrrining frnni cnnílitinns wliile £iirnisIiiii,rr succours9 tlult tlie 
junta of G~llicin wiia only lrcpt in p w c r  Iiy t,~ic eountciiancc 
of Englrand, evincerl in Iier lavish supplies, xnd lig. tlia 
residente of her cnroy at Conifia. Tlie interference of Britisli 
navnl officers to que11 a political tumult liad bcen askect for 
rtnd had been successful; &Ir. Xtiiart had been cntreated to 
meddle in thc alipointrnentu of ttte governiiig inembers, mind 
in 0 t h  contests for power ivhidi werc dxily ta l t i l ig place. In 
fine the folly peculstion waste and irnprovidence CEIBTW 
terising Spanish proceediiigs were 114' 311: rStuarL forcilily Iaid 
'bcfora hh.  Címning, witliout al kririg tlic liitkr's epiegious 
policy, or even attractiiig liis notice: he even intimated 
to tlie amliitious jnnta of Seville, that England would acknow- 
ledge itrc siipremncy iEf thc ntliw provinces would consent; 
tIitis offcring a premiuin Por fiiiarchy. 
Mr. Stuart wns kept in a comer o£ the Feninsulri, whenm 
he could not mmmunicate freely mith any otlier provinoa, and 
mliere hii presence niateridly contrilriterl t o  clierish tlie pro- 
ject of separntiilg Gallicin; and tliis witliotit a pretence, 
Iimuse tliere was a British ndmiral and cansui, and a military 
m fssion at Coriicn, nTl mpiihlr! of trnnqmit,ting local ititslli- 
p n ~ e .  Indccd, Iia littla did %fr. Cnnning cnre t o  receive his 
cnvo~""~~rpporta, th t tlie packet convcying his dcspatches mns 
ordered to toiieli at Gihon to  receive the congiil's letters, wliich 
aused t l~e delay of wcck wlisn cvery rnornent \vas big with 
iniportmt et-ents: a delay nof t o  he reinedicd Sg Zhe a d m i d  
on tlie station, beczutuse he liad not cven bcon oficidly inforincd 
thrat Mr. Stunrh ivns fin tnccrcdited p~rson! Anil mhen the 
Irtttcr, looking to the puli1ic intcrcsf procccrlcd on I i is  o w  
responsiliilit? to Xadrid and finally t o  Andalusia, be found 
the e d s  springing from Mr, Cmning's inconsirlerak contlud 
every~~*l~am equnily promineni. In tiic cnpid tlie suprerne 
junta r e ~ w d e d  EngIaild as a bontled debtor; aud t t ie influeisce 
of Iicr cliplo~natiqt n t  Scvilln may bc eritiinatcd from thc fol- 
lowing note, h t t e n  Iq 3Ir. Stutlrt to hlr. f i c r e ,  Iipon tlre 
subjech of permitting Eritisli troops to enter Cdirr. 'TIie 
junta refirse to d m i t  pnei.a! &laclccnzie'~ cletacliment, ron 
te11 me it is mcrcly from aInrm rcspcctiiip t l ~ e  disposition of 
t1ie iriheibihnts of  &villo and Cadiz. 1 iam not ayare o£ tlie 
fccling wliich prc~rnil in Rcvillc, hut 6 t h  resped to tbis 
t o m ,  whntever t l ie  nnvy or tlie Fngli~li trnvellers m? rissert 
to  the contrar~; 1 am perfectly conviiiced tliere esists only a 
widr to receive them, arid geiieral re@ md aurprise at t1:cir 
continuance on board.' 
Kor was tlic rniscliicf coníincd t o  Spniri. f icrc ,  rtpprently 
tired of ths presencc of ia mnn mhose cnergy ana talent weie 
a contiiiucd wflection ripon liis own iinbccile diplomricy, onlew:! 
3Ir. fituurt citbcr to  juin Gusta's asiny or to go by TTestste 
tu  'lTicnna; iie chosc tIie latter, ljewuee tlierc nras uor, even a 
scbordinr~tc political q c n t  tlicrc, dtlloug1:li this rrns the criti- 
m? period which preceded the Auetnm declnration of war 
apinst Fr~noe in 1809. Re r a s  wi tliout formal powers ns nn 
envoyJ yet his knowletlge of the affairs of Spain, and lii inti- 
mate personal acquaintanoe with mzny of the leading states- 
men at Tienna, cnabled him at onae to send horne the most 
exact information of the proceedings, the wanta, the wishes, 
and intentions of tlie Anstrian government, in reapect to the 
impending war, But that great divemiun for B~iain, whicli 
with infinite p i n a  h d  been brouglrt to maturity by count 
Stdion, was on tlie puint of being ubandoned becnuse of Mr. 
Canning's conduuct. He had sent no minister to Viennq nnd 
whilc he was lnvicihing millirins npon the Spniartls withont 
conditions, refi~sed in t 8h  most 11ni1ghty and repulsive terms 
thc praycra of  Austria for a subdclyJ or even a loan, with- 
out mhich she conld not pase her own frontier. %%en 
Mr. Stnart suggested the resource of borrowing some of  the 
twenty-five millions of do11m vliicli were then accumtilatd 
at Cildiz, it vas rejected bccausc Me. Frerc said it ~vould alarm 
the Spaniards. Thu~, tlie aid of a great empirc witli four 
liundred tliou~and good troops, wau in a mnnrrer rejected iii 
favour o€ a few miseratilc self-elected juntns in tlie l'euinrrula, 
while onc-linlf the ~uccours whi& they remived anii(1 misused, 
would have scnt the wholc Austrim nation lieaillong upon 
Fmnce; for nll their Innrlwcltr wns in nrms, m.od where t1ie 
ernpcror hnd only mlciiIatcil iipen onr. hiintlrcd nnd fifty bnt- 
tnlions, three hitndmd h d  come forwtirtt voluntnrily) besida 
the Hungminn i i i~ tmct ion .  In tliiswcty Mr. Gnnning proved 
hia narrow capwity for busines% and how IittIe Iic knew either , 
the strengtb of  France, the vrilue of Austria, tlie aeakness of 
Spun, or tha tme intercsta of England; altliough he hñd not 
scruplsd, by petultnt answcm to the proposala of Erfurtli, to 
confirm a war which he ww so incrapaLle of coiiductiiig. 
Iastead of improviilg tliis ~ e a t  occasion, Iie angrib recalletl 
Mi. Stuart for liavitig procesded to Vieriuawitliout perrnissiorr; 
tlio breradt of forrn wm with 11im of liigIier irnportanee tlia~tii 
the success uf the ohjcct. Yet it is cupablo of proof that ME. 
Stunrt's prexcnce would llave mndc the dustiians slowor t,o 
negotiatc &r tlic hnttle of TVwam; and the Walclt~rcn 
cxlieditian would liitvc bceii turncd towurds Germrsny, wlicre 
vat. III. T 
a grcat nortliern confederation WM r d y  to oppose France. 
Tiie Prussiun cubbet, in definncc of the Ir& or rathsr oE Bo 
quccn, ivliosc fcrirs influenmcl tlie lring's rcsolutions, only mited 
for tliat cxperlition to declare war, and it scems ccrtnin Russia 
would also Irave ado-pted tlint side. 
Tlie misCurtunes of Moore's rampni,q tlie folIy aiid am- 
gance of tlle Slianiartls, tlie Ioss or a Uritiuli army in Wnl- 
cliercn, tlio cxlinuñting Endend of troops nnd spccie when 
shc most necdcrI liotli; finnlly tIic tlii*owing Austria entircIy 
into tlie liautls of Praacc, mny b e  distiiictly traced to Mr. Can- 
ning's incapwcity as a statesman. Eut t,liruugh tlie whole of 
the NapoEeonic war 118 ~$*i.as the evil geniua o§ tlle Feninssa , 
Re gl~ve iniaiiEncct1 rniIitnry po~ver t,o Jlr. Villicrs' legtion in 
Tortii~nI wliile lic ncglcctcd tlic poli tial nfi~ira in tliat miintry; 
he sent lord Strangford to Rio Janeiro ~vhcnce a11 manner 
of miscliief flowcd; aiid 1)-])en x r .  Xtuart succeetled Yiiiiers 
at Lisbon, Mr. Caiining insistcd ulion I~aving tlic enorrnous 
muss oi iritclligcnce reccivcd from rliFercut parts VE the l'eenin- 
wln tsnnsI~tctl l~cforc it ivu sciit l iomc,-aii  mt of undi- 
piscrl indolente, mliicli reti~nler? tlic rcnl liiisiness of tha 
embassy* prevented importxnt informati011 froni licing trans- 
rnitted rapidly, and cxposd tlie secrcts of tiie hour to the 
wctivity ol hlie ciieiiry'a e~nisw~ries at Lislüliou. Iu :iflcr times, 
when Xq~olcon rcturrieil 1ru11i Ellia und Nr. Canniiig wna by 
s notorious nhuee of miiiistsrinl pciwcr scnt niiiliaasnrlor to 
Lisbon, Iie compluincd tlint no xrclii~-cs of fonner cmlinspis 
remaiiied, aiid compclleci 31r. Stiinrt, thcn rniiiister plenipo- 
teiiti:uy at tlie Ilepuc, t o  cmplog s e T c d  ltundred soldiers 
wpyjng popers rcltiting to tlie previous war, to be serit at 
pent 1ml)lic ex-peiise tu Lisbori, tvGcrc they wwe to t e  seeii in  
1826 unpnckcrl! 
And wliilc tliis folly was pnssiag, fhe interests of E1iro-p 
in gcncral wcre neglcctd, and tlie particuInr welfare o£ Tor- 
tu@ seriously injurcd Ziy anotlier displny of olKcid jnipor- 
trance still moro culpable. Lt liad beeii esrangcd Iliat ,t Por- 
tupcsc nuxilinry force wns t,o Iiavo joincrl tlis dulce of 
Wcllington's smy, prerrious t o  tlze Iiattle of Watcrloo, and tu 
have tliis ngreeixent etecuted, was the only business of 
imporhce wliicIi Mr. Crsnning had to transact during bia 
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embassy. hfarshd Beresford, well acqunintecl wihh tlie cha- 
rwter of the,Portnpese 1-epency, had assembled fifteen thouqand 
men, tlie flower of the oId troops, perfeetly equippec!, with 
ristillary bnggnge sud al1 things needfuI t o  hice tlie fidd: the 
sliips werc ready, tlie men williiig to cnibark, md tho marslial 
tvld the Englisli ambwsndor t l~at  he Iiad only to give tlie 
order md iri a few h r s  tlie wliole wouId be on board, ~ v m -  
ing bi~n nt the snmc time that in no othcr may could tlie 
thing ht! cFc'ccted. Wiis sumninrp proccccling {lid not givc MI. 
Cnnning- nn opportunitp to record his own tnlentrc for ncgo- 
tlation, nnd he replicrl, tlirat it must he done by diplomncy; 
flic Eiairxa fnction mgerly sciserl tlie oyportiinity of displnying 
their talcnts in the same UneJ tliey beat Mr. Cnniiing at his 
own wcnponq, anrl as Ecicsford liad foresccn, no troops were 
embnrked at all. Wellingtoa was thus deprived of importiant 
reiinforcemcnts, the Portugucse wcrc dcprived of tIie dvnn- 
tage of supporting thcir army for sweml years on tlic resources 
oF France, nnd of thcir slmre of the contributions from that 
country. Lrist and worst, tliose veterans o£ the Feniusuta 
wzr, the strerigtli o f  tlie countxv, were sent t o  t11e Rwails, 
wliere t1ie.y nll perished by disense or by tlle sword in t h ~  
oliceure ivars of Don Pedro! If such errara moy be redcerned, 
by an cloqncnct! alwnys u d  in dcfcncc of pnblic cormption, 
and ri, wit tIi& mndc humnn suffering its sport, Jfr. Canning 
wns an English stntesmnn nnd wivdom haa Iitfle to  do \\itFi 
thc affairs of nations. 
Wl~m tiie isaue of the WnIcTie~en expedition czuscd a change 
of minlstry, lord Wellesley obtnind the foreign 
Appendlx 1, 
affice. Mr. 'Benry Wdlesley then replaced >fr. Iv- 
Frere at Cndia, anrl he and Mr. X h t  remived 
orders to demnnd guarantes i'ar the due applicstion of tlie 
Dritisli succours ; those auccours mere more qarillgly grantea, 
and the envoys were directed to interfere with advice and 
remonstmccs in nll the proceediiigs of the respcctive govern- 
rnents to  whicb tIiey were accredited. Mr. Stuart was even 
desired to meddlo with the internal dniiaistratioii of tlie 
Portugrrcse nntion, tlie exertions and snrrifices of Grmt 
Drititin, fnr from bcing kcpt out of sight, wcre mabmified, antl 
I t ie  system adoptcd ww in  everytting a coutrut t o  that o i  
T 2 
YF. Cannfng. '.Ri thcn: mas in EngIxnd a powcdul, and m 
rece& events llave proved an unprincipled parliitmentary 
opposition, and two parties in the cabinet. TIie one hmded by 
lord TYelleslcy, who wxs anxious to ~inslt the wm vigorously 
in tho PeninsuIa witliout rnucli reprd to tlie ultimate pres- 
sure upon the pcoplo of hiiis o m  country; tlie other lieaded by 
Mi. Percevnl who uouglit only t o  mnintnin hmsclF in power. 
Nsrrow, ~ R T S ~ ,  factioua, md illiliernl in evcrytliing relating 
t o  public rnatters, this man's career was one of unuiixed evil. 
E s  bigotry hught hlm to oppress Ireland, lnrt liis religion 
did nut deter Iiim from passing a law t o  prevent tiis intro- 
duction of mcrticbes into Frnnce duriug n pe~tilencc; be 
liverl by faction; he bd neitlicr tlie wisdam to fiupport,~or 
the mmliness to put nn end to tlie m r  iii t l ~ e  Pcniniiula; and 
his cmoked cantemptihle policy 1va8 shown, by withholding 
what was necessery to sustain tE~e contcst md tlirowingon tlie 
general the respoasibility of fi~ilure. 
With al1 thi? € c m  of littlc mintls IIC nnd Lis cooiijutnrs 
awaited tlie r d t  of Wellingtonb operationa in 1810. TIiv 
affectcd to &end his rzsliriess, yet could give no reasonable 
punrl  for their alarni; and their private Ietters were at 
vnriiiiice ivitti tlieir pulilic instructioiia t h t  thq mi$t he 
prepiired for eitlier event. They deprivcd Jiim witFiout n o t h  
of Iiis coniinnnd ovcr tlic troops nt Crtclix; thcy gmvc Grablinrn 
powcr to fiirnish peiecunirtiy nuccours en the 8paniiirils ilt t l i~t  
place, whicli tlirew tlnotlrer di&criIty in tlic w;i4' of olitaining 
money for I'ortupl; and d e n  WclIin$on complainsd of tlie 
xttention paid to the unfouncled appreliension o l  some supe 
rior oliicera more immcdintcly &out l k ,  1ic wns pInin1y tuld 
tlmt thom oficcm wem hctter gciicrnls d i ~ n  himsclf. Xt tlle 
same time lie wns with a pitifd economy ordcred to rlisrniss 
tlle ttansports on vhich tlie snfcty of tlie amy depended iu 
tlie evcnt of fnilure! Detween tliese factions there wns a 
cotistant strugglc, rand Welliugtori'g successeu iri tlie field only 
furtllercd thc vicws of I'crwval, bcmusc tlicy fuurisl~cd p o i i n d  
for asscrting that duc fiupport h d  bccii givcn to liim. Sucli 
a r e d  t is t o  be nlilways appreliendcd by Eiiglish commmderc. 
She sliglitest rnoveiirent in ivnr requires a grent effort, and 
is attendad with m m j  vexations, wHieIi tila general feeb 
p(n1hIy and uncwinglp; the politician, believing in no diffi- 
a l t i e a  hecause he feele none, neglects the supplies cliarges 
disaster on tlie general and covers his misdeerls wjth words. 
The ineficient state of the cnliinet under both Crinniiig and 
PercevnI mny liomever be jrrdged of by tlie following extracts, 
tbe writers of wliicli as it is easy to perceive were in officjal 
sitnations. 
' I hope by next mnil wilI bc uent, eomething more satis- 
fnctory nnd iiscfiiE tlmn we bzve yet done in 
the of instntction~. Rut I am afraid tlie A p r i ~ 1 8 i S 1 D +  
late O. P. riot.9 have ocmipial al1 the thougl~ts of 
our grcat men hcre, so R3 to  make tliem, or at bt'le~t some ot 
them, forget more distant but not les3 intermting. concerns.'- 
'With mspect to thc evila you allulude to as arising 
from the inficiency of  thc Portug.tese govem- Aprir;gll. 
ment, the people liere we bj- no means so satis- 
- - 
fied of tlieir exiatence yon who are on the spot. Here w h  
jdge only of tlie results, the details we read ovtr, but being 
unalile t u  remedy forget t1iem tlie next day; and in tlie mem- 
timo, be tlie tools you have to ivork witli good or Iiarl, so it is 
thst you h w e  produced rcsdts so far beyond the moct san- 
guinc cqcetatiois cntcrtained hmc by nll who Iinvc not bccn 
in Portupl withiin thc la& ciglit montlitlis, thnt nono inquiro 
the m ~ ~ s c s  which preventer1 more being donc in a ahortcr 
time; o€ which indeed there seems to hnvc bccn x px t  
prohtability, if the governrnent coiild have sbpped forw&d a t  
an earIier period with one hmd in tlieir pockets, and in the 
otber ~trong encrgetic declarationa of the indispensable 
necessity of a cbnge of measnres and principies in the 
' 1 hnrve done evefpthing in my power t o  get people hcre to 
attend to their real interesta in Portugd, and I 
a. have clnmoured for moncy! moneg! money? in Qppt, ISIL 
erery ofice to ~vhich I b a ~ e  had access. To al1 
my damour and $1 my arpments 1 linve inrririably received 
the snme answer, ' that tJ~s .f!ting i s  Wnpm%il~.' The prinm 
birnself certainly appmw t o  be it 7a J~autew ckea circonskriws, 
and has expressed Gis determination to make every exertion 
to promote th good cause in the Peninsulk Lord Welledrby 
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hk9 a perfefect comprebension of the subjcct in its fullest 
extent, snri ia fully aware of the several rncrnsurcs which 
Gretit Britain ought and could adopt. Dut such is the state 
of liarties nnd sucli tlie condition of tlio preaent governrnent, 
that 1 rreully dcsprtir of witnesuing nny decidcd and atiequate 
effort, on OUT part t o  savc tlic Peninst~la. The prrscnt fwl- 
ing rippenrs to be that wc h v e  done mighky things, and aU 
tLat is in our pawer, that the rest must be left to aI1-boun- 
teous Providcnce, and that if we do not micccerl we must 
consolc oiirsclvcs by fttc rcflcction tIint P ~ o ~ ~ c ~ c c  hns not 
bcen so propitions to  ns as we dcservcd. Tliis fcclingyon 
must alZow is wonderfully moral and Christian-like, 5ut sfdi 
notliing will be done nntil we hnve a more viforous  milita^ 
systcm, and a ministry capaMe of ciirecting t l ~ e  rcsourws of 
the nntivn to  ~ornetliing iiobler tban a nur a f  dcscenta and 
cmbarlratiorr s.' 
A more perfect picture of an irnbecile administtation cwld 
scarcely be exhibjjtecl, and it was not wonderful that Iord 
Wellington, opprcssed with t l ~ e  folIy of tlie Peninsula govern- 
iuerits, sliould lirtve often rcsolved te relinq~xish z contest tliat 
wns ons of ctinstant riaks, dificultics, anrl crires, wlien Iie liad 
no bcttcr wpport frnm Enghnd. I n  tlie ncst chnptcr shaF1 
be sl~own tlie nltimnte effecta of Cnnning's policy on the 
Epnish anrl Portupucsc aKiirs. 
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CHAPTER HI.
POLITICAL STATE OF SPAI::;.
27!.t
As the military operlltions were by the defeat of the regular
armies broken into n multitude of petty nlld disconnected
netions, so the politicnl nlfairs were by the species of anarchy
which prcYlliled rcndered exceedingly diversified IInd incon-
gruous. Notwithstanding thc restor'ltion of the C!\ptain-
generals, the provincial juntlls remained very powerful, lllld
while 110minally responsible to the Cortes and the regency
acted independently of either, execpt whell intercstl'<i ,'iew$
urged them to a seeming obedience. 'I'he disputes between
them Ilnd the gt'nernls, who were for the lllost llnrt the
creatures of the regency or of the Cones, were constant. In
Gallieill, in the Asturias, in Catnlouia, in Valencia, Ilnd iu
Murcill, discord Ilugmcuted. Mnhi, Abadia, Moseoso, Campo
Verde, J.Jacy, Sarsticld, Erolcs, Milalls, Bassccour, Coupign)",
ClUlllltlOll, Ilnd .Blake were always in contention with each
other or with tbe jnnta.q. l'llllleioo, dismissed from thc
regency for his high mOllnrehicol opinions, 'I'll.'; made cllpt-ain-
general of Valenciu, where he immediately joined the ehureh-
party against the Cortes. In the Conclado de Niebla the
junta (If Sevillo claimed superior nuthority, but TIallesterO!l
<1eelared martial law, and the junta np~ale<1 to colonel Austin
the British governor of tlle Atgarves!
The Cortcs often annulled the decrees of tlle regency, and
the latter, of whomsocvcr composed, always hating aud fcar-
ing the Cortcs, were only intent upon increasing their own
power, and entirely neglected the general cause; their conduct
was at oncc haughty and mean, violent and intriguing, and
it was impossible ever to satisfy them. Thus confusion was
everywhere perpetuated, aud it is l)[OvOO by the intercepted
papers of Joscph, as wcll as by flia tcgtimony of Ole Rritigh 
ofliccrs and diplnmntigts, tlitit witli tlie Spnninrds, thc only 
muml itlqource left for lteeping UF thc war was their persond 
hatred of the French, wlieit partiully ~ I l c d  into action by 
particular oppressio~i. Sir ~ulk Muore, wibli tlint keen and 
Epnin M Eicing ' withaout armk,  gmrlull~, OT g o v m W . '  
In f 81 1, aftcr thrcc ycxm rif war, lord Wellington 
ht trr  ta comp1:tined tliat ' t7me was m barl in Bpkn, 
U i ~ m o u f i c ~  netlltw genesals no7 afiers,  nm rliuciplined trorogs, 
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m d  m cuvulry; that IJM gm~w~racnt  hud c m  
m3r~:e.d th QULJP d lm~b  a 'IWI~GW~TM or mitikzy . r~owrw of 
poople nt tlte I d  of ctflc1i~8 &re a9 feeZL as t l & ~  resozlrwa 
2 m  ~ n a U . '  Eut tlie miser~bIc stnte of tlie soldiers, the 
unqutriidiahle vanity of tlie oficers, neMZ no fiirther [Ilustra- 
tion; tliey liatcd and ill-used the lieasatiiry, aud were so 
wlioiis tlirit the poorcr pcoplc, mucli as thcj- dctcsted tho 
French alinost wishcd for Juscpli's ~ucccss, 
Only four points of real interest presentecl themselvee. 
Tmprovemeiit nnd better guidance of tlie military,-preven- 
tion of a war bctwecn Portugal and Spain,-thc preietensions 
of tlie Portuguese prinoess &rIottn,-tlio dispute witli the 
Americnn colonies. 1Vcllington had lubourd strenuoudy an 
thc fint, nntl hnrl more tlinn once s n v ~ l  the n rmia ;  and 
pwtinl attempts had been n a d e  to introduce Britisli officers 
into them, but to tbe system adoptccl in Portugal the leading 
Spanizrds mouId not listen: tliis alsu wiw a result of Mr. 
Cilnuingys fiistcririg of Spanisli ssrugriuce, Xt J V ~  Eiy iio 
means c ~ r h i n  tlint tlic pcoplc woulil havc objectcd, if the 
miattcr had Leen pmdcntly iirgerl Iiefore tfie repulilicans in the 
Cortes and the popular presa had prcjudiceil thcrn on the 
subjcct. For tlie Catalans rcpeatedly desired tc hava an 
Eriglisli general, anrl iii 1822 Greeri did orgmiize u snmii 
corps tIiere, ~vhile WhiEtiiigliarn aud Radie formell in the 
Bnlearic idc3 largo divisions; mIone1 COX propoqed a lika 
sciieme for the nerth, b i ~ t  it W R B  rcjected by lord Wellington, 
Ro important service was indeed i~ndered Iiy tliosc oficers 
with tlieir divisioug yet the priuciple was acknowledpd, and 
it m s  extended by one Downia, wlio liad passed from tlia 
British commissarint into the Bpnnish acrvice. Tfie Engliali 
rninisters, ttrtkcn with Iiis boxsting manner, supplicd him witli 
uilifvrinfi and equiliinei~ta for a bocly oof cavalry calIed the 
Eatreinadura Ilegion, of cuch an expensive nnd ahurd iiatnre 
as to iiiduce a getreral oficer to  excl:iirn un secing tliem tliat 
he bludied fur tlie fwlly of IJY g~)vertunent, 
M%en Ihe Britisli ministers fouiid tlietnselves u b l e  to 
den1 with the Spanish regiilnr.g, thcy lotilrctl to 
the irrcpilnra; biit thr: incremc of this forcc gnvc 'mendix 0 1. 
offence to  the regilar oficeiñ, and nmidst t l i ~ i e  
distrnctions, tlie. tralcliem, ill-orgnnixcd, ill-fed, nnd quite 
incnpable of moving in tlic field in lurgc Iiodies, lost al1 con- 
fidcnce in tlieir generalti. Thc latter, ns in tlie case of Freire 
with tlie Murcinn -y, cxpectcrl to he beaten in evcry a&i<in, 
and cmed little about it ; tl~c rcgency mre  sure t o  afirm 
that tliey tvere victorious, snd anotlier of tfiose manderjng 
atarved naked Iinnds called armies could be formed in a 
montl. But a war ivith Portugal wm always to bc appre- 
hendd. TLe ravages of the Spanisli insurgent foroea 5%-iien 
Junrit wa9 in Lisbo~i, tlie violence ol f i w ~ i a ' s  oldiera, tlie 
hroing of tha nllage of San Fernando by Xeniliaabel, 
coupled with dispubs beheen the Algarve people and the 
Andnlusians, rcvivcd thc mutual national Iiatrerl. Thc govcrn- 
incnts indeed cntered into a t,rcaty for rccruiting in tlicir 
rcs~ct ivc  territories, brit it was with the utrnost difficulty 
that thc unitcd cxertions of 3fr. Stmrt and I'i'clling%on could 
prevent tlie Portuguese regency first, nnd aftermnrtls the court 
of the Br~zils, from provoking a mar by re-annexing Olivenca 
t o  PartuguE, when it was taken Erom tlie Prench by Rercaford. 
A~id so littls were tthe pnesions of  tliese peoplc subordinate 
to tlieir liolicy, tliat tliis d m i p  ~ v m  fornied at tlie very 
oiuirient when the princcss Cxrlotta was strcriitously and witIi 
g o d  pro~pect of success pusliing Iier claim to tlic regency of 
Epain. 
]ser ilitri&wes vere coiishnt sourccs of evil, she Iabmred 
against tlie influence of tlio British nt Czdiz, and Iier ngent, 
Pcdra Soiiza, profering gold to vulgar taseness, dianiunds 
t o  Jeliwte comciences, md proinises to ail, was druit d 
persevering In  Aagugt, 1310, a paper, signed by ody one 
rnembcr, hut with fin intimation tliat it contnincd the scnti- 
inents of tlic whoIe Cortes, w~t.q secretly gicen to Rlr. WellesIey 
as a guidc for his conduct. Its purport wm tliat the impos- 
siGiIity of releming Fertlinni~d and his brotlier 
Ir"- n ss. Stu"t* from tfleir cqtivity being apyiarent, tlie princess 
Cnrlottn, sIioulrl ht! enllcrl to tlio tfironc, nnd hm 
eldcst son, Pedro, should mnmy tlic princcs~ nf Wtilcs or 
Borne otlier princcse of tlie house of Brunsnick, t o  give a 
' sudden and mortal blow to tlie French cmpire.' Hr. 
Wellesley was nlso told tlint n note, uriT bl~e s m c  tendency, 
would in tlie; first session of tlie Cortes be t,ransmitted t.o ths 
Eqllisli legation. T h i ~  homcvrr dirl not hnpprn, becauee 
A p e l l e $  openly anrl eloqiiently, cxpressed liis reasons 
qninst the appointment of a roya1 pcrson as regent, md 
some montlis later procured a decree rcndeling aucli peEOn8 
i~leligille. Czirloth's iutriguo was tlieri rluti~lied, but tllough 
mntinunlIy ovcrbome by- tlie Eng-lisli influcncc, licr pretcn- 
sions werc alwnys rcncmcrl, and often on tlie point of being 
publicly ndmitted. Tbis nssumption that Ferdinand's escape 
could not be effected, m founded part!. on the p e a t  inRn- 
ence wliicli It was kno~vn Napoleon I i d  ncquired aver hLs 
niiud, partIy on his persvnal tiinidity \~rl~icli rendcred it hope- 
las t o  attcmpt Iiis dclivcmec. Fnr nb tliis timo there aere 
twe brotlicrs crtlled Sa,p, Spsninrrls and daring men, who 
were only deterred from undertaking the enterprise by a 
previous experiment made at Briyonne. Tliere tliey lid for 
su liour iuiplorcd Perdiaand to escapc, all t h g e  lieing ~ d y ,  
yet in vcin, bocnuae Escoigues who xulcd t,Iic pnnce and waa 
as timid m hirnsc1.f opposcd it. To prcvcnt ill effects from 
tliis weI1-knom wenkness tlie Cortes pnssed a decree to 
render null cvery act of  Ferdinand wbile in captivity- 
Carlotta'g intripes were however of niinur consequenoe 
compred to tlie prooeedings of t h s  Amerienn colonies, wliich 
were of the higIir?st intercst nnd importante. The causes and 
the nature of tlieir revolt llave h e n  dready touched npon 
M%cn tlie Spanisli imurrection first commenced, the lcading 
men of Mexico signed a pper  whicli was sent t o  tlie Penin- 
sula in Rovember, 1808, urging the Unmeditite appoíntmcnt 
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of I n t n t d o  to the vice-roynlty. Be wna avcrse t o  quitting 
Spain, but hb \\rife persuaded Iiim tci consent, providcd the 
central juntn, just tIien wtabli~hed, wns not opposed to it. 
Mr. Stuart foreseeing great  advanhge from this appointment 
lnboiiretl to pcrsttarle Mr. Frcm t e  slipport. it ; but the latter, 
nlways nnrrow in his vicm, refuscd ~ C ~ U R G  Infnntndo waa 
pcrsonzilly disliked in Rnglnnd? T l i i~  joind t o  the duke's 
own reliictQncc ~eemcd to end the matter. er1okt.a however 
urged her daim t o  be r~gen t  of Rpnin and ultimately vcen 
of that country and h e r i c a ,  and lier interests wcre strongIy 
supprtecl in the latter county until May, 2809, mhen 
Cisneros thc Bpnnidi viceroy reaclicd Monte Video md spoiled 
her scliemes. 
R cry far free tmde with England wns tlien peptmkr, 
raised in America, ruirl Cisneros assentcd nnder 
conditions presenting a curioua contrast to tlre affected gens 
rosity of Mr. Cunning; and dording also nn additiorinl proof 
how IittIc the latter B n w  of tlie pcopTo he wm dcallng witli. 
After dctniling tlic dangcr of his sitnation from tlic tcndcncy 
to rerolt, nnd tilo impovcrislimcnt of tlic reyal tremury, 
Cisncms s ~ i d  the only mode of rclicf w i ~  a tcmporary 
permission to trade 6 i h  England for the sdce of the duties; 
necessity drove him to this mensure, but he rcgrettcd it, 
and the ardinary ~ W B  relative to the tesidence o€ foreigners, 
rigorous in thernselves, should be most rigorously executed. 
He added otliers whicli would seem to be dirccted ngainst an 
enemy of  rnankind, sather than t h e  subjecb of a nntion which 
was supporting the mothcr-country with troops and treasure 
in tlie most prodigd mannner. EngIishmen were not to possws 
property, to have a reeirlence, t o  Leep an liotel, or eren to 
remnin on shore exwpt for a fixed ~ i e r i d ,  Any properky 
already acquired by them wns to be corifiscated, aria when tlie 
goods by nliicli 110 liopoil to mise his revenue were laiided, tLe 
ownera wcre not to h v e  them carried to the wareliouses by 
tlieir o n n  sailors! * 
In  April, 1810, the Caracena and Porto Rico declared or 
indcpendcncc, nnd thc Eritish Ewernor of Curngotl exprcssed 
his approvd of thcir procccdings. This alarmetl the Spnniards, 
who loolrcd upon jt as n sccrct conthuntion of Nirnndn's nffair. 
Lord Li~erpool clisavowerl the govemrb mmifesto, but Eiis 
policy produced no effcct, because hc aoagIiittIireo incompatible 
abjccts fit oncc, namcly, to nbtnin tho trndc, to conciliatri; the 
Spaniards, and foree the colonista to declare for Ferdinand. 
Nexico remained obdieat in ontnrard appemnce, but the 
desire to  kave Infantado existed, and a stronp pnrby of the 
Mexicans puvoscd raiging Iiim t o  the throne, if Nnpoleon's 
success sliould aeprate tlie two countries: thc Spnnish regenv, 
with cliarmteritic folly, diose this inornent lu qipoint Tellegas, 
the tlvowed enemy rif Infnntndo, viceroy of Mexlco, and thus 
mvoIt wm fo~ccd on thrat country also. This gtate  of nffniw 
affmted the war in Spain m u y  wap. The Spaniarils, tliinking 
to retain tlie colonies by violente, sent out a smull sqnadron at 
first, but at: a litter period employed tlie succours rcceivd from 
England to fit out lnrge expeditions of their best troops, when 
the enemy were most closely pressing tIiem in tlie I'eninsula 
Tke rernongtranccs of the Britisli were considered aa iudications 
of a fuitliless liolicy; aud Cwlotta also wrotc to Elio, the 
governor o£  bueno^ Ayres, and to thc Cortes, warning both, 
to bew~rc of thc Engli~h as ' a  pcople caplile of  any hn~eacxs 
where thcir own intrrests wmc oo~ecrnetl.~ 'I7itis a notion wn.5 
engendered that England dcaigned ta connect itself vrjth the 
coloniea inrlependently o€ Spain, whicli gr&ly dimiilislied tlie 
English inAuence at Ca~liz. 
13y this dispute the supply o£ vede, which involved the 
existence of tIie war, was also endangered Lord IITellesley 
Ellerelore Ziastencd to offer mtlintion, and t o  pleuse tlie 
Spuniards xemoved tlie governor of Cura~oa; but lilre lord 
Livcrpool, lie desircd to  preserve tlie colonial trndc, nnd thie 
fccling pcmdcd d vitiat~l his instnictions to Mr. JVdlcslcy. 
wclf~s- Tliat gentleman rnm to discuss tlie mntter on 
ley ti: Hr- principies of cordial amity and good fnitli, and 
Tl'ellceIey, 
] [ay,  1 ~ 1 1 ,  seek t o  canvirice the regency tliat the British 
111s~. procteding hnd hitherto Leen best for al1 parties. 
For the primary objeet being t o  prerent a Prench party rising 
in America, Eiigland Bad opend sn intercourscr of trade, a 
measurc oonfiisteilt witli goud Eaitli to spain, inasrnuch 
the colonkta would otberwise liove had recourse to Fmnce, 
whcrens now Englmd --M cunsidered by tbem as a aafc md 
lionournble channel of rcconciliation with f bc rnother-country. 
Sherc had becn no formal recopition of thc eelf-constitiitd 
pyernments, arid if any Iiarl takcn place by nthodinate 
officers tliey would be disavowed. Pratection and mediation 
h d  indeed-been offered, buut the rfglits of Fedifiand 11d been 
suyported; and as war between spnin snd h e r i c a  wonld only 
injure tlie peit cause a mediatttury policy wits pressecl npon 
thc lnttcr. The liloclcade of Uuenurr Ayres nrid tlle Camccas 
hd alrcndy rlivcrtcd moncy nnd forcm froni Bpoin, nnd (lriven 
tlic Atnericans to seck br Prcuch offcers t o  w i s t  tliem. Tlic 
trade would enable Fngland to continue her acsistance to 
Bpin, and this hnd beenfretiut?ntly reprcacntd 20 thc regencp; 
yct the lnttcr had sent sliips fitted out in EugEeli ports, and 
&red at the expense of Great Britain for the war witli France 
to Iilockade the colonies nnd cut ofF tltc Englisli trade; nnd it 
mns done H-t a mom~nt w h  the rcgcncy was unnblc tr, trnns- 
port. Ulake's army from Cndiz tn thc Condwlo dc Nichla witli- 
oiit thc nñnistancc o f  Rritisli vcsricls. ' J t  \vas rlificiilt,' lontl 
Wellesley mi4 to state an instxnce in whicli the prcjutlices 
and jedonsy of inclividuats liacF occasionecl so much confusion 
of evcry maxim of discretion and p o d  liolicy, and so 
mucli b g e r  to the acknomledgecl mutual interests of t ~ v o  
grmt ~ t ~ t e s  cnpgeed in a defensive dlinrice apinst tlie wssaults 
of a foreign foe:'-'Spain could not expcct Englontl to  concur 
in n sptcm hy wliicli, nt hcr omn cxpcnsc, Iicr trailc wns 
the Frendi but apinst: the mnin sourccs of Iier olvn strcngth.' 
Thcse instructions being giwn beforc the constitution of 
Spin  was arranged by tlie Cortes, werc prcsrcd June. 
upon BariIe~i the Spauisli ntinietcr, d o  a p e d  
to accegt tlie mediatiun upon cundition tliat Mexico, wtiich 
hcl not declnrcd a form of gwrrnmant, ~lioiild hc exccptet1,- 
tlint Englnnil diould immcdintrly brcnlr o f  nll intcrcoiirric witli 
thc oolanies and if tlie metiiation fniled slioiilrl a.~.s~ist fipnin to 
reconver tlicm. Tbe injudice wd had policy of t h i s  propo- 
sition was objected to, Iiut B d m i  mxintaincd tftat i t mns just 
snd politic, and pressed it ns n secrct mticle; he hawever 
finally oEered to aeccpt tlie mediation, i f  Eng1.lnni.l were 
pled@ t~ break off tlie intercourse o£ trade. Tliis mas 
refused, yet the negotiation contiuued. Bardaxi asserted that 
lord V7clIington liad agreed to tlie pwpriaty of EngTand goinl; 
to war with the culonies, whereupon Mr. 'V\Tellealey reelerred to 
thc lattcr, rnd that cxtraordinary man, while nctunlly cnaWcd 
with tlie enemy, W R ~  tlius cnltcd upon t o  discuss so pnvc nnd 
extensive B sul3ject. It mas however on meh occnsions his 
great power of mind was displqcd, and hi manner of trent- 
ing tIiis question proved, that h political and even in coin- 
mercial aihirs, I i i s  rezcli of thought and enlerpd conception~ 
imrneasurahIy surpaased tlie caEnnet be ~erved:  liis opinions, 
stntcd in 181 1, hnvc bccn sincc vcrified in oll pointa. 
'He denied he hnd givcn groiincIs for Rnrciaxi's observa- 
tion. Hia opinton had always been ttliat Crent Britain should 
follow, ns l e  hopd she lid, liberal co~~nseIs towarrds Spxin, by 
Iriying aside a t  le& during the egistence of tlie rvnr $1 con- 
siderahion o€ mercliants\~irofi~. Sudi a policy would eqiialIy 
mit Iier comrnercial intercsts and licr warlike objects ss weU 
na atld gcntly  to hcr clinractcr. Thc irnmcdintc ntlvnntagca 
extortcd by an opcn trratle n?th tlic colonics hc considcrcd 
ideal. Profit wm to he m d e  there nnd cventiinTly the com- 
merce moiild bc very great ; but its value n u d  nrisc from the 
increasing dcha of the colanies and the gro\vtli of Inruv; 
and the pcriud nt wliicli this ivould liappcn \vas more likely to 
Iie cliacked than fomarded 3iy tlie extravagaiit ~peculutioi~s of 
EtiglisL trnders. Wlintwci niigtit be €he l i nd  particular m1w 
tiona cstrtlilislicd hetwcen Spnin nnrl hcr colonice, thc gcncml 
rwult must bc, tlie rrlnxntion if not tlic anniliilratioii of tlicir 
coloninl cemmcrcial sptem, find Crent Ri-itnin was fiirre to he 
the greatest gainer. In expeetation of thia ultimnte ~ I m n -  
tRge lier policy oiight to hnve been liberal througliont, tlint is, 
tJte colonics tliemselvcs sliould linve becn cliacl~ed, and tlie 
endeavours of tradew and q t z i n s  of sliilis to separate thcm 
frotn Spttin oug1it to hnve been rcprc~sccl, Englnlid diould, 
whcn thc colonies first Pihowctl a dispnsition to rcvolt, 11n.r.c 
considered not only what they eoiild do hut mhnt Great 
Britain conld assist them to effect. His knomledpe of the 
Spanisli ggovernment and its meuns ennfiled Iiim to sg she 
could not  reduce even one af tHe weakest of hcr colonies, and 
' to mdce tlie attempt would be a gross fully and misap~ilication 
of mmns. Nay England could not ia justico t o  tlic gcnt  
object jn tlie Peiliusula givc Spain nny cffcctual asaishnec; 
fnr it waM liut too truc tliat [listant colonics could niwilys sepa- 
rate Emm the mother country d i e n  they mllIed it, und cer- 
tainly it would be the highest madness for Spain to attempt, 
at tliat time, tte prevent such a separaticm by force, md for 
England to assist or eevn enconrage Ler in such an attempt. 
$The lutter sliould by dluencc alid advice liaw prevcuted 
the dispute cumiiig to cxtrcrnity, md siiuuld now divert spain 
from thc abmirdity of liaving rccoursc to violente. The rcoep- 
tian of tlic clcputies from Afincricn wtilch tlic Spuiiards so 
rnueh cornplained of, wm useful to tlie latter. It prevented 
tliose deputies from p i n g  to Frnnce, and if they hntl gene, 
the fact tliat colonies havc tha pomr to separatc, if they have 
the will, mould Lave been at once verified. 
' Gm~t nritnirl, ~~Itliougb late, I~ad qfwtad meclintion whicli 
Iie wieheied to buve Sccu wKd for, it reiliairicd to convidcr on 
what tcrms it oug.llt to bc noccptcrl. 3t woiilcl h v c  hccn 
better iif Spain l r ~ d  mmc fnrwnnl with trn cxplicit dcclaratition 
of ~vliat her intentions torrarcfs tlic colonies in rcspect to con- 
gtitntion alid commerce rvere. Eng1:ind could tlien Iiave liail 
somctliing intelligible to mediate iiliori, but. now Spain only 
desked Ler to prucurc tlic sub~iiissiun of Buenos Ayrw and 
the Crrraccns; and iE slie Süiled iu t l~at  iiiilir~cticullo oliject 
wris to nirl Sliain iu forcing tlian to  suliiiiission ! aud he, 
lord IYc l l in~on ,  was said to Iiavc npprovcrl of thia! Une 
mould renlly,' he exclaimcd, 'belicvc thnk Rfr. RnrdaxE has 
never dverted to  tl ie meam and resourccs of liie awn eouiitry, 
to tlie ol~ject licy linvc a t  liomc, nor to the efforts rndcing by 
EnglanrI in tlie Peninsule: aud Le imagines I hnve considcrcd 
these facta as little uslie appears to Lave done8 Greut Brihin 
caxinot wce to tllut cundiiiuii !' 
' Li respcct to constitution' ((ulluding to tlic rtc~rnowlctl~- 
mcnt of t!ic civiI Pig1:litbl of thc Arncricatis by tlic Cortcs) ( tlic 
Spaninrds liad gone x grent wny, biit not so far as some of her 
colonies would rcquire, t l ig would prolialdy ask Iicr to linve 
seprat'8te local rcprescntrttive todies for tllcir interior conccrns, 
such as the Englisli colonid risseniLlies. Pet tliis importsnt 
poiut h d  nut becii considered in tLe treaty of medintion, 
and in respect of commerce tlie Spanisli gevernment l i d  said 
notliing : nltiiough it was quite certnin her proliibitory system 
could not ccintiriue, anrl tiie necerrsnry consequence of the 
~ c t l ~ a l  state nf affnirs req~iireá that in the trctity of mctlintion 
tlie colonies should be pnt witli rcqpecf to  trade, exnctly on 
the same footing as the provincer of Old Spain. I f  tLat wiis 
not done it would be useless to tdk to the colonists of equd 
riglits and interests: ihg. would feel that their interests mere 
sacrificed to those of the motfier countq. If, was truo t11ah 
Spin wouId lose imrnediatcIy, tliougli probaihly not eventuully, 
vcry largcl  in rovcnuc nnd commcranl profit by anch n con- 
cessinn. This wna thc iinnvoidable rcrrult of tlie circiim~hnces 
of tlie  time^,  he hacl tfierefnre a fair clnim to pnrticipate in 
the advantages the colonics would enjoy from it. To tbis 
ohject the treaty of mecliatian sliodd have adverfed. Spain 
shvuld liam confidcntidly declarcd to &eat Britain lier in- 
tenrlcd cotirsg wliat systeni she wouId hllaw, what cluties 
impose, rtnd wliat proportiorl sho would demnnd for genemi 
impwinl prirposes. Upon sncli mrttcrinls Englnnd might hnvo 
wnrkcrl wivith a prmpcct of permnnentfy mnintnining tlie inte- 
grity of the SpnTIidi empirc on jll~t nnd foir pririciples; or nt 
al1 evcnts have nll2yed zhe present disputes and so removed 
the di6cuItieo tliey oecasioned in tlie Peninsula, and in either 
case linvive insured herown real intcrests. Xpain h d  horever 
taken a narrow view both of her own snd tlie rclative siturition 
of otiiers ; s h ~  du1 awt d w y e  it, matkrs v~ould gnwt wwse 
anand wor8e, It would ¡M zlseless fw Englmd to intmfm, and 
afiw rr, hy mn?cxt wI~ic7b e u d d  rml?y t d  to we&m tb mt7m 
cmtwj  aRtd dpy/nnzv ?/m M'the resou.rc~ eiiJLtc7~ 8A.e wmddotlaer- 
&jnd i~ zlie colonies .#& Rer war &?L Frunce: tL b u & m s  
wozck? enrk in the scpmtation oj' kJle colmies fiom Spain.' 
Aftcr much discussion the mediation was aecelitcd by the 
Cortes, Yexico only being excepted, nnd nrr English commis- 
sion, &Ir. Stuarf iiciug tlic liaaíi, wns appointed iil Septernber, 
1811, but froni various causes riever prooeerled beyond C&. 
Tlic Spnninrds ooiitinucd to ~Cnil out expcditiona, Mr. Tm?m- 
ley's remonstniiices wcrc unho~dcd, sntI tlioitgh tbc repcnc? 
afterwards offered t o  open t l ~ e  trade under certnin cluties ia 
return for a subsidy nothig was concluded. 
POLITICAL GTAT'E OF PORWaAL 
ALG the cmfty projccts of the Rouzm, their influcnce over 
their mcak-tnintled prime, their cabal to place tlie duke of 
BrunslvicIc at tlie head of thc Portugucse army, the peisorial 
violence OS tIle patriurcl~, t l ie  resignatiun of U l ~ j  ;IIimJ nnd 
tlie disputes witli lwrd Wellinghon, tiuvo becn beforc touclicd 
upon; but tlie dificultics tliw cngen~~ccrd cannot bo undcr- 
stood with~ut a more detnilcd cxpoaition. 
Mr. TTilli~m\ misien, like al1 thoac emnnating from Nr. 
Canning, liad been eqcnsive in style, tainted by intrigues, 
useleas in businesq anrl productive of rlisorders. When &fr. 
Stuart airirsd, he found everytliing except the yoh. 1810a 
army under Beresrortl in e &ate of disoganixa 
tion; and tho Influcnca o€ EiigErsnrI was dccreming from the 
pacillating aystcm hitlicrto pnrsucd liy licr govcrumcnt. As 
cmly iis 1805 WcIlin@on hnd nd~iserl tlic minir;tem not only 
to adopt Port~~gal as thc h s c  of  opcrntions in tlie Peniiisula, 
but to  ascume in rcnlity thc ~vliole administratiun of that 
muntry; to dram fortli al1 its resotirccs of men and money, 
snd make up any deiiciency by tlie polver oE Eiiglannb This 
advice h d  h e n  neglected, anUd tm ciitirely difirent pulicy 
pursned with a fccblc and unccrtnin cxccution. 
Likc most coris-titutlons springitig from thc fcurld sptem 
thnt of Portugal m s  cxccllcnt for defence, biit oveni.liclmcd 
by abnses. It wns a fa~ourite maxim that it did no$ become 
R paternal government to  pnnish ncglect of duty. I'Lien 
wurt intripcs wcre to be effwbd, or poor men to be 
oppreased, tliere wiis no want of vigour or of severity; but 
in tho dministrntion of nfhirs it wns consillered suficient to 
givc ordm nritllout lookins tn tlieir cxeciition, und no animad- 
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vercion, much less punisliment, followed disobedience. weak- 
ness cliaracteriaed tlie government-tlie taxeq partidly levied, 
prmlaced anIy Mf their juñt nmount-the payments from the 
trmurp werc in rrrrcnm-the a m y  was ncglccted in al1 tliinga 
deliendent on the civil arlrnini~tmtion, anrl a brrd navy was 
kept up at the cost of a qiiiirter of a million t o  meet x wrrr 
witli Algiers. Tlie lnst matter wag however a knifc with a 
doubIe etliyei-for peace invohed s tribute prrid in coin which 
drained tlie treasury, and in war the fleet did riotliing; the 
f e d n g  of Lisbon, and still more of Cdiz, wwns tlius renrled 
precarious. In commcrcinl nffuira thc iisual Pcninsulnr jenlomy 
wn.4 rlisplnyed; thc irnport of British gooda ww proliibiterl 
t o  thc advantage of miig-g.ler~i, wliile the government, ncglglect- 
ing ita own resources to  the injury of LotIi eountries, was 
clamorous for pubsidies. Pinally, the power of tlie Xouras 
was so gwat and the regency so entirely suliservienf to them, 
tliat, dtlinugh IMr. 8tuort lirrrl h e n  assured by Canning tliat a 
note forbirlcling Domingo Soura to medrlle with tltIair8 i ~ t  
Lisbnn had Gcen procurcd from tlic Brazils, a11 reprcsentntions 
t n  the rcgeticy were still niet hy refcrcnces to tliat nohlemran, 
who wks in bndon! Tlie business of the miasion n-as tliiis 
paralysed. 
In Afnrcli, 1809, the British govemment took ten thousnnd 
Portupese troops into pay; in Mny twenty thousand; in June 
thirty thousnnd. Their cost, aticled to tlie subsidy, amounted 
to tivo millions aterliag; but p r t l y  from negligcnce, prin- 
. cipally from poverty caused by Cunning's pmdinnl donntions 
t o  Spain, thc subsidy ms in arrears. TIiia licing howcvcr in 
unison with thcir own rnetl~od did not much disturb tbe 
regency; but they were esger t o  obtain a lom, in the diqasnl 
of whieh they wuuld have been quite uncontrollcd, and for 
t b t  reason MelIington strenuously oppased it. In revcnge, 
by wilful misinterpretations of tlie debates in ~iarliament and 
the clistortion of fmts the repncy assniled tl~a sincerity of 
England; and t l~e  JVhigs, encournging dl Po)ortupcse malcon- 
tenta and clamoiiring ,justly q-ainst thc ministem, but iinjustly 
against the geneds, p t l g .  a ~ ~ p e n t e d  the disorder of the 
timm. In 1810 after Mr. Qiining bad, happily fer the 
country, lost liis ofice, lord WeIlesley changed the rlip1omatic 
btructione. f l ie  envoys arnd agenta were tlien t o  make can- 
ditiom ss to the suppliea, and in Pertugnl were to medclla 
witli civil chnws, nugmentations of revenue niid militory 
rcseurces, e ~ c i i  to demanding monthly repnrts of the condition 
5f the troops und the cxpcncliturc of the aribsiily. Lord 
Wellealey also> tliinlcing the Spanish Cortes might excite a 
desire f o r  more temperate government in Portugrsl, was willing 
to forward a climtnge provided old forms were prmemed, antI 
that it ahould nppear to flow from the crown. hsistnnce t o  
the enemy, 11e said, wonld be in proportion to tlie peaple's 
attaehment, md it \vas dviaable, to mnke timoly cancessions, 
giving no more thm wns nbsolutely necessary. 
This notion of a Cortes mas ill-reccivcrl by the regcncy. 
hlr. 8tna~b ~ n d  lord Wellingbn Asa nffirrned that the people'a 
docility and liatred of the Frene11 were si~fficient for action. 
Ttie time maq .pei.haps incon~enient, the people certsinly did 
not desire tliis revolutionayv rneasure, wliich, as Spin proved, 
would not necessarily liclp tlie war, and TVeUington, looking 
onIy to m i l i b y  succesa, acted oonsistcntly; but the Eiiglisli 
cnbinet clib~lnyed wondrous nbsurdity. The rni l i tq  con- 
~cription in Fmce,  nuthorixcd by the Iam, mri they snjd an 
nnlieard-of tyranny l In F'othigd thrat conscription, enforced 
by foreigners, irns a &se measure! h r d  Wclbsley, ~clcltnow- 
ledginl: the Portuguese government to be Larsli oppressive 
wenk and cnpricims, wafi yet content to withliold from tbe 
people, expressly Liecxuse tIrey l o v d  tlieir country and were 
obediont subjects, la better system wlii& 'ha wouId bavt? 
gr~bnted them if tbey h d  heen1 unrirly nnd of doubtful 
pritnotism ! 
hír. Stuart in concert with lord Wellingfoe diligently 
laboured to remeay the evils of the hour, but whenever tlicp 
eomplained OS any psrticular disoder, thep mere offcrd arbi- 
tmq pwer €0 punish, rtn expedient to render Ilie British 
oriious to the people, and tlierefors refuseil. The intrigiies of 
the fiddilgm were now appan?nt, nnd the first regency was 
br0lre.n up in 1810. Das Minas retired nnder pr~text  of ill 
Iiedth, hut renlly bectrutie hc could not upliold oiie De Mello, 
a fidrilgo oficer, thmst f o m r d  to oppose the autliority of 
Beresfod; C~primo Freire was then made minister of finance 
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and of Eoreign affairs, and Forjas, secretary at war with a 
vote in the regencp on rnatters of war. Tlie fomer soon 
resigned from some dispst, and the coiide nedondo htfving 
undertaken the office, commenced, witli tlie advice of Ifr. 
Stunrt, tb bctter arrangement of tlie tues, esliecially the 
'dc&v:o' or income ttax, an impoct neitlier imprrrtially nor 
strictly cnforccd on thc rich town~i, nor on thc powedul people 
of the fidalilgo fnction. Tlie clc~gy also cva(1cd thc impo~ts, 
and the British mercliants, dtliougli profiting enormnusly 
from tlie war, gonght exemption under the factory privileges 
from tiie taxes, wwEiich in certzin cases tliey couId legally do; 
d from tlie liilleta and recrtiiting lnivs dec t ing  tlieir ser- 
mlits, \r,liicli they coiild not justly demand when all utlier 
classes in thc communjty werc linlilc, 
r l l i i s  orgnnizntion of tlic rcgrncy mrizi soon chnnhped I)y the 
worlring of tlie Soum in tlie Rrnzils, where tlie finmce 
minister desired to have tIie regulation oE tbe Portupiese 
treamry. Freire's resigliation ivm tlierefore not accepted, 
Iletlondo was excludcd froiii tlre regency, and Forjas, tlic most 
cficient mernlier of tlic government, was Jeprived of a11 Iiis 
furickions. Tlie remaiiiiiig membew proliossd Go fill Das 
Minns' mcnney, but Iord Wellingtcin resista1 on thr. fi~ountI of 
jllcgnlit,y, wliicli woulrl involve Iiim in an inilcfcnsible qunrr~l 
witli tlic Brn~ils. Tlie remo~nf of Redondo and tlie disriiiasnl 
of Fur j ;~~ 3ie in concert witli ;\ir. Stiiari witllstood, and thus 
for tlie moment stapped a chmge rvIiicli rvot~l(l. have jmpeded 
the amcliorations bcpn;  but tlic finances were so disordered 
t h ~ t  O&. 8tuaLt ns tlie least difficulty prgosed to t&e tlie 
whule Jirectioii on ltiniaelf, Englnnd iieing re~1)onsiblo for 
sums tcquired. Lord Wclliiigton tliought tliia could ouly be 
done by nasriiiming thr. wholc govemmcnt, wliicli Iie Iiod pr* 
vioiisTy nílvised biit jiidgeiI it now too late. Otficr ~ifirings of 
misciiief soon bubblcd iip. Lord Strangford, in rewnrd for 
liis diplomrttic dexterity nbuut tlic DruGoik-strect deqtatch, 
liad bccn rippointecl minister plenipotmtiary at the Iirnails, 
and fuiled not to justify Lis previous cliarncter forintrigue. Tlie 
policy of the EngIi~h general niid Mr. Stunrt was to kecp tbe 
regency permnncnt, imd the crccrdnrintrc in thc hantls of 
Xdondo and Forjas, mcn who co-operated best with tlie 
Britkli nukhorities. h r r l  Btrangford soon intimated tliat lie 
had persuaded the pinte to dí1 the English envoy at Lisbon, 
the coiidr! Ecdondo, doctor Yogueira, and tlie principal Xouza 
to tlie ola regency; to aplioint admira1 Berkelcy naval com- 
mandar-iu-diief; xnd to direct tliat nI1 tmitorous correqon- 
dcnce should l e  provcnted, and tlic exuberiint power of  sub- 
orclinntxs lirnitctl. Tliis Iast rtrticle was ninior1 nt  Fo jns,  and 
the wliole dmignerl to g i ~ e  prcpanriemnce to +,he Souxrili : even 
tlie envoy's appointment, settlcd by lond Strangford bcfore he 
knew <if JIr. Villiers' recal1 and rlesigned to give thc lntjter 
power, not Mr. Stuart, hsd the aame view of favouring that 
pernicious frtction. 
Tbis chznp, althoiqli very offensive, was sulimitted to b ~ i  
tlie Engtisli pner:il atid by the envoy to svoid iiri aIipearnnce 
of disregarding tIie prince regeni'fi riglits; Mr. Stuart mns 
howc~cr nvcisc to join a ~ovcrnment wlicrc a divcrsity of 
vicm,s cxi~t~erl, withoiit nny cnsting votc nr controlling power; 
and onIy yicldcrl to tlic mirihcs of tlic gcne~d wlio jutrtly tiiougllt 
his gresence would obviate much &l. Nogneira's qpointment 
was by lord Strangforrl cd.lled a tribute to  ciemocracy; wvliereau 
the real object was to sap tlie power of tliose secretariats wliicli 
Welliiigtori snd Stuart wcro labouring to up110Id. But lord 
SLrninrigford prided hirrisclf cliiciiy on tlie apliaintment of  prin 
cipal Souzn, wlio lind, he said, hehecn rccommcntled to Iiirn by 
Mr. ViIliem, n confcsriinn ~ h o w i n ~  thc sccret spirit of tlic nr- 
rangement;. For flie principal, wliile in R suhodinate situntion, 
hnd a l ivn~s  opposd the Britisli autliorities in Portugal, W L ~  
the ar.o~ved enemy of Deresford, the contrivcr of al1 confnsiun, 
and known as tlie most niisclievous person in tLe kingrlom. 
So peinicioua indced hatl been his proceedings tliat lord 
Wellmley and Mi. Strinrt forrndly intimatcrl to Iiim tliat liis 
nhseuce from Portupl m dcsini.lilc; imd nnw Iic mq nmd 
witli ndditionnl pewcr hy lord St,rnn$ord'# diplornncy, wl~icli 
fendwl in effcct to  ruin tlie &use he hatl becnsent t o  tlie Ri%aile 
t o  support, 
h r d  Xtmn$ord in mnouncing tliis change described him* 
sdf as a voInntary agent; but in a siibsequent despatch he 
afirmed ttat Mi-. Caiining had ilirected him to press tlie a p  
poi~tment  of tlle Englkh envoy as s rrgent; ancl h t  Nogucira's 
appointmcnt ww thc prince rcgent's own \vill. In liko man- 
ner ivhcn lord WelleaIcy wna intent to asscmblc n Poi.tupese 
Cortes, lord Strangfnrd ~ l l c d  it ' a ywat a d  essentidmuwrs 
slronyly and &sdy a~$qecf hp tAe govmmmt,' yet zfierwmds 
acknoivledged that Iie neglected to press it, bemuse he thought 
it 'useerrs and even 7mrlfiLI.' Sbis inconsistency reiiders it 
diflicult tci dekrrrlinti on wliom tllese itfiiirs rested. As mffect- 
incj- Mr. Citnning's ~iolicy, if he a r r n q d  the cliatige, liia ubjcct 
was to put &Ir1' V i l l i c ~  in tlie rcfrcricy; not witli n vicw 
to control Portugal for thc pi~rposcs of wnr, birt, the 
iustr~ictions to Crntloek prove, to m w e  a prcponderance 
to thc clipllomatic department over the rnititary chief in that 
country. 
Lord Wcllin$on had mrnestly aougtit a betkr anangement 
of tlie financia1 system-tlie executian of th lxws witliont 
fuvour to tlre fidalgos-tho supprmsioli of tlie jiinta di vivres, 
a neglige~it md fruudulcnt hoarrl for which 11% n j s l i e r l  to mtab- 
lish u Pnrtu(gucsr: commissarin&tIic due mpply of provisiom 
nntI storc~, for the nationnl trnops nnd ~ O I % T B S R C + ~ ~ ~ C  consoli- 
dntion o€ tlie arsenal clepartmcnt itndcr one head-the forrna- 
tion of z milihry chest distinct from thc trcasirry wllicli was 
dways diiverting the funds to other purposes-tlie enirircing 
regulntions about military tranqorb-thc repairs of roads nnd 
I-iridges-tiie reformation o f  the l ~ o s p i t a l s ~ t h e  succouring of 
tlie starving people, rind t,he revi\-al af wiculture in the 
pafts desol;ttetl by the war. He hd Lope vf suocess utíl 
lord iStrangforc1 effcctcd l i i ~  cliangc, liut thcn unceasing 
mimonious dipputea cnsuctl witli tIic govcrnrncnt: md no 
speciea of falsel~oorl or intripc, not evcn personal in~ult and 
the writing o£ anonymous tfirmtening letters wwe #pared by 
Uie k u z a  faction. In tlie beginning of lS lZ  they h d  
orgrinizcd an anti-Engliñli paty,  and a lilot was laid to iorm 
tlle Rritish out of tlie country; which wodd have sacceeded if 
less vigilnnce liad lieen nsed by lb. Stuar4 or less vigour of 
control by lord Wellington. The exemition of  this hnpcroua 
conqirncy homcver requircd tlie pntrbrcli's prcscnco iii ths 
northcrn pmvincc~t, whi cli Mr, Stuart always dextemusly 
prcventeil, znd so savcd thc musc. 
Lord WelIington's com plaints, accompanied wtli a demnnd 
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for tlie remolwl of principal Xmzx, rmE1ed the Brmils in 
February, 1811, and Dw as'in.w died nbont tlre ñnmc timo; 
but tlie Souzu's fzction ivwe 80 po\verful at Rio Jnneiro, tliat 
in Xay tlio prinec announccd his np~ñovnl of tlieir proceedinp 
nnd his high dispIwure with Forjas and Nr. Stiiart. A ~ R  
mini~t~cr tho conde de Enliiircs wrotc, tliat the captnre of 
Massena and his army, mliich he daily expectcd to hear of, 
would not compexqate the devostation of the counf by the 
allies; and officidly to lord StrangFord lie declarcrl, tlmt the 
prince would not permit &fr. Stiia1.t to vote on tlie i n t e d  
pvernment because lie rronsulted pcrsons suepcctcd of tlis- 
nffcct.jon: nn cxprcsriion rcfcrring, lord Stren,nford said, ~ o l c l y  
to  Forjns. Tlic prince also wrotc tu Wellington, c h q i n g  MF. 
St,uart with acting aeprntely and rnischievously so a.3 to  pro- 
duce the factions complnined of; and unlesa he were remlled 
&m shou1d remain in power: Forjas, he said, the real 
oppoiient of tlie Eritisli and miist conie to the Rmila  tu 
m w e r  for his conduct : finalIy hc would write in Iiko straXn 
to tlie king of Enpland. In reply to tliis roya1 intemperante 
lord Wcllinghnn proposcd tn qiiit Pnrtiigp1;- June. 
Forjas rcriigncd,-thc cnvoy and t hc  admird 
decilled to do so likewise, anrl the lattcr withhdrew from council 
until the pleasure of the English cnbinet was made knom.  
The war waa then on tlie point of bcing enrled rvitliout the 
public being awrire of tlie crisis, betiause Wellington kept the 
mattcr secret to avoid clisturbanee, and iii hopw tlle prince 
would finally yicld. But nam otlier cm2inwassments were 
auperaddcd, snficient to dnsh nsidc h g c s  of continuing t,he 
war even tliougli t,lir! intrigue@ nt Rio Jnncim ~hhnuld be 
abateted. Forjaa, Pu'og~eErn, and &dondo hnrl been mpported 
rtgninst their cnaniies bccause they were the bcrit public men 
to be found; but, tainted alilíe by national hnbits and the fear 
of ultimate consequences, they oontinualltlly tliwarted the urccu- 
tion of measures they hnd agrwd to in council. MQ dellnquent 
was ever punislied, no fortrcss ever stomd in dne time a d  
quantity, the suKcring peopla were uncnrcd fer, dimrdei-s mere 
unreprcsscd, thc troops wcrc stsrvcd, thc fidnlgos favoured, 
thc junta de vivercq supportcd, the formntinn nf a militrsry 
cliest and commiasariat delayed: wild and foolish scl~emea 
W& dnily browhcd, znd the mt.ura1 wenkness of the pvern- 
ment was increased by i ts instability, becanse the prince 
re@ wrly in 181 I intimater1 au intcntion of i~umetliately 
returning to Europe. 
To tlie Erlvourite mnxirn wítli tlio regency, thxt a paternal 
govcrnmcnt shoulrl not punidi delinqiicnts ia the public 
scrvice, ma.g nom mrldcd nnotlier more pernicioiis, nurncly, tlint 
t l ~ e  Portuguese troops coiild thrivc under primtione of food 
which would lrill rnen of another mtion. WitL tliese two 
follies they excused neglect, whenever denjing tlie rieglect 
becltme fatiging. Collisions in tlie tiiarket betwcen the 
Eritisli commivsariat and tlie juntri de viveres were frequent 
and hurtful; for tlic formcr, ahIe $0 outliid anrl more in fcnr 
o€ fniliirr, o\,crhoiight thc Intttr ; ~vhicli contrn~t~cil t ie m a l 1  
apliere of their d iv i ty .  Lord Wsllirrgton was also preventer1 
feeding the whole Portuguese nrniy liimcelf by a curious 
obstacle. Ha depended for tlic supprt of his o ~ v n  troops upon 
tlie Xpi~nidi muletews attacIied to the army; tliey wem the 
lifc and sustenancr! of  the wrar; und tlieiiu 1iatient liarrlitiess rand 
fidelity t o  thc Biitkh wcrc rcmnrlrablc; but hlicy abhmrcrl thc 
Portufiiiese peoplc rtnd \vnuId not carry provisions for tlieir 
goldiers : t h i r  scrvices could onFy be ol~tained for the native 
brigacles attachcd Go the English divisions by making them 
think t11e f o d  was entircly for tlie Inttcr. Upon such nice 
mxnngement cwn iin apparently ttiiling matterx dirl tliis wvar 
deperirl. Pet it is not uiiconimoli ror politiciana, veraed ouly 
in tlic cImi,ssic pt~erilitics af public seliools antl tlic trieks oT 
p r l i n m ~ n t a r y  fnctiw, t o  hoIJ the ruggerl experience of 
Wcllin,rrton's camp ns nothing in tlie fortnation of a states- 
man! 
Yery soon and severeIy mere the e!Tects of tliis complication 
of evils fclt. Abrrintea i v w  lilrc to ba uliandoncc1 frum \id 
whilc Massenn hcld Snntmcm; the Portiiq~csc troops   ve re 
atnrvcd diiring tliat gcncrnl's rrtrcnt, Rcrcsford's operatinng 
En tEe Ai~mtgo were also irnpcded, and Lis hospitals left 
mithout succour. At Fuentes Onoro amtnunition failecl, and 
the Portuguese artillery l ~ n d  to pick up t11e eiiemy's Iiullets; 
the cnvnlry of tliat nntion wes entirely ruhed; nntI of more 
than forty thonsand regular troops formd by Beresforri, 
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only nineteen tliousand were under ams after the linttle of 
Xlliircm: &Le rest had deserted or died from cxtrcmc wnnt. 
WLcn lMnsscnn rctrcatcd, tho provincid orfi.anianhion oE the 
country was restord, anrl sced corn furnislied by MI-. Stuart 
on the credit of tlie subsidy; an amnesty foi deserters wns 
azso publishetI, the feudal irnposts for tlie year were remitted, 
aiid fairs were mhbIislierl tu  supply tools of hsbandry. But 
rio peak W ~ B  tlie niisery tlmt at Caldas eiglity persons died 
dnily; nnd nt li'jp~cmq, where twelve thousimrl people, chiefly 
fmm Prirtugucse Estrmii~li~ra, had tnlren rcfiigc, tFie dnily 
deathn were abeve a hundred : the whole would hnve perislied 
but for the active lieue~olence of mnjor Von Linstow, an 
oficer of finnt's staff. Banda of robbers mcrc so numerous 
tht military pcrsons could riot trawel 011 service in safehy, and 
it was feared t,roolis muct be employed te acour tlie country. 
Ofimrs on rluty w m  insnltcd dnily, ~ n d  cvcn assnssiiintcd in 
Lislion with impiinity, tlic wliolc army wns dis,wtod, nntl tlic 
Ietters to England were engendering a dislike to tlie war. Tlie 
Rritish solrliers mlien not witli tlieir regirnents comrnitted 
mriny outrages on tlie lines o£ commuiiication, snd as a climnx 
of misery tlie Iiarvest fniled in Portugal and in EngL-tud. No 
m muld Le got hom tlto Baltltic, hceusc tliere wnr, no specia 
to puy for it and hilla werc rcfuserl; Iicncc fnminc, &rc and 
wnstlng, prmilcd, until Yr. Stuort ohhincd lcavc te liccn~e 
fifty Aincrican wrn veasels, wliose cargocs werc pnid for prtly 
by Englkh charitable donations, partly by a pnrliamentary 
pmt  pnssed wlien Nasscna retrenkd. 
Li tliis crisis tlie Britisli cabinet p f e d  an additional sub- 
sidy te Portugnl; but tlio greatcd purt was af necesvity paid 
ia Irind, rtud tIic ciistrcss of tIic rcpncy for inoney mns sairecly 
lmscned; for thcsc mpplica merely atoorl in the place of 
t l te  plunder mhich hnd liitlierto premiled in the country. 
TLvs Mr. Canning's prodigality, hlr. Viinsittart's paper system, 
and Mr. Perce~-aI's wonomy, aU combiued to press upon the 
Dritisli general; to use liis own words, he was supplied with 
only onesixth p& d tlie money newsnry to keep the great 
mnchinc going which hnd been ~ c t  in motion; nnd in n w e r  
to l i i ~  rcmonstranws, n ~ocrctny nf tlic Trasury mas cmployed 
ky >fr. Perccval t o  prove in u Inboured paper, founded upon 
falsc data, that the a m y  liad becn over-snpplietl and mnst 
hnve moiiey ku sliwe.-Tliat rninister, whose speeclics wero 
big \iitli the final destruction of Frrancc, wat3 tlieri iiitent to  
confinc the cfforta ofEng1:lnnrl to thc dcfcnce of Portugnl witliout 
regcrd to tlie rest of tlie Peninstiln! 
Amoiigst tlie follies of tlie Portupese rcgency m,w a 
resolution to issne proclainations, fined with bonilmtic adula 
tion of tI~ernselves, vulgar abuse of tha  Prencll, nikd :~Itogeblier 
unsuited to tlie ol~ject o l  rnising tlic puliliu fccling, ~ ~ I i i c l ~  
flnggcd undcr tlicir 83fitcm. To tlic Englgli~h gencml'a rcmon- 
strnnccs on tliis hcnd, Ferjns rcplied, that pmis~ of thcrnsel~cs 
and abuse of the French m s  thc natioml custom and codd 
not be dispensed with! English miters mho llave implicitly 
fdlowed the accounts of tlio Portuguesa autliol-, such as 
Accursio de Nevea u i d  men of liis stump, wletive to Frencli 
cnormities, wouId do wcll to considcr t l~is  fnct. An<l hrrr it 
mriy be xemnrked, tliat 50 many cornplaints were made of tho 
cruelty comrnittcd by Massena's army d i l e  at XHntamm, t l in t  
lord WelIington bad some tliouglits of reprisals; but liaving 
lirst caused strict inquiry to be nrade, i t  wi~s  dis- 
cavercd that in most cases, the w d m ~ w ,  dter M$$. 
baving submitted to  the Frencli md received 
tiicir protcction, toolc ndvantngc of it to dcstroy tlie mtmqglcrs 
and srnlill cletachments, and thc melty complained of was 
ünIy the inffictian of legitimnte punisliment : thc projocted 
rcttdiation was therefore dianged for an injunction to the 
m-&nanqcw to cease such \vadarc. 
Faitliless and Eoul as tho regency's conduct ~vaa on al1 
subjeds, it wnrr morrt opaily dispInyed in rcfcrcnce to tlie 
convention of Cintra. Al1 bcnefitc insured to Portiig~l wcte 
complacently awcptcd, al1 pointa nffeding Rnglnnd's chnmcter 
overlookerl or annulled. In violation of tliat treaty Prcnch 
residents jn Lisbon were cast i n b  loatlisorne dungeons witli- 
out offenoa clinged; and in respect to the count lfwcnrheiias, 
wn~ton cruelty and usdcsa treuchcry wcre alike exliiliited. 
Tliis youth, whcn fifken yenrs old, h d  with mnny otherrs 
cntcred the Frcnch ~crvice in Junot's time, bit& ivith thc pcr- 
miaqion of his own priiicc, Fíe and Si~l~rignl were mptured ia 
1810, plissirig from BIacsena's axmy to Spnin,-Xabupi ia 
unifam, Mesc~rl~eiins in disguise. Reing tried for trcnson, 
tlie fimt, a genera1 mith friends amongst tlie fidd, -08, WM 
acqnitted, which was just : but he was inimediately employed 
nnder tlie regency, which mas dispecful  and tlic result oE 
faction. Mascarheñas, a, hoy witliout poveverful {rienda, was 
condemned t o  denth! Lord Wellington and hfr. Stuart 
irnpugned the justics o€ the scntence, nncl desired, if liumanity 
werc unhmlcd, i,hnt hc might hc cxccuteil as n spy for heinfi 
dispiacd, as tliat would obvinte tlic danger of reprisnls nlrcndy 
menaoerl by 3hseua. Tlie boy's rnotlier and sistcrs provelling 
in the dust implored mcrcy of the regency, but thot body toId 
tlie miserable lvornen tIiat the British general and enroy 
demnuded liis denth, nnd tIicy wcro sent with thia brutal 
falsetiood to wcep antl wlc grwe ef t l io~e i d o  lrrid no power 
to grnnt if. Mnscarlicúas mas publicly cxemted a trnitor 
for entcring the Frcncli scrvicc undcr thc anthority af his 
native prinoc, while Sslmpl w a s  aqttitted nnd rewnrded, 
altliougli precisdy in the same circumstances when $he excuse 
of the disguisc liad been rejectcd I 
In 1610, one Corea, cnlling hirnself an aide-de-camp of 
Masenq WF seixed in dispise within the British lines. He 
gave useftil inhrmation, nnd wns kept iin St. Julinm t o  pro- 
kct him from the Portuguesa government, Becoming de- 
rranged hc arts rclensed, wlierenpon t,hc rcgcncy dcsircd ho 
niigl.lit he scnt as a prisoncr of mr t o  EngIantl; tliiis for can- 
venience admitting the principie which they Iiad rejected when 
honour and humnnity ivere concerned. A process ngainst 
d'Alorna ~ms dso commenced, but hi famiIy w a s  too 
powerfd ; yet tlie government refuserl madarnc d'Alorna leave 
to  join her l i u s h ~ d ,  thus sliowing tliemsclves spltefuiil and 
contemptible m welI as cowardly and bloody. E~rcn the 
court ox Brarril wns shoclred; the prlncc rebnlrcd thc regcncy 
aevcrcly for tho dcrith of blnccxrhcñns, revcmd thc scntcnccs 
on somc othera, anrl bnnislicd Srrbugal to Terceira. 
Tliis was the politicd strite of Portugal. 
Lord Liverpool's intimatiorr, tliat. neitltm corn nor speeie 
cwld be lind from England, tbrem 'RrelIington on hi oivn 
resourcesi for feeding Lis trmp. Be hrid created a paper 
monq  by me- OP commissariat bille paid rep ldg  bit 
certain l>criods, wliicli passed witll tlis peoplplc whcn thc 
nationd bonds callcd 'apolocic~' wcrc nt an cncirmous dis. 
coiiiit. He now in conclcrt mitii 3fr. Stiiart cngng~d in mm- 
merce t o  supply his necessitiea. Por having ascertained that 
gmin in different parts of tlie world, especially in South 
Bnierica, could be bought by bille clieaper tlran it i8 sold 
for hmzl msh in Lisbun; aud tIiut in Egpl  riltliough only to 
hc htniglit with spccic it mus at a rcducud price, thcy cm- 
ploycd agents t o  purcliase for tlie army accoiint, nnrl aker 
filling tlie mngazines soId tlie overpliis t o  tlic inliabitan~. 
TLis trnnsaction was Jioiuevcr impetlcd by tlie disputes with 
Nortb Amerim, ~vliich were now rapidly hastening to a 
ruptura; nnd Amcrican sliips frequenting tlie Ta,..us, being 
prcventcd by tlie non-importation nct from Iirlnging hn& 
mcrelituidise, n-erc forccd t o  dcinmd coin, m1iich lielpetl t o  
cTrain the country of specie. 
)fr. Stuart could obtaia no waistnnce from tlie Endish 
niercliauts of Lisbon to airl a tntfic iiiterferi~ig ivitli tlieir 
profits. \171crcferc hc wrotc circular Icttem to tlie coneula ia 
thc Mditcrrnncrtn, and in tlic Portngucfic islnnds, and to thc 
EngIisli ministcr at ITmhington, desiring them to negotiate 
trmcury bills, t o  increasc tlie diipmcrits of corn to Lishon, 
anJ pay 6 t h  new bills to be invested in t,he articlcs of Britisli 
manufacture still permitted by tlie non-imliortatiun law to go 
to ~lmcricn. Shis cummerce, wliicb WclIington truly olisetved 
tvnq not \vhnt ouglit to hnve occupied liis timc md i~ thnt ion,  
snvetl tlie. army nnrl the people wlien tlie proceedinga of MF. 
Perwvd would linve destmycd both: yct it \vas cavillerl at; 
md cenmred by the ministers on the rcpresentntions oE the 
rncrclinn~ sitli whose exorliitant pins it lutcrfered. Thwe 
ncmimuliited dificulties aecl tllr: mnt uf udequnte support in 
Englnnd cnusotl: tlic Englisli gcncral scriously to  tliiilk of 
quitting Iiia commiinrl. Riit wlien Iie reffcct~d thxt i t ms 
more an Engrlish than a Peninsiil~ caiise,-tliat tlie French 
embilrrassments rnight be greater cven than ]lis own,-tlat 
Napoleon, gignntic ns liis cxertions lid been, wm searcelg 
n\van: of al1 tlie dificulty of conqueñng wliile an EngIish 
army helrl in Portugal, and that light was brcnking in tlie iiorth 
on tlie clinnczs of wnr tlicrc, Iiis nicntnl b e  pcrmived a eorninp 
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glory anrt he rekcmpercd liis mighty cne rn  to  hcar the l ) ~ i f c t  
of tho tempcst. 
Birt mnny ohstnclm chokccl his path, nnd yet he coiild not 
etnnil ~till  Iwt the ground sliould open benetith his feet. Xf 
1ic moved in tlie nortli, fiIarmont and k s i k r ~ s  wwere there t o  
oppose tiim, nnd t e  must tnlre C i u d d  Rodrigo oor lilockade it 
hcfore hc coiilcl acivance apinst tliem. To tnlce tliat place a 
bnttering-trnin w t ~  tu bc lirouglit through a Inountainoua 
coiintry from hmego,  and there ivas no covering position for 
the army during tlie siege. To blilockade and pws it woulít 
so wenkcn 11is forces, alreacly Xcrior to the enemq-, tlint be 
coulrl do notl~iiig eihctual; antl then Soult vould again 
aclvance from Llcrcnzi, and pcrIia1is ndd Elvm to Tiis fvrmer 
contlurnto, Tu nct un tbe deikndve in Beirn, snd invade 
A~idulusin iri concert with RIiil<e, Bcbwines, Grdinm, and the 
Jf~iiircinns, whilc Joxcpli'ti nlxcncc pnml-cd tlii: nrmy of tlic 
centre,-while tlic army of Portugd wm hcing rc-orgnnixd 
in Castillc, nnd Suchct engagea ~ritli Tamgonn, woiild hnve 
bmn nn opcrxtion suihblc to circuinstances. But then 
htlajus must linvc heen bloclraded witli a force abIe to meet 
the army of tht? cciitrc ; anrI the Portiig~ese govcrnrnent Iizd 
so reduced tlie nirtire forcca that n sufficient a m y  t o  en- 
countcr GoiiIt, woirld na t  hnvc rcmaincd. Henee, ufter tbe 
hattlc of Albiicrn, t l i c  only tliing to bc clonc ww 60 rcncw t11c 
~ i e g e  of Badrtjos. It contained the enemy's bridge cquipnge 
and batteriiig-train, x11d on ordinnry military calcdati.tions 
could scnrcely he espected to fnll before Soult and Marmont 
woidd bri~ig auccuur; liut it was oriIy by reducii~gr it tliltt 
Portugal itself could ba secured beyond tlie ~ireciiicts oF 
Lisbon, rinrl a bnsc for furthcr opcrntions olifaincrl. 
Fiillowing tlic rulcs nf art, SonTt rilioul<l llave lieen driven 
ovm the moiintdns bcfore tlic siepe \vas hegun, biit tIicrc ~vns 
no time for tliis, md Marmont wns equnlly to be drcadcd on 
tlw dher sidc; w~ierefore WcIlington sought, as it ivcre, to 
match away tlic fortrcss from betiveen theni; and tliosc who 
knowi~ig Lis renl situntion censure Iiim ior tlie atteinyit are 
neitIier priernls nor stratcsmen. Tlie question \vas, wlietlier 
tlic nttrmpt sliould bc nintlc or t.hc contcst in tlie Pcninsut 
resigned. It wng made and failcrl, y& tlic Fcninsula n - ~  not 
iost; bat no argument can be thcnco dcrived, hcmt~se tIle 
attempt ratlier thnn snccesa wm requisite to kcep the wfir 
alive: rnorcover tFie Frencli did not push tlieir atrlvantnges ng 
fnr ns tlicy miglit havs done, and tEie unformeen cirmirnstane 
nF n Iargo sum of moncy h i n g  brouglit to Lisbon by privatite 
speculation nt the momcnt of failure, e n d l ~ d  the EngIiah 
gcncrnl to gnpport tlie crisis. 
THERE iis no aperation in wnr more certain thnn n modern 
sicg~ if tho mIcs of art nrc strietly followcd; antI uiilikc thc 
ancient sieges in that particular it is also different in thig, that 
no aperation is less opex~ to irregular dhng ,  because tlie 
miirse of the cngineer can neihher be liurried nor delayed witll- 
ont dtinger. Wellington knew the gicge oF Rnditjoa in f o m  
required longcr time and ht te r  mcnns tlim wcre nt liis 
dispos~l; but he wm compelled to incur dangcr d loss of 
mputation, which is loss of strength, or to adopt some com- 
pendious mode of tuking that place. TEie time he could com- 
mand, and time i s  in an sieges thc greatcst point, saEi precisely 
that wliicli tlie Frencli required to brilrg up a force sufficient 
to disturli tlie operation. Tlieir doiug so depended oa 
Narmont, whow rn11rch f r ~ m  Salamnncn te Bdqjos tlirough 
Rnños, or t l~e Gatn, cou1rI not IE stopped by Spcncer, sccing 
tha t  those defiles were commanded by tlre Frtncli positions : it 
was possible aIsa af that ssellson fo  ford tlie T a p s  near Alcan- 
tars ,  mcl more than twenty Jap' frce oiction againat Rndajos 
muld not be calculated upoa Tbc l>~ttering.-gun carriages 
w d  in Beresfunl's ~ iege  were dama@; the artillery oficera 
aslced eleven days to repair them, rind the scurity meckns of 
transport for storcs more diminishcd by carrying tlie wounded 
from Albucrx. Fiftecn dnya of open treliclies and nine days 
of fire was al1 thnt could t e  expected, and mith p o d  gunri, 
plentiful stores, and a corps of rcgular gzlipers nnd miners thia 
time would ~ T B  mfficed; but none of thece th ing were in 
mmp, and it was a lcoee jest of Pictan to say, tlixt clord 
VelIinghn ~ued  B~dnjos in forma pauperis.' 
Of thc guns, somc cnst in Yliilip the Socou.d's reign were oE 
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soft brws and fdse in tlieir bore; the shot wcre of diíferent 
sizec and the Iargest too small; thc Poi.tuguese pnners wwe 
inexperienced, tliere were but few British artillerymen, fewer 
engineem, no sappers or mincrq mrl no time to teacli t.he 
troops how to maka fnscines ancl gabions. Rcplnr npproaclies 
against the p1,lnce hy tlie Pnrrh~1ei.n~ nntI tht! Piciirinn outworks 
couFd not be nttempted; RemLrrl's linm of atittnck on the 
castle and Fort (JIiristovnI were tlierefore d o p t ~ l ,  avoiding 
the errors of tliat; general: that is to srry, tlie (touble attacka 
were to be piislicd sirnultaneoualy nnd witli more powerfd 
rnenns. Snn CIirktoval miglit thus be tnlren, aiid batteries 
from tlicnce mrc,p thc  interior of  tlic cnat,lc, mliich wns mmn- 
while to be hrcachetl: something nlso waa h n p d  from the 
inhaliitanti;, m(1 sometliiilg from the effcct of Soult's retreat 
from .klbuera, In  tliis liope tlie worlr b e s n .  Mnjor 
Xlicksoii, an artillery officer oonspicrious for tdent ,  prepared 
i v i t h  uncxpected rripitlity n battering train of thirtp twcnty- 
fr,ur porinders, foiir sixtecn-poundem, tbnd f w e l ~ e  cigllt nnd 
ten inch howitaers U E ~  as mortalyi by placing them on trucks. 
Six iron Pottupese diili-pns wcre fomarded from Salvritierrz+ 
nixking nllogetlier fifty-tivo pieces; a convoy oT engiiiscr'a 
storcs rtrrived from Ncacer do Sul; and aome British nrtillery 
w i e  from Lisboii to be rnixctl with the I'ortugiesc, making ib 
tcitnl of six hrindrcd gunners. SIic ~cgilnr cnfinccr officm 
p r ~ e n t  mcre hcnty-one in n~inilier; elcven volri1itcci.s from 
thc line wcrr. joined AS nssi~t*int engineers; snd a draft of tbree 
hundred intellipnt infnntry, including twcnty-frve wtificersi oE 
the stnff corps, strengthened tlie foroe iminedirttely under their 
cornmand. 
Hamilton's Portiigi~ese division wna nlrcndy hcfore thc t,own, 
and tlie 24th of Ma7, at t,he cloriei of cvcning, Hotiston's 
divislon, incrensed tri ftve thousand men by the seventeenth 
Portupese regiment and the Tavlrn and Lagos mflitia, invested 
San Cliristoval. Thc flyiug bridge was then laid down on the 
Gudiana, and on ttie 27th, I'icton'~ division zrrived from Camlm 
Mnyor, crossecl the river by the ford nliove the town, nnd joined 
Anmiltan, thcir united force hMng nhout ten thoitsnnd mcn. 
Tlic covering mrn y which incliirled the fipanimrda w ~ s  11nt1er 
UiIE, and sprend from Meridn ta Albuera ; thc ca~nlry prisled 
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forr~ard in obswvation of Soult; and ahen iiitelligmco nrrivd 
that Drouet was efecting lsis junction with tbat rnarslial, t i v o  
r e m e n t a  of cwdry anrt two bripdes of infantry, quartered at 
COI% as pmts of oommunicntion mith Spenccr, were callcd up 
f.o reinforce thc m~cring army. 
Phillipon hari used the respite given him to lcvel Rercdord's 
trencbes, repair bis own dnmages, and obtatn smnll supplies of 
wine and vcgetnblea from the people of Estremsdura, wlio were 
stilF awed by Soult's vicinity, Witliin the placc al1 was quiet, 
for the citimns did not nom exceed five thousand ~ o u l s  and 
when t h e  placa was inrested parties of tlie tomsmen,  mixed 
+th soldicr~i, wcrc obscrvctl vorlting to impro~e the dcfcnces. 
Whcrcforc, M rctmnclimcntfi hchind ~ F E C  jritcnrlcd p0int.q of 
attttack monld prolong the sicgr, a l n r p  telescopc was plaeed in 
the tower of La Lippe st Elvas, +tli nhicli the intcrior of the 
castle was plainly seen and al1 preplinrntions discovered. 
In the ni@ of the 29th p u n d  wris brokeii for a fabe 
attaek sgainst tlie Pardaleras; and tlie following n i k t  ~ixteen 
hundrerI workmen, lis\-ing n cavering parky of tmclvc hundrcd, 
sunlt a pamllel ap ins t  tFic cnstle on an cxteiit of cleven 
huntlred ynds, witlio~it bcing discovered by the encmy, who 
<lid not fire nntil after dryliglit. T h e  $ame niglit t w e l ~ e  
hundred in-orkmcn, covcred Iry ei$t hundred men, opened a 
parallel, four hundreti and fifty yar~ls from San Cliristovnl rind 
seven hundreri yards from tlie bridge-hearl. Ou tlris line one 
breaching and two counter batterie~ wme ruiseii rgainat the 
fort and bridge-hend to prcvont a ñnlly : a fourth bit tes  nw 
also coinmenced to search the defenoca of thc cmtlc, but the 
morlrmcn mere discovered md a heriv fim stniclc down many 
of tlicrn. 
On the 3tst the atta& againd the ca~.tle, the soil being 
very aoEt, was mpidly puslied forward witliout much interrup- 
tion; but the Cliristuval attttek, carrisd on in n rocky soil aiid 
the eartli brouglit from tlia renr, procccded ulody nnd with 
considerable 103s. This d a y  the artillerpcn from Eslion 
cainc np on miile3, and flie engheers Iimtstencd tlic works. Tlie 
direction of the parnIlel apainst the =tle madc tlie right g r s  
dually approach thc point of nttnck, by mliich the heaviest frre 
of tlie place wns avoided j yct, so gseat nas the desirc to sarve 
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time, that before tbe suitable point of dist~nce wns attained 
a battery of fourteen tmenty-four-pounders with six large 
Iioeitwrs was murked out. 
On the Christovnl ~ i d c  thc hattcriea wcrc not finished 
before the night of the 1st of Junc, for tlie rocky soil required 
that the rniner ~hihoiild first leve1 the groilnd for platforms; 
and the pirison baving mortars of sixtecn and eighteen 
incIies1 dinnieter mounted on tbe castle sent every sliell amongat 
tlie wurkuieii. Tliece tiuge migsiles woulrl Iitive i i i i n d  tlie 
batteries on thnt sirle nlt.ogethcr, if thc lottcr liad not been oe 
thc edgc oof n. r k l ~ c  friom whence mcst of the E;,":, ,f ~IicIla rolled off before bursting; get so difficuft 
t1ic s i ~ ,  is it t e  jurlge rigbtlg in war tbat PhilIipon stopped 
IUSS. this fire tfiinking it tlirown nivay ! Tlie aork IW 
also delaycd by tlie bringirig of  csrtli from a clishncc, and wool, 
packs purclinsec:erl at Elvus werc used iustend. Iiowever, in the 
night of tfie 3nd, al1 the lmtterics were coinpIcted and nrmed 
witll forty-thrce pieccs of difrcrcnt sizcs, kwcnty bcing pointeri 
agaiiist the mst1e; tlie next rlay the fire opncd,  brit the wind- 
age cnused by tbe smnllness of the sliot rendered it ineffe* 
tunl nt first, and five pieces were soon rendcixd unscrviceabla 
Towa~ds e~ening tLe pniclice bemriie stmJier, the fire of the 
fort wus neurly sileiicerl, and tlic coverirlg of  rnasonry fulling 
from the mstle wall rliscuvered a pcrpenrliciilnr bank of clay. 
Ncxt night thc pnrdlcl rigninst thc castIe w w  prolanged ond 
a battcry for scvcn pnEi t r w d  out six Iiundred md fifty yards 
from thc breach. On tlie 4th tiie prrisen's fire wtifi increased 
by =\peral arlditioad pns ,  and six picces of tlie besiegers wem 
disali1ed j tlieir batteries told &o Liut slightIy apinst tlie bmk 
of cltay. 
Cliristornl wnq now rnuch injurcd, nnd somc damngc uñs 
donc to tlie cwtle frorn one of thc tuttteriw on t h n t  ~iide; but 
tlie p u s  were so soft rtnd bnd tl~e rate of firing \vas of ueces- 
sity greatly reduced in all tlie batteries. In the night tbe nem 
liuttery was armed, tlie rlamagcd m-orka repaired, and next day, 
tlie enetny haviiig trairied a gun in Clirígtoval to  plunge iino 
thc trcnclies on tbe cnstle sidg the parallcl was dccpcncri nnrl 
tm~cmca constructed t o  protect thc troopa. Fiftcen pie@ 
still phyed @nst t h e  castle, yet the bmk of clay, although 
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falljng uway in fltlkcs, aIways remained peqiendicular : one 
rlamnged gxn was repaircd oa the Christewll sidc, but two 
morc 11d hccmc unservicenlile. 
I n  tfie night tlle paralle1 ~igainst thc ~11.4tle rnaq q ~ i n  
extended, and a fresli batkry tmcetl out fire hnndrecl itiid 
twenty j-ards from thc breach to receive thc Portuguese iron 
guns mhich l i d  arrived at Elva; on the Christo~al side aIso 
aome nem Iiatterjes were opened and some ola ones alinn- 
dorid. Duriiig tliis nig.ht thc  garrison licp11 to entrench 
themelves beliind tlic m t I o  brcach, nnd two dditional 
pieccs fmm Gliristoval plungd into the trenches Rith gr& 
cffcct. On thc othcr hmnd tlie bcsicgcm~rc hnd brokcn tho 
c l ~ y  bank, mliicli took a slopc iiwrly practicable, nnd the stmy 
sliells sct fire t o  tlie lioiises narest tlie castle, but thmc more 
guns were disublcd. On thc 6th there wcrc trvo brmlles in 
Cliristod, the principal onr! seeming practicable, and a com 
pany of grenadiers witli kwelve lddem were directed t o  assault 
it, wliile B second cumpiny tnrned tlie furt by tha east to 
divcrt thc encmy's attcntion. Thrco hundrcd mcn from tho 
trcnchcs M-crc at tlic srtmc timc puslid fomrnrd by the wcst 
sicte to cut tlic communimtion hctwccii tlie fort nnd the brirlgc- 
liead, while a detaclunent with a six-pounrler moved into the 
vdlcy of the Gebora t o  preven% any paSSAge of tlie Guadixna 
by bata. 
FIRST ASSAULT OF ClUUSTOVhL. 
Mnjoi hlcInto~h of tlic 851;li rcg-imcnt lcd fie d.nrmcw, heing 
preccded hy n forlam hope nntlcr lieirtenant Dynñ o£ the 51st; 
a~iiiid tliat V F ~  gnllant gentlcmnn, gu;ded bythe engincer Forster, 
a young man of nncommon bravcry, reaehed the glacis and 
descentled the ditcli without being discovered. The French 
i d  clemd the rubbish awafi the breach had still seven 
feet of perpendiciilar s n l l ,  and above it were pointed hanis of 
wood and cartirts dininerl tcigcthcr, lwgc shells Licing nlso runged 
along tlia rampnrts t o  rol1 down. Tlie forlorn hope finrling 
the opcning imprncticnhlc w n ~  rctinng 6 t h  little losa, ivlicn 
the mnin botly, which bar1 been cxpmcd to  a flank firc from 
the town as well II dire& fire f ~ o m  thc fort, camc 1caping 
into the ditch with lailders. 'I'hen an efod Wa8 mnde to esea- 
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Iade nt diff~rent points, Iiut the ladders mere tuo ~hort, and 
tho gnrrison, consisting of only se~cnty-five men bmides tlie 
mnnonccrs, marlc ao atout a rcsirrtanec, nnd tlic confiision find 
mischief occasioned by the bursting of the shells ww so great, 
that the assailants finally retired with thc loss of more thnii 
one hundred men. 
F d  aucccss dwnys prorlnw disputes. This fnilure m 
attributcd by sorno to tho breach boing imprncticahlo from tho 
fiirib, by utherw te  mnfusion after the mnin hody 
Lnmam's had enterid. Fsench writcrs affirm tlizt the S i e ~ .  
breacli, certainly practicable on tbe ni# of the 
5th, m not so oti tlic 6th; for, as tL hsiejicru did uot attack 
until midnight the worlcmen hd time to cIenr tlie ruin8 
emny and rnisc frcsh olistnclcs, and tlio bravcry of tlic ~oldicrrc 
who were providerI6tli three muslrets: each did tlie rest. It 
is ho~vever cvident, that from inexperiencc, accidcirt, or other 
causce, the comliina%ions for the nssn~dt m r e  not well calcu- 
lated; tlie doniiiug party wzis too ivcak, t l i ~  Itirlil~rs feew atid 
short, tlie brmch not scourcd by the fire of thc liatteries. 
TIic attnelr ivns ttlso ill-combined, for tlic Icnding froops wcre 
repulsed befom the mcin body cntmed tlie riitcl~. The i n h -  
pidity of the asmililants was dmit ter l  by al1 sides, yet it is a, 
great point in aucli abtacks thnt khs supports should form 
almost une Liotlq- witli tlie Ieadeni; t t e  sense of power derivod 
from uumbers is a strang inwntive to valoiir, aild ob~ttlcles 
insumoiintnblo to a fcw vanisli bcforc a mdtitudc. 
Dtiring tliis niglit thc iron p ~ n s  were pIaced in battery 
rgainst the castle, but two more of the bnus pieces beeame 
unservicenble, and the following day three othets were dis- 
abIed. Tlie ban1~ of clay hmevcr dopcd more, and cnptniu 
Prttton of the engineers examined it clowly; he VAS mortally 
wounrlcd in returning yct lived to report it pructicuble. Tlia 
Rcnck ns nmd clcarccl awny the ruins, and with bales of 
wool md otl i~r mnterids formed interior defenws. Tliey 
LkeGse ranged a nunibcr of Iiuge ~hel ls  and barrela oof powqler 
ivith inatches ftastend fo tliern along the ramparts, pIwd 
chosen men, ench supplied with Eour miiskets, to  defend tlie 
brmches, and in tbat order fenr1ess.p w m i t e d  another rtttack, 
whicli was soon mnrle. For intelligcncc noiv arrivcd thut 
Drouet w a ~  clovc to Llercnn, nnd Marmont on the move from 
Salnwncn, wherefore, lest tlie l i r q  should cscnpe, anotlier 
aasnult on Chri~tnwl w a q  orrlered. Tliis titne fnur Iiiinclrlred 
Rritish, PoLtaguese, and Frencli mcn of tlic Chasscnw Cri- 
tmniques, carrying cixken long laddem, were employed; the 
supports were better closed up; tlw appointed hour w n ~  nine 
instead OS twelve; and more dcttachrneiits were distributed on 
tlie right and leit to dhtract tlie enetnyk sttentiun, cut off 
his communiention with tlie town, and impmve cucoess. Fhil- 
lipon jn opposition m d e  tlie gorrison two hundred hrong. 
Major M'Gecliy commanded the stormrrrs, the forlont hopo 
WRII a g i n  Ecd by thc pllnnl; Dyas, acoompanied hy t.he 
enginecr Hunt. A littlc nfter 9 o'clock the first troops 
boundd forward, and were closely followed by the support 
d e r  a shattering muslcet.ry d i c h  IUlled NCG)eccliy, Hmt, and 
mnny men, but the others with loud shouts jumped into the 
ditch; then t te  Frencli scofingly calling to come on rolled 
the barrds of powder and shdls dom, nnd the musketry 
made fcnrful hn~oc.  The tivo lending columns unitcd nt the 
main bwnch, tlie supports nIso cnmo up, confusion arose about 
the ladders, of mhich only a few could be mred, and tlie 
enemy ptrinding on the rrimparts bayonettcd the foremost, 
orerturned the Idders, and q a i n  poured tlieir destrnctive 
fire upon the m w d  LC~OW. %%en a hundred and fortp liad 
fallen the odor to retire was givea After t l i i ~  failure tlie 
b r w h  in the cwtlo rcmnincd to be stormad; but tho stormcrs 
oould not thme gather in foroe, hetwcen thc wmrnit and tlic 
interior eotrencliment, unlcss Cl~ristoml wm tnken and its 
guns umd t o  clear the castle of obstacles; this mould h a ~ e  tiken 
s e v e d  dnya and h u l t  was no~v rcady t o  advance : wlierefore 
on the 1 s t  a bbchde  wns ~ubstituted for tlie athck. 
19 T h i ~  aiege in wliioli four hundrd men and ofticem feil, 
violated dl rulea The working parties were too weak, the 
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pns and atores too few, the point of attaclc ill clinsen; tFa 
defencea w r e  untouchsd by counter fire, and tlie brcwl~ing 
batteries were ti10 JistGnt for tlie bd guns; lioiviteem on 
trucks wme poor substitutes for mortnrs, anll thc snp m not 
pmctiscd: lastly, the assaults were mdc before the glacis 
liad been crowned annd a musketry fue established agninst thc 
lirenci. 
2'. It was not atran~e that tIie siege failed. It wns strange) 
nnd culphlc, t h t  tho IBritisli pvernincnt nftcr sucli long 
wara sliuirlrl havc sent nn cngincer cnrpc: into thhc ficlrl so ill- 
orgtlnhed and eqnipprd that nll tlia oficcrs' bravery nnd z c d  
could not render it eficient. The very tools mcd, especially 
those supplied from tlxe store-kceper general's dcpxrtinent, 
were unlit for work; tlie captiired Ir'rencli cutting iustruments 
were eagerly souglit for in preferente; and ivlicu t!if soldiers' 
livcs nnd thc honour of England's ArmS mcrc at stdcc Englisli 
cutlery wodS not lirar compxricon with Frcneh ! 
39 Want of foresiglit has also been objected t e  tlie general, 
~ I I B s ~ u c ~  as he might havc prcviously obtainecl a good batter- 
ing train from Engtnnd. Rut iii the lincs tlie coiiduct of the 
Englisli and Portuguese governments led Iiim t o  tlii~ik ratliw 
of embnrlcing tLan besirging e fronticr fortress; mereover 
the extreme bdaess of  tlie l'ortuguese guns irras not kiio~vn 
bcforc trinl, nnd thc time hctmecn Soitlt'ñ captiire of Batlnjos 
and thia s i g c  ~vns not s~~f ie icn t  for hringiiig otit an English 
battering train. It mxy also be kken as ib m s h  tlint in 
the requircnients of m r  w head  as cver strong cnougli t o  
forecalculate rrll 
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CHAPTER VI. 
~QULT'S position nt Llcrenri nfter tho linttle of Alliuern ivw 
sdoptcd witli p c n t  Icnowledge of mnr. It mas thc merit 
f~vour~Eile point for ~iecurins Droiict's junetion, anrl thongh 
cloaely rrakhrd by Rill, wliilc liis own troops were opprcr;aed 
in apirit by tIieir Iosscs rind uaruly irom want, lie maintaincd 
an ofensive attitude until assured of Drouet's vicinity, and 
then advanced to Los Santos, near ~vliich place b i s  mvxliy 
aushined some Jisatl\,antnge in n skirmish. On the 14th 
Drouet arrivcd, annd Soult, who kncm WeIlin,&n SoaIt to 
m q  expecting lrtrgc rcinforccmcnL~ from Rcirn, H ~ m o n t .  
and was deqirous to fore&ital t,hcm, rrglin ~ l -  i"bept'd. 
vanced to Fuente dd Irfiaestm, wliereupon Hill  conccntmtcd 
tlie covering t roop  at A1Lucia. Neünwhile Matmont nlio 
liad re-orgauiecd the army of Portugal in six divisions of 
infantry and five b~igndes o€ cavdry, rweived Ntrpoleoii's 
orders to co-operate witti Suult, and in tlmt view sent Beyiiier 
witli two di~isions by thc p ~ s s  of Baños, marching liimsclf 
witli a oonsidcrdilt: forcc of infiintry cavnlry and guns to 
introduce n conwy into Cit idd ItodBgo. 
UcneraI Spencer was tlicn behind the Aguerla with fonr 
diviaions of infant~g and a brigade of cni7alry; Paclr'a Por- 
tupese were nenr Alineida which liad now been renderd defen- 
silile apinst a surlrlen msauIt. Spencer'g orJers were to 
meke Lis marches correspond witli Marmont'~ jf the lntter 
pointcd tomnrds thc Sagus; but if tlio French nttaclccrl, he 
wm ta  tilke the linc of thc Con and blow tip Almcirln ~dicn 
bhc movemcnts ivent to isolate tbat fortrcss. On the morning 
of the Gth, Msrmont mamllied out of Edrigm in two columns, 
ons moving upon Qallcgos tbc other upon Espeja Tb 
Eight division fell Iiack before the latter, Slade's cava1 y beforo 
tlie formcr, but BO as b lend ita ilai*k t o  the encmy, who 
suon doacd and opencd R mnnonde from ciglit pioccs. me 
Briti~h rear-pard thus pt jiammed bctwcen tlic Fimicli and s 
nirirsh, and would have been destroyed, if captain PitrPis h ~ d  
not gdlantly cliargc-d tlie FrencL with a squ~dron of tlie ropalq 
rluring wliich the otlier troopcr~ bnviiig slrong liorsm anda 
knon-Ierls of tlie firmest pnrts got tlirougli the mnmh: M a  
thcn pns~ed nlso and tlie Prcnch homes coirld not follm. 
Tlie rctreat wa(i thus effeeted witli the lo= of only h e n t p  
men, and x h r  the rtction an oficer calling bimself liontbrun'~ 
aid-de-camp deserteir to &he allies. 
Geneml Bpencer, more xioM for intrepirlity than d i t a r y  
quickncss, wns now mcillating, anti tltn army waei ill-plncori; 
t.lx c o u n t ~  rrras covercd witli liaggage, the movernents were 
m-icle and without concert, Pnclr Liad too Iiastily destroyed 
Almeirln, and soms decided step u-as nbsolutely necessary. 
In tEUs slatc! the níljuhritgeneral Palrenliaiir oliservcrl that the 
Frencli did not n(lvnnco .m if tci @ve battle, t l~nt  lieir num- 
bers were amn11, tlieir movements more oste~itntious than 
vigorous, and probably designe4 to cover a 8.mk movement 
by the pwscs lending to tlic Tagus. He t'herefore q e d  
Spencer to assume a position of battle md thus force tlie 
onemy to discover his nurnliem aiid intentioiis, or murch at 
once to lord 'CVeUington'~ asissistnncc. Ilis views ivcre s u p  
porhd by colonel Wntcrc, who, linving becn clow t o  %he 
Freiich, eaid tliey werc too clenn ~ n t l  me11 tlrcssed to have 
come off a long mwch, ancl must tliercfore be a part of the 
grrison: he liad also awertained that a large botly wai 
puinting towards tlie passes. 
Yiclilíng to these represmtatiolis Spencer marched in the 
cvcning by Alf~yatcs to Snito, and thc ncxt [Iny crosscd the 
Coa. There certain inteiligence tl~tit Marrnont wm in tlic 
piisses reachetl liim, wherefore lie continued Iiis march to the 
~Uemtejo by Penmacor, detacliing a Jivision and Iii cavab 
to Corix ne f l d e n ,  whle  he P B S E ~  C ~ t e l l o  Branco, Vilha 
Yelhg Ni24 tand Portdrpe. Tho season was brirning, the 
marches long, yct so liarderierl and so well organized was the 
Kght dipieion tliat, oovering from dgl~teen to eight-and-twenty 
niiles dliily, tliey did not leave a single strnggler hehintl: the 
flunking trclopg who M beea mtlier unnccessnriiy exyosed at 
Coria, thcn fallowed; fin4 Nnrmont mtisficd with bis demon- 
strntion in front af CiudorI Rotlrigo filcd of f  hy thc prtss of 
Peralea, while b p i e r  moved by Bcjiar and Ratos, and $ha 
d o l e  were by forcd marches soon united at tlie bridge of 
Almaraz. A pontoon bridge expected from Madrid hd not 
arrived and tlie passage of the Tws  was =de with only one 
f e q  Iioat, wlJch ~ U S B ~  8 dclay of four drtps wnd wotiId have 
been fatal to Badajos if the allie~' batttteringpns liad bmn 
cffective. The French army then marched in tivo columns witli 
the g e a t e ~  rnpidity apon hleridn nnd Medellin, where khey 
arrived the 18th and oomniunicatcd with Soult. 
Weliington had beea att entively wntching these movc- 
ments, Be bad nwer intended to presa Badajos beyond tlie 
ZOtli, becanse be knew thnt SoulE reinforced with Drauct'ri 
divisiua would be strong enougli to mise tlie siege, hence tha 
hurried w~nnlts. But he wm resoIvcd to fi&t Soult, and as 
a deciphercd interoe~iterl Icttcr told him Pliillipon's provj~ione 
would he exhausted an the 20tI1 he continud the blockade, 
hoping some such accidcnt of war xn the delay at Almaraz 
might impede Marmont Eere it may be mked why he did 
not retrench liis camp and persist in the siege? Because 
Elvas being out of repair, anrl exliriusted of proPisions and 
ninmiinition for the a t k k  on Badajos, Soult would llave taIren 
t h t  fartress. 
Enmilton's Portupese fivision naw joined H i l h  oovering 
fom, and Wcllington wcnt io pcrson to Lllb~zcra expccting a 
battle, but tmlilre ñeresforrl, he hprd thst pnaition entrcnched 
md did not forget to  occnpy tbe heigbts on Iiis right. 
On the 14th it w w  hown that Mamont had reachd 
Truxillo mtnd would in four dajs unite with hdt, where- 
fore the Ailoclrade wns alao raised witk a view to repass 
the Guadiaw. WelIington lingered at Alliuera Iioping to fa11 
oii Soult sepwately, Iiut that ccautious cephin, aImy,s refus- 
ing IUs left and edging with his right towards Alrnendrralcjos, 
soora extinguished this chance; hencc thc bloclrndr Iicing miser1 
%he 16th the alliea repwsed the Uundiana in two columna 
tlie 17th; the British and P o r t ~ ~ g e s e  by tlia pontoon bridge 
nem Badajos, BltIkc'~ Spaniards nt Jerumenba. Tliis move 
me& not an easy one, was exccuted without loss of men or 
stores, ~ n d  witliout accident, save that; Tillinn~ Stewart by 
gome errar, took the -me line riai Blalce, and coming on tlie 
Spnniamls nt night, t.hcy thoiight his division French and w a a  
likc to linve fired. 
On the 19th tbe iiniterl French amlm entered Xacltijog 
wkcli was tlius S U C O C I ~ ~ B C ~  niter two honourable defenceg, and 
at a a m e n t  wlien Fliillipon, despziring of aid and lvithout 
provision- was preparing to  break out and eswpe. The 2lst 
P3odinot,% division ivhiclli hhn mmnhcd by Vdverdi: took pos- 
ses~ion of  Olivrpnza; tlie 22nd Ire pushd a detriebment under 
t.he p n s  of Jenimenha ; mct the next day the ~vhole of the 
Frencli camlry crossed the Guediana in tivo columns, nd~nncing 
towartls Vil18 Viciosa and RIvas on one side, and Campo Yayor 
on tlic otlier. 
But nriw fjpencer wntl come np nnd Wellington licld a pmi. 
tion on b t h  sides of tlic Gap, Iinving cnvnlry postq nczir tlie 
mowtli of tliat river and on the Oundiana in front of EIYBS. 
His riglit stretcl~ed Iicliind tlie Gaya to tlie lowest Firirlge] and 
Iiis left, hrtving a field rif b:ittle on high p u n d ,  rested uii tlie 
Gchorn a littlo bcyond Campo Mnpor, wliich mns occiipicd nnd 
the spme betn~eeii it ancl thc troop atrongly entwnched. TRe 
cat-alry mas br.yonrl the Geboia nnrl aboiit hlbuquerq~~e, and the 
whole position prescnted m irregular are emhrncing the stone 
bridge of hdnjos. TIiesood andfortifietl t o m  of ibonches wers 
a few miles beliind tlie centre, and tlie srnall fortified place of 
OugielIa waa beliind ths lcft. Tlic! right wing lieing on rvmlcer 
groiind m most nurncrous, nnd tIic hlontc l i c p i n p ,  n 
woocled rirlge hetween Campo Mayor rind the Gaya, was held 
1 the light division in reserve, but hidden fiom the enemy. 
II tlic French atkckcd tlie left 8 sliort movernent would bring 
tiie h I k  of tlie army to thnt side., for tlie wiioia pcxsitian Wa8 
not more thnn ttwclre milcs long, ttnd the communicntions wcre 
gooood. On thc open plana in fmnt, cxtending ko Cadnjos, tbe 
cnemy's 'sovementa could be distinctly observcd from G m p o  
Mayor, from Elm, and from themany atalayas or watch-towcrs 
aucieutly erected for thnt purpose. Tliis position corild no€ be 
recognised liy tlie enemy, aiid to  prevent Iiis turning it ozi either 
flnnlr tlir: Erst divisinn I\W rct~iricd nt Portnlt:pI from whcnm 
it could interccpt bim a t  Bfwao nnd Ciistello de Vide on the 
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leR, and bctwcm Estrtrcmo~ atid EIvas on thc right ; bnt it was 
too distant to rtid in ri, battle near Campo Mayor. 
Thc Frencli cavalry having passed the Cuadiana on the 
23rd in two columns, ene by ttie bridge of J3sdctjoa the othcr 
by the fods  lielow tlic oorifluencc of the Cuya, the foinier 
drove linck tlie outposts, yet lieing opposed by Madden's lioiwe- 
men and tIie heavy drqoons retired without being abla to dis- 
covm thc pnsition on thati side. Thc otlicr enltimn, moving 
towarda Villa lriciosn and Elms, cnt aff n aqnatlron of ttlie 
elcvcntli drngooes, nnd the seconrl Cerman htissm eseaped 
from it to Elvas mitli p a t  difficulty; one hundmd and fifty 
men were kiIled or taken in this affnir, and tlis Prencli avcr 
tliat colanel Lallenland drew tlie Britisli cnvalry into rrn nm- 
buscade. The ruinouru in t l ~ ~  nllied camp wero discordant, 
but no more figlitiiig occurred, antl a fruitless ntteuipt to sur- 
prise tlio English cleLqchments at hlbuquerque entled tlie 
demonñtratinnñ: thr: Frcncli marñhnls thcn qretad thcir fnrccs 
along the Guadiana from Xews de los Cavallieiroa to Nontijo, 
and proceeded to collect provisions. 
A great and deciaivc bnttIc l i d  been expecterl, and theugh 
tlie crisis glirled mvay qtiietly, Oie moment was onc o i  the inost 
dungcrous of tlie whole war. Mnmont liad Eirought down oC 
his own rtnd tho centrc nrmy n c d y  tftirty-six 
thouslind men with fifty-four guns. Soiilt carne A ~ ~ n d i x  @, 13. 6 t h  twenty-eight thousand combabta nnd tliirty- 
six guns. Sixty-fonr thoiisand fighting-men, of ivhich moro 
thnn seven thousand wers cnvalry, having ninety field-pieces 
were in lime; but to efect this Andalusia and Cnstille 
b d  beon nearly atript of troups, und B~sicrcs  had abanituned 
tlie Asturias without Iieing nblc to do mwc t h n  liold tlie 
Gallicians in cliecl~ on $110 Orlii.jo. Thc cliicf arniiea of thc 
Fcninsiila werc tlicrcfore in prcsencc, a great Iiattlo W H ~  
for the inberest of tlie Prencli, thcy h~nd tiie porver of f o i ~ i n j  
it on, and tlie repulscd msairlts at Badajos, and the c a ~ x l r y  mc- 
oess on tha Gaya had wmpeilsated for tlic defeats at Los Santos 
and Usagre; lmoa wIion Bndojos nras mccoured and tlie alliea 
forcerl linck into Portiigal ~Ubuern s e c m d  a nctory. She 
gencral wsiilh of tlie cnmpaiigri hatl tlicrcfurc bcen fnvourahlc, 
and the political state dcrnnnded some daxxling aciion. Tlicir 
army was powcrful, they were strong jn cavalry, a d  on fnvour- 
alde pound. A succesaful blow wwuld havo olvexlged &hsena 
niid ~ c n t  JTcllington to Lkbon, pcrlinps to Rndmnd; an 
nnsuccessful one ~vould llave invol~ed no serious consequences, 
because of tlieir strenfith in horse, and the nearness d Gadnjos. 
Dut tlie allied force wpposed to be strongcr t h n  it really 
was by $he wliole nuinlier of tIie Spanisli hoops, thlie position 
wns rlificnlt to hc rccognised, 1Ycllinghon sliawed n bold front, 
and no battle took place. 
NapoIeon's estimation of moral over pliysical force in war 
was here exemplified, LIamont's m y  was wnscious of 
recent defeats n t  Busaco, Sabugal, and Fucntes Onoro; the 
Iiorrid fieErI of Albuerim mas frcsli, the firrcc blcud there spilled 
still rcckctl in t,he nostrils o€ fioult's ~oId ie r~ ;  anbnrl if C z ~ r  
held it unsnfe at Dyrraccliium to risk bis .vctcmns in battle 
zRer a partial check, tiie French rnarshaI may be cxcused, 
fur there were fightiiig men ou tlle Cuya ns gaod zt al1 pints, 
and more cxpericncfd thnn thuse he met on tlie Blliuerffi. 
Soult lrncw thc rctern nntiirc o€ thc Britisli soldici, nnrl he 
could not hope here to overmaitcli the general: nevei*theieca 
Wellington's ofer of  Iiurttlc ~ w s  onc of unmitiptcd boldness, 
as tlie occasion was one o€ unmitigated peiiI. The Portupese 
gevernment hxd brought tlie native troops to t l i ~  leat dcgee 
nf misery, and thc fortrcsses u7ere rlmtitute. Tiic Engli~ih 
mbinet hnd rindcrtt~klkcn ta pny tlic native troops, not to fccd 
them, and Wellington in consequence repeatetlly refused sup- 
plies from the English stores; yet nt last, unable to endurc the 
sight of tireir misery, md to preved tliem frum disbanding, he 
took three-fourtlis on his own oornmissnriat, ctiarging tlie oost 
t o  the subsitly; but tlien tlie infiimoiis pvcrnmpnt ~ b r v e d  tbe 
remnant Iiltewise, and during thc s i g e  of Bacl;ijos it was sub 
s i s t d  from and exliausted tlie magaziiies of Elvas. Thus by 
desertien, famine, and ñickness, tliis fine a m y  wliich had pre- 
senterl farty tliousand good soldicrs undcr rima to Xusscna, 
could only prcscnt fourtccn tliousnnd sinlring rnen for a bnttlo 
on tlie C a p  when their coiantry's fnte was nt shke. 
Althongh largely reinforeed, the Britisli troops had so many 
sick and n-ountled that onIy twenty-eiglit thousand sabrw md 
liayonets were in line; wkerefore tLe Fr'reucli liatl a fourtIi. 
more of artillery and infantly, anrl twico as many cnvalry. 
To acccpt battle witli such disparity of form on moro military 
corisirlerations would lidve beeu recklesv folly; but the Purtu- 
gumo govcrnmcnt h ~ d  n e g ~ ~  thc fodrcascq ns it hnd 
tlic tronps, i~nd Elvns, Jeriimcnha, Cnrnpo Mnyor, OiiguclJn, 
Aronehes, Santa Olnyq were unprovidcd. No wrriage for tlie 
trttnsport of storea had been previrled, antnd heme the eiege of 
&dnjos hsd been neceosnrily furnislied entirely at tbe expeme 
of Elvas; Lut al1 tlie carts and animals to be found in tlie 
vicitiity anrl as far as detacliments cou!iI go, and al1 tlie per- 
manent comtnissariat mcans, scarcely sulliced to  convey ammu- 
nition-atares nnd subsistenca for thr. Porbuguesc troops di17 by 
clay frorn E l v ~  to tlic sicge; nnd it wns im1~nsaihfc ta replncc this 
mnmirnption by rlrrtnring From tlie mspttrrinea of dbrantes and 
Lisbon: mherefore, mlicn tlie nrmy crosscd the GuaiLiana, Elvas 
bnd only ten thousnnd rounds of shot and less than a fortnight's 
provisions for tlie garrison; the works were mriuldering, 
liouaes snd enclosuree encumliered tEie glncis, most of tlie guns 
Ld been rendererl unserviceulrle nt Badajos, tlle rest were bad, 
and tlio gwtrrison ivm a mixturo of young soldiers und militia. 
Jcmmcnhs m s  in no bctkcr condition, Olaya Campo Jfuyor 
nnd Oupclla Imf onlg tlicir walls. 
Hacl Soult known diis state of zffnirs he rnight hnve parrccd 
the Gudiana by tbe fords, and by menns of his pontoon train 
from W j o a ,  ovcrpowered tlic allics' n'glit, inwsted Elvas 
and coverccl bis army Gt11 lines, rinless tlie Eugli~h pnerai 
anticipating tlie ~ t t e ~ f l p t  defeated Iiilii Iietweeu ttie Cap md 
Elvm; wliich rnight not llave liecn easy in an opcn country 
affrring evcry oxlvantage for thc ovcrwhelrning cnvalry nnd 
mtillcrg o€ thc Fr~srencli. Soult cuiild alao Iiave turne([ tha 
right by Estrcirim nnd rncnwed the camrniinication witli 
Abrantcs, mliich woulrl have forced on a retiwt or a battle. 
'Tellingtorts position on the C a p  was tl~ercforc a politicai 
one to imposc on the enemy, and it did su: lie thw awed 
Elvas and JEruuienha, perliaps t l ~ e  ivhrile Peuiusula. 
FTiiiIo a front of bxttla ww istliu preseiited the r a r  was 
clenred o€ liospitals and henvy bngpgc, worImen Itlliourd 
d q  and night, to r m r c  thc fortificntiom, ancl guns am- 
munition and provisiona wcrc Srouglit up from Abrantcs, 
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by the anirnals mtl cnrts bcfore employcd in the sicgr! of 
13nd~jos. 
~ i ~ i i w l i i l ~  Portugal was on tlie briak of perdition, and the 
Pcninmiln chnrticter was displayed in n rnanner forcibly illas- 
tmting the rlificulties of tlic Englisli gcncral. Thc rlangcr o€ 
Elvns aroiised dZ tbe bnstle of the Lishoii government, but 
when its t a d y  efforta were forestallcd by T'Vellington's 
activity, ttlic rcgency witli prodigious efrontery asscrted that 
1ie l d  exl~nusted Elvas to suyilify liis Eriglishrrier~, azid thcy 
h d  replcni$lictl i t ?  His impcrti~rIinblc Brnpc~ iiindcr t h ~ c  
crosscoi nncl irisiilts w~ tlic morc arlmirable, tliat Perccvnl's 
policy, prersiliiig in the cabinct, had left Iiim witli an cn~lity 
military climt and mitli Iittle I~ope o£ futiire support. 'ct 
his daring was ~ i o  n-ild ctist of the net for rortune, he threw 
it with circumapcction, nnrl his pcnetration anrl activity 
lct no radviantqcg cscnpc. ITc lookcrl ovcr tlic wholr: Pcnin- 
sula and hcyoiirl it; Iic Irnew his true sitimtion, nnd he told 
the Spaniards how to pus11 their .mar wllile thc Frcnch were 
concentrñted in Estremaclura. Pmm them he hnd a right to  
expect niuc1i &id, l u t  lie obtzined little. Sotilt and 3farniont were 
befure liim, tlie mmies of tlie nortL anrl centre werc plirulyyd 
by iIie kiiig'~ flight, thc nrmirw of Ciltnlonia nnc.1 Anigon werc 
ciitirely oceiiliicrl by Figiic.rnc nnd Tnrrigoiia. Tiiis ncnrly 
al1 SpSpain rrw opcn to patriotic enterprisa, and tlie Mnrcinns 
and Va1encinns had above forty tliousmd regdar troops 
ksides numcrotis partidas witli wliich they iuight Iiave 
menilced Madrid, wliile thc G~llIicians opcm-dted in astille 
uiid the Bsturinris auppiposted tho nortliein plirtidas. Yet 
nothing uscful wne effedorl. Bnnchcír, jndcctl, cut o f  a convoy, 
mcnaccd &lamanca, and blockadcd Ciudnd Xorlrigo while 
ilantocildes carne dom b Astorga; ,?bina anrl tlie northern 
cliiefs harassed the Frencli comrnunications; some stir iras 
mde by tlie gcrilhs ncar Mdrid, mtnd Sucliet \vas liarassed; 
but the commotion soon siihsidcd, rtnd a detachmcnt from 
'Mndi id  s~irprising a conpegrition of prtrtidaq h t  Pcnernndn 
killed manq-, nnd recoverrd a Earge convoy whicli Iirid been 
talen. Bnt though the war, sprending over the Peninsula and 
quivering like z spider's n+cb to tlie most digtant extremitiesi 
if a dretg wiis m d e  at many poinb oKcred tlie regular S p i s h  
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amies good opportunity, tliey effected nothing; nor diid any 
geneid hsurrection tnke p h e .  The French retained d their 
fortified pmtq and tlicir civil ndministrntions pvcrned the 
great towas tranquilly as if pence prevniled, 
To dissipate tlie storm lowering over the C a p ,  Wellington 
had relied chiefly on EIake. That Spani~rd, as usual, wanted 
ts  iight beyond the Guadiana and waa Jiscontented at being 
denied. 3n t.bis mood tlie Englisb general knew be would 
prove an uueasy colleague, and liring into lina ten or twalve 
thousand tid soldicra ivlio wouId quarrcl with thc Portupese, 
nnd wmlcen rntlicr than strcngthcn tlie army. Whercfore, 
giving him tho pontoons uscd xt  Radmjos, he persuaded liim to 
move down the Gwdiam to Yerto14 and cross tliere to attack 
Seville, tl~en slight1y p d e d  by a mixt foree of French nnd 
Spanish troops in Joseph'~ pay. This blom, appnrently casy 
of execution, would Lavc miued the irsewle aiid maganines 
supporting the blocknde of Cadiz, m d  have brulcen up tlie 
uniterl Frcncb force oo the Cuya; tu aid it, Wellington 
irrgcd thc rcgcncy ta  push Reguines lilrewise apainst Scvillc 
from San Ruquc, wliilc the RnntIn insurgents Tiwnmed tlio 
smll foroe left in Grcnnda on one side, and tbe 3furcian ~ r m y  
pressed them ou the utlier. 
Dlake crossed the Guadiana at lfertola, but Balted from tlie 
22nJ until: the 30tli, when he detaclied a small forco ugaintit 
Seville, una sent liis Leuvy tirtillery by iyvater t o  A p u n t e .  
He wasted two days more before tlie smtlll m8tIe of N i c b l ~  
which he coiiltt not tdrc for wannt of tht! p n s  he hwl jiitit 
parted witIi; but tlie force of the combinatiion wm strendy 
felt ; Sodt instantly destroyed Olivcnza, and passed the 
Morena with sonie c n n l r g  and Godieot'a infantry, t o  succour 
Seville, seiidiag a dehliment off from lhlonasterio, to succour 
Niebla; at tIiei same Lime, giieral Conroux, moving from 
Seres de loa CavalIieiros, erossed Uie mountaiw liy Aracena, te 
cut Blake off from Ayamontc. Thus fin, notwithstmding 
Blrtke'~ stuyirIit,y, tlie plan wm s~iccrasfi~l, hi i l t ,  woai dmm 
off, Mamont corilil not remain alona, niid Portugnl u*as safe. 
RIakeS cavalry untler Penne Villemur, and some infantv 
under Ballesteros, lid also, during the investment of Kiebla, 
menaced Seville, and a sliglit insumection h d  placc a$ 
Camena. The Serranos, almys  in nmq bcing uidcd by 
B e ~ i n c s  with three thousanrl men, bloekadeíI thc t o m  of 
Ronda; and the Murcians menaced Laval, who had sncceeded 
Sehastimi in Grenada. &neral Daricau, unnhle to keep thr! 
Sreld, sliut liimself up in a g e a t  convent fort.ified by- ~ o u i t ;  Li 
tlie Trirtna suburb of Seville; Josepli's Spnnish soldiera did 
not shrink frnm h i i ,  and the Sevillanos were quict, Iiut ta 
p c n t  hIom mi.gh:ht hhavc! bsen atruck if Blt~lce's incepncity lind 
nat marred the whole. 
On the 6th Soult approached Seville, Ballesteros and Ville- 
mar retired, and the &rmona insumction ceascd. Blakg to 
avoid Conroux, fled from Niebla, and only escgped into Por- 
tugal because coloncl Austin laid a bridge for him at San 
Lumr dc Gnadiann. Fíe ivould then have cmhnrkcd wme 
troops to attaclr San Lucar de Bayameda, but being Inter- 
rupted by the aclwrncing Frencli Red to Ayamonte and from 
thence got into tlie islmd of Canelas, where a Spanish frigate 
and tlirea Jiundrd transports liar1 accide~itally arrived. Eal- 
Icahros, who wns neo=, toolr a position on t h e - ~ i o  Piedrn, hnt 
Rlnlcc emhnrking with pcnt  disordcr ~xi lcd awey. Tlie 
Freneh after reinforcing San Lucar entered hdvamonte, whmb 
upon the Algarve militia mw cdled out, and Ballesteros, losing 
mrne men on *he Piedra, entered the Aroche mount~ias 
until the enemy retired, when he entrenclied himgelf in 
Canelas. ~ l i e r e -  l ~ e  reinainetl uutil August,> anrl then em- 
harlíca his i n f m t q  ander protection -of thn Portupestl 
militia wliile bis m~nlry mcnt np tlic Giiatliana to join Cas- 
tanos who remained ~ 6 t h  a few troops In Estremsiilurra A 
battalion left in tlie mstle of Pfiymrqo wm m n  after un- 
mic~es~ru l ly  attmked, biit the pttrtisan ~ a r f a r e  of the Condado 
de Niebla censed. 
Soult now recalled the troops of the fourtli c o r p  Trom 
Estrcrnntluy t o  take tlie placc of dctnchmcnts scnt fmm 
Seville, Cadie, arennda and Afalaga, to  qnell the Serrnnw of 
tlie Ronda, a d  prepared to move himself @ s t  the Hur- 
cinns: Beguines was soon after rlriven Eiack to h n  lbque, 
and tlie Serranos, di~ps tcd  by tlie insolcnce of the regular 
Wpnnish general, were inclined to capitulah. AIeaflvhiis 
(Xdinot, quitting tlie pursuit of Bl~ke, cnme t o  Jnen, nnti 
was directed to march asajwt the Murcians at Pomlqon and 
Baza, ~vhere Elde, who had lmded at Almeira, joined them 
raising their numbera to twenty-seven thousand. He designe& 
to attnclt Grenada, but fi5t ha went to Valenciai, wbere 
Palacios rnnking mischicf, and before he ieould return Iiis 
amy was dispcmd by Soult and Godinot. 
BOUT OF BAZA 
The Murcian right wing at Pozalyon waa under general 
Quadrn, who hnd orders tu rejoin the centre and left wing 
uilder Frcire at Venta de Daliul, but Iie Jisobeycd. Hsnce 
S~ul t ,  leadiug a mixed force of French, and Spanidl troops 
In ,Joseph1s semice, drove Iiaclr Freirc'rr ndwuiccd guarda md 
came in front o£ Rirhul thc 9th, beforc tlic army wru concen- 
trated. Tlie 3furcirinñ hd stmng g r o ~ ~ n d  antl a deep ravine 
covered their fmnt wherefore Soult, who deaiped to cut off 
their retreat by Lorca, only ~hihowed a few troops at fimt, skir- 
misblng slightly to  draw aittention wIiile Gdinot forccd hi8 
way 13y Pomlcon to  Freire's rear; but Gdinot also lost tima 
When his iulvanccd p r d  h d  defeated Quadra with losa, he 
hnlterl for tJie niglit near Rnxn, nnd Iet Frcire's troops, who 
were then fallilling bnck in disorder before Sonlt, pms in the 
dark through that pIaoe and make for Loi-ea: yet the French 
cnvdry, iinmepting that h e  alsq drove the fugitives to thet 
by-rmdn, slaugllitaringr many. Murcia mas tlien in a defencelaa 
shte, yet klle people generally took arms to protect tlie city, 
which waa entrenched, ancl na tlie yellow fever ~vm raging nC 
Cnrthnpnn, the Frcnc.h mmershal, whose tronps werc fcw nnd 
fatiyed with consttint mwching, wturned to Qrcnads. From 
tlience he scnt dctrichmcnts to disperse some inmrgents in the 
Alpuxarm, nnd thus the province was quieted. 
His vigour md nbility had now been signally displayed 
for six moiitfls. Taking tlie field with a rima11 force in tbe 
deptli of wiiiter he rerltlced Qlivenzn, Barlajus, Albuquerqns, 
VdcnMa dlAlcnntnm, nnd Cnmpo Noyor, dcfcntetf a l a rg~  
amy on tlie Gchorn, nnrl wtptiirctl t~vcnty thousand rncn. 
'CVhpir unexpectedly awrailed by Bercsford from the north, by 
the Murcians on tbe east, by nnllcsteros on the west, by Gra- 
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hitm and LnpeEa in tEie soutlr, he found meana to repel t h e  
of tl~oee attuclís, to continue tlie blilockde o€ Cadie, a~id to 
krcp Ecville tmnquil wliilc hc mnrelicd againd tIie fanrth. 
At Albuera be lost one of the fiercest battles upon record at 
a moment wlien the king by abandoning Lis thone had 
doulilerl every embn~rassment; nwertIieless, holding fast to 
Estremd~~ra,  1ie mninhined tEio struggle, and vniu tulriiig 
tlie nffcnnive conipellcd tlle allics to rcpnss tlic Gunrlinnn. l f  
Iic dirl not tlicn pnri~li Iiis fartune it m i i ~ t  be con~idercd, that 
his comrnaníl wns dividcd and Es troops still impresswl witli the 
recollcction of hlbuern, wliilc tha gcnius of liis x d v c r s l  waa 
norki~ig new truublcs Eor liirri in Anddusin. With wliat reso- 
Iutiort md act i~ i ty  hc repres7d ttiose truuhlcs Iias just hccn 
~liown; and Iic is liltcwisc tabccommcndctI kirtlicpri~dcnt 1- i, rrour 
of his dminixtrntion, whicli, despite the opposition of Joseph's 
Xpanish counsellars, liad iinprcsscd tlic Andalusinns mitli such 
a notion of  Iiis liowcr nnd resoilrcea tlirit iio r m l t  of any 
real coriscqueuce took ~ilace,  autl riotis of Lis civic g n d s  or 
cacopctcros fniIcd hirn in tlic Iionr o£ nccd. Lct tlic wide 
extent of miintry Iie Iintl t o  maintain lic considere(1; ttie fmn- 
t.!crs fringed as it mere witli hostile nrrnies, tlie interior siiffering 
under war reqiiisitions, tJie pcolile secrctly liiiting thc French, 
a coiif;hilt insurrection in tlic Ihnda, n natiund govcrnment 
antl a powerful army in tEie Isla de Lcon. Iniiurneiulile 
Endi~h  m d  Spmisli agenta, lirodigal of rnoncy nnc.1 of nrms, 
oontinunlly inritipting thc proplc to revolt, tlie eonst covered 
mith hostiIe vesscl% Gibraltar slidtering bcnten arniics on one 
side, Cacliz on anotlier, Portugal on a tliird, Jlrircia on s 
Eonrtli; t t e  communication villi Fraucc ~liíiicult, l i ~ u  battles 
lost, tlie reinforccmcnts fem, and al1 the maiterid mtms t u  he 
crcntcd jn tlic eountry. Fcw mcn could linre stooirl firm in 
wcli a whirlwind; yet SouIt did not merely keep liis pound but 
contemplatcd giguntic offcnsi~c cntcrpriscs, and was alwriys to 
be dreadcd. wbnt tliongli liis slrill in actual comb~t   vas 
not so rcmu~1i:ible ae iri yome oT liis cuiite~ti~ioraries, wlio mn 
dcny him firmncss, nctivity, vigour, forcaiglit, pnni l  conccp 
tionri, iind ndmirnlile arrangcmcntl 
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B J A R H O ~  liaving cevered Soult's rctrogrnde ol~rntions reti reü 
gmliially from hdajos,  nnd qunrtcrcd Iris a m y  in tlic valley 
of thc Tayiñ, lenving onc division at Triixillo. Ttie fiftli mrps 
went to Zafra, ond Welliwon was t h  relieed from tlre 
Frencli when Le had most season te rlrearl tlieir eforts. Ha 
hrid seenred the fortresses, Iiut Iiie troops wvcre beginning ko 
auffer from the terrible pestilencc of tlie Gudiaiia, wliich, 
couplcd wilh f i r n o n t ' ~  melI-chosen po~ition, furbad rtny 
rencwd 01 tEie aiege, :,niid cunipdletl him to  relinquisli tlie 
brillimt nnd grtiud comliimtiona he 1 1 ~ 1  dcriigned nfkr 
hfnsscnn'~ retrent for R new plnn of opemtions coiifomntile to 
his rettcred circiimstnnces, R u t  to uppreciate the motivca of 
this clirangc anotlier lixsty gInncc mrist bc tliro\vn over the 
general state of the war, ivliicli was constnntly rarying. 
In btaliloriia Suchet liad stomed Taragona seixed Montserrat 
and dispcrsed tlic Ctttul~iri anny. Tlitr army uf tliz ceutm liad 
c h o d  thu psrtidns from Guadulrtxnrn, ;md Cuenca, and re- 
estulilislied t he comniuuicutions with Amgoii. Vnlencin md 
Murcia wcre In confusion from interno1 intrigue and the 
dimsteiw on each ~ i i l c  of tlieii frontiers at Xwp. and Taragonlr. 
Nripoleon \!-as again pouring reinforcements jnto Epnin by tha 
northern line, and ns usual t l~ey  scoured tLe country to put 
down tlie perillas on encli sidc of their marcli. Porty tliou- 
mnd frecli nien, mostly old soldiirs, w r e  come, or corning 
into thtl nurtIi of Bpaiii j and tlie king was un liis return from 
París in I~nrmony witli his brother, and Iiaving tlie powers xnd 
duties of al1 pcrsons definod. Tlic young p i ~ r d ,  nclw untler 
Dorsenric, was itnurgos incrmscd to aeventecn tliorrwnd ; and 
aa tlie Spmiards Iind mrule no efort to profit froni 'tlie 
concentration of their enemies before IVellington, the Frencli 
were enabled t o  plan extensive meamires for further conquest. 
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phcetl a dividon nt Srrixillo, repaircd the cnstles of tknt place 
m d  MdelIin, and extended his m y  from Talavera to PIa- 
sencia clown the nalley of tbe Taps,  mith posta nt Bejnr znd 
13&w;-that Qirard'~ diGsion of tlie fifth corps held Zafra to 
connect Budt and Marmont, and mpport Badajos, whicb 
Pi'upoleon wir;~ly garriaoned with rletachrnents Crorn tlie tlirca 
arniies, to  giva them a dimct interest in i t s  mfety : iii tlie sama 
policy Rodrigo wns in time to bc gRnisoned by Dorsmne, thnt 
M m o n t  might not neglect the m y  of tlie south nnclw pre- 
tence of siiccouring tbat fortress. To restore md mintain 
AIcanhra wm beyond Marmont's means, but be repaired the 
bridge of Alrnantz, anrl constructed strong forts, onc on ea& 
bmk, t o  protect it and aerve as 6eld depBts. A t h i d  and more 
considembIe furt w a ~  erected on fhe Mirnbete ridgc t o  sceurc 
the p a s q t !  to Triixillo, by lvhich free inkrcoiirse 4 t h  Soult 
was maintained; and on the otber side the communication 
with Dorsenne was maintained by the fortified pasa of Bañw, 
and by &jarr; aand by the old noman road through thc Pico 
p w ,  which liad been restoid in 1810 and was now being 
enlnrged. 
Napoleon's affairs in Sgnin at this time bore a favourable 
aspeat. !bere was indeed nsnt of mimey, bit the people 
scrupIousIy obeyed the militaiy authorities, not only in tlie 
o c c u p ~  districh but even where tlis partidas acted, We1- 
liigton attributed this submissiun to fmr, and tliought ths 
hcnvy cxactions woulcl finnlly force the pcopIc to fight os ffec 
from their habittitions; but tliia did nut happcn g~neraily~ 
md the obedienoe seems rather to  have been tlie aign of sub 
jection, iñhich by a judiciona mixture of mildness and severity 
would hrtve been complete, iif England hsd not kept the war 
alive: for on tlie Epanish &de neahess and awchy  incrwd. 
The disputes between the B~iti5h general and Porkuguese 
gavenirnent mere ako becorning unnppmmblc, nnd lord Wel- 
IUigton dmíving up pwcrful expo~itions of his ~ ~ ~ V O U S  
situation, aent onc h thc Rrmils, anotlier to Englmd, dedar- 
ing tliat if a new system was not adopted he could not md 
would not continue the mar. Lord Wellesll  made strenuou~ 
exertions in both countries to avoid this tmination, but his 
brotlier whie awaiting the dect of his efort6i had to contend 
witli tho mosk hperious diEculties, and seck in Lis p~rsonnl 
reuourccs thr, mcnns of holding Portugm1. He hntl sent 
Reresford t o  Lisbon, immedintely after Altiuern, to o r p i z e  
tlie restoration of  the Portupme army; and Bercsford had 
aent De Lemos an oficer of Iiis staff to tlie Brz~ils to represent 
tlic eviIs of the regency inki-fering- in nilitnry nizttcrs. To 
meet this tlie Souaos scrit one Vnaconcellos, wlio l i d  been 
their qiy nt tlic Jlrifisll hcnd-r1unrt4rs, to ltio Janciro, d 
thus tlie politicnl aE:,ciirs bemmc more coniplicated while the 
rnilihary prospect becnme l e ~ a  promising. 
Wellington understood and felt the force of the emperor's 
new combinations, yei Iie did riot despair o€ overcoini~ig tliem 
if he could ~ustnin tlic palitical Iiurthens m recklcssly hcapd 
upon Eiis shoiilrlers. Ac hticI a powcrfiil nnd cñpericnced 
Britidi force, tIie militnry departrnenta mcrc beootne more 
skilful and rcady, aand bc had secn enougli of l i s  adversaries 
to  estimate tlieir polrers justly. The king wss no generd 
and was iIiscontented witli tlie rnrai~lials; Soult waa d e  in 
administrntion nnd vnst in Iiis rnilitary plnnhns, yct $00 cuutious 
in cxcciition; Mnrmont rvaq ~goroiis nnd prompt, but hd 
alrmdy shom somc ras1;linew in pusliing Rcynicrk division 
fonmrd after passing tlie Tagm. It waa ea. to  conmive 
that no very strict concwt would be rnnintaincd by these 
diffcrent commailders iii their corntinod operatioiis, aud Wel- 
liiigton lind now also eshIilishccl good elittnricls o f  information. 
Hk Spnnisli spics wero niiinwous ivithin tlie Frencli lines, 
nnd n Britisli oficcr constnntly visitd their nrmim in dis,nuise. 
SobrnF, a Spnnisli counsdlor of stnte, living at Vict,or's Iicnd- 
quarters, gave intelligence from tliat sirle; and Fuentes, a 
guitrtr-phyer of celebrit y, repeatal1 y madc his way to Madrid. 
>fr. gtuarh, annder cover of vessels licensed to fetch corn from 
France, Bept chasse m~6es coiistantIy plyi~ip aloag the 
Biscay coast, Ziy wliicli 110 nut only ucquircd direct informn- 
t ion, hut fncilittttcd BE trnnsrnission of intclrigence fmm the 
Iand spies; amorrgst tlmse the most remarkrtlile was a 
col~bler, living in a little htitch at; tlie end of tbe tiridge of 
h, where, always plying ]lis tmde, he wntinued for yeam 
witliout tieing suspectcrl to count evsry Freiicli suldier 
pnssing in or out af S~~~inin by thtlt bridge, anll trmsraitted 
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sickly and requircd changa of quartm, wherefore os an inter- 
eepted deqatch said Ciudad bdrigo wanted pro- baRnd. Gsions, Wellin~on, hopina to proíit fmm thia 
moved by CasklEo Branco towards that fortress pretending he 
sought healtliy mtonments. Tbk was in August, 
&eral 
and tlm mar& was unmolmted sava by some 
~ ~ ~ ? g  
EIench dragoona fiom Plasencin, who captured a $:zn'* 
convoy of rnules Imdcd mith mnc, got drunk, 
aud in tlmk atate falling on somc Portuguwe inkntry were 
beaten and lost tlie mules apin. Eut there were other osten- 
eiible ~ u a e g  for the movement to blind the French generals. 
Dorsenne was then menacing Gallicin, S o d t  was operating 
against the Murcians, and at first designe$ t o  invade t h t  
king'rlom; Wellington's march therefore appeared to have tho 
double otiject of saving GdIicia by tlireatening Dorsrnne, and 
o f  relieving Murcin by dmiting JIarmont from the srrpport of 
Sonlt, who w&ld not thcn quit hdnlusia. But G8llicin ms 
in grmt peril. me partidas of the north I i d  becn 0 0  repmserl 
by CaFnrelIi and Reille, that Dorsenne was able t o  msemble 
twmty thousand men on t l ~  Esla. Abadia who Qncd 
bad succeeded Santocildes waa a vain weak man, walker. 
atss. diqnting with, and fextring Moscoso the chief of 
his staff, and on bad terms with tlie junta. Helad "se- 
only seven thousand sttarPing tmops on the ESFA, nnd a reserve 
cif fifteen hnndred ttt Foncebdnn, for to this htld the Chllician 
army rlwlnrllcd; and thc dnngcr was RO mnnifcst thot generd 
Wdkm adviaed the ~emaval of the ships, tbe atores, and fifteen 
hundred p n a ,  from Feml ,  which was nntenable, to Cornña. 
In tliis date of affdrs general Dorsenne pnssed the river 
Esla, tu fow columnrr, and general B b d b  after a sharp con- 
flict near h Daneza retired by the line  ir Jolin Moore h d  
*en in 1809, Iiaving neiirlp the sarna diaproportion ol 
farce; but rvanting tli~t general's akiIfuE diligente he was fors- 
atalled by t.he enemy at Bembibrc, entirely cut off from Villa 
Franm and driven into the Val des Orres. From that atmng 
country he mnld alway~ retire npon Portugal ; but 
Rr H. his etrmy was ready to  disband from miserg, Gal- Doug]- 
licia was helpless, and Dorsenne wonld have taken uss. 
Coruña and Frtrrol if tlie ariivlil of Wclliligt.on on tIic Coa bnd 
not ulurriied liirn. Tlicn lie rcliuquialieil tIie invnsioii, rnd 
SoriIirim nlm, irhu wns in rnnrch f m ~ n  13rrrgos ta  i~id Km, 
Zialtcrl ctt Rio Scco, evciits wTiicli ;lL:uIiñ witli :,aiighablc mnity 
ascribed to IiIs orrn fi,nliting. at La Xxncex. Tliis saving o€ 
GdZicia was a great tliilig. Tliat kin~rlwn was tlie base of al1 
tli: cilwratiuns ngiiiost CIic gcmt Freiicli litic of coinmiiuicatiou, 
from tlience ivcrit fortlr 13ritisli ~iq~inrlru~is tn nuurivl~ tlie 
giicrillns of Riscay, ot' die Montnñn, Nnvnrre, tht! Rioja., and 
tlic Asturias; it \vas tlis ehief resource £01- t l i ~  su~iply of mttle 
to $he allid amy, it wna tlie outworlc of Portupnl; and if 
liuiiest?y anal vigurously govenied, would have heen mote 
importtint tlinn Cxtnlu~iiu. 13ut lilco tlie rcst o f  Spain it wm 
nlwriys wcnlc froq tl7sorilcre, nnrl tlicrr: wiis nnt;Iiing tn prevent 
Dorseiine from conqiicring it. Had hc only octnipietl St. 
Jago, Lugo, Villa Franca, nnd Orense, tliey woulrt hnve $ven 
Iiiiii entire mmriinnrl of tlie inferior, nnd Bie Spaniards IioIrliirg 
only tlie ports could not havc ilisluilgcd Iiirn. * 
Wclliiigtrin rrncl~ctl tJic Con ni1 tlic 8t,li nf A u ~ i ~ t , ,  intend- 
iiig fimt n C ~ # ) R P  1)lncknrle of C!iirrld Roilrigo nnrl finnlly n siege, 
be wvm too late: tlie place liad hecn revicttiallcd for two 
montlia on tFie Gtli by Bc~sikrcJ convoy, snd tlie lilockde 
h i n g  necessarily rclinquislietl tlie troops were quartered near 
tlie sources of tlie Coa and Aperl+ ccIose to tlie line of com- 
muriictttiur~ lietwce~i Marmont arid Dorseeiie, nnd in n, country 
wbcrc tlierrr mas still sorno corn. From thcnce if t21e enemy 
ndwnccrt in sitpcrior nttmlirr- tlierr. I ~ L R  x T C ~ T ~ R ~  throitgh a 
strong country t a  a posit.ion of hatflo ncnr Ehbugal, wlienee 
the commuiiimtion witli IXill was direct. Flor was the rest of 
Beira much exposed, as tlie Frencli woultl have Fent their left 
flttnlc by un atlvance towards Altneidn, nntl tlia J l im cauld! hy 
Guarda, mnd dctiiclimcnts to tlic ~ d l c y  of tlie liondega in 
time to sccnre thc inng-nzinw at Celorico; biit tlie lintterin3 
train and line oF suplily h m  h m g o  w w  uny~rotecteri. I n  
t l j e~e  positions tlie preparations for tlie s i c p  went on unti1 
Wdlington lenrned, centrary to bis furnier beIief, thak 
Dursenne% diaposable forcc \vas above twcnty tliousand good 
troeps, and Ciudad Pmdrigo could not hc nthclccd in fncc of 
t h t  force and Rhrmont's arrny. Then clianging hk plana, 
he q a i n  resolved ta lilockade the p1me and mntch to strikc a 
audden IiIow ugzinpt the furtrcsh or qairist the enerny's trriops: 
for it  vas tlie fuundution uE hia Ilulies, that n9 the Fr'rencll cuuld 
not leng kecp in mnsses foi wunt of proaisions, so he cvuld 
check tlioso rnmscc on tlic fronticr of Portupl, und aIwaye 
force tlicrn to  eniicentrrttc or suffcr t l ~ c  Ioss of somc imptrtimnt 
post. Biit it is wortliy of obserwtion, tliat Iie did not com- 
pise tlie Gallician army as an nuxilinry ; lie ha¿? no expectril 
tion thxt it wouht zct ~t di, L R ~  '(VM cccrt~in it would aot ad 
effcctually ; yet this \rrns in Au~q~st, 1812, and hl l ic ia had not 
seen trn enemy sincc June, I SO9 ! 
llarly in Septcrnb~r~ Blarrnunt pushcrl a dehcliment froin 
Maseucia thougli ihe ptisses, sitrprised a Britisli cavalry 
piqud nt Xit. Riurtin de 'rrcb~jju, arid tlius upeuetl hia com- 
miinicntioris with Durueiinc. Wrllingtoa Iiud Iiuwcvcr tlien 
formerl Iiis hloclrde, anrl fixing liead-quartera at Guinaldo 
plnccd tlic fiftli division nt Rerulcs t o  ~vntcli Mnrmant; thc 
first diviaion, mhicIi I V ~  now undcr Grnhnni, occripicd Pcn* 
mncor; a fielJ Iinttcry was witlidrnwn from Aill, nnrl thrcc of 
bis briprles, reinforccd by a aortugu~sc rcgiment, wcm posictl 
on tlie Ponqul, beyond Cwtello Bimco, to prol;cct tlic mn-p 
xincs on tIint liiie. TZe battering train tlicn reaclied Villa 
Ponte, tlie troops niade gnliians and fxsci~ics, and two hundrerl 
men of the line were instriictcd as sappers; the Almeida 
bridge on the Coa was permnnently rej~üirerl, and Almeida 
wm once rrtore rcstored as a place of zrnls f'ur bwns and stores. 
a r l m  cl%Ypaiía nlso carne from Lcon t o  frirrn a uew army 
undcr the allics' protoction, liut Iie wm williuut money, 
aficers, arma or storm. 
CHAPTER VIlT. 
D m a  tlie fid mngements  for the Iilockade, €he garrfson 
hwl m d o  excursiona to beat up the quurkra of tlie British 
avali.y and forage vthe vill~ges, and some Ianoers from %la- 
manca drove Julim b c l i e e  out of Ledesma I n  Estrerna- 
dura, Morillo chasd the enemy from Caceres iind menaced 
Tmxillo, but was beaten by Foy and returnd to ITontijo, 
whence some Frencli mvalry coming from afra drove him to 
Albuqiierque. Ot.11~ militury opemtions wortli reIating there 
were none, but tho civil tmns&ions in Portu-pl werc vcry 
important. Mr. Xtuart'e exertions had impmved tlie revenrie; 
the mnks o€ the infantry were fiIled by the return of de~erters 
and by fresh recruits, which with the r e i n f m m e n t s  from 
Eitgland liad raiserl the dlied amy to npwarda of eighty 
tliousand men, fifty-six thousaiid K i g  Eriglish. Tlie nmber 
uncicr ums did not however exmd iwcnty-four thousnnd 
Portupese and thidy-tlwe thoumnd Rriti~ih, five thouwnd 
being cava1 y* with ninety piecee o€ artillery ; for the sick- 
nws quired  fn the Alemtejo was increasing md 
Appndlx 6. 
rv, twenty-two thonsand were in hospital : henoe, 
HilSs corps being deducted, WelIington codd 
not liring to the blwlrsde of &dad above forty-four thou- 
snnd af nll nrms, including hnchm's prtida. But Nimont 
done could in a few days bring' quite as many to ih auccour; 
and Dorsenne had from twenty to twenty-five thonsand men 
iu liand, becanse the Frencli reinforcements ha-ving relieved 
tlis old grtrrisons in tLe north the latter liad joined the amy 
in tlie fidd. 
At this time the British d i *  chest was bankrapt; wen 
the niulctcers, upon whose fidelity nnd eficiency the wbr 
aholutely depended, were six months in arrears; and the dia- 
puta with the Portupese govenuiient were more acrimonious 
than ever. The regency had proposed a new sgstem of 
militaty regulationa, calculiited t a  t.hroa the burtlien of feed- 
ing the iiative troops ~utirely upon tlie Britisii'comrnissarirtt 
witliout any reform of abuses; Welliiigton rejected it, wliich 
eauacd moro violrnce, rana m Beresfod hnd fdlen siclr at 
Ciiitrn, $fr. Etiitirt, dcprivcd of liis support on mili trary rpw 
tions and himaelf no longer a member of tlic regency, was 
unable t o  restrain the trinmphant fact.ion of the Souzas. The 
prime regentBs retnrn fo portnpl was prevented by troubles 
in the B r d s ,  ond tlie regency, expecting a long Lold of 
power, iind foolishlp imag-iiiing tlie wm wrul no Xongcr doulitful, 
were, hle  nlE people who employ powedul zuxiliaries, dwising 
how to get rid of tila Eritiiih ariny. 'CVith tliis view thcy 
objected to or ncglwted cvery nccessnry m e m ,  nnd mntIe 
m n y  nhmriurd dernnnd~, ~ueh na tliut the Bfitisli genen~l shouid 
pay tl:e expenses of the Podufpese post-oíñce; ak thc same 
time they prefcrred vnrious vexntious and unfounderl chnrges 
against British &crm, while p s s  corruption and opprcs- 
cien of tlie poorer pmplc marked the conduct of their own 
magiatrates. 
But the fate o€ Portugd, mhich to these peupIe a p p e a d  
fixed, was in the eycs of tlie English general more doiilitful 
than ever. I~itercel~ted letters gave reasons to Iielievc tlie 
emperor waa oomiiig to Spain. Tliis was corroboiitted by the 
asscmbly of nn a m y  of reserve in Frmce, and tIle formution 
of p e n t  mngminca nt Rurgou and other platts, to supply 
whicli and t o  olitnin moncy, the Frcncli genernls wcre 
exncting thc fourtll of thc han~cd nnd sclling thc oveqlus 
rtgain cven by retaii. Minnte reports af tlie stnte of thesei 
magazine# were demanded by Napolcon, reinfoxcements, chieñy 
of the imperial guards, were pouring into Spah ; and ?Vet 
lington, judging the emperor must either d r i ~ e  the British 
from the Peninsula or lower 16s tone with tlie world, tliought 
he wonld im-aqle Port,ugd from tlie side of Rodrigo, nioving 
aIso by the vnlley of  the T q u ~  aiid the h lmte je ;  and that 
Iie ivould risk hia fleet in s comlimd nttack upon Lisboii 
by Eea and laud. I t  i s  isuucertain if Yiipoleon mlly meaned 
thie, or sprcnd the rcport witl~ a view t o  restrain the 
allics from ofFcnsivc opcrations cluring t1ic summcr; or to 
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mldcnrl the English ccrtliinet as ta tbe rcal statc of hie ncp- 
tiations with Russiit, intending if the i ~ t t e r  proved favour- 
able to turn his wlioIe force against the Feninsula; but 
evcrytl~ing in Spaiu at tliin time indiciited his approach. 
UTe1lin@on's notion, that he lvos bound to drivc the Britisb 
army away or Ioric his infliicncc in thc werlrl, docs not h o w  
ever aeem crinclusive. Tlie mighty expetlttion te 3fwcaw 
proved tlint t l ~ e  mperor did not iwnt farce to cunquer Spain; 
suwess in Russiz wouId Iiave cnabled liim to proloiig tlic war 
in thc Peninñulo, as a dmin on the Eng1:lish resoiicces fo r  manp 
ycnm; aníl thc rrst of Europc co~ilrl not f ~ o n i  tlicucc dmrv 
concliisions nnfa~ourable to his influence. 
Nqoleon's cominfi being probnble, Wcllington with charm 
tcristic pmdcnce turned liis own attcntion ngxin to the lines 
o€ Torres Vedras. and urge~itly desired tlie pveniment to piit 
thc fortrcsñcs in orrlrr, rcpair tlic rodñ, nnd rcstore the 
bridgcs broIrcn dtiring 1Tnri~cnr~'s invk~inn. An increiiscd 
numlier of worlrmcn ivcre itlso ~ iu t  to thc lines, for the 
engineers h d  never ceeqed to iniprove those on tlle nortliern 
b:mk of the Ttigus. On the southern bank tlie double 
ent.renclinients of Alm& lid been continued on a gigantic 
scalc. A dcfcnsivc cniinl thcrc was plitnned un a rleptli to  
flont ships of tlirar, Iiunrlrcd tonq nntI ñcrvr! nri n ptmngc ffmm 
t h ~  S A ~ I ~  t~ Retuval hy joining the nrtvigntion of tlic &da0 
and Mnrntccn rivers, tlius mndridng to ol~jects o€ general 
utility as lvcll as tlie military deferice; and it mil1 be found 
thnt Tellinptan did at al1 times suhin, not only the political 
and financia1 and militrvy affairs, bu€ nlso tlie agicdtiiral 
cornrncrcinl and chnritriblc interesta of Portu~al. The battcries 
at thc month of tlic Tngus bcing lilrcwisc ~iiit iii ordcr acre 
providecl with fumaces for lieating shot; and criptain Holloway 
o l  thc enynccrs, a t  a triRmg expanse, constnicted four jetties 
at St, Jnlian's in such an ingcnious rnnnner, tlint they witb- 
stood the most tempstuous e l e s  and secured tlic embarkation 
of tIie army in any season. Vio militiu aIso wcre npin 
callcil out, a mcnsurc of grcntcr import in thc nctual .&te of 
affairs tlran would d first apyear; for tlie expensc m s  U 
h e q  drain upon the finantes, and the nrimber of hancls tliua 
taken away frum rigriculture was a seriuus evll  
H d  al1 these t l i inp  been duly executed, wcn Niapoleon 
was not to be feared; liut tlie Portnguese gorcinment, if t h d  
mn hc d l w I  govcrnmcnt which iras but nn idle futioii, wns, 
as usual, entircly ncgligcnt. The rpgcncy rcfusctl t o  pirhlish 
nny pmclamntion rinnoiincing dangcr, or exciting tlie pcople 
to prepare for future efforts ; and thozigh the nncient lam of 
Portugal pro~idcd amplc rncans for meeting sudi ernergencfes, 
the bridgcs over tlie Ceira the Alm nnd otlier rivcrs on the 
line of retreat were left nnrcpriired. The roads rrcm there- 
fore impascable, tlie rainy season m s  coming on, and tlis 
safety 01 tliti arniy would Iiuve been seria~~sly arJniigered if it 
had retired Lefore the emlieror. Tlie regency pledcled w n t  of 
money, n, result of its own negligente In the col!cction of 
k m ,  for, the devustn~tl rlistricta cxccptcd, tlic pcoplc wcre 
trcher thnn thcy ])ni1 cvtr bem, riiid in banl cnsh nlso 
from fJie enormous sums expendcd by t 1 ~  Britisl~ lirmy. 
dnother terrible embarrassmcnt %-as Eikewise mu9cd bp tlie 
culpable indiscretion of tlie regency. The secret corre- 
spnndenk on the side of Salamanca suddmly ccnscd t o  wrike, 
because tlie Portugucsi? govtrnment publislied in tFie Lisbon 
h e t t e  tl ie intclligence seiit to Silveira, and ilie Euglish 
newspapers by copying it drew tlie enernyb attention. At 
fist it was fcarcd tlie poor people liad lost thcir lives, biit 
fortunntely it wns not so; yct an nggrnvnting wnRc of nll liia 
dificdtif~ W P ~  tlius prcss~rl on tlic English gcncrnl whcn he 
compared Iiis own situntian with thnt of tlie enemy. Neitlier 
his necessities nor his monep could promire due assistance 
from tlie Portupwe, wliile tIie French gc~icrnls ,,,,Iinaton 
had only t o  issue their ordcrs to tbe fipnaiards to IOIYI r.ivm- 
tlirougi the prefects tsof provinccs, and nll kiiids of Po''' 
aid possible to be obtnined were suwly provided on tlie clay 
and at t11e placc indicated. 
In tlie midst oE t l ies~ mres NTcllin$on was mddenly cdled 
into milihry nction. Ciutld Eodrigo ngniu wnntcrl fond, unrI 
Afmont ,  \ ~ h o  Iind rccc i~e~ l  c lc~cn tlinurinnd mcn from Frn~ce, 
and liad fifty tliousnnd iin<lcr nms,  conccrterl witli Dor~cnne n
combined operxtian for itr: siiccatir. Tn tliis r4ew Triixillo 
bnd lreen ocrntpicd by )Y ypart of tlie fifth corps, nnrl Gimrd 
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from Plwencia tnke the right wing in reserve. Meanwhilc 
Rill, sending Hainilhn's Portuguese towmds Albuqerqiie to 
anpport tho Spnnish citvalry, tlicn menaced by tlie fiftli corps, 
drcw nenrcr tlic Tn,?, to tiikc, if neceasilry, the plnce uf liia 
thirrl brigde, whicli mnrclied from tbe Prinqiil to  Pcnomacor. 
Dut tlie armp was too mrich sprezd. TIie broad range oE 
heiglih tining tlia left Eianlc of LIie AgueJa euded somewliat 
nhruptly ul?ove Elhodon and Ylistores wlicre tho ceiitrti was 
posted, nnd mas flanlrccl in its wliole Irngtli by ~~I lnns  anrl 
woüds extendlng from Ciudad Rodriga to tlie Coa; it wns 
tlimcfore untenable epiiiist a11 enciny comnimdiiig that opeir 
country; and if t h ~  ceiitrr: wprc rlrivcn 1'1~11idly icyontl Giiiualclo. 
tlie disktnt wiugs co~ilil bc interce~iterl ir1 retreat. Tri uvoiil 
tlmt, thrce íicltl mdoulits wcrr: conqt,ructrd at, Guiiinlda to 
Irnpseupon nlie cne.rny, nnd tliris gxin time to conccntmta 
and fcel Marmont's rlispositiou for bnttle, hectbuse a retrmt 
beyond tlia Con was if possiMe to be a~poidetl. 
Ou tlie 23rd tlie Frciidi, ndvaricing from Turnunies, en- 
cnmpcd bcliintl tlic 1iilIs to tlw north-cnqt of Ciudad Itodrigo. 
nnil a strong dctac.limrnt, cntcring thc plnin, cornmunicntd 
witIi the gwrison examind tlie liosition of tlie liglit diviaion 
on tlie VatlilIu arid rcturned. The 24tl1, ~ix thonsand cnvdr~r 
an(l four divisions of iiiTmCry crusscd tlic billa iii two 
coliimns, nnil plilcinfi Romc troops i ~ i  obscrvutiun on tlie 
Y~dilJo intirorliiccrl tlic coiivoy. On this d;iy tlie fou~th 
diviiion of tlie allies ivas brouglit np to  the position of 
Guinddo, and tlic rerloubts were coinpletctl; yet 110 otlicr 
cliange wns innrle: for it ww thougllt tlie Prcnch would not 
sldvancc fiirttier. But tlie 25i,h, suiiii after daylircalr, fiiurtceri 
squndrotls c i C  the imp~riaI ~ n r t l s  iErove tIie oiitpods oof the 
lcft iving from Cnrpio ncrosa thc Aznvn, nnd tlic lrrnccrs of 
Ucrg crosñcrl tlint rivcr in pumiit; tlicy were howaver 
flnnl~cd hy wma infnntry in n wuod, unrl tlien cliargetl anil 
h a t e n  by t1-m ~qundroiis of  tlie fnurteentli and sktcenth 
dragoons, mlio rboeciipied tlie post at Carpio. 
Dnring tliis skirniisli, foiirteen litlttriliuns of iufnntry, tliirty 
squndroiis ol cnvalry, siid tivelvc gunq t1ie wliole under Atont- 
bmn, pnsfied tlic hgucda by the bridge of Xudrigo and tlie 
fortlñ ahovc it, antI mnrehed towards Guiuuldo. Slie road 
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tlivided, one branch turnetl the Elbodon Iieigl~ts on the right 
liniitl, tlia 0 t h  learling neurer tu tlie Aguerln passed tliruugli 
l'n~torcs, Ln Xncina, ttnd Elhodon; fina ns tlic point of 
divarication waq covercd by ri gentlc ridgc iit, mw for some 
time doulitful which brmncli the Frencli would follllow. Xoan 
tlie doubt 1-mislierl, t.heir cnvalry ponrerl aloiig tlie right-hand 
road lcading dircctly to Guinzildo, the smnll ndranced posk 
whicli tlic nlIjerl ~quntlrnns liad nn tlic pluin ~vcrc rnpirlly 
drivcn in, svr1 tlic enemy's horsemea, witliout wniting for 
their infantry, commenced the combat of Ellioilon. 
Tliiir aation Iiegan disadvaotapuiisly for Ilie nllies, The 
sevcnty-foiirtli nnd sixtictli rcgitncnts of tI~e tliid division 
bcing nt Pimtorcs on tlie rigl~t, were too rlistnnt to be d l e d  
in, nnd Picton +th three ot2ier rcyments, bcing itt Elbodon, 
coulrl not irninediahly join in tlie tiglit. 1Vclliiigton sent tn 
Guiiialdo for a trignde of tlie rourtli divisioii, aud directed 
Colville to tlrnw iip tlic scventy-seveiitli and fifth British 
rcg$menh, thc taenty-Rrst Portugliesc, and two Iirigades of 
rirtiliery of tlie same nation, on a liill over aIiieh thc road to 
Guinnltlo passed, eiipportiug their flanks mith dltcn's tlim 
squarlroi~a. This beight wlis convex toiuards klie eiiemy and 
covered in front rand on liotli flntilrs liy tlccp rnvines; Iiut it 
vas tm cxtsnsive, nnrl hefnre Rcton cniild come frtirn Bbo-  
don the crisis had passcd. Tlie Portuguese guns sent their 
~ h o t  i11to hlantbrun" cborsemen in tlia plaiu, yct tlic lntter 
crnssing tIic ravines r d e  up tlie rough heiglit un tliree sides, 
antl fe11 velicmcntly upon tlie alliw. Tlie loosc 6rc of the 
jnfiintry and ni-tillery could not stop tlicm, iiut tlicy serc 
cliecked by tlic fine tigl~ting of tlie cnvnlry, wlio clin~ging tbe 
Iientlu o€ the ~scending masses, not once Iiut twcnty times, 
mniiihiineil Uic upper ground above an houl: 
l t  was astonishing ta  see so few truo~iers resist tlie slivginp 
rniiltif,irrlc efcn on tlink ~tecp  rocky groiinrl; anrl w1icn Jfont- 
briin, obstinate to win, tiioiighht ~iip Iiis itrtillcry, his horsernen, 
gaining ground in tlie centre, cut down soine gunners and cap- 
tured the guns; one of tlie German squadrona cliarging too 
far tlicn ~ w t  enhngled iu t!ie iutricacy of tlie nvjues and 
thc crisis wns pcrilous; biit sutldenly tlic fifth rcgimcnt, I d  
major Ridgc, a dnring man, dnshed into tho midst of 
the French carnlry and retoolr the rtrtiUery, wliicli a p i n  openerI 
its fire, and nerarly at the same time the sevcnty-seventh, 
~upportcd liy thc twcnty-firh Portupcsc, vigorously rcpulac~l 
the enemy on t,hc Icff,. g~niis chn.S;ng of infnntry ngtlinot a 
powerful cnvnlry coi11d only check tlie foe at tthnt parbiculnr 
point. Montlii-un prcssed on 6 t l i  fresh mases against the 
lcft flanlc of tlie dlics, whilc otlicr ssqudrons penetrntcd 
bet~iveen the riglit flank snd Elbodon, from tlie vineyanls 
of which viIlnge Pieton was thea mith difficiilty and some con- 
fiirricin rxtricnting l i i s  trnops; hc conld givc no succoiir, thc 
bripcle of tlie hurtli rlivision mas not in siglit, the French 
infantry rapidly approaclid, the position was untenalle, nnd 
Wellin$on directed both Picton xnd ColviIlc to fall back and 
unite in tIie plain bcliind. Colville, forming his bnttalilions in 
squrires, iinmedihtel y descended, Lut l'ictnn was at n corisidernlile 
Jistmce; and tlie Gemnn ~quntlrons, fming t o  be surruunderl 
by tlio Frcncli \ h o  liad complotcly turncd tlicir right, tooli 
refuge at FL gxllop with tlie Portiiguese rcgirncnt, tlicn the 
fnrtliest in retrerrt. TIiiis the 6fth antl seventy-seventh, two 
wcnk batlalions formed in one square, rvere quite exposcred, asid 
in nn instiint the wliole of tlie Frene11 ca~alry came thunder- 
ing down iipon t.hern. Bub liaw vain tu match ths s w o d  witIi 
tlie musket, to send tIie cli~rging liomemau againeit tlie stead- 
fmt veterai! Tlie miiltitudinous squdrons rendi~ig tlre slrics 
with t ,h~i r  shoiits closed on tlic glowing s q ~ ~ m s  like the fslling 
erlges o£ a burning cratcr, ancl were as instniltly rejected, 
scorchetl, aiid scnttcred abrod ; the rolling pea3 of inusketry 
echoed through tiie hills, bayonets glittered at the edge of the 
amoke, t~nd with firm and cmn fitcp the Britislr regiments 
carne fortli unscathed ns the IioEy nien from the AssyBari's 
fiimnce. Picton tlien cffected liis junction and tlia whole 
retired ovcr tbe plain for six milm to thc position at Guinatdo. 
Tlic Frcnch mould not rcnew the close nttwk But plicd shot 
and slieli nntil fmr o'elock, wlien tlie entrenclied camp wam 
~ainecl. Here the fourth division prcsented a. fresli front, 
Pdck's brignde carne from Campillo, tlie heavy c a - m l ~  from 
the uppcr Axava, and the action ceased. Tbis retrograde 
movement of flie left nnd centre of tlie tliird division isulnted 
the sevcnty-fourth rbnrl tho sixtietli regiinents postcd at 
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Piistorcs, wnd thcy hall to ford tlie llgizcda, iind tIicn rnoving 
up the riqht haulr Lnppilj* renclied Guiunldo iii tlic niglitnfter 
a, mar& rif iifteen Iiours, in tlio cuurso of nliicli tlicy captured 
a Prcncli cavalry pztrolc. 
During tlie retrcat from Elbodon, tlic lcft wing of tlic army 
was or<lered to fa11 back on the first diPiuirin at Nava d'hver, 
Iiut t o  kecp posta in obscrvatioii on tlie h a w .  Carlca 
d'Espn6n rctirctl with Snncliez's infantry bclii~id tlio Coa, rind 
thc gucrilla chicf hinirrrlf pos~crl mith liis cnvnhy into thc 
Prcncli renr. T i i e  se~enth  division sas ivitlidraw~i from Alla 
rnadilla to  hll~rgaria, nnd thc hend-qunrters Iiaggagc moved 
to Casilla íle Flores. Tlie liglit clivision sliaulrl Iiave mnrclied by 
ltulilcrlu tu Guiririlrlo, ii~irl Cmufurd rccei~rcd tlio order nt tlirca 
o'dock, Ilcnrd tlic ciiiinonnrlc, md miglit Iinvo rcarlicd Qiiin- 
nldo before niidniglit; Ziut fcaring n ni@ mnrcli lie only 
~aovcd tci Ccslierlosn, onc leaguc iroin tlie Vndillo, wliich river 
wns i~t~iucdia~tcIy passed by fiftceii huiirlrctl PrcucFi. Tlie 
poaition ut Guinalrlo ivm tlicrcforc occuliicrl Ly unly fonrtccn 
tlioiianiid mcn, of wliich rihoiit two tlioiiñitiid six Iiuntlrc(1 
were mvalry. Tlie lcft of tlie ariny, eoricentr:~tcd T L ~  Na~n 
d'Avm undcr Gmhai~i, was tcn niilcs distant; tlic liglit 
divlsion t e i n g  at Cespdosa nntl dcliarred tlic clircct route by 
tlic ford of Carros, wiis tiixtceu niilcs diritliiit ; tlie Fiftli rlivisiou, 
gusted nt Ptlyo in the rnountuiris, \vas tivcIvc miles distant. 
JIcn~idiilc blnmont  brougl~lit iip a sccontl division of infitn- 
t . ~ ,  nnd in thc cotiiwe of Zlie niglit and followiug day, uuited 
sisty tlioiisnnd men in front of GuinaTJo. WcIlio$on ~ v m  
tlien dnt~gcroudy mcnnced, h t  lie woulrl iiot abniidon the 
ligltt divisiriti, wliicli licing intcrce~itetl by tlie f wrich cav:~lry 
iit Itolilcda, aiid compcllsiI t,o rni~kc n cimuit, Oirl not nwive 
unbil nft,cr tliree o'cloclc in tlic evening. h2ermont1s furtune 
was fixcd in t.11nt I~our! Ignoriint of tIic true statc of  nliiiirs, Iie 
cletuchcd 8 strong coluinn by tlic vitlley oof tlie Axava to  
iueilucc the left, und mudc au o~tr~rihitiot~s di plity of ttlie 
imperial guirds iii tlic plnin instcatl of rittucking an ntlv~rmry, 
wlio, bcing too wcnk t o  rc.si.st, Ii~iigliccl to  sce kiin so cinploycd 
znd soon cliangctl thc fitt~tc of afiftlirs. 
In the niglit, by a sl~ilful  concciihric moveincnt from Gui- 
nddo, Nav.vn d'hvcr, l'cr~leg niid Yayo, tlic allies m-ere unitcd 
bctmcen tlic Coa niiil tlic swurccs of thc Aguedn, tivclvc miles 
bcyontl Guintildo ; nnrl ITnimont so little kncw liis awn wlvnn- 
tnges, tlint Iic al80 rctirctl íluring tlie niglit, and wns netiially 
in march t o  tlie rear mlien the sco~its of tlic column ~vliich 
liad mrtrched Iij- tlic valley of Azuva, told Iiim tlie alTies were 
iri refrc:it aud tlieir diviaiona atill widely separntcd. Dor- 
senne's remunst.ili.nces tiicn tvnilielled hiin t u  wiieel ruunrl 
nnd pursric, hut  Wcllington mas nlrwdy in a stroiifi position 
bel~ind tlic stream of tlic Villn Tdiaior. Tlie fiftri rlivisioii 
was on the rigl~t at Aldea Vcllin; tlic fourt11 and liglit 
divisioiis, Srictor Alten's caíralry, and tIie l iea~y drngooons 
under Cotton, were in tlie ccntrr, cavering Allayatcs, witli  the 
convciit oE Swnlirrrte on tlicir Icfk; tlic linc was prolotiged ta 
ReSuluri by 1':iel~'s :irid M'Maliorik P~urtuguese lirig~dcn, and 
tlic sixtli diviuiuii witli Anson's cavnIry closcd it nt 12isrnu3~. 
Tlie wttlry piqucts mcrc puslicd l iqoi id  tlic 1511n Mnior t o  
AIdcapontc iti. tl ic cciitre, niid Fiirmllios on tlie riglit; the 
third and se\-cntli divisions were in resetvc bcliiiirl Alfa- 
gntea TIiis position ivne cxtensii~, but tlie da? were short, 
the allies covered al1 tlie practicable mnJs lendiug to tlle 
bridgcs aud for<ls of ilic Coa, thcy cuiild riut be turristl, und 
scrioirs dispositions werc nccc s sq  for u Ii~~ttle. 
Comiiig on Iiy tiie mads both of Fiircallios and slldca. 
ponte, tlie Frcnch wcre cliecketl by tlic liiquets of tlic liglit 
diGsion on tlie Sormer but on tlie latter tlieic liorsciiien 
drove tlie criralry liusta aeross the stmarii of tlie Villii. hluiwr, 
nud ahuut ten u'cloclc toolc possessiori of Alilctipontc. At  
twclve o'cEuclc t l ~ e  Iicud of tlicir infmtry nrrivcrl i~nntl immo- 
diatdy ntt~climl Pakcnliaiii's Iirfgdc of tlic fotirth division, 
mhicli wns pastcd an tlic apposite liejglilits. welliiigton mmc 
up at tllc rnoincnt, und dirccted tlie sevcnth ftizileem to cliarge 
in linc, supporting tliem ou eacli fin& witli a Portu, wcse 
regiinent iii coluiiiri. Tlie PI'FI~LII, ~ 1 1 0  liad ncarly crnwned 
tlie lii31, were driven iiaclc ; arid tliougli tliry aftemiirda 
att~mpted t o  turn tlic Iiripdc by a waod, distnnt &out m w  
ket-aliot froni tlic Rglik, whilc tlicir cavdry advnncd to the 
foot of the hill, the artilIery bafled that effort. Tlicn the 
nllies tnking the off'cnsjvc turned tlie Frencli left and scizcd 
tlie opposite liills, but tlie fire aoon cca~cd, 1XIdenyionto wari re 
occupicd, and Welliiigton ivhe had b n  pemonally much 
exposed rode to anotlier part of the position. Scaroely was 
he gone wlien ti10 Pronch, corning by tlle Furcallios rond, 
juincd those nt A1deapont.c and retook tliat villugc, nnd Palien- 
litlrn, tliougli hc rccovere<E it with his fuxilceis, fiiiding tho 
eiiemy numerous, and unable ?n that riigged and woocted 
cou~ity  to  see wliat was passiiig on his flanlcs, knowing silso 
tlie fiiiuI battle-ground w u  bd~ind tlie CCR, ab~ndiined Aldea 
Ponte fur liis orignltl post. 
In tlic niglit thc allics rctrcntcd, and on the mnriiing of the 
28tli *ccuriied. a strong position in front of tlle Coa, tlie riglit 
rcsting on tIic Sierra de Ilesas, tlie cer?tre w~ered by the 
village of Soitq the Ief~ a t  Xtendo uporr t l ~ c  rivei: TEie 
amy thus diut up as it were i ~ i  a d e g  loop of the Coti river 
could only hc at.t,~iclícd on m nnrrow front, mrl RTnrmorlt: mlio 
hnd only a Few dnqñ' prorisions niid could gather none in that 
country, retired tlie sume day. Tlie garrison of Giudiid 
Itodrigo waa then changcd, snd 3 f m u i i t  icturued to tlie 
valley of tZie Tagus. llcirsen~ie re-uccupicd Btilain~tim, and 
placed it division ut Alba da Tornies t o  conneci, Iiis Isfb with 
Mnrmont. Foy* d i o  hnd comc mth his 'cwa clivisiana h 
Znrsa Mnyor, rctiirned t o  PLucncia. Girnrd, menaced by 
Hamilton's Portuguese divislon, wliicti HiIl liad scnt to check 
Lis dvance, Ieft twu t.housand men of tlie fiftli corps at 
Merida aud retired to Zafra. Wicn tliese moverncnts were 
kuown, tlie liglit division, reinforccd by some camlrq; rmumed 
tlic nominal blockade of Ciudatl RorFripo in rmuccrt with 
Jiilian hncIiez, znd the rest of tlie miny wtis cniitoncd on 
botli sides oE the Coa, liend-quaricrs bcing fixed at Frenada. 
Wearly a nionth bad been employed by the French in prepara- 
tion md exccution of tliis grcnt operatiun, wliicli teriiiitinted 
fecl)ly and abmptly h~iecuuse thc gcncrnls werc ns usual ut 
vaiiance; G i u d d  Rorlngo 11ind bccn victuallcd, hut the oppor- 
tunity of invadi~g Gallicia was lost, notliing had beeu gined 
in tlic ficld, time was wasted, and tlie EuplisL general's ~ilnns 
were forwarded. 
lo. Wcllingfon's poriition bchinrl thc Soita hna becn noticed 
by two rnilitltry authors. One wnsiircri thc im- 
p d e n c e  of offeriiig baktl~ whcre therc was no 
~ , ! ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ' '  
rctrent ; the other intirn~tes thlct it was assumcrl l~o i~r inn-  
dcrry k in contempt of the adverenry's prowess. Tliis last Niirratlve. 
appears a mere cmsion of what was iiot under- 
stuocl : liar1 rlrcllington despised Marrnolit lie wciuld Iirive fotifilit 
lifni Iieyund the Agiictln. But sixty tl~ou~nntl Frencli suidicm 
werc ncver to be dcspisrd; and it is not clificult to ñhow thnt 
tbc position wns choscn without impruclcnec, and witliaiit 
prcmimption. 
From the Sierra de Mesas to tlie Coa WRC Iesg ilinn six 
miles, and the park oyen to  nttñck wm much reduced by tlie 
ruggcd bed o£ a torrent covering tlie left. Fody tlioustiud 
meii were enough Eo dcfend this liiie, wliieh wm bsittlc niero 
tlilin oue-tliird af tlieir Su11 front; sud m the mslls were Liad, 
the country brokcn with wocicls md rwiiies, tris enemy's 
~iupcriority in hor~c nnd p n s  would hnve avniIcd bim little. 
ITcIling+oii hnd n riylit to ~ffront an nddversnry whn liad no$ 
mulested liim at Giiinaldo, and it i a  a l w i ~ y ~  o€ impnrtance tri 
show a menncing front. Glrcat combinationa must have becli 
made liy Mnrmont for a general batble; it was known tliat lie 
l id  only n few days' provisions nnd tlie ncigllbourhood d d  not 
supplp him: it was tlierefore rensonuble to expect he would 
retire rntbcr tFian figlit, and he did so. 
Let it be suppmcd ~Iarmont was prepnrcd nnd refiolu t o  to 
fight. T1ic po~ition bcliind Soih  would hnvc ~ C F R  gnnt?. Tlie 
FrencZi, too strong nn tlie ptnin, were not so powerful nato mr- 
rnnt n retreak indicatingfcar; hence tlie allietr liad retired alowl J 
or three days, although each day engagcd, and thc enemy's 
fpon-erful horsc and wtillery always closeiipon tkeir mar. The 
riigpd bed of the Coa offered only a few poiiits of passqe, 
t l i e  principal being the ford of Berraleh beliind tiie right of 
tlie allies; the ford of hpoullia de Con behind tlieir Icft,; the 
bridge of Snliugnl hdiind thch  centre. TRs ways t o  t,hoae 
points were nnrrow, nnd the passage of the river mitli al1 tl~e 
baggnge, couId not hitve h e n  ensily effcetcd in f x e  of an 
rncmp mitlioiit some losa antl pcrhnps dislionoiir; nnd tlie 
difficulty of passing &€ter losing tlie position lvould not Iiave 
becn miicli increnserl, iiecnusc tlrc i~ic~imbntnccs rvould linv e 
been at thlie otlier oide, m d  u secund r:iiige ( i r  Iieiglits linlf-a- 
milc in front nf SnEiiignl mns fnvotirnhlc frir iz rcnr-guanl. 
Tlic pnsition o€ h i t a  wns tlicrcfore well takcn ta oyiposc thc 
enemp, but tlic battering-hin, tlren I-ieti~cen Pinlicl and Tills 
Ponte, wae compZetely exyosetl to tlic cnciiiy : ñIarniont, h m -  
ever, l i d  not suiricicnf,ly considered li iu eriter~ifisc, rtnd knew 
nnt wiicrc nr I~nw t o  ~tt'ilíc. 
2 O .  AlrFrn Ponte wns al30 a good pnsition. ?!nd tlic allies 
~etreated a t  once from GuInddo to Soita, Iiaggage nnd strires 
woulil Iiave been Just, tlie maverneiit ivoulil Iiare seemed a 
fliglit, tlie rtitirl from Puyo would Iin\,e bcen uiicuvererl, nnd tlie 
junction of tlic fiftli clivision eiirluiijierctl. At AI(1er~ Ponto 
t,hc mceting of nll tlte ronrls w m  sttnngly comrnnndeil, nnd it 
was casy for siicli SL qnick genemi, tüviirg axccllcnt troops nnd 
knowing the cot~ntry, to clieck thc Iieads of the a~lvitncing 
colu~nns unlil tlia biqgtige liad p ine i l  ii. suUicieirt olling and 
tho fiftli dirision carne in. 
3'. Ciiiiinlrlo r c ~ t e  on difirrnt grni~ntls. TEic enrIy tn- 
tienching of it dcnoted forccig1:lit; tlie liolding it foi tliirtjt- 
six lioi~rs wns proof of firmness. It is said sir Gleorge 
lfumy urged Wellington t c i  abanrlon it in the night of tlie 
CStli, but anxious for tlie liglit division Iie ivotild not stir; 
tliat it1el:iy wns ano of t l~use  rlaritig irri~iulses of fine genius 
wliieli rriIcs werc nwcr mntlr: to control. Thc pcisit,irin 
waa contractFr1, of no great naturnl strengtli in front, antl 
eesily to be turned; tIie entrenclimeiits, a fcw breristmorb 
2nd two w d r  fielJ redoubtitq nFere oren in rear and ~nthoiit 
ptilipatcs; i i o t  more tliari fuiirteen tliuusiir~rl Britkli and 
l'ortrigueac trriops wcrc in liiic, ntutl sixty tliousand French 
vetemnu witti n Irundred piecca of nrtillery mere brfnrc tliem? 
RIien Marmont limrd of tlie escripe of tlic liglit divisioii and 
discovurt.d thc deceit, Iie, nlludinn t o  Xupoleun's fortuna, 
prc>l)hctintlIy cñcli~imed, ' A wl JVdlingtrn's s h ~  al30 G 
hiq?i C .S 
4". If tlic positions of Aldea F'ontc wrl Soitn orc to he 
cummenrfed, tlitit at  GiiinaIJo is to be admired rather than 
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imitliteil, but the p r e d n g  operationa are censurable. TIie 
country beyond Cindd b d r i g o  furnisliecl no covcring pmi- 
tion, md the sudden ffuoda of tlie Agiíerla rendered tlie com- 
municntions witli tlie left h n k  precurious. Nor witli bridgcs 
oould tRc rsllics liavc cneniiipcd rounrl tiic place witliin lincs 
of contravnllatinn mntF circurnva.nlletinn, Iicwuer! 3Inmont 
wo~tld l i a ~ e  ~trlvrtnced by Cñstello Bxnnco, seized tlie liridne 
at ViIhn Tellin, nnd in concert mith tlie fifth corps enriaur 
gered Rill. TLis would have compeIled Wellington to quit 
his entmnched mmp, and Dorsenne could have revictuall~l 
the place. It was necessary to have a positiuu, ceiitnl with 
respect to 31arnront and Dorsennt; strurig enuugh tci lloIrI 
both in chcck lvhile sepnrntc, nnd defensiblc ngninst tliem 
wlicn unitcrl. Sueli a position WM fn~lncI on tllc Coa; for 
Siilnmanctt nnd R e j q  the two ncni-cqt points wfieru convoys 
for Ciudad h d r i g o  muld Iic collectcd, were fifty and sixtjl 
miles distant; m d  tlie French were rrg much compelled to 
nsnemble in lmge mnsscs for its relief by tliis distant. invest- 
ment aa tliey rvould have bcen by a close one. SO far tIic 
mmbiiiation was well czlcuhtetl, Irut wIicii sixky tliousand men 
camc to Ciudntl IlcidrEgo t,hc nl1ic.s uliauId bave miicentrated 
a+, Guinnldo withiiuh dclny. Insterd of tliis, ia line many 
mi le^ long ww nrnintninorl, nnrl tlie riglit wing scpnrated fmm 
the eentrc by a dificult rivcr. Tlie Rnglish general justifierl 
it because he wantd to verify by actiid ubseiriition some 
uncertaiiity nc lo tlie Prencli nurnliers; I-iut that is  not a valid 
reason; liis olijecb cwld lmve been obtaincd by otlier meana, 
and tlic wholc ivar sliould not llave bcen endaiigercd, and the 
folloiving vitu1 rulcv o1 wllr violatcd fur sucli a secondury 
ubjoct. 
19 An nrmy sliould ncvcr be parcclled beforo a conecn- 
tmted eneiiiy. 
2.. The point of concentrntion shodd not be within t l ie 
encmy's reach. 
Nliw on tlie 24th nnd 25th tlic army was pnrcelled from tlie 
ford of tlie Vadillo beyoiid tlie hguedu to  Xaiialva on tlie 
Av.a~a, and from tliuse places to Guiualdo %,as IE lona as from 
Ciutld liorlrigo t u  Giiinnlrlo, antl by worse rozds: tlie diu- 
tnnce from ltodrigo to Elbodon wac uti nothing compareil to 
tlie distuiicc of tlic wings from tlie lnttcr point. Wlicrcfom, 
w1vlic.n ElEiotlon wiis abanrloned, tlie riglit wirig wnr, eiit off, und 
if tlic Iiglit divisiun nnd tlie tmops at Pastorm cscsiped it was 
by fortune nnd gallantrg. Dut wliat if Jfarmout liad mmIe 
good disliositions for a great linttle? He must liave kiioan 
tliroug1:li tlio pmson of tlie nllies' positions nnd thcir mmp a t  
Cuinddo, aiid Iic rniglit hnve renelicd Canipillo two Iioiira 
after dayhreak tlie 25th mth one colirrnn, wliile another 
msaiied Elbodon antl Pastores. The tliirrl division would 
tliiis Iiave lieeii enveloped, or broken aiid Jriven o v a  the 
Aguetlu at the Zltrnttrn f o d  larid irretrievnlrly scliaruted fruin 
GuinnliIo; nnd tlicn Marmont \voirld hn-i-e ovcnvlidmcd thc 
fourth rIivisEon on tlint position. hIexnwliilc a few tliousand 
men, thrown ncross tlie ford of &ros RCm Roliletla, mould 
I i a~e  kept tlie liglit division at hay, hecause tlie ehannd of tlie 
RoIiIorla torrent, over wliidi tlieir rt?treitt luy, >vas a veiy deep 
nnd rugged rnvinc. Tlir: Prcnrli could tlicn nt  tlicir clioiw, 
liave surrounded t.ha Zight division or directed the mma of 
tlieir forces apinst  tlie reserres, and hava coniyelled tlie left 
wing to retre~t from the Axava to Almcirla, 
IL is true a11 Qie Freuch were not np on tlie 35tl1, hit they 
miclit Lri1.e heen so, und tis IVellingtun was resolvctI t o   se^ 
thcir nurnbcr IIC wouEd linvc bccn iil tlic snmo position thc 
26th. It is liowcver suficicnt to remark tliat tlie alliea 
erclusive of the fifth division, ~vliicti was at IJa70, did not 
exceed thirty-five thousnnd men of al1 ams; thak thcy were 
on an irregular line of at least tiventy miles, iwid mostly in an 
open cuuntry; tliat at no point wcre tlie troops more than 
cigl~t, and nt Pastoxq, tlic prin+al ppoint, only t.hrce milcs 
from a fartress ñ-heme sixtg tliousanrl infantry and six thou- 
sand mva1xy with one kundred and twenty guns v.me ready 
to issue. Finnlly the point of concenaatlon a t  Guimldo was 
only twclvo mi le^ from tliat fartrms. Tlic alliss ewnpd 
Iicciau~e tlieir n d v c i n q  wns blincl! Wdliiiflonh conduct a t  
Gninnldo wns nliovc rulm, at Elhorlon it wns sgainst r u l q  
which is just thc difference lietnreen genius and error. 
So. Marmont was a gencrlil ratlier shining tlian 
Bcfore he comriienced Iiis march lic hall desired Girad to 
arlvuiice uiz tlie side of the aemtejo, ussuring liim tlie \vi018 
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of the alIied m y ,  and even tlie Spanisli troops under 
Castafios llad crosscd tlie T n g s  to operate qninst. Rotlrigo; 
but in fact only one briprlc of Hill'a corps lind movctl, 
and Gimr woiilrl hnvc hccn dcstroycd, if, fortunntdy for hirn, 
the allies had not interceptetl the original and cT~iplicato of the 
letter wntnining tliis fiilse infomation. Again, ~vl~en the 
convoy cntered Ciudad3 3famont liad no intention of fighting ; 
but tempted the false pogition of tlie allies, aníl angry at 
tbc repulse oT Itis cavtllry on tlic luwer Azava, he tnrned Lis 
scauting troops intu columns uf attacb; yet Iie permitted Iiis 
ndrlermry to throw dust in his cyes for tliirty-six hoam at 
Guinnldo. At A l d r ~  Pontc Iiia nthdr was a usclcns lvmte 
of men, b~cnrise therr! nw no loml nntlnntagc oticrcd nnrl hc 
did nat intend to fig11,lis a great bwttle. 
6'. The lo@ was not liemy on either side. Tlirce Iiuiidrctl 
m w  and aficera fe11 on tEie part of the allies; of tlie Frencli 
rather more, because of tlie fire of the quwes aiid artillery 
at Elbotlon; but the movements for three dayñ were ful! o€ 
intrrpsb aud inst,mction, rlivemifiorl: nlso by l~rilliurit exiirnliics 
of Iieroism. Ridge's claring cllarge lias tieen noticed, nntl in 
one of the cavdry cncounters n Frcnch officcr, whilc striking 
nt Fclton Harvcy of thc fou&centh drapotis pcrocivcd hc 
had only one arm, and witli a mpid change brought doivii hirr 
mord into a. salutc and pnssed on ! In tlie next book rviil be 





' Seville, Aupa.b Blh, 1810. 
'P,tn nne dfitiGon dc l'crnpcreiir cln mois dc Fenirr dcrniri- 
8. M. cl6tcrmino qu'h comptcr du 1" Jmvicr toutrs loa d6pcnsr.a 
cl"ar2ministration ~6nL:ndrale ddu gOnie et rle l'urtillurie serai~mt nu 
compic dii p~uvc~iicnieril Espagiiul; aussil0l que j'on fub iiinlruit 
je eoiiicilui S. M. C. d"ussigiier :L eet e h e  une somme; m i s  je ne 
p!a obtcr~ir qiiri 2,000.OUO dc riínnu (55J.0006) et; crirore b 
roi entendait 11 que les p~yementx ne rrniontanscnt qu'au mois 
de Fcrricr; cctte somme btait de bcauconp insuffisant~. Je n'ai 
ccssF d'cn faire la represcntation, ainsi que ?donsr. l'lntendant 
GI:ii6rnI; nos dcmiinrlcñ n'ont p39 6t6 mlceiieillics, ct  pmr eouair 
nntant que po*.;~ble Iai diTGrence j'al db avoir recoiirs niis 
mcettea extrmrdiiiairca fnitm mnti ln p~rtic.ipnkion dca minisires 
Rspiignola. d'csli>rc: quc ee m q e n  rrliissirm, d6jl momc il m 
prodiiit yluol<lucs i o ~ n o s .  L'Etit qiio j o  mota oi joint fnit 
mno? t r c  cs r~muvwrnfnA qui ont 6th opFda sur lcs fonda do 
533,001)f. &t cr6dit mcnsrrcl U, l'dpoyuo du 1" AoEit lcsqnch for- 
lncnt la somme de 3,731,000f. meis indbpendammcnt Il y a isu 
des recelles exlr~iordinairen pouia uu moins S03,OOOf. qiii oüt 
*a c 6 enws d'ddininistr;iiion g61ihdu) rcp 1% m¿i~io des ~i i inl  ion (Ir 1 j, : ., 
anterieureineiii $ r:etlc 6poque. nvas fait inettrc ln dispositioi~ 
de Nononsr. I1bt~11d~i1t  Gén&rd, des v d e m  pour pIus d'unnillion 
ui devmt B C T P ~ ~  B m une p n d e  de l ' m 6 e .  &. 1'Inten- 
4mt GOnOrul jiiatiiie & i'omploi de toutcs ccs sommes daos sea 
wmpterr g 6 n b r ~ 1 ~ ~ .  Lcs ministres de S. 31. c. n'zdmettent pas 
Ics comptcs qne je  prcsentc; d'nbord ils nc veulent pas alloucr 
la sommc dr: 5iM,Mnf. ni a 4th r~portir: $ l'nrtidc des dbprnsrs 
dhndrnioistration CinibrJo, npqpiiynnt snr oo sujrt mr In d<'riiinn 
du roi qui no fnit rcmontcr ccs di:pcnsea qiie jnsqit'au mois dc 
Yerricr, quoiquo i'cmpcrcur nit cxprcsaemcnt mitcndu quc lo 
moiu de Jiturier dcvüit uiissi y Otre coinpris; ils no vculcnt pas nou 
plus reconnilni les recclies exlraardinaircs, ofi ils prelentlent eii 
p$compter le produit sur le cr6dit mensuel de a' '33,CNHf.; ' il 
11 e s l  pus dam rnon pouvoir d'arluieltre leurs inorllfu; la dficiaion 
dr l'cmprrciir e d  cxprcasc, et tnnt que jc  serni d n n ~  ln ~ihntion 
d6Iicatr: nii jc  mc t~ouvc, mon dcvoir m'obligcrn rlc pnuI'vci1r mx 
bcssins du scrvicc par hi is  Icu mojcna praticrtliIcs. Lca rcrcttcs 
qui ont cu licii cn llndalu~io ont semi ?t tuutcr les d6prnscs do 
I'nrtillcric, di1 gcnie, des Btit mrijors ot de Ilidminidrntion ~4n6rnls 
ul wnt vnimcnt immennes, et quoiq~í'on ait ab.tiaoliiment ricn r c p  l e  Frrnoo ni do Madrid, j'ri cn m0nia Lernps pu f:iire payer lroia 
moiu du soldo h I':imBe; c'eut s m s  duule liicu I J ~ W  quaud il esl ilii 
8 i 10 mois d'arrihre la lroupe el qiie I'iiisiiiGsance dee muyeua 
uliligc h ituperiler ericore c e l  arriurc, m~iY nc recermnt ricn je  
mois qu'il m'6tait unpossiliIe de micux fitire. 7'. d. en sera elle- 
mbme conr~üincuc- si d I c  veui s'.m~c?kr un mmenl sur l'appcrp 
queje raia lui donnerdes cli~i~rgea qtic Yhndnlusie su porte. C'u 
ronsommo taus les jours prCs de IMi,OOO rrtioai & ~ m s  et 
20,000 rations de fourragc; 11 y a 2000 malades aux hGpitaiig, 
L foopt~rpwc de Jwn, le f'ort de Mdnga, 1'Allirimhra [le Grcnde,  
ni1 drssx~s doqurl on a construit tin piind camp retrnncli6; buii 
l e ñ  chhteniix siir lrs boda de 1.a mer rlcpiiis le rap rlc Gata jiinqu'i 
Fiimffroln, Ic rli:Ftcrri~ d'121cnfn In J l h l ,  1% plimc dr: ltnndn, les 
nnrirns clihtrniiu rl'0lhern ct, da Momn, lc dihtcnii  (Ir: Rclalcm~r, 
lc diiitcnn dr Cn5till0 dc Las Gunrdiiis rt plusirurs nntrcs pnrtcs 
Rnr lcs frnntidrr<s dc fE~trcmaclura qu'on a dfi arissi occizpcr. 
On a pourvu nnx cl6pcnscfi que lcs tr.caux dcvnnt Cadiz c t  la 
construclion d'imu iluttille ucc~sionmcnt. Ou U 6Latili B Gmnada 
une poiirlribrc el unc i':tlirirltie d'nrmcs, laclueile jusqu'ii prtscnt 
e peir donnC, m i s  qui pnr la suile srm I r E i  ulile. Un a rCtiilili 
e l  mis ~luns une grniide xclivité la rondcrir ct  l'arsenal de Scville 
oi jomricllrmcut 1SU) ouvriera sont caploy6s. Pouv mmrluions 
de pon& et dc prqjrctiIea dr feu c t  d':iffuts. J'ai fnit r6tntilir 
dcux morilins ii. p i i + c  >i Seville et fu i t  rqloitcr toutcs les 
nitribres dc Z'Andalu~re. A présrnt on com te amui k S&lle  de^ 
p ~ j ~ t i k - 8  di! foiir I ra  eniil>roa, jiisqu*niir Iorniicr de iz poiicea; 
toiit Ir vieiix f'or n rnrnn~si.; oi> n ennst,ruii les affifa n~c:~csfiims 
pour I'nrmcmí.nt dcs Imttcriv~ dcvnnt Gadix. On ti fnit dcs rr ui 
ritions rn a~uliors ct c f i t s  d.liohillernrnt dunt la trou c npra8t6 
J'A~ ffnit lorcr d m ~  I P  p q ~  2100 mvlca qui ont ~ t f  donndea i 
I'oriillsric, nux Fqiiipagrs inilit~ireh et a11 gknie. J'aiIait cun- 
pt riiim ut org:iniscr un 6quipage dc 36 pikeis de moni~gncs,  dont 
13 obus~prs, íle I.d qui sonl porL4s ii doa de mulcb ct voiit blxe 
rcpartia dans b u s  lcrr corpcs d'armée. La totditE de ces dCpenscs 
aiilEii qu'une infiiiiti. d'autrcs dont j e  ne fais gas l'4numera~íon 
uont air ccimpte rlu gouvrriirmcnt iispqpol, et  Ir p n ~ s  les aup- 
porte iiideyndammrnt dn crhlit mrnsiicl dc 533,0(30f rt des 
rewttcs crtrnordinaircs qiic je  fiiis o p h r  loipqu'il y apossibilitó 
dont I'npplieation n lieu c.n fiireur de I'itdministration 6nCrdc de 
I7ni.mfr, du gíwi,, d,: I.srtillrríc, dea dthtr mnjois, fcs frrtir dc 
couracs ct dcs dEpcnscs srarrcttra. Ccs rliilrgea ~ o n t  inimenws, et 
Jnmais Ic n 9 n'nizrnit pu Ics stipportcr si noiia n'Etiona pnrvcnus 
a mottro icy'ordre ut 1s plus grniido rceuliritd &os los dipenscs 
c l  co~iaonimatioiis; mnis ii pernil diirIrilc rlo les uugrncnter, peul- 
G i r o  rnDmo y a m i t  il du danger do chrcher B la Gire.; c'est BU 
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l'empmeur, et avair ses inslructions aIin que le cas se pdsentant 
o i  iE l u i  serlijt Fail opyiooition &une mariiere quelwnque, il yuiuira 
so conduire en cmisúquerice e l  parvcnis au hul qui Iiu sem 
indigi16; taut auli*c sgljitme rctsrrlera la marclic des allaires et 
wcaxiunera in6vilablcmeut dea d6sa,&mens gu'on peut autre 
meul bviter. 
' J'ni l'lionneur, &c. 
' { S i p E )  LE Man%caat nuc m DALMATE~' 
' STRB,-T;~~~L~ de nullitd oii j c  mis depis  qne Mon~ieur le dile 
dc Dnlrnntic, major-gdnfral, n ris I'initintivc! do toiis Ins rnoiirc- 
mcnn mimo lo lus minilticiia !a jeme miwps rind ioi mil preacnra 
toiit-ir-hit inullc, il nil nomo mate qua l o  riinmin de voir creclledes 
troupcs rinirnfics clu rncillcur esprit, disec2n~:cs dans toirt 1'Anda- 
l i i ~ i c  t  peirlanttous lcs jonrs do ~ P Z V C E I  gens FnnR hut ni re~nltat. 
Uuns ctLt 6t:~t rlcs clioal,a j o  pric V.hI. rlc vouloir bion me per- 
rnrltra do mc relirer jt Ilui.gotr pour y atlendre dcs ordres s'ii ne 
juac pas 3 propos do ni'uccorrfer un cong6 pour retournm en 
>r:~ncc, cong6 que rfclxrne nin smt6 h la suite tuue malde  
pava dont jc s u s  B einc cori~~lc~cerit.  
' $ai l'hniiciir, &c. &c. 
' LE M~n6c1t.z DUC nn Tnzvrs~.' 
' Generals Romana itnd G:irrera llave gnne Lolord TVcllington'e 
Iletld-quulers, b1iii1 lile lütlw hi~s nut ab:rudoiied Lis lines.' 
'WQ BE covering thc sicge of Ciudad Itorlrigo, a place ~trong 
hy its position and worlts, aiid ~ h i c l l  has bccn uttackccl with Imt 
liltlr mctbocl. SIic J<nEIiaIi army i s  o p09it.c OUM, Iiut, for good 
rerrnnr, dues not moro: \Te eomliose tfe mrps of obscrration, ni 
are on the loolc out for tlicrn.' 
Brkait du Joumal dac C. de D. Pckt p - e p n k r  aide-Jeeuqn 
~ I L  m ~ r ~ E c ñ a l p r i m e  dlBss1ing. 
" IRIO. 5 hoiit, jt C i i i r ld  Rndri9.-Tic cnpitnini: du g h i e  
Bonclicrat m i i ~ e  du 2" corps; il a Ciit Tn cm-qngiic du Purtugd, 
1807. Rca~icoi~p eau~usk avec 111i siir ca p-s. Il a fait la ronfe do 
Lishonnr! h Almeydn &ver. M. M airct, ct  me remet nn itinhnire 
qn'il p,n B drcss6. ll pr6tcnd ces routcs t rh  diíñcilca; les rivibres 
trbs cn~ai~issh~, ct  innbordnblc sur les denx r i ~ c s  du M o n d ~ ~ o .  
Gclui-ci u pcn d'cnt~, doit Ctro ~ 6 a b l o  ]prcgque pnrtout; c t  una 
pnrtic de ñca rires bien diflicilcs, et en certn~ns endroits iZ n'y a 
pas plns da 20 toisea de largeur; un s e d  pont san8 cliemin (je 
croiri :i Pornos;) inais la. ri~ii're n'est pila un obstacle aux commu- 
nimtions dca cleux rivea. La ronte d'Idanha, Cnstelbranco, &c. 
mi~iiviiisc, cepeiidant non zbsoluinent imprniicable R des pi8cm 
léphres. Tqe, trks escarpb, rocniIleux, profond jir~qu'b Abritntea 
* * * * * AU drasua dc cetto ville, ou pTutUt an conflnent du 
Zedre, le ryscle"cnt plat; lo lit dii Tnge s'<'lrrgit; il n'y n plus 
que des co ines mPme filoignfies, at tout est: tr&srriaticab\e. Lea 
rnontagnea de Santarern~ont dm mllinns peu élcv4es, prnticables, 
acccssililrs RUT lenr aornmct;, pen proprcs i & h e  d6fendiies ce qiti 
ext comrniino jnaqiih Ia mcF Tour crllca do Montachiquc, qui ~ o n t  
d c ~  pl~tcaiix moiidis, acccñeibles Ji.toutc lcs ermca; ct on pourrnit 
marrlicr ou mmmui-rer duns toulesles rliwctwm. Xai fut copier 
cet ilinbrairire.' 
" 1810. 7 Octobrc, k Leyrin.-GauaQ ave0 lc gEndral Loiton 
de0 position de MoiitacLi'i uc, en~uite avec le prince.' 
* inio. 9 Octohre, hhiomajor.  On dit que Yememi se 
retranehe L Alhandrx et Bueeilas. Les g6n6ram lleynier et Fogr 
ont une carte dc Riomajor h Lisbonnc; 6 8  t?rcch croquis fait &la 
h t e ,  d's ria de bons rnntCrisux, mais oi E Bgws cst trOa man 
v .  L ic ~ u i a  copie=.. 
J'ni l%onnmc de vons ndresscr nnc Icttrc qiic je  viens de rece- 
aoir dn ~Jndrrti Rcvnicr ct eopic d'uno rdponsc. 
TTous tronvcrcs <$cmcnt a-joint uno lcttrc du g 6 n M  Rcynior 
adressiie 5 votro sxccllcnro. 
Jo vous renou~cllu, prince, I'assnrance de ma hauk conuidb- 
ration. 
LE &B~cEAL DUC D?ELCHXAO~~ZT. 
D nis que le bmuillnrd est disaip8, on appeqoit; sur le S e m  
an d% de St. Antonio, cinq bntsiilons Portugak qoi étoient 5 
mi-c9te ct qui sent montCs sur la crl.te kmemre que le brouillard 
deat 6clmrci. TI 7 a de plns rau cnl oii passe ic cliemin, 6 pihces 
do canon ~ . t  un dhchcmcnf ,  d'infantrie hiiglsis, et h mi-&te iine 
l i p o  de tiraillciirs partio Anglais qiii a'dtentl dcpui~ le chcmin 
qui monto du villwc de Cnrvnillin it mu ~ ~ i c l i c ,  'u~quca vi&-a-vis 
i . ~ s  ros i rs  dn 6' rorpa, on voit dcs troupes sur )es aommit6s gY 
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font fnce an 6' mrp; m n i ~  comma on nr Ien a~prrqoit que d3 
revers, on ne pent j i~ger "I leitr nomhrc. 
On ne pciit drvincr ~ ' i l  p a de* trorrpeu en nrribrr, mnia rl'aprbs 
l'orjinni~nt~iion dr: ln monlngnc dont ICR crC.t,cs sant btroiks, ct qiii 
n ~ P R  prntrs rnpirlc~ de c1:linqiie c h k ,  il nc rloit pna mvnir dr: trwnin 
pniir y plucrr dr: Fortrs rhcwcs rt mranmnvrcs. Ccln nir: pnrnit 
irnc arrfbrc pnrdc, mais Im position cst furk, ct il fnut fitirc dca 
diflpositiona poiir l'nttnqiier w e c  suc~bs. J'i~tknds drs nuiivellrs 
$e cr: qi!c l'cnncmi friit devxnt vous poitr Caire aucim moi~vrtnent; 
81 vousjugca que c'est: itrie itrriErs cardo el yuo vous l'ntlnuliiierz, 
j'attnqueriii masi. Si vous juqcs wilven~lite d'attcndrc les ordrcfi 
de ~Tonnreurlenrari:~l:lid priucu d'Easlinfi, j'ablenrli.ai aussi; comme 
je pensc qqu'il viendrx vers votro corpu, je  vow pie de lui Ltire 
parrciiir le rapporl ci-,joinl isvec les viilrcu. 
J'ai I'honneur de vous ~rior,  hlonaiour le mar&clial, ci'qder 
l'hommage de mon reapect. 
(aip;ne) REYRTER. 
A Mg~e.ea'ertr Ee +qJn Pral ~ / n ! ~ .  Ssr b Lautrwr m a r r i  de 
~Woira,  lis 2íi L S P ~ ~ P ~ ~ L M ,  1810, b 10 A P U ~ ~ H  a du mi~lin. 
Je reqois h I'instnnt, mon chcr g6nfr,zl, vokc l~ttrc do co jonr, 
Jo pcngc qu'une randc partic de i'nrtn6e Ariglo-ljortugaiso a 
pnsd 1s niiil sur fn c r í h  iici inontngiic,s gui ilumine loiik l i i  
va1160 do Moira. l;'~i pyszu tlit  qii'il r y s i q l c  tlc I'xittre cbtf dcwa 
muritagues unrb ilniiio assrs Iicllc rl'uiirt ilriiii-liruc rl'blcndue, c t  
tris ganiic c~oliviirs. Uepiiia oc rnzlin. i'riinemi iuorelie pnr 
Ea ganche, ek semble diiiger srs coloniies priiicipiilert niir la route 
d'0portn;  cqcndnnt il tirnt encnrr iis=cn dr innndr i~ Ir& droitr! du 
parc qiie rouvrc le convent drn minimcs nommi. Salio; ct il montre 
iine 13"" de pibc~s cl'arfilleri~. Le clchemiri dc Cuimbre prissp t r h  
pr>a (le cc rm$cnt. 
J'ni rnvoyd ct: mntin nn dr! rnm nirlrs-ñc-rnmp nii Tirin~c' 
d'E~sling ~ u r  111i dirc qiic no118 ~nrnrnrfl en I I ~ ~ S P ~ R P ,  nt  qu'ik 
sernit n6cessniriiro u'il nrrirfit pour prcnclrc ~ i n  pnrti. Si j'nrois 1~ 
oommnndomoni. $ttfllUP"i8 san8 hEsitrr un ai*ui inalnnt; miis 
je erois, mor1 clier gfincrd, que vous ne ~ioui-ez ricn c o m p r n ~  ttw 
en YOIIS I:c1111~lonn~111 sitr la (IroitL' de X'cnnemí; e l  en orwsrinl 8cs 
nvajit-poatex, e u  e'r.s~ v~riisl~lemont par oc point p .8  hiirlrail le 
forcer la fairc sa retrnita. 
Jo rons renouvetIe, &c. (%P4 LE ~EAR~CECH DDC D'ELCHXXGBJ. 
S ~ c n e r  'I'lr. 
A Nonsim~ le mar~cluclprinw d'B~slinq, commañIla~at-mccIigf 
I'arm&c de Puriuiyul, PaiFs, le 4 b ~ ~ v m b r e ,  1S10. 
B I o ~ a ~ s n ~  LE PBINCE D'ESSL~NG,-LE gEiiL~al F o y q u ~  rous ~ T C Z  
expc'dif e a t  arriv6 A Paris le 2% iVovembrc; il s hit conndtrc k 
sn mqjcstO ct dme lc plus ~ m d  dCtail ce qni s'cst p ~ s b  et votre 
sitnntion. 
Deei le 4 Novembre le g6niral Gnrdanne Qhit en avmt 
d'hlmrida mee un c o r p ~  de GOOO hommcs. Le combe GeErlon 
a ~ c c  les diviaion~ Clrrpnrhde, Conroux, et la dividan Bournicr n 
dii #a trou~er b Guarc1.z vers le 20 Kovemlire. 
L'empsreur, prinre, a vu par Ieei journaiix Anglais, quo vons 
nvFcir btubli d c ~  pont3 sur lo Tagn ct qiic vous cn a ~ c r  un EUT Ic 
Zdekc ,  difcndu sur Ics dcux rivea pur dc fostcs lGtes de pont. 
8a mujc~t6 pcnsc qiievous devex vous retraricher dantl la position 
que vuus orcupea rleviml l'enuerni; u*~lbranlfs c lrouvant :L 
$400 taisea du Twi, voua l'nurez isolr' !a son poiit e l  bloqué our 
un faire lp aib-e. L'ernprreur vous roconiininclo d'Fhb5r {cur 
ponts aur le ?%sbre, dc dckndrc ces ponta par dca ouvrageri con- 
hidci-ablea, mrnrne ceux du Spitz devant Vicnne. Votre Iigne 
1lbp61litions rt cle cornrni~nications devant btre 6talilie par la route 
de Cnrcla, partnnt: di1 Ki:ísi.re, passmt par Cnrrligus, siii~ant la 
d t e  des mnnt~gnca par I'ampinlin rt Relmonte, voua Riirrz toii- jonm ln mute dc CnatrIlirnnco ct Snlvakrn oiw faire dcs vivrps. 
Jo vicns do donncr do nouvonu I'orrlrc d & ~  rOiiErfo plusicum 
Eois au duc de 4)ttlmntic, rl'anvojcr le 6'"" corps sur lo Tagc entro 
Nontalvro e t  Villdlor, pour fuire sn jonction nvcc vous. L'cm- 
ercur eroil qu'il scrnit iikcssnire dc s'emp:arer d'Ucanuilara, de 
forLiGer e t  de coninlidcr tuiis lis ponta sur 1 i  ZCziro ot  sur l e  
Tage, d'assurer touics VOY cuinmi~uicatioiis en sassissant les 
poiiits faroraliles quc peuvent oflkir les loealités pm fortiiier de 
y i t c s  positioi~s ; des cL&t.tcnm ou maisons qui, oecup6ea par peu 
c ~ ~ O U ~ L I S ,  aoicnt k l'aliri de3 inmmions dra milices. 
Voris sentirex, RTonsiciir le princc d'lilssling, l'amnfnge de 
r6p1lariocr iiinai I n  SI~EPPC, cc qili VOIIR M C I  t1.n 5 ni2mc de 
prnfitcr do ln  diininn dc toiis les corpe qui ~ o n t  vous rcnforccr, 
Iiorir rnnrclier sur lord Wcllington ct attnquer la giu~uclie de 5a 
position, ~ o i t  poiir l'oliligei. h uc rembtirquer en murclinnt sur L 
iivc gauchc du IL'agc, ou edin, si touii ces uioyeua ne r6ussissuient 
pas, iFous sewl e n  mesure dc mskr cn pouitiori pcndau~ Ics mois 
rlc Ddccrnlire el de Jtriivicr. cn vouei occupmt d'organiscr vos 
ri~rps et de bicn etatlu. i .0~ communieations ave0 -&&id et  
Almeyda. 
L'nmbe dia centre qiii est ?I Madrid, a p n t  des détachementa 
mr Naeentia, TOS communicatioiia RVCC cctte cnpitsle ne sont paa 
(iiflcil~s. 
Deiix rnillion~ 600 millc francs rlcstin6s L la solde de votre 
nmEc ROIIC cl+ h Vldlndolid; dcux n ~ ~ t r c  milliona pnrtenl; cn cr! 
rnornent do 8ayonne. llin~i votre m d e  scra iim une eionna 
~iikuation. 
Volre poeition dei~iendm hGs emliamannte pow les Anglaia, p, indr'pmriamrne~tt d'une eonsammation &norma d'iiommes et 
'argent, sr: tronvemnt cngagbri dann unc picxre de systcnie, et 
ñyant to~ijours une immensitC dc lihtimcris b la mex pour Ieur 
rmbrrrqiiement. Ii faut do~ic, princc, travniller sana teme H, 
roiis Fori.ili~r . p i s - b i s  do In. position de. ennemi~, pt ponvoir 
prrlcr 1ii rUl,re svec moins de moiillc; er qni rendra une partie 
dc votre iirmúr? mnliic ct vona rnctba it memo dc fuire rlcs incur. 
siom dnna le pays. 
A a 2 
Vous Prouverez ti-joint des Moniteur~ qui donn ent des nourelIea 
de Portugal, pmwenues par la ~ o i e  dc i'rbglctcrre, datCcs da 
12 Xovembre. 
Le prince de Wag-ram et de Yenchktel, 
Mnjor-gén&ral, 
(S ip6)  ALEXAYDBE. 
J e  vous expEdie, prince, le g&nEra! Fo que l'cinpercur a 
nomm6 gEnérd clde diviaion; j s  vour PnvaicKs 3lonitcurs; aous 
J vcrree que i i m s  npprcnons pnrlea iiouvclles d'bnglctcrrc qu'au 
1 Décenilire, rrous vous forti6ez dans votre position de 8m- 
tarem. 
L'empereur met la pliia p n d o  importaneo B co que vons 
bniez constammcnt en echec Ics ilnglni~, b cc que voiis avez  de^ 
ponts aiir lo Zdzbro rt fitir Ic Tage; in saison vn dercnir hnnc  
ponr les opCrntions militaires, et !tvm siirrz In mnycn de l~nrc~lcr 
ies ~hgl-lnia et  de leur fnire Cproiirer joiirnrltrmcnt dcs prtcs. 
Pnr Ira nouvcllcs dca jniirnnuñ Anglnis, il parait qu'il y a Iirnn- 
coup de maladcs dma lcnr m E c ,  ills nc rnmptcnt qiic 27 h 
28 mar! hommcs sous lea armes c t  nn cfictif do 31 millo, 
y mmpris la mvalcrio eb lhrtillorio, La situation do i'ann60 
Anlaitie en Portugal. ticnt Londres duna une arigoi~e continiiellc, 
e t  l ernpereur wnarde commo un grana livau~agc do tonir les 
Anglais en Echec, de les attirer et de liiur fairo perdro du monde 
dans les affairea d'avtmt-gardes, j~iusqu'L ce que row soyez ii 
mDmc de les engaEer dan8 iine nEfu~re gfinhde.  Se dilbre enconc 
a ~ i  mw6chd duc (le Travise l'ordre de rnard~ci: .sur le !Ccagc avcc 
le 6"" corps. 
Le comte d'Erlon, qiii duni t  son corps ;t Ciudnd-Rorlrign, 
vn rofiter de ce rnoment oii 1 ~ s  pliries cPssent poiir reprrndro 
l'ofcnsiur et  hnttre t o u ~  ora e o q a  de mniiunirca tmupas que RO 
tmuvent 811~  TOA cornmirnicntiona e t  sur voa f nnm. 
VOR ponts 4 h t  bicn nssuda sur lc Xcebrc, la l i p c  do vos 
opErntione ln plus naturellc ~nra i t  dcvoir etrc pnr la rivc gauchc do 
cettc rivibc. 
Lo ~EnEral Fov, h qui I'unpcrcur n pmld longtompe, vons don- 
nara pTus de dEtiils. 
Le prince de Wagnun et do NcuchhkI, 
Maj oi.-pbn6rd, 
(S&U~]  ALRXAKD~E, 
SECTION VI.
A Mm&w le waréch J d'Es;~Iiw, maandant-m-chef FamBe & 
Pwtacgal, ParHs, lc 16 Jmnwk~, 1811. 
JB iTous prbviens, prince, que ar dhcret impL:rial, en dato du 
15 de ce mis, l'emperiur s &m& une du Nord ds 
I'Espapo, dont le oommandemcnt est con66 b Monsiour Ic 
maróclial duc d'lstrir, qui va Bhblir son quartior gbn6ral S 
Uurgua. 
L'arronJlesement de l'amke du Eord do 1'Egpxgno erit com- 
pos; :- 
lo. Do la Navrirre formgnt Ic S puvcrnement de I'Espqnc. 
ZO. Des trois rovinces de la Biscqe et de la provincc da San- P landm, forrnant c C gouvernemcnt. 
3O. De la pronnce des ~lsturies. 
4O. Des provincea de Llurgos, Aranda, et Soria, formnnf Ie 
5' goav~rnement. 
5 O .  Des provinceu de Pdcncia, Vnlladolid, h o n ,  Rencvvente, 
Toro, ct  Znmom, f m n n t  Ir: ri" ~ouvcrncment. 
F. Dc ln pmvinec rlr: Snlnmnntyuc. 
hinsi cct nrrondisarment compmnd tout Ir :  pnys occnpE par 
lee troupes Fmncaises cntro 1s mcr, la f rancc, le Portiignl, et 
 le^ limiles de I'ürrundisse~nent dos m i e t i  du ccntre et du 1'Ar- 
ragon. 
G e t k  diaposition, cn cciitralisnnt Je pou170ir, va donner de 
l'ensernble ct uilc nouvello impirlsion d'activili! aux op6raliorin 
dans toutes Ics yrovincca du Sord  dc 1'Espagnc ; et Monsiciir Ic 
rnarklial rluc distrie mettra un soin partirulier i~ maintenir les 
commuuications cutre ~ T a a l l ~ ~ ~ l i r l ,  Snlamnnqire, et: LUmeidn. 
Jc roua engage, princc, 2 corrcspondre nvec Nonaienr le 
marfehal duc rí'Istric tontes Ica fois qiic voiis le jugcwz iitilo au 
semice. 
D~tprhs les orclrcs ilc I'cniprrcur j e  prhiens Monaicnr le dne 
d'Istric qiic dnnn rlrs circotistnncca imprhvucs, il dnit apptipcr 
I'armbc di: Porhipnl c t  lui portcr dii sccours; j c  Ir: pr6vicns nussi 
que Ic 9"" coss d'nrmio uerait sous 8129 nrdrcs dnns lc ras o& ca 
wrps rmtrerrut en 1Ssp:qne. 
h 1)riucdde Wrqraam et de PSenchhtel, 
Mqjor-g4nGral, 
( SigilI) ALEXAND~E. 
S ~ c n o n  VII. 
A ,Xom'mr io mar&hul duc de ;Dalmlie, Paris, le 21i 
Januier, 1811. 
Pons verraz par le Moniteur driior, Monaienr le duo de Dd- 
matie, que Iea arniúea ile Yortug:d Chieni B Ja ih inde i'annde dcr- 
nikre dnns la ni0mo poliition. L'en'niperm me oliarge du vuuti 
renouvellcr I'orrlre dc V O U ~  por1er uu P C C O U ~  du pritl~c dlS':~a!ing, 
qui est toujours n Santnrcm; il n pluaicure ponh sur le Zéxbre, 
et il a tknr l  que les ranx goient diminuEcs pour ea jetter un sur le 
Tage. 11 pniait ccrhin que le gm* corps a operé ea jonctron aTec 
lui par le Nord, c'cst-R-dirc, par hlmcydri,. 
L'ernparrnr espCre que Ie prilecc d l l b l i g  nava jdtd m pmt 
le I'ayc; ce que 1111 h n n e m  ~ C R  vivres. 
Lcs mipe infinrghs dn Vnlence c t  dn Miircic vont sr! tronvcr 
oocupb piír lo eorps du gdn6rd Siichct, nuseit8t quo Twono 
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sera tombC rntre nos mains, comme I'a fait 3s plzee de Tortosc: 
nlors sa majest4 pensc gue le 6"" cqns e t  une par& du 4,"" 
pumont se porter au mours du prime d'Essling. 
Lo major-gCnCrd, 
( S i p r i )  ALRXANDRR. 
Jo vous previens, prioce, que Monsienr le mñréclial dnc de 
Ddmatic R ' C S ~  mis en marche dans les prernirrg joisrs de JA~T~cT 
a v ~ c  le fin" roi-ps d'am&c, iin cnrps di! cavalrrie, ct un 6qiripqe 
de si'gr, ponr se porter sur 13nrlojnn c t  fuirc Ir: rrii:gc tic cc!tte p l i ~ c .  
CCR troltpc~ ont r l i i  nrrivcr la 10 de eo mois clcrunt IlntIajox; jo 
mandc aiidllc dc I>almatic qtl'nprh Im riso S c  eottc lacc il doit 
80 portcr sius psrdro do toms sur lo $o avcc 8on &uipage de 
sibp ppour vous donncr les moyens d'uasidger ot du ~irwndre 
Abrmds. 
lk prince do Wagram et de XoucliWel, 
Mqjor-gonerd, 
(Sigric) A L E X ~ D E B .  
Als pvince b Wapw st de fimhatel, mnjor-g6nbal, PaGS Ee 
5 klh?wr, 1811, 
M(in consin, jo pcnsr: nc vons devcz cnvoyer 10 Moniteur 
d'aujourd'hui nn duu do ~ i n m i i e ,  au duo de Trbrisc, nii dnbial 
Belliard, nu duc Kbtrio, auñ communduns de Ciiidnrl-Rodrino e t  
dii lmpida,  raux gendral 'I'Lidmut, c t  nux g6n6rsuaur Uomi\nnc, 
Gal:,iielli, e t  lbille, Ecrivez au duc d'lstrie vti I+ envuyatit le 
xoiiiteur,pour lui m o n c e r  qu'il y tr0uvci.a ~ C B  ~ C I - H L P P C B  norivelles 
d u  I'urtugül, qui paiaissent Etre du 13; qiie tout paraitit prendrc 
une coulcur avuntngmsc : que si hdi t joz  aSl6 gris diioslc couranii 
de dnnvicr, lc duc de Dalneatie m p6 se porter s i w  le Yagc, et 
fueililer l'ktab2issemmt du, p n t  aw prince d'Xxsling : p ' q  
devicnt donc trbs importnnt de raire toutcs les dispositions que j'ai 
ordonnEes nfiu que le ~4nGra.i Urauet nvec scs dciix divisions puisso 
& t r ~  tont sntier h la diaposition du prince rl'Eaaling. Emivez eu 
meme tcma au d i ~ c  de I)ulmatie poiir Iiii fnisc connaitrre la sitna- 
tion du diic d'rotric, et Iili r6itEwr I'ordre de fuvore'sw It! p-im 
d'EgsILny POUT son pacaago cln Tape ; gne j'espCre que B:tdnjoz 
aura EtC! pria deus lo conrant dc dnnvicr; ct  rluc vcra Ir? 20 Jtm- 
viw sajonctim aura m binc  su^ le  Teryc, arrc lc princo d'Rm1ing; 
qu'd pcut, ~i ccla est ni.cess;iiro, retire? dcs traupcs du hm' crirps; 
pu1en$n tmf ecst mr b ?'aje. Sur cc j c  rio l)lcu, mon cousm, 
quiI vous ait drns s i i  saiutu et  digne g a d .  
(SignB) NAPOLEON. 




A Masaasamr b m w M a l  prime b l T s s l i ~ ~ ,  mmmundant-m-chef 
l'am&e de I'wtwgrti, Parti, ¡e 7 Pevrier, 1811. 
Jn vous envoie, princc, le Moniteur dn 6; voiis y tronwrcz 
Iea dcrnibrra nouvclles quc nous avons du I'ortuyd; cllcs uniit 
ju~qii'nu 13 J n n v i ~ r ~  ct annoncent pila tout p m d  o&m twrtawe 
rwianf~gesi~~e. Si Radojo.: a &ti? pris dnns b ~wrar t  de Sanijlcr, 
eomm ccla e& probublc, Eo dtac de Balmafie auca yitc fuiw 
m m l m  des trmi~eu f u ~  le Tye, ct  wousfuciQtm I'eia61i~acmnt 
rl'inponi, Jo l ~ i i  cn ui rlonue st  je lui en r6itbr~ I'ordre; i'ern- 
perrur evpkre quc lajonclicis des troupeu de ce marichal u ac lielc 
mu~iitma~at vee 7ioec~ w3. le Tugs. 
Lcs deux divisions d'infanteris dn corps du g4néral Droilct 
voiit icster cntibrcmeiit votrc dispoaition cl'nprbs les ordrca quo 
je  tlonne b 310ilsieur Je m~r6chñl duc d'Iskir, commandant-en- 
chcf 1'xmCe dn nord [le l"ll:spsgne; j e  liii m:ande de porter son 
quwtier ~6nCrul ia Ynllndnlid, d'ttnblir drr corpa nonibreiix da 
cnvnlrrin rlnn~ la prnsiiino do Snlnm~nqiir: afin d'naaiircr d'iiiio 
mnni;rr 'niininli8rcsiiiircrt;rnpiclc Inroi.rcspondnniie cntrchlmqdn,  
Ciudad l h r i y o  etVnUndolid. ot naoa niroyor prornptorncnt toutcs 
les nouvclles qui po~irront purvenir YnrmEo de Portugal. 
Jti Iiii prescris de tenir ?t Ciudad ltodrigo un eorps du 6000 
hommes qui puiucie 6loiper toute esphev du troupe ennernie de 
Ciudad I<odrigo e l  d'rilirieidri. foire in8nie de8 incursiona sur 
Hnlicl et Guardo, emp&clicr qu'il sc forme aucun rassemM~mrnt 
sur Ics derrikres du 9"" w 9, e t  prCsenÍxr des clispositions olC~.ri- 
sivea sur oettc frontiere du%ortugd. 
De &unir unc forte brigade de Ja $arde impbride vcrs Zarnora 
d'oii ellc Fcra R portSe de soiitrnir le cnrpa (Ir: Ciirrlad Rodri~o, ct 
oii ella ac t,mIwerti d'nilleim dans une pogition avnnc6c pour qir 
auivant lea circonshnces. 
De rftinir une iiuirc f o r t ~  liri~ade rZi: la gnrdr b Vlillndolid oii 
eUc wrn cn mcsiirr: d'nppuycr ln p r c m i h ;  ct de dunir lc resto 
de Ia p d c  dnns lc gouvcrncmcnt rlc Uurgo~. 
I'w ccs disyouitioiis, prliicc, lcs dous divi~iona d'infuntcrio du 
9"" corps, ~urunf eritibwnicrit u votre día osition, ct avec ce Aeeours 
vour acni  un nicsurii de tenir longtoriisL positiou qus vous oiiu- 
pez; de vous porlcr s u r  la rive gñucLc ddii Tage; ou eiirin d'ryir 
comme vous le jugercz conveiudle sans avnir auucunc inqui6tuJe 
sur lc nord dc l'Espagne, puis uc le duc d'Istric sera ii. ,ortCr do 
marche? sur ~ r n c ~ d u  ot ~iudn\ l ladrip et m&ino sur dadrid, si 
des circonstmecs irinttciidi~cs ic rcndiiient nEcessaire. 
Des qne Ic dac rl'lstrie aura hit sesi diupoaitions 11 cnvcrm tia . 
oficier au gCnPralDro~ict, pour l'en instniire et lui fire connoitre 
qu'il peut, wPi,cr rn criticr porir voua rrnforccr. 
Le g':.n':ml T q  n dii pnrtir ~ m 3  Ir S9 .Ttinri~r do Gindnd Ro- 
drjgo, avcc 4 batsillons ct 300 liommcs de envalcric pour v o u ~  
icjomdrc. 
Lc prince dc W~b~arn et de Peuchhtd, 
33.ri,lor-gCn6rai, (-4 A L R X ~ D R E .  
APPENDJX. 
XoX c m  MAR~CHAT,,-VOU~~ RUTPZ npp& notrc nrrivdr nns 
fronti;~': dti Pnrtir,nal, I'armbr RC troniFr: dnns un pnyR nliñolirmcnt 
niinf;  rt iivrc toiitr rnn colonti! et lnpnticnrr (Ir I'~mt"c, ji? 
mninm dc n'y ~iouvnir tcnir 8 jours, e t  j ~ m c  vtrrni fnm6 dr: rcntrrr 
en Eupqy .  
J'fcris n, M. Te cte. d%rlon ponr qu'il fassc ripprovisionner 
Almcydn et Xodri~u ; ces deux place3 nkuraicril jarnius dfi 
oeeecr d'avolr pour :3 moib (le vivres aux qucls on ri'aiunit p~ di1 
touclier sous HULUU pr6lext.e; e l  inn sitrprjse est exli+ma d'ilp- 
prendre qu'ii n'y 21 uc pour 10 jours de v iv~es  k rilmeydit. Je  lui 
ómrc awsi de prcri ! rc une po&lion cnlrt! Hotlrigu :uL Atmepda, 
avec deux di~isions; vous scnler. combi:n il cst nficessaire, 
qu'il se place U. portic de mnrcEirr au sccouy d'Almcyda. 
Si je  trouvara des vivres, jc  ne qiiitternis as lca frontieres 
d%npape c t  dii Portugal, mvis eamine j e  rousy'oi dit, j e  nt vois 
. . . . . . . . . . . .  g u h  la p~sriibilit4 d'y rester, 
Morr CHER B ~ A R C C H A L , - ~  pilyS qU(! 1'8~m6t! OCCUpe lie ~ o u v ~ U ~ %  
an aucune rnauii~rc le kire v í m ,  jc xrir vois IOrcL: dr 1xfait-e r~ntrer 
en 13spwe. Voici lea cantunnements que j~ 1ui ni assignEs et 
. . . . . .  l'itinwuire de marche de eliaq~ie mrps d'armCe. 
MQK CKBR r n n f c r t ~ ~ , J e  BU~S arriv6 avec. touta I ' w n E o  siir 
Ci~idnd Hudrip, mcs troupce dcpuis plueieurs joure soul saiis 
pai~i: et j c  suis oblipd de faire prcildrc sur les approriuionnemeiits 
do Rotorlngo 200 mille rationn de Iiiscnit, que je voiis prie d'ordori- 
iier dc rcmplacer avec Ics ressources qui pcuvcnt se trouver B 
Salamanque et Yalkadolid. NUUS partirons ensuite pour lea can- 
'tonnemcnts que j'si eu ~ o i n  dc TOUS faire mnndtre. J'espbre que 
~ o u e  aiirez bien ~ o u l u  fiiire dcniner des ordres aus intenclnns de 
province, cl'y !aire préparer d ~ a  vivres, s e d  moyen d'y fnjre 
maintenir I'ordre. 
JP mmpte ~6~ionrner 3 3 4 joma ici ponr wir 6 I'ennemi ne 
~'npprackeraie paa des places. 
(Si&; LB PEIBCE D'ESSLINO. 
APPENDIX. 36 I 
Mon CABE M A E ~ c H A L , - ~ ~ & ~ ~ R ~ ~ ~ o ~  dcvienttoujonisplnadar- 
mnntc; lcs places ñppcllent des aeeoara ; j e  ne recois pñs [le 
i.Cponses de vous 2 aucune de mes ilernnndes; cf si crt Ctat (10 
cliose he prolonge, jc scrai ford de fairc prcndre ib I'arm é~ des 
cantonnemcnts oU ello piiisse vim, et; d'abnndonner lea plnces 
qne je  ne suia pns climrp5 dc d6fmdre et encorc Iifcn moins d'np- 
pro~isimaer, mcs troupes manqunnt absolumcnt do vincs. (sbP4 Iim ~ I G I X C I E  D'ESSLTÑQ. 
SECTIOW xv. 
A 1 7 1 ~ W g B g m ~  le madc76aE dw d%tr8e, Pa*, Ic 3 dad, 1811. 
Le g4n6ral Foy est arriv6, Xonaicur le marEehd dnc d'Istrie, 
ainei que los d m x  nidee-de-cam du marécliiil prinm d'li:ssling, 
i o  eapitaino Porclier, et le chef H e r e h n  Pciet. U prrrit que le 
prince rl*Rssling m e c  son COrpQ d'arm8e prend position ir Guarrln, 
Delmonte, et Alfayates. ilinai il protEae Ciudad Ilodrrgo, 
Alrneyda, "hrndrirl at  i'Anrlalousic. Ses cornmunications doivent 
s'6tril)Iir fntbilcmrnt zvcc I'armh dii midi pnr ~rXcnni.n~n el: Rnddos. 
S i  o f  q11'on ne pGvoiti pns, Ic pririnct: d'EssTing ftoit -rivcmrnt 
atknqir6 par I'armf e A nglnisr, l'rmprrrur prnat. que .t:otc~ 
ie ~outcnir aurr nnc I n ~ n c  dc nrili~~v liorn7ncs. Lnrm6c Ec"Z 
doit avoir poussE un corpa sur Alcantarn. L'armbo du midi sora 
renforcdcrprr ce qiia uous sume d6jb f& pnrtir, et J'cprhs le 
prince d' Axsling, elle vn se trouvcr assoz ibrh pour no rien 
crairidre de Yennemi. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
{h reste est sana interfit.) 
h major-gEn4rnl, 
( SipC) ALBXANDBX, 
8~cr1orn m. 
A ; 1 a m ' ~  b rmadckal! duc d'lstme, S a h a n q w ,  k 17 Avrz'l, 
1811. 
MOX CRRR ~IARI?CTTAC,-~ ghnbml Xcps.nd, commandmt 
aninyiPrirur k Itmlrigti, ninsi qne Ie gEn6rnl Mnreli~nd, qui est avec 
sa dii.iuion autour dc cctta place, mc rendcnt comptc que 2 divi- 
sions Portu niscs nvec uno diviaion Anplaks ont priu position aux 
w i m n a  d'ffirneyda. Quoiriuo cetta plueo ait e u m  das limes 
pour uno 20'"" de jonrs, el que  le^, Anglais et Ies Porlugai~ 
meurent de faim daus leurs yoailions, 11 ikut faire des dispositions 
poiir les chasser m del:% de la Coa, et pour rxvi(ai1ler cette place. 
Je vous yropose cn consbqucnce,mon clier maGclial, de rnettrck me 
di~posit~on i 2  ;b l5W ciirirnux, ceus de I'armCc de Portugal n'ctmt 
en Btat de rendre aucun sewice; j e  TOUR demande de plus une 
d ik ion  d'ifnnterie our placer en rem-ve. Ven le N on le 
29, .es ames se ioinlmot niir 6 dvision. que j e  nrnptc reunir 
de l'armée de rortug~l p m  attnquer l'cnnemi, s'il nous attend 
dan3 sea ouitions et le chsser an delá de la Coa. U est impos. 
sibie dc &re Faiiro le moinclre rnouvcmot k touten ecs troupai, 
du moins 5 eelles de i'mniéc de Portiigal pour ñttnycr I'cnnemr; 
si on ne cut lcur faifuirr: distribaer pour lOjours de biscuit et avoir 
de Pcau {e vie 1 ln suit dc I'urmEc. Ja vous demande encore 15 
k 18 pibce~ d'artillerie bien attrlbea, celles k mes ordres Etant hom 
d'Ctnt dc inarclier. Avcc ees mwcns, nul doufx quc I'enncmi ne 
soit di.po~t.6 et chaasc hora dcS fruntibrec de I'l<aprip,riir et hit d ~ i d  
de la Con. Mon clier mrirCclia1, j c rts ici nn j our dr jour ; ja  ~iiis 
unnR le 801, VC~IIP OIIVCZ hiit;  i l  Fniitdonc noiis rnvogrr du liiscnit, 
dc I'eaii do uir, xi pnin rt do l'orgr. C i  acrn avco crr r n q u n a  
uc noas pourrons rnniimiivrcr. 11 no fniit ns prrdrc iin in~ tnn t .  41 cst iras urgent do mnrclicr ou Gccaura d*i~!rnqhu. C c ~ t  irrai~  
L donncr vos ortlr~s ; ct vous mc trouvcrcz port4 de la nicilloum 
voloutd U f&o tout, cc qui scra convcnnlilo nilu intl?rBts dc P. M. 
(Signd) LE P ~ ~ W C E  U'NSSLINQ. 
Sxmaa X m .  
A Jfo'onhr le ma&lrai! duc TIgfric, Snlmmanp,  le 22 .AmPITBl, 
1821. 
~ Z D N  CHER H A R ~ C I U L , ~ ~ ~ ~  nfpu voire dCpCche. Tontes vos 
promemes de voiis rhiiuir h moi s'hanoiiissent rlonc dans le 
momcnt o; j'cn ni Iicsoin; ravitiiilla Almeidn rt R a d r i p  ese la 
1' opcrntion rt lu, saiile qui prut noira dnnnerln. fi~cidt6 de rendre 
I'a~m6c dr Porttlgnl disponible, lortrqri'on n'niiri~ pliia rien ir 
crniiidrc sw lc sort den plnces. En y jettant pour 3 ji i moia de 
vimcs, un peut cnsuitc ftoblir plusicri~a eolonucs mobiles; on 
ycut envoyer des trvupes h Aviln ct SC~ovic; ou peut au Liesojn 
ppyuyer le mouverncnt dc l'i~rn16e d'hridduiisie. Afsis ne sci-dil 
31 pas Iioiiteux dc laiascr mnrlrt* iine ~ll i ict i  Fzulc (le vivrm, en pfi- 
sence dc dcux marCclinux [le I'Enipirc? J e  vms  ai d6jk prévcnu 
de la nullitfi de ma cn~dcrie, Je 1'impossil)ilité oii sc trouvcnt le? 
elcraus d'artillcrie (le rsndrc otictin aervice. Vous sriiTez Rusa1 
qiic je  doia cnvoyer le Irrnc C ~ I ~ T I R  cn Anrlnli~sie; jc  voulais rtumi 
I v  faire concoririr nwnt aw d 6 p n ~  aii niviinillcmrnt drs plncr~. 
Poiivex-voiis, mon clier rnarCi~lia1, hnlnnrcr iin sriil i iintiant B 
in'pn~oycr dc la cnvn'tcric,rt dcsiittclqcs d'nrtillrric, si voua voirlez 
gnrdcr o t r c  mnt4rirl? No voiia u-jc pns prbvcnu quo jc  com- 
niencrrüiti mon moizr~mrnt  lo 261 e t  voiia pmrai~scz attcndrc le 
(22) une semntle dmandc de nis pwt, Vous le swcz :iunsi bien 
que nioi, pcrJrc iin ou deax joure B la  v e r r e  est beaucoup; et 
ce dflai rut avuir dea auites ficheuses qilbn ne rbpare yhs. 
~ u m 8  j e  vous ni ciit qno jc  nr rdiinerris que 6 mriaims. 
ciEtait pour ne pas tont drgnrnir dcg poiniq importans occnp6a 
par ICR corps cl'rirm6e ; mala & lia cwillcrio ct (le l'urtillrrie aont un 
eecoura dont je ne puis me passer. dc TOUS prie mi conséquence, 
mon clier mar&clial, de me fairc nrriver do la cri~aleric et dra 
attc>lnges d'artillcrie ?t rn~rirclies forcCcs. R6flechissez ii'nnr foia 
1 ~ s  pi~om r6nppraniaiminiios, j e  poiirnii disposcr dcs 3 !o Ihrmhe, 
ct que c e t h  oli6r:~ttion passe uvant tout. 
Eti rn'ofinnt dc noiis onroger Ics attclagca pour I6pibecs, vous 
aurez Oicn eriteridü, sans doub, mor1 cher ~ n a r C c i d  y cornprendru 
ceux núcescairee pour le8 wtisuons des pihws. 
(S i~na)  LE ~nrwcn D'ESSLTICI. 
SECTTOK XVrIL 
A Mom'eu~ la ~ ~ L u r l a a l  duc d'lstrie, S u l a m ~ p ,  le 2% A~m', 
. 1811. 
ATox cnEn M A R ~ C ~ I L L ,  -JC ma rends demain 'R Ciudnd 
Itotli-igo, 01'1 toate l 'armée scrareunie le 26. Le ravildlement de 
ln ~ I R C C  d'.klrneida est du yliia Iiniit intbdt poiir lcir arme! de 
S.M.; et  il ciit 6th hirn B d6sirrr qiie Irs smoirra nr j'a~ cir 
i'ionncur demm dcmfindcr nous P T I R S C , ~  6td C I I V ~ ~ R .  %,niiemi 
nnrnit avoir de 20 ii 29 mille hommcs autoirr de cette plwe. 
vous dire quc j o  n'aurni en c ~ ~ ~ n l c r i e  quo 15 k 1800 hommcs, c t  
seulcmciit 20 pi8cctr do cnnon ponr touto l'armbc, c'est vous fairc 
sentir, mon clicr rourtdiul, comliicn votre gocoura m'eut 6t6 nbcus- 
saire au moins aous deux rapports, pour votro ttrni&u mBiiie e t  
pour,ln, trnnquillith du nord du 1'Espttgne. Je n'sti pas mEiiag6 
mes instiincrs suprbs dc voiis. Si mes effmts nB8taicnt ptta heu- 
rciix, voira dGvaacinent pour le swvicc do i'empcreur, voiis 
ferai t ccrtaincmcnt rcgrettcr de ne pns Ics avoir sccondCs nvec 
les moyeiis que vons m'aviea fait espGrer, nvant qite j'en eussa 
1iesoin. 
ISipn4 LE PnrNcn n'Rss~rxa. 
SSCTXON XIX. 
A Mmsieur b mar&haZ &e d'I~trk, R o d k p ,  le 29 Auril, 1800. 
Non CEEE HAX~C~AL,-VOS l c t t r ~ ~  o n t  inconewrililc~, Dms 
collo du 20, v m s  mo ditcs que vous nc pouvcz rno clooniicr ai~cun 
aecour*. l'ar ccllc du 5kd vous m0 ditcs que le 25 ou lc %G YOIN 
me joindwr. purtout oii 'o acrui, et  qiic ~ I L  tbte de vtitro colurino 
srrivern h Srlarnaiiqui !e i i i .  Par a U i  que jc reqoii :r i ' i i i i h h ,  
voiui me dites, qrie votre cavaleric et votrt. artillerie se trouvent 
encore le 27 h iitie journiSe cn arribre de Salamanque; et vous 
eoncIners qiic mon mou~ernent doit Btrc fini; et  miis mc tirnoip 
nes vos wgr& de n'ñvoir fi g coop4rcrm Conrenez, m6n clicr 
mn+oiic), qiie si 1.arm6e i e  ~>orti i~nl  roocrsit un écliec, voilr 
nurirs hirn drs rryirorFic~i ir r70irs fnirc, .Tc vous ni dcmmdP do 
l'artillcric ct dca nttclagr? ct cncoi-e plna poeitii-cmrnt <le la can- 
leric; vous aves soris diffhcns pr6tcxtcs EludLC m& dcrnandr. 
Toutes les troupea qui sont en Eypnppe, sont dr 1s mcme fumille. 
voua Stcu, jusques k ce qiz'il y sii du noiiveaux ortlreu, chtirgG do 
12 dEhuse e t  do 1'appruvisionnoit~o11t des plwcs d'blrneida e l  de 
lidrigo. J c  n'anrxis pm micitx deinnnd6 que d'eiiiployer l'armée 
de Portugal sous mes ordreg B difeiidre cea placcs, it marclier au 
secoiirs de l'armee du midi; mnis commcnt puis-jc le hire sana 
vivres? 
Je m p t o  hire mon mouvement de& math. J'ignorc 
qiielle ama, Btrn i'issne de ce mourcment; si ma lettra TOU8 
srrhe !nns la journOc dc dornaia, ~ o t m  ervnlcrio ct rotre arta- 
lerie pourmient toujours se mettre en motiriwmcnt dms 111 nrijt 
potir arriver aprEs demain 1' B!ai L Cabrillas. Je rotia prie de 
faire filer anns s'arreter le biscuit, lri. furinc, le pnin qno ~ o a s  
n'ourex pas mmpu6 dc rbunir k la auitr! rlc vos troupcs. 11 rqt 
in~tant que ces i~cssourccs comnie h~ali~01lp d'mlrcs arrivrnt ii 
Rodrigo; ccttc pIace n'anra pas pour 16 joiim dr vimes. A mon 
départ $'ici, il faudra que des convais mnsidl:rables y noient 
envoyéa, 
(Sipé) LE PRTYCE ~'XSSLT~TQ. 
S ~ c n o r a  XX. 
A ~im&ercr le mmCcAal dplc de Raywse, Paris, le 20 Avd, 
181 1. 
Moh-~rrnr. LE DUC DT I~AGuRE,-VO~~~ tro~wmca ci-joint I'ordre 
de l'empercur q i ~  voiis donnc Ic commantlrment do i'nrmbc du 
PortugnI. Jc donne l'arilrr RTI rnnri:cliai princr r T R a ~ 1 i n ~  dc voits 
rcm~ttrc lc oommnndcment de cettr: t~rnii:c. Snia~srz Irs rhcs 
d'unc mnin fcrmr; filitrs rlnn~ l'nmi!r Irs rlinngcmrnri qiii drvi~n-  
drriicnt n6crssni-w~.  T,'int~iit~iion dc I'rmpcr~:izr rst qiic Ir: dne 
d'Abrnntes c t  Ir gfn6rd Tb~nicr  r r ~ t c n t  pous TON ortlrrs. S. Iií. 
comptc nsscz sur lc dhoilcmcnt qnc Iui  portcnt ñrs pEn6rnu1, 
pour htrc pcrwad6 qii'ils TOUR secondcront rlc toiis lrurs rnogcna. 
Ii'ernperliui ordonne, 1IIOm1cur 10 rluc de llngiise, que lo 
rinco rl'Eesling en quiltmt i 'armi n'cmmhnc aiJihc Iiii qiic son 
ct m do ses aides-dc-oamp. Msis son ohrf d'iint-mdor. lo 
arnl Piirion, le colonel. Pclet, ses nutre aidcñ-de-camp, ton8 f""' ea officicm C10 p o n  6tnbmajor doivent rrster nvcc vous. 
Toutefois, Monsieur le duc, j e voua le ~L'pEte S. 31. met en vona 
une d a n o e  entibe, 
Le M~jor-g6nérd, $c. 
(Si&) ALEX~DBB.  
35o~srrc~a LE ~$h$nlt,-6kXXn des oiliciers Frnnqais, pri. 
soiiniers clc pcrre, d6lEnus L ln rnaison me S. Jean, pi.ii6tré des 
obligations qu'il voiis a, clesircrait rous offrir individiiellement 
l'expression de BR reconnnisnnce. C'est noiis que ces mcrsieurs 
ont ehoisi pour Ctrc aiiprh do voits leur orgnnes, et naua Rommea 
d'autrint @lis flnttds dc octtc commis~ion qr6ablc qu'il n'y en a 
pris iin parmi noiia qiii dans rron particiilier n'ait rqit dc roiis dce 
~ c n - i ~ c s  jmportnnts. Xous oaons nous flatter que voua n 
P,'~vornblomant co foiblo t6moignngo do nohe gratitud0 et cEz 
cbres rcmercirnentu que nous venona vou! pr6sentw pour loutw 
les bontEs que vous ave& eus p u r  nous. Ge n'ost ds sana un 
nf regret que novs ennsqeons le momrnt de robe $p.part, rnair 
oe que d6ji  vouti avcz C ~ i t  pour nons, nous fnit espércr que votre 
solicituda s'btcndra zu dclX de votm sejour c t  ue pendñnk votr~ 
abrrnce non* continuerons iL en 4 muvcr les e#&. 
Ce n'eat as, monsienr le gén 2' ral, dlapi.s 1Ttcndno de notre 
lrttre iliipil%udrr mesiirir celle de nohv rrronnoio~nnoa; noua 
sommes miciix cn dht dr! ~cntir q i ~ c  d'crprimrr cc qiic nona voris 
de~ona c t  lorquo dcs cjrconatnneca plus hcurcuaoa nous ranx6nc- 
ront vera notrc pntric, nons nous fcrona un dcaoir et uno sntis- 
faction de f.tiro conndtro Irt maniha dunt nous avonii 816 traitfis et 
les pcirisu que vauv voua Elcs h m 6 s  poiir adoucir nolre ~ o r t .  
NOUS ~ O U B  rccomrnrtiidon~ & ln, continuation de voke liicnvejl- 
Iancc, et nous vous prions d*rqrl:or I'assurancc de gratitude et  
de haute consid6ration avec lesquelles nous avons l'honncur 
d'htre, monsicur le gdndral, vos h E e  hamlilea et trhs obeissants 
ierviburs, 
hii nom dea ofTiciers Franpia, risonnicra de guhrrc, 
%ALLO,, 
Doctoiir rnddecin des armrSra Frnnqnises nttaché au 
grrand quariicr gdnErnl de I"nrm6c dc Porhigal. 
Le wlonol sous iiispccteur anx revue~ dc9 troupes Frmqaitres, 
CATX~,OT. 
U. DCL~EAYE, 
C"". de la Narine. 
No. IP. 
SIR,-Ton mil1 do justice to my relnct~ncc to entrr into nny 
controvers For tlie purpopr: of coiintcrncting the eff'ccts of tIiat 
ohlaqny aiiioli you oiirsdf nnd mnny otlicrn wsiirrd ma my 
nnduat ana cxposcdto by tlia rqorto oirculstod at C h .  rola- 
tiw tO tho issue of t!io lntc expedition. 
But la copy of a, printcd statemcnt of peneml Ln Peña having 
been ahom-a to me, nliirh, Iiy iiiiplioation at Iraat, learcs the 
blame of tlie faiIure aC tLe rnoet Iirilliunt prospccta on me, it 
becomes indispensalily neceasüry tkal 1 aliotild lake up my pen 
in self-defcncc. 
Having a l r e ~ d y  sent you a copy of mmp despatch to the ear1 oof 
~di-rerpol,  Fntli a wport of thc action, 1 aill riot tr~ubIc yon 
wifh a detail of the firat rnovernenta of tlic arrny, nor witli any 
other observatioii re1ntiae to thern, tLm tliat tlie h o p s  suffcred 
miich nnnecessary fatipo by marching in the night, and without 
gw,d pides .  
Conaidcring the naturo of tI ic ~cmico wc w ~ r a  cngwcd h, I 
vias mast nnxiouq tbat tlie army shonld nat como i n h  eontrst 
with tlie cncmy in an cxhauatcd si&, nor be exyioscd to the 
attaclc of tlic cnerny bnt whcn it was wcl1 coltcctd; nmrl, ia cm- 
Regiienw of reprcs~ntat~ions to t l i i ~  ~ f f c c t ,  1 i ~ n d ~ r ~ t o o d  tillat tha 
marti1 of tllc nftcrnoon oF tlie 4th wns to lic R ~iliort one, tO 
takc 1i-p for tlip night a po~ition npar Coriil; t o  pi.c nre whitli, 
cscnrt. 
P ~tnff-otRcrm, of hotli nationg wcrc scnt forwnrd wit i n propm 
Tlic mnrch vas, amertlieless, continued throii~h the n i~h t ,  
with thor-c hqucnt and Iiarmsing Iiales n hicli tlx I I C C ~ E B ~ ~ ~  oF 
groping for tlie \wy occssioncrl. 
IVlicn thc Uriiiah diviniun bogan its mnrcli froni tlie position 
of llltrrosa to thal oT Berincj:~, ! k@ !he g w a E  m U e  Ultrra~m 
Btk~L1, nur clid 1 knom vJ' hia i~~lc?a¿iluri# UJquflliny 11; aiid, 
~ h c n  I orclered tlie division to counterrriarcli i r1  tlie i~uod, I did 
so to support the troops lcft for its dcfi.ne~, and believiiig tbe 
general to be t h m  in pcreon. ID t lua lielirf 1 sent no report of 
tlie attaick, rrliicli a s s  made BO nem tlie ~ p o t  whrir the general 
was siipposcd to  be, nnd, tliough confident in t11c bravcq of the 
33ritiu1i troops, 1 IVIW noh lcss $0 i n  I l ic aiililiort T shoiild recetre 
from tlio Spani~li nrmp. Tlie diskinrc, Iioi~rver, to Jlermeja ia  
triffing, rtnd nn ordr-ibii w r c  givrn from Iirnrl-qiinrt<m fiir tlie 
ninrrnicnt af iiny roi-ps ~ i f  tlic S~iniiisli iimy 6 0  utipport tho  
Britisli divifiion, to prcrc~it its drfcut in tliis iincqunl contrst, or 
tu profit oP tlio succcss cnrncd nt so Iicavy cxpciisc. Tho 
roluntnry xcal of thc t r i  o mal1 battalions (JkTdlooii g u d s  md 
Ciukid Red,) wliicli h d  Leen dchclied Smm rny divisiori, 
brouglit 1Lm done back from ilie nworl; bui, noh j llisluiidin~ 
their utmost efforh, Ilieg muld 0d.7 come n t  the cloao of tlie 
act i~n.  
lIad the ñ.Lole b d y  OP tlie Spanisli camlry, witli the Iione- 
~ r t i l l c q ,  b c ~ n  rapirlly srnt by tlie scn-bc:ich tto form in tlie plain, 
and to cnrclop tlic rncmy's Ictt;  lid tAir? pcntes t  prirt of the 
i n f r i n t ~  Iicrn mnrtlicrl t l iro~i~l i  tJic pinc-rnood, jn our rcar, to 
turn liis r i ~ l ~ t ,  wliat Riicccua rniglit Iiavc hccn rspcctrd Eroni such 
dccisisc movcmcnts? Tlio rncrny mtist ciilicr lias,e ivtircd 
imtnntly, md witllout occ~sioiiing nii serious loss to the Ilritisli 
divisiun, or Iie vould hivr piyusud 6mdi to aliiiilu~e duabuo- 
(ion, liis eau:ilry grpatlg oiitnuniticred, Iiis w-lillery !o& Lia 
columns mixrd and in confu3ion; R gcnrral disj)ernion would 
Iiavc ticen tlio inevitable coiiscquciicc of  a close pursuit; our 
we;iried men would lisvc found s irits to go on, mcl woiild Iiave 
done so tniskiniug to lindiny! reiresements nnd rin o le  at C b i o i r n ~  
This moment whn imst. Witl~in a qoiirter af an 1oirr.s ridool the 
scene o€ nction, tFip aencral rcrnain~d ignornnt of wlixt ar iñ  passing, 
aatInofAing aa~dolne! Let not:thcn,llii~ nrtion of Dnnnsii forrnnnl 
pncof rlic general rcsi~lt of tlic Irensnctioiiri of tlir dnv; it wm on 
iiccldcntul fcnturc; it waa tlicrcaiiltof iio combinntion. ít wnscqud1~ 
unsccn and tinhrcded by tlic Spanisli slnff'; tlic Xrilisli division, 
1cIt alone, suiiiircd tlie loas ot' moro tIim oric-fourtli of its numbcr, 
and became urilit for future exerlion. Need l say more l o  juslify 
mp detwmination of declining nny SiirtIier co-operdion in the 
firld towarda tlie pmecution o€ tbe nbject of tlic clipedition!- 1 
m, lroai-cvr~a, Srec to conf(,sa tliat, hnrinc thire placcd mpelf and 
the Rrili~ii division nndcr tlie dir~et~ion of tlie Spariisli com- 
mandrr-in-nliicf In t,Iia licld, (contrnrv to my in~lrnrstinns,) I 
rlioiild not hnvc thoudit rnvsclf justifi~d to my king and ooun- 
trv to risIc thc ahsolute dcstruction oí' this divisiun ln a secoiid 
t&J. Uut I Lave ti. rigIit to elaim twJiL for aliat rrould lidve 
been my eoriduct Froni ivliat il ws; zrid X li'ill usk X i t  can lio 
douliled, tií'~i=r iny xcnlous co-o~icratiuri lhugliout,  anrl tlie 
rcady assisimcei affordcd to tlie troops left on B m s n  Iieiglit, 
' t h t  the fixmB anxicty for tIie suceeao of tiie enuse would not 
I i a ~  ~ecurcít to the 8pa~is l i  army tlic utmost cKorts of the 
Ikitish division during tlie ahole of thc entcrprlse, And wc bcem 
spyrkd as roe Aorl R righf lo  crpect? 
1 Iicrr i~ not n mnn in tlir diviriion wIio wotiid not d d l y  hnvc 
rclinqiiiel~cd Iiis claim ta ,vlov, acquircd by t h  nction of Hnrrosa, 
to linrc sliarcd, witli tho Spriniarcls, the ultiinatc succcss tliat was 
wilhin oiir gib:ap nu it weru. 
Tlic peoplt. uf Spaiu, l l~r brave and persevering people, aro 
nnivcrsally cstcrmcd, respcctcd, and adiiiired 1i.v ti11 wlio valtie 
Iiberty auttirl indcpeiidenw; LEie Iicwts nnd hanrla oi'llritisli soidicss 
will ever he mith tliem; thc cause o£ S p ~ i u  is fclt by ali to lic a 
common one. 
I coiicliide with mmtioninn tliat tlie onl request qrcsxed  to 
mo a t  Iienri-rliinrtors, on tiir rnorning o?tl~c (itli! on horring 
of my intention to send thc Britisli troopa ncmsn tlic nvcr St. 
l'ctri, TnR t l n l  f ke oppcrfuni!y ofwitlatlrawin,g f lnc Spanidli twp, 
di t~ i~ t -q  Zke nfghf .  w1t.7 losi; nnd on mp obscrvin~ tlirt, aftcr such 
a uafelit, t h c w  ww nu ritik uf' ü t h k  from an esieiny, a very Lwn- 
tmrPy opiuitiri Nan rnrijntained. 
111 puint of fact, no enerny ever xppeared during acveml d a y ~  
employcd in liringing oil'thc iroundcd and buving t l ~ e  dead. It 
niay be proprr to reii~arlc on tlie rcport pulilisued relatirc to the 
~ n c m y ' ~  numl)er at St. Petii, (4500 men of VillaW~'* dirision,) 
tlint, hy tlir concurrent tc~timong ofnll  111e Rcnt.Ii o0lw~s here, 
pncrril  Villattr'a divinien liad c l i n p  of thc w11nle linr,-wlint, 
thcn, must h~ tlie str~natli of t'riat division to hnvc aaonlpd 45e0 
mon to St Po'otri alonct In ordcr to cstibIiah, bj autlicntic docu- 
monta, fiicts which may Imvo bccn dispulcd, and to ducidato 
otliex~, 1 encloae, Iip way of appendix, tlia rep~rts  of vnrio i s  
oficrrs of tliis rlivision. 
J. hnve the honour to be, &c. &c. $c. (si@d) TEOS. GR~RAM, 
Lt.-, menea. 
P.8. 1 m ~ ~ s t  add this poshcript distinetl to dcn m ha~in- 
spokcn, at Iiond-qunrtors, in thc ovcning or $110 jtt ,  ajsenrlini 
for marc troops, or Cor provi~ions fiom tlic Ida. My visit w w  :L 
T e T  8l~oi.t onc, oT mcre cerfmony. 1 mxy havo naked if llic 
Spnnish troops expected wpre arr~vcd, This error must hnve 
ariscn from the rlifficulg of conversing in a forcign l m p a g e .  
Witli this 1 ~ o n d  you a skctch of tho gonnd, &E, of tlie 
action oí? Barrosa; by ivhich it will bo secn liow impossible, 
riccmding to my jndgment, it vouId bo for an cncmy to q o u e  
liitr lefl flank, Iy malang u dircct riilnck througli the F O Q ~  on Qe 
Bermgii positivn, ivlule tha t  OS Barrosü iras occupied in forw bg 
LLe dbed army. 
ddjutaiab-gmmal$ &ato of i!Ae t m p s  assmblrd al Tarifa, wnah 
th wmmand oflieut.-gmwal Grahum, 25th $d. 1310, 
Two ququailrons of 2nd 
... Uermm hnsfírrs a i o r  n ~ ~ a . .  ......... 
... Detachmmt of artillery ... Major Buncnn. 10 yna. 
T)-chment. of anginee ni... 47 Captain Dirck 
Brigade of y u r d s  re-in 
forcd by J detwhment 1221 nriffadiw-gcn, ~ i l h  
of :he 2ndbattnlion 95th 
rifles ........................ 
1st hattnlinn 28th foot; 
2nd b~tktlilion 67th; 2nd 
hattxlion 87th ; re-ln+ 1754 aolonel Wheatley. 
forced with 3 companiea 
of tlíe 20th Portuguese. 
Flank h t t d i o n  composed 
of &tacIiments oi' tlie 
3 rd  EiattrsIion 95th iiRes i W4 U,-ooL A. Bamnrd, 05th m$. íriid two campniiis 2f tlie 47th foot ............. 
h a  compan y of the roya1 
st3.H curps 1 SS Littutemnt l<sd ................. 
'1 rococdcd rupidly tonards tho cntimco of tho mood, fwnd 
the &rmiios, rrid wndnoted t h m  along tha riglit t h k  af' our 
littlc m y ,  V c  csInc in conklict ii-illi tlie Freuch h g o o n ~ ,  
whom u7e found nearly alircwt of uur Cont Iine anrl aboiit t h e e  
Iiundrod yürdu iipd Irom it on our  rijilrit fluuk; our linc liad j i ~ s t  
Wted and tlie firing ivus firradually decreasing at the time we 
chargd. 1 do not im.iginc tlie li'rcndi dra oons mucl~ excreded 
us in numbcr; the berim-ed well, but if me%arl h ~ d  halF a. dazeo 
stout iirdrons t t e  m u s  of beaten infmtry would uot Uava 
ret-7 to tlicir oump: 
'Aíter our bripde o€ infant-ry, ñ r a t  cngqed, wore i o  ulrieü, 
I aar drsirud by general t u r b a n  Lo tell l i ia  count (lo $mine 
Villamur lo cliarp ilic lancers, and wo iall slurtcd, aa 1 Iliooglit, 
h do IIie tliing ivcll; Iiul mlicn witliin a fcw paces of tho encmy 
the aliole yulled up, and there nas no gctting tliem farther; and 
in a few moments a h  I wm left done to  nin tlm gauntlet as 




~ n k r c @ d  papm nfco20nmZ Le Jecm. 
Onnm. 
II e ~ t  ordonnb B Monai~ur le colonel haron b Jeunn, mon 
A.D.C., de partir sur le c!irimp en oste pour porter les orrlres ci- 
joinh et parcaurir l'Aiidalanric et ~~itrorntu1ili.e. 
Monsieur le colonel Le Jeune se rendra d'ahor dli. Grenada 
auprh do Nonaieiir lo gCncra1 SSeastinni, commandnnt du 6'" 
mr a d'am6c, ct  il lui remcttm les ordrcs qui le corcernent. $ Grcnnde, Yomicnr le Jeme sc mndia par ShiUs clerant 
Caclie, et v~rrapnr Iui-mi!~el~situation des r.hose.s, aRn de ouroir 
Osonretonr en rpndrc un coniptc dftnill6 h i'ornpcrour. d n a i c n r  
Lc Scunc r em~t t rh  ii, Non~irur le mardclial duc dc Dalmniic, lcs 
d6pbclics qui lni sont rlcstinLcs, soit ti. SkviIIc, soit h. Catliz, soit 
pnrcout oh jl scra. U sa rcndra cnsuitc au 5"' eorps d'arm6c com- 
mandó par 3Tonaieurlc rnnr6clialdua de Trdviso cii Jhtrcmudure; 
le corps doit Etre  h Uadnjoa, ou mDme snr b Y'age. 
~loiisieur Le Jeuric prcudru une oonuaissance cxaete dc sa posi- 
tion, et de celle des troupes do i'asmEc du cenlrc cornwndhe par 
le g8nGal qui  sont rCuniea a u r  l e  Swe, Il verra si 
ces corps 8ont en communicahoion avec l'arm6e de Portugal, c t  
recucillern les nonvellcs que lbn  pomnit  ai*orr de w t k  am6e do 
- 
ce CM. 
Monsicnr Le Jeune prcndrn tons lesrensci~cmens n6ecssniroe 
nr ponyoir rr'ponrlre b toutes lea qurstiona (le l'ernpereur, sur 
Pritunüon des ciiuspa cn hnrlalo~,s;e, dcvmt Cadiz, et en Edre- 
madure, d'oil ll  viendra mc rcndrc romptc do sn rnk~ion. 
LE PRIKCE DE WAGRAH RT DE NBC-PCHAFEL. 
' N o n b ~ e s  do &ndn foycr d'insumdion entre le hme corp~ 
e t  le premier.' 
'Les oliiisiers b, la vilIanlrois nortent L 2560 toises: I'ohs doit 
rrer 15 livres, et  coiiticnt 11 2 12 cinccs dc pudre: O= charge 
gbusier b oudre di>n -3 du yoida de i'obua pour obtenir wcta 
disimee. 8 n-7 cn a que le 4 en battcrie: n la redonte Ka- 
bon on Pn a 12 en fmdiia: mais 11 m a n w  de rojectiiles et g1 pudre cn auaiannic quantitO. Toutes les o k s  n'fointent 
png cn villo.' 
' Le pont de St. Petn a 6th tm~crtit! Ir: jonr d o  l'nffniro pnr nn 
s~rgcnt du 'MI°" qui ese rcvcnn nvcc Iic~ F,spagnola qnc ron n, pria. 
Le momcnt sut út6 fwornblo naur s'cmilnrcr do 1'Jalc.' 
'Lc diic de Reilnne bien e;nuy6, d&irc Iiciautoup r~tourner: 
bon génhiil, mitis voyant bs choaes trop en noir. 
S Ei 2 
S ~ r c n o a  VIII. 
Fitmto &al, 20 ,Wars, 181 1. 
MON CEER ~ 6 ~ 6 ~ k ~ , - & ñ n  aprh 15 jo i i r~  de8 plus cruelloe 
souíi'ranc~s je me t r o i m  en i t a t  de reprendre la pEiime e t  de 
wnt~nucr Ic rfi~it que j'ai eu i ' lonnew de vous adresser ddans ma 
1eth.e du G aa 7 de ce mois. 
L'nnc des clioses qiii r n e r i ~  a'aT3md de fixer w t r e  attention, eat 
la cornposition de cettc nrm6e combince dont non8 avons 616 ton& 
bcoup nssailIis. d'ni drijii ciit que IP 20 Fdvrier uno flotte de 180 
roiles Chit aortie de Cndiz portrant 2j00 Iiornmeñ di: ddbarquement, 
et; qiie de rc nomhrr rltnicnt cnviron 40170 An~ln i s  rt IOIK) Por- 
tngnis. Cetti: flottc ~o dirigrn ver8 Tnriíia oii Ir di.liarcyucment se 
fit. Ir! lcndrmnin anns niii:iiii n,ccirlcnt. 11 pilrait qiic l c ~  Anglnis 
cn r6unissaiit les garnisona d'AIgecírna ct dc Oilirnlhr h q~~clquca 
rcstrs de tmupcs vcnucs r6ccrnmct1t clc Sicilc. nvnirrit ddjhformlh 
Tnnfn, un pctit corps dc lhW L2ng%is ct dc 2000 Portiigais come 
mnndri par le rbut:i'tll Stuwt, ct qui formii wcc 2 oi 300 Iiummcs 
da eavilrbriv, kavant e r d a  do l'cnpcditian d i r i~ lo  contro naua. 
Ccltc w11i6c aiiisi corii[iosdo dc  10 k 18,000 Erpagiiolg liieu oU 
mal Equiy6sY de 4 i 5000 diiglais et dc 3!KX) I'oritiguis ac mit 
snfiii rn camyqnc, el. vint iious attnqucr Ic 5. 11 paruit que 
3Toiisieur le marl:clinl  victo^ nc Eut instniit giic hr[l dc la waio 
direction prisc par 1'mmi.e enneniie. 11 erriva b Cliirlnna le 5 
eritre 8 et 9 heures du rnd in ,  nruG des bntaillons de la 1' et 
2'" division: lc plan d'op6rations auqucl il s ' a r r h  f~i'iit d'envoyer 
aur 10 ehnmp 1% (Iivi~jon Villr~tlc nvcc iin r6gimrnt rlc cncnleririr ~IUR 
l i y e ~  de S!,. J1ctri, iivcc ordrc dc laisser ~rrivor I'ennrmi, (lo Iiii 
rtbsistcr fnihlcmrnt pimr 1'cngn:rr aiiivrr notre moirrcmcnt de 
rctruitc c t  dc J'nttircr ninsi stiua la poriition St. h n c ,  oiiil ne 
vuvltit manqucr de so trouver danins unc sitiiation cxberncment 
$csuvantngeiiaa. I'ondnnl cello riunmuvrs I , ~ n s i c u r  Iz mrrlolid 
T~ctor s'blnit lui-m5mc por16 avec la 1" e l  2'1'divisionentre Cond 
et St. Petri, A peu pres it la hautcur rlc la Torro Dnrrossa ave0 
l'inbntion de eouper l'cniiemi ln retraite des monwca. fi, 
rencoiitiant la quene de l'nmée, qui finissnit de se iilcr, jl In iit 
attaqucr vigourcuscmcnt, cnllittta tout CF qui se rencontrs devant 
Iiu et acculs lea Esprignols iL la mcr, mais les Anglais qne ce tk  
mnnceune lrardie met tnienk entrc deux f e u ,  et  dans I'impossibilitb 
dc regiagner Gouil, rpvinrent sur kurs pna, et at.ttnr[iiant avec 1% 
rngo di1 d(:acapoir, ils forchrent ln retrnit~ nos dcur diviaiom, 
qiii ne formnicnt pns cnacmhlc 5000 Iiomrncs. 
Cependuul fifonaiour Ic mndclial Viciar so cropait si Rur dc In 
victriiw yuaavurit d'alliquer il envoya o&c aux trotipori vi Etaicnt 
U. Mddiii:~, de ric porler enlre Vcgcr et Coiiil, pnur ramnsser le 
reste dcs trniuasds; les bnpges, e l  les Irüius de munitions qu'& 
poii~aicilt rcneontrcr. 
Le projet; d'attirer l'enncmi tnir 10 TCU dc St. . hne  n'a~vit pas 
micux rcussi dn c6tE de 1% dihision Villattc; car si cctte division 
fut; d'abord a p s d i e  par pesque tonte 1'~rmEe combin6e, lea gén6- 
miis Anglzia et Espqpois, a e r t i a  de bonne heure v e  Moiiaicui 
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le murEclin1 les tnnninimt n.vrr. nn c o v s  de tronpeti, amEtcr~nt 
lcnrc colonnrs ailr Imrivr! gnuche du niisicnir qui toiiclie ni1 MoiiIin 
d'Almnnzn, c t  Ih, nnttircllcmcnt retrnneii6s diirriirc ec mnrnia, iis 
n'ouront h gardor quo le pont e l  le Moiilin, lcs soiile ondroits par 
l c~quc  [Soa pouvitit les ~ttspurr .  Q~ichjiie cliosc de luu rndbcii- 
rour, tht, que dha Ic oomrni*neerncni dr I'nolion, nos &Des  dc St. 
Pelri u'6lnri t pns di:i'endiics, il sorlit par le paot de Itarlcalix 5n30 
liomrnes de troiipes finirliea de ln 1~1% 11csqiiels se ~ilaqmt cn 
lintnille dcvnnt In divisian 'Irillnttc, ct  courerts par la riiisseau du 
Moulin d'Alrnanea,lniñs~ri:nt aurc~tt. dei'nrmlc r~rnbinielaliberte 
dc se retourner tout  entihe contre I'nttnqne dc IVIonsicnr Ip marir. 
c1ial Victor. hinsi RC: tr?rmjnn IR biit.uilic dri 5, I"nncrni coirt.lin 
mir aon clinrn dc Iinttnillc, snnR poiimi~irrc! IPA dir i~ioi ia  Tmvnl rt 
R11fin dm.3 Ewr r~trnik. .Tc TOU. ni d4ji Foii pnrf do nahc 
twto. Lo ~ f n ( . r d  Iiiilin que nona movons tiib p a ~ u n o  bollc, qu i  
fui s travns6 13 tOk. n E L <  p o r l  p m  lea bng air ?t In Isla, au 
n p ~ a s  deux joun do JPtllerl;ie, il a doiinii sjgiiua de rie; on dit 
qu'il va micux, 
La p-te de l'ennemi a 6Li  h pen prbs de STXX) -1ais on 
Portugnis, et de 5 iL Goi) Espngnols, ttids on IsleaaCs; les ~lnglais 
out eu licsuwiip dcs otíieicrs mis hors dc comliat, on croit Ics 
énérnux Grhin. c t  Stuart ainsi qiie le génfirnl Pbna blessés. % 6 a 1. p i n t e  du j o w  no. nous attcndiona bien L une attaqne 
g&n&rrile rlui ponvait noiin-dtre t r i is funcstc ; m ~ i s  i'enncmi ae 
conknt~,  d'oeciipar nvec Iiomrncri le forte dn ?vl(dinii, qiie 
nans nvions iin pcu imprudrmmcntn t~mdonn~~:  la flotillc cnncmio 
fit aussi dcs d61nonsti.ntione d'attuq~ic Bilr Ic f i o d c r o ,  mais ñans 
effet. Elle dfilinrrlua R ir7001iommes cntre le l'ort de St. Marie, 
el le furl St. Ciiktluie, q i~ i  fiit somrn4 de se rendre; on rhpondit 
ii cwupn cle canons. Un otljcicr Angiuiu vinl clier 1s gouvcrneur 
de St. Mwie lo prFvenir gu'il aIIail prcndre po~scssiou dc laville, 
mais il amit lai~aé ~ C B  tmupea & la porte. XUes courent faire 
nne action d'bclat en brulmt et r6duismt la petite rcdwh St. 
Autoine, qiii d6tai.it oint garrl6e; cnclinntEs (le co succbs ils 
ae rcmb*r<liiGrrnt. i(T! Jc mnrEchnl s'ntf endnit hien B Chr nttnyiiEs 
IR fi .i Chir-lnnñ, il mnit  donné d c ~  o r d ~ r s  en mns6qiiencc, rea 
ordres fii~rnt mal intcrpdt6s, c t  on eiidomningrca miil-:L-propos 
dnnn la nuit qnclqurs uns dc nos ouvragcs, mí9 ils firrcnt sur le 
clump r6pds. Lui-mOmc 6tait vcnu :L Yucrto IVal uvec ln 
division Laval, ct ami1 cn~oyE la leFc dirkion iL St. Jlario pour 
r e p r e n h  la ligue de I3locus wmmc avant la liatnille rtu 5. LB 
LmC re~mcni.  de cl~isacurs ful envoy15 cntre Pucrto &al et 
Méha iL la f c m o  de G ~ u r r a  en rcconnaissance; il y mncontrn 
irne poatc de mvalcric rnncinie, ct  la tzilln. en piEecs. Le Lo au 
R O ; ~ ,  on ecariya de rcprendrc le fortc de nlcdinn, mnii. sans succ$s. 
3~ 7 i l  fiilliit y enToycr plna de monde, ct les Espqnola l ' k a -  
cnbrrnt snna oppirinser de r0sishnoc. 
T>nn~ 10, ncit  d i 1  5 les Rcpnpiril~ nvsi~ni. rnah no8 l i~nea  de 
St. Prtri, ila cmploy?!rrnt, pcndnnt pliisiciirs jniirs r t  plusicum 
niiits 6003 liommcfi, h trnnñpmm n la Isla du bois. dant 3 s  
mnquniciit, quclqucs joum nnrcs, nous arom fa& wsuer m 

partant de la baye de Cadiz, poiir se diriger Riir Tarifa. Ge 
convoi portiiit ii peu prCs B ou 7000 hommtls dcs troupcs do dE- 
tia ueniciit, qui nlliiit joindre celloa ltilipnt d6ji~ rfiunica sur 
i a  3arlifiie i1 dms 1 ~ s  onrirons dc I'J% de los (T:vulra. Le > 
Mwa h la poink dn jour, I'ennemi cornmenca aon o bration sur 
Caaa lT je j& qui fut evacue et en mbie temps, iI % f~,, \ctua vers 
I'embouchure de St. S~tri, un prisaage poux faciliter 1 etahliseio- 
ment d'iin pont dc rndraux et d'unc tEtc de pont. Il fit aussi 
d6harqacr des tronpcs dan8 I'Ialetta del Coto, et a'ocnipa d'y 
Ctablir deur batterics. I.+e 3, on fit mardier le clivisi~in dit 
,&Pral Itrifin, q>i prit: position h moitii: efiernin da Piicrto %aE 
k M6rlinn. Eidonin. Grllr: di1 ~6nCrnl Tai-nl, s'ctahli t on avnnt; dc 
I'acrto Ikd, ct  Ic gdndrnl Villnttc garcln ~ c s  p~sitiona upss dc 
L%icIzna, Cc jour ou nh peryut aucun mouv~mcnt do l'onncmi. 
T o u  les ouvirger de In r'tzirnt gnrdfs par Ice gararnisuns 
qu'on avajt designees auparavmt. Santa Mmio fut dvncuh et le 
p n t  replii. sur la rive gnuclie. 
'Puerto &al 6la i t  dGfi:ildu par una compqnie de sapeura, 
dem iIir 45"'" &gime, et par tow les refqlés Emqnis qu'an 
ilTOit R T ~ S .  
%e 4 3l.onsieur le marEchnl fit attaquer b b poinb dn jour 
l'ennemi rlans sn tete de pont de Santi Petri. Cette attaque ae 
lit pnr 41 rompnpiw du 95"' rC~isimenC qiii a'empari:rmt do I'on- 
.rraKe, fimnt priponnie~s 500 hommris, et cnlcv;mnt iin drnpenu. 
11 c s t  ecrtnin quc si en mit cmploy6 dnns cettc op6ration 2 ou 3000 
hommcs an cnlweit; lc w t  c t  l'IsEc de Lbon. Ecnncmi fut si 
discanecrt6 qu'ii nuait afmndonnd sos battories et sos auvmgos 
fcrm6a. Un nroil rvCwltU pnrsissnit Citro d'un t&s bon augure 
pour Ins grtt~~ii>os pdrutious. Un Ut  partirlcm0nii joui. do Nll'dinn 
une reconriiiissnnce sur Casa Vieja. On recut avia dans la nuit 
que ceite rewnuaissmce n'avait rencoiitr6 pcrsome, et que ba 
colonne~ ennemies se dirigeant sur Conii, le moii~amont ne 
pouvait avoir pour but que d'opkrer la jonction de ce corps 
d'armt:e avec cclui qui 6tait reste dnns me. Le 5. avant 10 jour, 
nn #a mit cn mmelic dc le poñiiion qii'on occupnit it moiti6 
chcmin dc W d i n n  p u r  ac port,cr s u r  Cliiclnne. hrrivfi dona 
cct cndroit, AIonsicur le mmEcM doma I'ordro tlii dn6raf 
Villratte de raissembler tante sa division ver1 les fidcfes de 
St. Yolri, pour y rriuintcnir l'cnnerni qui y p~raiasait en rorce, 
ienclad u'd dirigc;iíl m la route de Conil, Ica Ilivisioils de 
k ~ ~ n l  a ! aunn, ct le pcu de oavderia qu'il avriit aveo Lui. 11 
se porta dc ce caté, et ne tarda pas ib rencontrer uno forto 
colonne, giii rnarcli3:t la lonv de la m w  entre St. Petri et C o d .  
e t  8 B  ctingenit sur le prmier dc ses cndroits. Lea troupes 
nrrivkes l portEe de canon se formkrent. Le gCnhral Rufin prit 
la puchc poiir aller oceilper un mamelon o& l'cnnemi paraissait 
s'dtelilir. &umd les dcux diviaiona furent formboa, cllc se h u -  
vhent enpri.scncc #uno armh, bcanwup plils nombrouscqn'on no 
I'avnit cm d'alord. Iinrtillerie n'Etait paa eencore arrirbe, et cello 
de l'ennemi cammeugait ii jouer de toiik yarls. Le g6uéraI YillsttB 
n'iivait pu gurdcr Ics iikches de St. Petri, qui 6tnient au mwiiient; 
d ' h e  prises, n'6tmt dors défendues que par un s e d  bfihillon du 
27"Wd'fantrie Iegbrc. 
Cctto division fiit oliligh de Be re lier et de repasser le rapin T' dans lequcl roulent lea raux du Mo~i n d'Alrnanaa. Ce rnoriw- 
ment empbcha le gin6ml Villatte dc so reiinir a~~irx dciix atitrea 
diviaions, rlni n'a~inint en tuni; que dix htltriillons, eaaiiyarnt iin 
frii terrible de la pnrt de I'cnncmi. Nospcrtes rlcvcnnicnt d'nutant 
p l u ~  sensible qnc lc nomhrc dcs comliathna n'U~uit quc lo t i c r ~  do 
i:clui de l'enncmi. Dco corps cnticrs sc tiriuvnicnt uccnlilE~ armt 
q~i'on mi u cntnmcr la li no dcs ~lnglais. II n'y avait point do 
r6scrvc. E c s  dcux mills fomrnss dc J1Mina Sidonia 6taicnt cn 
marcho p o ~ i i  Conil. 11 fhiiut pcnscr b la rctmitc qui so lit oli h n  
ordm, jtisqus sur lcs htcilcurs en svatkl rki CIriclana, oh I'ou fit 
mlnper uul: divieion peiid~ul la nuit, Lcs Augh;iis fwent lcur 
jonctian awc Ecs troupcs Jc l'ilo de Lkon, ct les Rsprijitiols wn- 
tinul.rent d'occnper iiotre: posilion du Moulin d'Alin~iiza e t  da 
St. Petri. Si l'ennemi uoalniit continucr ses ophations o h s i v a  
dans la journEe du 6, se fut prbsent4 de bonne heure, il est pro- 
hable que dans Ia situation oii nous nouv trouvions aprbsln journée 
dir 5 nous 8tiens obligrs d'évacucr le terrah jusqu'k Puerta XCal, 
oii on aur~iait pris la poñition dont j 'ai pnrlk plus haut, pour y 
l i v m  nne ~eooncle lid.itillc, m n i ~  les opCriitioiia ont mnnqi~fi h. 
~rn~liilc. 11 R ' C B ~  contrntlj de rentrcr d n i i ~  I'ilo ct cndant ee 
tornps m fxha pctit oor s do troupcs dnglniaos ap)lrnrieot un 
dfI>;u iicrnont oiibo St. h r i e ,  e t  ln pointc do St. Ca~iierino. gui 
n'cib %'nutro rbsuiat quo d.rn1orc.r uni httoric tidlbudue par 
quiwo Iiommes o t  de su promcner iine uu deux heures dana lee 
ruvs dc Si. ,Xarie. IToti~icur le mwCclitil no voyriit aucun 
moii-rement ofensif, ordonna de r6talilir les grnrides conimunim- 
tionn par St. Karic, clincun rentm dana aes portes e t  c e t h  meaum 
produisit beailwup plus d'cff'ct, sitr X'armCo e t  les habitans du 
pzijsz que lea dispositians qn'on auralent pu prendre.' 
No .  V. 
SECTIOX 1.
' X w c h  1, l81L 
'1 hnvr: becn employed in eondmeting bnt.kcrriw, op orrite ttha 
mni~tli of thc Zmcrc, for h e n q - f i v o  ! tliough wc ave only 
ane brigrdc of i~inc-poundm to arm rc":. R 
'Tlinnk Gori, for my o m  credit, 1 protested n g r h s t  thcso 
bnttories fmni tho hnl ,  in my reporta ~vl i ic l i  wem scnt to I o d  
Tlrrllingtou, md non- I velily believs tlie marslid himrtolf is 
asliürried of thcir construction. Tunl~ete, you kriow, ie si luakl  
precisely at tLe coduenw of thc Zezere with i.he Tqus, the 

before Ihc 15th of Mny. Biit rr-liiat Iias hccn thc fmtP OIU 
little eorps on the C h r i ~ t V ~ d  si a WM absolutcly sacriliccd. She 
diole  film llnd tittcnlion of Undajos uus dircctcd qpinst otir 
urisupporlerl fittack, aud our loss iu coiiscqucncu )*=ay severo.'- 
'Otw yper~tion helbre CIiri~tovaI  vas zilisurdly lircaued rorwtird 
wiiWmd uny m-opwuliun an ¿IN lrj? bunk vf the rii~rr. Slie mar- 
shal Iie-sikutd-d~la~cd, and d Imt ii-itlidrciv Lis troops at sucli 
a momcnt that lic wraa swceiy time enongh t o  meet tlie eneniy 
iu t t c  field!' 
Ko. VI. 
G%'FraZfar, Odohcr 23, 1810. 
'Thc tr0op.s at Mnlngn, with tlir: cxccption nf tlirro Iiuntlrcd 
mcn, movcd tipon Fiirn~roln, of  wliicli lord Bla,vnry wns np 
psiscd; but, in placo of liia lordship taking atlvantagr of t h i a  
forluriii(e cvcut, Iiu M utpd two da73 iri n fiuitless attacl: on tlie 
forí ut  Pucngirolx, cmuincinürline; i t  from tu-tlve-lioundcra, alt1101i;h 
lie percciverl thal nu iniprersiun liad liceu rnallc o11 it Eiy tliu fire 
of tlie diippiiil~ aud fl,riui-liouls, tlie :trCillery of ii liieli se re  rluiihl~ 
tlie calibre. ti1 tliis aituxticin Iie nas suqirised by an jnferlrir 
forcc, znd, ~hi l s t  Eic v.as on board of a gun-lioat, 111s guns triken 
nnd tbc Tcliole tlirown into confusion; ut this momcnt 11s sas 
inromed of thc diszstcr, nnd, so fiar to Iiis crerlit, Iie rctook hia 
guna, h t :  irnmccliatcl~ nfier, concciving n body of Frcncl~ cm*nlry 
to be Spaniarirds, Iic ordrred the iiring to ccaee, rrlipn hc wi~q 
siiimntlcd nnrl madc pibisoncr; Iiiti mon, lming roniiiir:ncr, guro 
any, anrl, l i q i n g  to tlio b c d ,  rclinquislicd tlicir lionour ~d 
thc field.' 
No. VIL 
JESTIFXCATOW PhPER? ELRELATIVE TO THE STATE OF 
SPMN AT UIPI'X11ISPiT l'.UIlXOL)S. 
' 3. M. S. Bmclia, Cm%, May 6,1810. 
'T have becn cruiaing for theae two month p ~ t  h h e e n  
Daponiie and Suntana. 
' Iii addition to the tmops 1 have obserred mdcr arma, tliere 
has liwn a great p q o r t i o n  of armed pensantry at  Baquio, a 
srndl j~lace to tlie we~tvard of lhchidacs; a8 our bonh wero 
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iwtnining from deatroyng Romc batkries, they were attacked by 
nrmcil pcasitntry done, ivlro rere dispewcd by shot fmni tlio 
ship, nnd nlso sincr: tlicy lime nssi~tcrl tlia ITrench troo s, wh~n 
we <:i~~iiurid B iesrei l d c n  r i th  mili* atores f%m St. 
kndcro.' 
HT. EXluaí-t to g ~ a l  W a l h .  
L!ahm, Fdma y U), 1811. 
'1 omn that from tlio vnrioiis nppointmcnts d i i c t i  have IatcIy 
talren place in thcir armiea. 1 fiircbudc little adutbnttqe in tlie 
mursc o[ tIie cnsuing catiipaign; it i s  perliaps nccdhi to  tell you 
+ h t  my bars are gruiindcd oii tlie noiiiination oF the diilcc of 
Albuquwque le Gallii:in, Caatnjios to Xstreinadm, M d i  to 
Murctn, Coupigny t o  Valcncin, and thc brotlier of O'Donnel to 
Catdonia.' 
S+ ZowarrZ Do y h  to  7ord WellZqytc-ta. 
T5llt$.anca, J ~ ~ t a a y  4, 1812. 
'Eac11 chief is a l l m d  thrco scsrants, x captaiu two, a sub. 
81t~rTI one; the numbrr of aoIdicra cmployed in tliis wap is  
certainly not zaridt~ tlie renidntion, nnd dl ollicers resirlent in tlie 
intcrio~ likcwisr Iinre this i,xcessive inrlnlgenne. Tlia officerri' 
scrvnntsnevcr do dixty, or ntrcntl nny dril1 oi.rcvicw. Tlic eookñ 
aro in gcneml cliangcd írccklv, nnd urr ncvcr prcscnt nt dril] or 
rcvicw; ono molc ;S nllowod bcsidcs to cvcry tlircc ~crjcnnts. 
TIiosc t iro itcms cortninly talre 5000 clioico mr?n from tko rada 
of'tliis army. 
' Some v w y  violenl remimiiialions llave lieen brought en by the 
impi.lidcnt rcply of thc r n i l i h i ~  presn, to aomc obserrations pub- 
lislied in n Coruim paper extol!ing t l ~ c  perillas, anrl nt; tlie snme 
time intcnded to muvcg a cciisurs on tlie oondwt of tlie nrmy. 
I llave l i d  frcqucnt convemations witI1 generd+Abda on tlre 
spirit of disunioii wliich thcar tmo papers arc suwinE. Hc lins rit 
length prol~ibited tlie militnry press from publisliing anptliing 
biit prolkssinnid paprm. T nns pwscnt idicn ho gnvc t,lic nrrlcr- 
h~ r n g n ~ ~ d  mr!in tlin convriwntion, and 1 ronlil i in t  ni-nirl oliscru- 
ing, tlint whnt wnri l o ~ t  c011111 nnlg hc r r ~ u i n c d  by thc mord, not 
tho pen. I n  this I dlndcd to tlw hsturia, wl.lierc ccrtainly rcpu- 
h i o n  nnd public confidenac aero  sncriiiccd 
' Tlic tnitli iu, the arrny is oppressivti antnil ~xpens i~e ,  m welell ap, 
heficicnl, iium ils disorganizeti da le ,  pxrticulurly in h e  defitirt- 
ments oi siipplg: md il is il. ve;,. unplensir~it cl~eumsluiice lo licar 
it gcnernlly dmit tcd ,  that n Spiiuisli corlis is mucl) inorc dcslru* 
tire to tlie coiintry il iñii  an equal Preiicli ariny. rllcre aro algo 
rioleut dissensions bctwcen thc juutns of Leon and Gallicia: in- 
closure -\'o. 6 ~ i l l  show this date oí'feeling.' 
Sh Jfoward & u g h  to  8ir B. Wcl7r~Iqj. 
' C d a ,  MamA 1,1812. 
' On tlie at l i  ultimo 1 liad the honour to dce atcli lo your 
~ e c l . l ~ n c ~  a cupy oi rny lettcr of Uut date to lord Pl'ellingtan, u> 
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wEiich 1 ncqnxintcd his lordship tliat thrce bnttalionv of tlie amy 
of G allicia ai.e pw nring for ernbiirkütion fur Amcrica, an3 tbat 
I had porilircly !oi:lincil makinp, and would not permit tha 
Edivev o€ nny Ur i t i~ l i  ririns or stores for t h t  gcmicc. I liavo 
now disrovered, tliat in addition to tlicse troops it is intended to 
send a division of liorse nrtillery, to e uip sliich, orders huve 
brrn given t o  t rnnaf i r  rppointnicnts 2orn  tito rzrdry af ihe 
arrny, nnd a dcmmd ia madc for funds t o  piepare tlie oiulnance, 
nnd cvcn to xlnpt" to coloiiinl scrvice more ot' tlic ficlrl-artillery 
wliidi 1 1aÍxly clclivcrrd Tm ilic use of ilie ~ixtli Gnllicinn ar.my 
Tliin mcmiisi: Iins nercr Iieen opriily nvnsrd liy tlie gorcnim~nt 
of Cndix, it; Iins ncvrr bcrn ronimunic:iterl to tlic jiintn of tliia 
pmvincc hy tlic rcgpncy. It Iins, 1 imu.$nr,, hccn conceded f r m  
SOUP CXCC~~CUC'~ nand i6 Ims only come t o  my kno~lcdgc, b tlie 
mrongcuii.n?a no lungcr (o ho 'Iildd.cn, which g o ~ c ~ a l  i ibn4a is 
mnking to c q  it inlo cfcct.' 
u 
' m i I e  rrc llave r c n d  mrn, i p n r a n t  men, md prrfidioiis men 
in our ~ t c r n m c n t ,  no p o d  can IicW lis. TTc must be mnd rrho 
cm exprct our conclition t o  ameIiorntp. 'rlie venal are tliogc 
who, n~itfioiit heinfi cnl l~d,  s~rrningly ~bnntlo!i i,lirir o m  níiaira, 
nnd introduce themsclves in tSic dill"c.wntl)ranchrs of ndrninrstrn- 
$ion vitli no otlicr vicw than to cnrich tlicmsrlvcs nt; thc pulilie 
mpcnso. l l i c  ipmnrtt aro tliosc wlio tliiuk tlrmscli-cs wisc. aod 
who ciLhc~' obt:iin by iulriyuo or ncuept witboiit mluctnnco 
employmenk tlic duties of ii liicli t l icy i i r n  noot c:apnblc of (lis- 
i r  SIle pcrl;dious are sll Utose ivlio tire inrlifircnl spec- 
tahw o[ tfiis bloody nlnifiglc. and wlio cnrc nol fur Ilic iu~ue, as 
tliry mil1 eq~rnlly submit t o  aiiy msstvr. Plact! iio coniidcncc. my 
fncnd, in tliesc sort of pcrsons, iiotliing can br! cxpectcd f m  
tlem, and yct b an incoaceivable intality wliicli js attaclied to 
ni, to tlio ruin oqr111 parties, it would nppcnr thnt the piorinoci 
crn~loy iionc I)ut theee very peoplc. Tliosc wlio comrnend nis are 
eitlicr renal. or iporant ,  or incliferent; at lcasise, the more Re 
s ~ m h  for the rerncdy the more oiri mil inerrmes.' 
Captuin Codrt'ngton to  si* CihrZc~t Coffm. 
' Apri124, 1811. 
. . . . . ' Witli ivspect :tto the proposed plan of ndmitting 
mip$ics o£ pnin in nciitral resscls from i h ~  ports of tlic enem?, 
kv., 1 hive no lieñitntion in ~sying  J do not aec sdicient 
scmon to jii~tifp i t  in  tlip prrnc-nt, ~irciimstmce~ of tliia part of 
tlic P(~nin~tiln, s T liavt! n I a m ~ ~  founrl br~arl foi. oalc nt thr dif- 
fcrcnt p l n r n ~  on tlir conñt, at thc ratr: of nbout fmo pnzmda apnd 
three quartersfur Ihe pvartw of a d o l l a ~ ,  at whch prico I gw- 
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terdav hou~hk  it ah Rscala And m therc ha8 been o€ late more 
corn nt Tarn~nn.  thnn rnnnry to piirclin~ic, 3 presume thc: lntter 
has been tlie greakr dcaiderntum of tlic two.' 
. . . . . ' 'Fha diilieiilty nf nlloiving a free parrsqe o€ pro- 
visiona from onc pnrG oF thi: eoast t o  tlic olhcr wodd Iin Irsscned 
hy licing lirnit,cd to v c ~ ~ r l s  ahovc tlic uixc of cnininon fisl;liin=;- 
h t a ,  in wliicli 1 liavt: rc~son to bclicvc considcmhIe qiinntitics 
bavo bccn e u ~ ~ i o d  to I4mcelonn: nnd captnir~ Ihillcn, I uudcr- 
stand, found cven a morlar in U bozt of tlilu dewriptiori.' 
' Z+O~, AF?, lgll. 
' Can yoa belicve that in thia  tomn, ffie only fuGr%F of uvarn8, 
& months have paused willioi~t a hclock bciig mmodr ! ! Tlicy 
begin to-morrow, and give me lmo hundred and Uty evcry 
week, &c.' 
[Note. The italics nnd notes of dmiration are in the original.] 
Advni~ul Frmattle lo cuptaia Cod?%'ngtora, 
' JfaRm, $ 1 ~  19,1281. 
' 7 % ~  nnr~r tnint~y of cvrrythin~ conncrt,ed rrii31 Spnnish a f t~ im  
i~ ~u[:li, tllat 1 tim tired of writing nnd cxplniiiing ?tlI t l i ~ t  mi~cs 
from tlicir inconaistrncv nnd wnnt of cncrm. 
' Ilntil ciglit o'rloclc f liad nnrlcretood that the intcndmt hnrl 
procwd orie thouti:~n.nd qiiiiilnls uf biscuit 1Ur tlie army at 'l'tir* 
gonx, wl1ic1~ nurt~ber I Ijtitl o11 iuquiiy 11m dwintlIcrE Eo jilLy-scvm 
&P. I I ~ R V O  tlicroí'orc beeu nntlcr 1110 ncccsaify of  ecnrliiig five 
huiidmd bap, wliich wo can vcry iil spare, fro~ii our own etores, 
mith a proportion of rice. 1 caiinot tell ou how much 1 h v e  
beca uorried nnd annoyed tlic Iart tliree $ay S, partioulnrl y as 1 
fcel the very grent importmce Tlirsgona ia ta the Spnniards, nnd 
how mucli tllia islatid is canncctcd nitli th evcnt of tLe Cdl of 
tliat fortrcss. Tlie jnten.claiit licrc liw mate tliat he has sent 
two  h u n d ~ d  and tliirtqv-ttvo hnps of Iimd. P o n  wjll hnvc tho 
godnccs to cxgliiin tliiit only iif~y-scvcn wcro rocurcd by hirn, 
whioh I b n ~ a  ingoged to pny for, nnd tLnt n i  tho rcst oorncr 
immorliatc.iy from oiir own stnrcs, xnd aro conscqucntly at tha 
diupusül o i  the Urilisli aufliurities at Twquna.' 
Extá-aet of a k m  fmm & XdwawJ P e I h  h mptnia 
Cod'odrifiyogtm. 
'B. M. ship Guledmzia, JwZy 22,1811. 
" c  indceision, inac t iv i~ ,  and appnrrnt disanion amongt the 
Spnnish Icdcrri Jinvo bcen tlic ~ r r d  caiisa nf rnilnrt: tliroii~l~out 
tIio xliolc of this nrdnaiia contcat, and is eapccinlly ohscrvnlilr in 
tha lato cvcnts in Catalonia; nor until thc pabiota rro dircctcd 
by puro milit sry muncils und moro cncrp rrnd docision, c ~ n  1 
yrrrnit mysclf to tliink i b i t  u y  e~ectut l .~  shud riui be iiiude 
agaínst Ihe iavudcrí;." 
Sir E&a& Pelh  fa ca~tain Codn%glm. 
' Au-wt 2,1811. 
'1 Itave to acknowledge the recdpt of yow letter, &c. The 
inforrnritinn tli~rrin convryed nffnrda me A vriT mc1:lnnclioly view 
nf tlic ~iffnlm of tlic: pntriots, anrl i v c s  me Iittln renson to hopo 
hettrr t11ing~ from tlirir fut11i.c exrrt,ion~.'-' A dc~p~tch whicll 
rcaclicd rno Iiy tlic s m c  epyiorhinity from thc suprrinr junta of 
Catrslrinin cnnhins a pro osal for occ~~pving a position on tho 
eomt m n n m a ~  a. &t. a.8 LIIC ~cicotion oi. ~ a ~ a r n o s  1. prcsrniod 
to my clioioo. 11 YUUR Iiut appoiir io mo tlint tlia jimta possesien 
al present resaurcei; for ddUriduig any such po~ilion, aiid fFom 
the measureR licing niilimilled l o  my detcrrnirirtlioti, it rcenis l o  
be cxpccted that 1 shodd provide mi ms of dereliding tlicm wliils 
employad in securing tliemselves in tllcir neiv elalion.'-'Yet 
wliilst Ilie iioble spiril oT ~ l i i u  iii-Frthd peopIe reiiiaius unsu2iduet1, 
it would not hc just to cxprct a t o l d  failarc, dtliorigh tJie loas of 
d coufidencc bckcen ihcm and tlie rii. ilered ordcrs, and tho 
r m t  oE leadeis mong tiien>selscs $10 possesr citlicr akill or 
com etency to guide tliem, afL0r.d but a vrry preczi<iiouij prospect 
of  t E cir doing angtlibp cffecttd ial stop thc inradcrs.' 
' xmmhw 1,1811. 
'l3p a lctter from mptnjn Stmng it s m a  tlie people of 
C a d a p  in the e d y  pnrt of October opeenly refused assistance 
to tlie @Temor of tlie Mcdns islands, ílcclaring tlrat thev onlg 
ackiio~-ledgerl tlie. stronaest party, and tliereforr paid tliclr mib- 
~criptions to the Fsencli ; and tliat iipnn tlir 13ustnrrl's going witli 
R p1114,y o f  S p ~ n i ~ h  t . ~ n y  tn cnforcc olietlfcncc, thry rnn t,hi: 
nlarm-iicll na tlio signal for tlio nppmnoli of nn encmy, mcfscnt 
to l~osas for wsisk~nce.' 
Extrmt 0J.m 7eflmftwm caplaim Codringtow fo 
3. a. Luc~W~ z8f. 
Pdmay 7, 1812. 
' W~ilst  lie Frencli pay tlie pom, d o  serce their prirpose, 
at flie expcnse of the nch, tlie Spnniards rlrd otit sevrritp to 
the lowcr cl~qses, and oblj~e tliem to aeme withoiit; pny nnd with- 
riut c1othi.a; and thc debairdi~d and pmfligntc nf Iiiglicr lifc nrr: 
in mnny in~tnnccs rcwmdcrl, for imbccility, ignornncc, and índif- 
Scrcnnc to  tlic fatc of  ilirir coiintitrv ncrcr yct cxcccdcd, wiihoiit; 
ono a i n ~ l c  xmpIo bcing mndc of tlic many trnitors ~ h i c l i  l nve 
bccn dismrored in I l i e  prrfons cif priesh, oficors of rank, or 
whnt are trimed gentlemen. 
'Tchrua y LB, 1812. 
' Bcing nn qc-pritnces of thc iliscontent of thc pco lc, aliicli 
haa ariaen fwio their being partidir disarmed. znf knowing 
how Mal have been tlie oontiequencea rrhich havo fonowcd thega 
practiees on ~ormer,occnsioria, J. mnst own I cannot offer to the 
adrnird my conviclion of al1 tliill beuefit arisiug froiri Iiis hwod 
iutentiona, in wllicli I sliould otliemisc have confcled. The ofi- 
cers and men of tlie Frerieli wniy aro walking about this part 
of tlie coa& uniarmcd, because t&c jmtm aad j~mifcces Haee con- 
cealed tlie muskeb t i i q  hrd rit t!ieir disposnl, anrl wfused the 
people pcmisnion to at,twk tlic enemp. 7n thc mcnntime, t,ho 
poor pcople, wliose hearts are Iiiirning witli paLriot,iiam, nrc stnrv. 
ing for m t n t  of Iircad, tlnd flic riclii'r citixcns of tEiis dovotcd 
coiintry m supplying tho cncmy rvilh corn and o&cr spccies of 
provisiono.' 
Gaptain Corle~kgBn lo &r A'. Pelleao. 
' k P J h  bbwm, Pebrrurry 29,1812. 
'1 fenr tliings mc going an vcry III in thie p r i n i p a l i ~  from 
tho sndtlcn ehiin~c in thc qstcm o£ gcncrd Laq, nnd tlio con- 
sequcut dcstruction of tlint conlidt?ncr on thc pnrt of thc pcoplc 
irliicli wna cerlüirilg IIie canRc ol' Iiia I'onnor suceesses. ~ O F  can 
tliere be any doubl of th ~oundrca~on iiliich guidcs tlio ~oniluct 
of &e Cattllans on tliis orrnsion; fur the mode in wfiicti ecneral 
Z n q  effcckd t h ~  dishnourablc Iircacli of I'aitli of t i-Liicl~ tlicy 
aomplain, bespcalcs o mind r t i r r d  iii deccption. Ue ordere(l 
tlie pdriotic cornpanies to e sent tu particulzr poin'cs jn siib- 
dirisioiis, at whicli points gcncml fiwifield rvris to tnkc foraliEo 
posse~aion of tlicm, and attncli tlirm to diiTcrent corps of tlie 
regular nrmy. And t,lle disco ver,^ of tliis trenchery mu m d e  hy 
the lettcr to gwrrxI S;tmlirld fnlling, hv mistrike, into the hamls 
of thc offircr dio cornmnndcd t l i r b  wf~nlc ilivision of pntriotio 
compnnirs. I n  1 .11~  mcrintimc llic cliscont~nt of thc p r o ~ l e  gains 
mund xith tlmir siifcrings, and instcod o€ thc Spaniah nrmy 
!ehg inacasod iiy t l iu l n to  nrbitrnry mandato aoording to its 
avon7ed object, and not l r a a  probntly in cwnsequencc of tho lata 
extraordiuary condiict of gcnerül Sürsficld, mwiy of the Catatalan 
soldiars lizve aclually passed over to tlie euemy.' 
'me letter of the baron de EroIes in tlie gmette No. 10, 
~hows tlint lie was again deceivcd in tlin romisd siipport of 
pnersl Smslidd on tlie 2~11, and I am to& Iic saya publiely it 
r a s  part of a scttled plan to sacrifiee Lim nnd liis wliole division.' 
' ViUe iiTm)ia de Xitjm, P~eIrwury 22,1812. 
' Pothirig h t  a totd changc cm producu permuneiit gvod; 
for the villaniee of tho iutcnritlllt md eommiasq dep~rtmenta re 
80 tharouglily orgnuixetl, lhal not onc link uf the ehin  can be 
le& wit l i  > n f c t ~ .  1 hltve goorl reason to iliinli Llwt evcn t lie money 
furnislied by %ngland is so ernployed in tho trallic of corn, 1)v the 
indi~iduals Ihrounli nliose h~uidu it pnssw, as to be th0 direct 
means of suppljing tke enemy.' 
C a p t k  Codringtm k Mr. 8. Wsllesley. 
' ~Vurc?¿ 1,1812. 
' The change of the regcncy wi11, 1 trust, prolliicc ri radical 
c h q e  oE thnt diinT>olicd ayqteni by wliich plunder Iins berm opcnly 
licensed, ancl clcepotiarn nnd injustiee towardrr tlrc peo le and 
e ~ c n  treaoiiery itaelf, in t haa  of a Iiigher olnss. havo e the r to  
pnssed 6 t h  hpunity.' 
f l ~ e  muficillm- uf state, ~iar ianu  OrpuGo, t o  Ling J o ~ q h .  
' 17ladrid, Deceidrc $1810. 
'Jc vicns do roir lc  proviscur ct  vicaírc gEn6ral qic fuk m b t 4  
h Logogcu par ICB hinsurg6s. Son opinion prononc6c cn faitcur 
de V. M. lui B atitlir6 toi~tes: ~ortea  de mmivnis traitcnicns et de diu- 
gmes, rna& enfin il c s l  arvcnu L su s o u v e ~  de 1-~lcnce. 11 m'a 
~awort.tl que i'egprit puEilio do ootto cnpitrle n bcnuooup clirogd 
depuis que 10 ~ c u f r x l  C:im (frcre dc Ilornnna) i i 'csl  I i n6  aux 
vexacions o t  aux dil:tpid~tions de toute espcce, et que son opi- 
niori est qubn dy iI.prouverrt aucuue rGsisl~iice. L'ureiieu&que 
de Yalence, qni joud % prhsent rl'une ~t incte  inlluenee, lrii a 
souvciil pailé eu secret diiue mani2re F~~oral i le  de V. N. et 
de seu niinistres. C'eslt B I'nrcIici-Eque qu'it est redc~rallo 
de son evasion. Ce prrlat m'ayant connu ainsí que k M. de 
Bfontarro clans d'autreu tcms le clinrgca [le nous ro i r .  Le géné. 
ral Dassecourt n'6tail nullement considCr6. Lc províscur ajoute, 
u'& Alicant rl'oir il es t  pnrti le 14 Socsrnbre, tou t  itait rempli, 3. dibfi6s de Crdiz. D7aprEs toiit i o  qu'ii ni*a clit, j e  con4 
qu'auasikht la pr i~o  de Tortuze, Vnlenre so rcnrlra snna coiip 
f llris. d'ni rcnvoy6 ec proviacur k Monsirur do S n i i h  P6 qui I'a 
rotdgd en su 11tilit6 do minfstrc dcti afi~ircs cecli:sin.qriquca c t  qui 
!ut trbs sonni& au m~llrcur vi lui arr i~a  L Logro~nc.' 
'Mavch 8,1811. 
'Thcre is a strong French pnrty 1ii Valench. 11 i~ a sad 
thing that wc cmnot sacar Pu~tz"do uf thiil Iringdom, in wLcL aro 
morr: revources tlian iu al1 tlie u l l i ~ ~  provinccs of Spain. 'CVilli 
my b s d  1 ansiver for i t  lh t t l  in one nionlli two Ihousu~id aavairy 
aud twenly tliousand inf t~dry,  inrlcpciident oT th exisling iimiy, 
wliith k one Iliousatid íire Iiuridmd edbclir s cavalry aund ebwen 
tlioueand infantry, coulcl Fic raised, znd Ihere ia moncy enough 
vritl~in tlie city t o  p q  thcm for six monlh,  and without lookin 9 clservhme for iissistnnce to cloilic t h m .  Thcre is nliundnnce o 
cloih, and ymisiona iii nbutidnnoe,~t Vnlencia, is doing nothiq! 
and t i i is timc so prccious! wliilc asscna draining nll tlie red 
nf thp Pcninsda gires us time to oynnize. Wc want a llobed- 
pierre iu the government, and another in e n r g  pmrince ! ?' 
ík6an-d Roehe to  Nr. iSluart. 
' C&ba.qena, Jum, 93,1811. 
'Bfter threo yem leaving them to themsdves, this army (the 
Mnrcian) i a  averyrrhero in a worso state abaolulely 1han it was in 
the mrnmencerneni of the revolution.' 
'Th iext is Ihat t h  Spmirirds have no coddenca in thek 
'general, nur lie in them, and thus f ie ire  apprellends if he figlita 
Lis peopIe wili disperse. Ydcncia, with an imrnense popnlation 
iind great reaourees, is doin* littie. B~secoiirrctired to Cuciica. 
Tlie eame indolcnce, lasaituae, and egobism prevails t h  rh the 
mon'q. md 1 aee link sha lus  pmriiiced by the e d n b f i k c n t  
of the Cortes; tliat f~el ing of enthnsinrirn wliicli existed is fast 
dying n u y .  Thc thing in the ~orlrl  most ngreeable to tlie 
Spnniarda nt thia momcnt woiild Iir: t o  be n l l o ~ d  to  be neutcr, 
that Rnqlnnd and I h - t n c ~  should fight tho battle nnd pay al1 tl is 
ospenaes.' 
Cuptaix Codkn,qlox to  t h  kmwralile E. WeIlealePj. 
e s ~ t m a ~  8,1811. 
'mer ascerhining that mnch art waa ernployed to disgust the 
amy a i t l i  generd Blnlíc, and at  the a m e  time to prcjudice tbe 
pmple against thcir oiriccra, I rcIicd upon tlie 
maiircs, rnd aprned tila aiib.ert to  the gcneriU a i t ~ 1 " t ' h ~ e S Z  
nnd Freodom it rorluirrd. I /id p-ent sntiifaction in finding him 
wcll awrirc of al1 tliat wns p~,ssing, and npon Iiia nrd m to tlw 
mnse IICLIPCB. Cpon m7 mrntioniog tliat i:ci-tain &d-bills nere 
p n ~ h 4  up. ho pmdiiood snd grso me the onolosed oopica. lie 
iuld me lhat upon obtaining tlirm he went Iu the mirquis of 
Pulwioii, who, ~iecesaxjly wreeinq in LZieir evil tendeney, con- 
aenkd t o  acconipiiny Ilir: gericral l o  tlie palace o i  tlic arcliliishop, 
where I t r u s t  mcwurca wcrc adopted to  revent a rcpetition of  
tlw mi~oondiict of the Padre 4iid a n d e s  numeraus bigotod 
condjritm. I aitbmittcd t o  ilir ~rneral'la attcntion $he fatal 
cffrch of hia qiiittin~ tliia nrt nf tlii: Pe'eninaiil~, whilc t h ~  minrls 
of tlx pcoplo wcro in suol  a side of fcrmcntntion, nod nlloning 
tho suprcmo nutliori to rcvcrt to tho maquis of l'dncios. 
He nssimd mo tlint 2 e clearly snw the diiii~or vhicli wotild 
arise from it ; he liad detemined on no aceoimt to  do so unta 
the marquis was removed by I l i a  goverrunent fiom his present 
situalion.' 
SBCTIQN T V . - ~ D A L ~ S I A .  
G-2 to XP. S t ~ w i .  
Muy 9,1810. 
'Nothing new here; the re ency md the 'iinta a ~ c  as uaual 
more d o c p  dinn nwnko, nnd f p n n  nnpir noti ing good from the 
govcmmcnt rcmaininaf in such hnnds-let tlirir iiitcntionti bo rv t.r 
ag pod.  Nothing Knt the asscmlily af tlie Cortes, and Emrn 
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tbenac ~pringing np a revolntinnnry ~ystem, ovcrtnrninr ahna~a 
md interc~ting thr: pcoplc in thrir oñii carne by ~ol id  nnd ptirmn- 
ncnt. in~ttrnd of mntingcnt nnrl pronpcctivc rrfnmis, cnlling forth 
tnlcnts if tn 1 i ~ :  foi~nrl for tlie chicf ~ibint~inns, nnd cnfarcing vigolir 
~ n d  rousing cntlirisinrim. Kotliing bnt Romc grcat cliange (such 
as wc miglit in tEic bcginning h n ~ c  nssist$ in brin ing alioul) c m  
carry o i  rIiis am to nny good rcsult. Ilio pcopki Iire ubslinih 
in ilicir liatred of tho Zr'~+sncli, and from that donc spring tlie Lts of 
pattriotitrni and lopltg rrhich kccp alivo tlic flmc ir1 somc Ince 
OF nnotlcr;  thnt i t  is so onc cannot doulil Jhrorn tl\o clkota, 
but it is never to be met with wliere ono is; nt least 1 hare J~CGEP 
aeen eiithuaiam lliougli 3: Iiavc he:ii-d o[ il. Htleiict! Ilie bulk of  
tlie peoplo oeem Lo be roniplelely inrliil'crelil to wLal is goiug un, 
~ u d  ti11 gccm rnosl urii~illin~: to rruliinjt Lo tlis dc rivalion ol' any 
comiort, and to t1.e sncrilisrs ivl i ici i  n s t a k  ofsirge r qu i e s .  
Shcy a o d d  be v c ~ y  wcll plcased l o  havc an~tliiiii: donc ror ibem 
anrl to scc the cncmy diivcn may, tlial lliry might go io cat 
strnwberries Clliclann, and they m much disposcd to blnme 
our inactivity, especially that of tlic navy, in permitling tlieenemy 
to  have ñdvanced so ncar on tlie point of Tiwcadero. Tlie destrnc- 
tion of tlicse tn-o forts at fimt RXS certainl~ n great error in 
admira1 Purvk ; h d  tliey hecn lrept up an d meu garrisoned, m 
t h ~ y  ssupport one anot,licr, i t  woiild Iiava hrcn a r c r y  t~dfons 
operntion to Iiare retinccd thcm. Mclmn~liila y n  will liear thnt 
tlie impm\*idencc: OS t,hc jiinki, nnrl t,licir dcnial of any ~ u r l i  risk 
to Mr. 'l+rclleslry, plilcrd t,lio hrcatl provision of  tlic town in 
muclz too preenrious a situaiion; in sliort, tlicy complctcl~ de- 
ccivcd liim by tt!icir assuiaancm of tlio moat amplc mcms o? sub- 
sistroce, and both nour and wheut Iiwc bcen sent an-ay since he 
ame.' 
Mi-. WeZEesÉq tu  MT. Sttaarl. 
Vsb de Leon, Rebruay 5,1811. 
'Blnke is beeoming very unpo alar, nnd 1 tliink his r c i p  xiU 
be ~liort. He is siippo~cd to f e  $ no monos partid to tbe 
Englisli. I Jtziow nol  ~vlietlier you N i11 nppruce of' tlic apyioint 
mstiiri to Estremntlurs, anrl Gnllicia, bul l m suro you ni11 Iie 
suryriscd l o  liem l l in l  encrai Nnlti i a  iilipoinled Eo com~naiitl tSe 
anny o i  the ccntrc. 5 oornmui~ieated roiiiidcritidly to geneid 
Dlalre tlie copy of the lettcr which pou for~mdrcl to me from 
genera2 Walker, tairing cme to conceal general IYr~lker's name, 
80 fbai Qlakc ww f d y  apprised of o i r  opinion of generd 
Mahi previously ta Lig appointment of him to the comnimd in 
&furcia." 
XF. PawggJnam to Mi. Stwrt. 
' Cadiz, T e h a y  27, 1811. 
'Tt ~ ~ C V P R  me B see from da t o  dny how little is done By 
the Spnoinrds, nnd how little is &rly to Iic donc. Thc Cortes 
h e  not givcn n ncw impulse to tine ww a0 wns eqeeted. Th;g 

mere are some instances of impndwce anpparting fdsehaod 
be jond example, Tha p m d  Spanimd is no leas van'a, 1 tiiink.' 
ammaz tu JET. st~iart.  
' Isla, May 6,1811. 
' The govemment hero suwortcd )y the Cortes seemed to be 
detemined to ndliere with Iilind olistinac$ and ride to a ys tom 
thnt Iins nesrlg Iirought iiic oruao to  ruin. an8notwithatnorliiig 
lord Wellitigton's great cfforta they are pl:iying 13uonaparte'8 
g n i e  so poaltivdy that 1 Icspair o f  sny gwat good.' 
Colme2 Aa9tin to Mr. Staart. 
' Faro, MareII. 21r, 1811. 
Whether B R ~ ~ C P ~ T M ~  i a  aiithorined hy his govcinrn~nt t 
pmnt: tlic stc s hr Iirta tnkcn, I Imow not, hut 1 ccrtninl,~ can- 
not but m n r i k  them ns j i i a t  anU nccossnrg. Tlie j un ta  de 
Scville Is a mcrc fmcc ñnpportcd nt un immcn* c q c m e ,  withoiit 
thc lcast utilitg or bcncfit, md prcscrving in its trnin a ni~mFicr of 
idlc clinrnctcrs who oiikit. t o  lic cm loyrd in tlio dcfcnoc O S  tho 
nation, but aha  nov  only add to  i t a  Eu;tli~us. I hnvo 11nd mang 
ncgotidicins mitli t1ic junta, and tliough 1 hnva nlwnys kcpt up 
appcnrances throug1i pulicy, yet 1 have fomd, in tlio room of tlio 
huiiour and cnnrluur wl~ich uugllt to chraclerieo it, no&g but 
chcanery and rliYsimuEalion.' 
G m a E  Cnml  t o  MP. S i s t d .  
' Olivema, Ap"k 29,lsZl. 
' WouId to Denven that tlic Seani+ amies, or, more properly 
speaking, tlie skeletonm of thn hpanish armes, mere mder Lia 
lordslip's (Wellington's) comma~id; we might in that case do 
w a t  tliingñ, but alas! our ridc acerns to  incrcnae with onr T misfortunes, and i a  onIy equd ed I?g our ignornnce!' 
NY. Bfaari: tu  lord We&sh, 
' 13,1811. 
'1 have endeavonred to lhrow together tho numbers, &c. of  
tke dSerent guerillas, &c., whliich clearly dernonstrrits tite f&a 
sxaggcrations circulaled reapcclíug tliul dencriplion of force; 
tl~ough their appcaraiice in diffcrcut parta lias motit nnrcriwri- 
alilgr incrcmed tlic al- of th cnemy and pro oriiomble con- 
fidcnoc of the Synnirrds, they cannot he crle&kd to eroeed 
in the aggrcgate twentgr.five or t W y  t h o u d  men at tho 
ntmost.' 
Note.-Herc follors a list of the pnrtidas, with tlieír numbera 
and stations, too long to inscrt. 
MT. W~&sLy to 2% &uart. 
T a d k ,  Jw!y 31,1811. 
'Notlting om be more metched &m the &te of dah here; 
the regenta are beld in universal contempt, md such ia the waxt 
of talent, I can hardIy hope that a c h q e  vil1 make any impreve- 
ment: the treasury is einpty, md no robabilily of tlio amival 
of riny money from hmeriin, ao tiuit s#ai,s are re* k n rorse 
~tatc  ihm they have Leen at any time smce the commencemenh 
of the rara' 
' mero h v e  wncbcd the vmment tha crieu of tlic nrmiee 
whieh dcfond va, drpicting tgir ninhl privntima; t h c  gmnns 
af the inhnhitnnta of diabieta, rrmfT to fnll imder thc yokc of ihe 
barbnroiis invndcrs; tlic complaints of tlie ymvinccs dreadg 
occu ied, d w u ~ ~  loyd tliongh op rmsed and laid waste. 
< $%a nux, rnd henorfumarcf rll pmoual pretenrions ; tbe 
jll-understood fcelingu ool iuierest dictateci iy rovincial epirit ; 
eaempiiaos nnjually dcmanded al Oiis pcriai o?desulrlion, a r i t  
ings ~liich, wliilc tlicy oughl lo crealc l l ~  mosl ardenl patriolism, 
to unite and enlighten the nation, appcar inspired. úy l l te  enemy 
for the purpose of ensla~lng it.' . 
Caplah Codriaqton i!o 3. PeUw. 
' A T ~  de Mar, AY@ 23,1811. 
'1 have numberleee com lnints of the Spnnish privatecm thd 
mmc irpon tho oonst. rtnd 1 am sme i t wou1d be a bmefit to the 
oountry if they were nll  deprived of tlieir commission. Tliey do 
n o t h i n ~  but plnndep tlie inliahitmts o€ those placea whieh are 
owa~ionally 01-errnn by thc Prencli armies, and u.110 emlirnce tlie 
opport~~nity of  ihcir ahscnm to mmy on n littlo tr& witk othcr 
parta o£ thu X'ccriinsnh' 
Ditb to &F ir* Welleaky. 
Pa.?mcia, Q , k m h e r  8, 1811. 
' 1 t r u s t  some deci~iae rneamnis will bc t ~ k e n  t o  aholish db- 
getiier a Sy&m of prir~f@ering nothing uhort of pirncy ; ñnd in 
whicli tlic vcasclei from Gibmltiir srem h tnkn thc: Icad. 1 Iinve 
grcat reason l o  bclicvc tIint tlicy plundcr thc anfortunatc vcascla 
of all countries by lioistinn w1iatei;cr colours mrty answcr thcir 
purpoaea of  aasumed rv~tiond ho~tility; znd as rre ncver liear 
of iheir xlbulung c~c l i  other, I liavo no doubl that tho Uritish 
and Fxeneh flrys are ofteii united in furtlicrance oí' tliis pre- 
datorp warfare. Thc nnmberless complaints wliicli I receive 
from al1 parta of tlie coast, and tlze diffieuIt~ of trading betwixt 
Cfitfiloniil nnd Valrncin, on raceount of t,llic privntonrsw11it.h. annrm 
in tliena seas, drivo mmy into nn inlerrmurse with E~1rccIona 
and otlicr laccs in tlxe oceupntion of t h o  cnomy, in order to g ~ t  
a iiaclihool 
' Thc depredntion~ nf the Qihrnltnr privatccrri havc bcm cnniod 
on to ~nch nn cxtcnt, i n d l  pnrts of tlic Ncditxmnean, ns t o  hring 
acrioiis rrflcction~ 11p0n thc Britiah flq.' 
Capiain Codrimytma fa .E. Locker, Xuy. 
' Scpdemhcr 18,1811. 
' I cannot at al1 events think it ta wiso mensure to rcceivc hto 
colonel Wliittinghm's cor s tlie risoncm al Cutircra, wlio have 
lmg tqo goitlaiood tlic o!er;crx oPcencrnl lloeiic, ~ u i r n m k v d  or 
they wna h a n ,  aad $gAli~tyfor eack otliw's mierable raieom fo 
p w l o ~ y  an exktence Cnconceivaliiy wrekhed, in hopes of rejoining 
the Fxench.' 
S ~ P  P. WaIles* Go captah C&ytmm. 
' Odober 10,1811. 
'With mgyd to the Frcnchprjsonors n t  Cabrera, 1 procured 
from thc Sp:iriisli go~ernmont lorig sinw an orcler to I l ic gurernor 
uf Llio Balc;~ric Itiliiiida to suspend a11 iipgotiatioua ii i t l i  iIic Frcncli 
on i k t  aubject, nnd not on any aecount te coment to excliange 
them.' 
' !Ptzrugma, Muy 15,1811. 
'3)aring the piwuc which sccma t o  liavo prmilcd apon i%o 
nncxpcctrd nrn~d ~f tlic h n c h  army, thc geatcst cxcrtiom and 
tliamost cxtcnsiro ~ l in i i i ccs  apprm t o  hare been rcadily nubmitted 
tu. Hut Srom ihe present npatliy md inrlil~crencc iir tlrose wIw 
sliould ~ e t  m exam )le of activily, and rrom t l ~ e  generul deficiency 
of orunanec stores, !C by no rncnni eonaider tlio ylccc in tlirtrtntc 
of sccurity which the strenoh of' its rorks and posítion would 
otherviiae lead me to expect.' 
' A  wcll planned sortie Ras m d e  ycsterda bnt faiIed throngh 
the bsdiasrdneas ofrome of dio ofioen ernpy~yeogod in it;-<I Lad 
the ~atisfaction of hring nacirratl llv an d c e r ,  d o  conspimouslp 
did hiii~ duty on thii omnñion, and wlio wn9 outflankrrl by tlio 
cncmy, from tlla hnckwnrtlnrsa nf thc roliimn dircctfd tn support 
him, tlmt ho nttrihiitcs t h  sdvation of kis troops entirely to tho 
he from tho shipping.' 
Cq Eain Codrimytmb tu C. CO&!OXL 
' Blake, of Elka rTma, Juw 15, 1811. 
"eaving Taqonn on tilo I6tli ( B C q ) ,  s e  reached Poniacola 
in the forenoon of tlic 17th.'-' li'rom Ilicnco general Dogle wrott, 
to gcncml O'll.onnrl an mconat of the situation of Taragolla and 
of Iriy delainiiig captniii Adam at I'cniscoIn, in readiness to rcccive 
any reiiifarc~menl whicli he m i ~ l i t  Iie pleased to send to tllaii 
garrison. T7poii orir arrisnl oif' Murvicdro, we fonnd pneral 
O'Donnel. liad alrmcly mdcwd tlio crnb~rklttion of trPo thoiisand 
iliree Iitinclrrd i n f an tq  and two L u n d r ~ d  and eleven ~ r k i l l c ~  
rnen.'-L Drlivering to gencral WOonnel two thousand stand of 
ams, accoutrementq, nnrF clottiing to enali l~ him t o  biing inte t11e 
fi~lil ns mnny rrcriiit!: nlrrii(1~- tniincd nR ~ n 1 1 l d  ~iipply tlic plnce 
of thc rrsilnr ~olrlirrs tlnis drtndicd frnm Iiis nrrngr, WR p o -  
eccdrd to Vdencis and lnndcd tlto rmnnindcr of our cargo, by 
wliicli mexns ihc troulis o l  grncra! Villa Cnmpa, tlicn dis cmcd 
aa penszntnlry fur want of mms, wcrc cnahled ngnin to tucc ? tIio 
field, and Llio corps oF Iilinliarid the E m p c b a d u  completcd in aU 
h e  requisiies of tictive wnrfurc.' 
At Slicant TC procccdcd 10 takc in as many necessarg rnate- 
rials for Tarngona as thc ahip ivauld notualEy atoa, bcsidee ci~1:lity 
artillerymcn znd a considcral>lc qunntity ofposder, ball-cartrirlge, 
&c., arnt in t11e lbloma Spnnish comette from Carthagena in com- 
puny witli o. Ppnniah tmsport fiom Cndiz rletiply lnden with 
similar wpplics.' 
*A~F;cT r o t ~ ~ r n i n ~ .  tO Valencia. where n e  landed fhe ndditiond 
m e ,  h., For tliccA;2rngoncsr nirnp, rrc movcd on to Mumicdro, 
whcrc tlio condr: of Bis nIprocccdcd from YaIoncia to 'oin UB in 
rt con~ultation irith Lis t~oilollicr, aii hauCh on aemunt af {iia nound 
he nas very uniit for sucli a jnurney. T11e result of t1Us 00n- 
ferance u lw a dcterrriinatiot~ on tlie y:rt of gcneral O'Delinel to 
oommit to rny irotcctiori, far tlic succour oi' Tnriigona, another 
diririon OI Lis Iicst troo s undrr pocrd Miranda, mnsisting of 
four tliousand rncn, wliiit lie 1;rnscif aould move forward wlth 
the remñinder of h i s  army to tlic bmks of tlie Ebro.' 
' TIw frcqucnt disappointmrnfs irliich tlie brave Cwtdonian 
army lind Iierctofore mct mitL from Baleneian promisee, mado 
tlie sfght of so eñtenair.~ and dieinterested n reinforcement tlie 
morc trulv ~clcome,  bccimst: tlic: lr~nt  rxpectcd, and tlie acImim 
tion ~ l i i c r l  was tlius crclitcd in tlic Ficsicgcd nppcared to produce 
pro ortioiintc nnxicty on tho pnrt of tlic enerny.' 
'! sliull dircct tlic wliolo of my attcntian to tho noi hbourhd  
aP Tarwuna, in redinoss for Uirwsing tUa rctrcntof %o Frcnch, 
if general Suchet sliould fortunntdy bo obligccl to rnise ths aiege, 
and for re-embarking and rcsloring to geuernl O'l)onncl. ~ l i a t -  
ever may remain of tlie Valeucian t m p s ,  wuiir3q toirie solcmn 
pleedge he eumted froni me bcforc he would consciit tliiis to part 
witli ihc floivcr md atrength of liis army. Be  cvcn wcnt so far 
tui to declare, in thc presence of genmd W i ,  the principal 
oficer of  hi4 [~tflff, generitl Do le, csptnin Adam, ~ ~ p h i n  White, 
anii rníself, thnt iie mginmedme as entimi, nnawrrnhlr f<>r the 
anfety of the kingdom of Vdenmn, snd t,hnt ;f 1 fniled in rrderm. 
ing my plcdgc lic would rctiign Iiis eoinmand fnr thnt pnrticulm 
sccount.' 
'It is hut jujusticc to myself, ~ O R ~ P ~ T ~  that I ~ h o d d  t e l  yon 
thal 1 &d most diritindly wani general O'Oonnel, bhtit I would 
in no case answer for hia army ii phced under $110 immcdiate 
comrnim~i of C m  o Verdo, l'or any d i s h t  uilaud opcralion, mora 
pryhicularl~ as I &new tiiat, in addilion ko lus oau dciioienq in 
atiili?, he was wrromded by people whoae advice nnd whme 
conduct were in no case to be relied on.' 
Captah Cdrim$ols to n+ C. C'oftors. 
' Blake. Xarayma, Jzw F2, 181 1. 
' I found upon my last rcturn ILPPC m arrnngcmcnt rnadc, that 
in case of  thc. encnip pininptlie Yurrto, gcncrd Snrafield shocild 
retire tu thc Molo nith part of hís division, from whcnce 1 IiaJ 
only to ~ s i s t ,  but much asionislied lo  firid, by a mess c, 
"r t hvugh  colonel Cheen, From, general Coiitrcrns, hnt  slllioiqli ic 
had l i e d  of sucIi a tlisposition being made by general Sai.sficlcl, 
anrl as~ented to by tlie Illnglisli ~qmdron,  it liad not his 05cia.I 
knowledge or approbation.'-' 1 uuderstand tkat ttn order lid 
xrrived in thc morniiig fmm tlie mar iiis of Campo Verde for 
gencrd Y~lnsm to tnke tlie command o j ~ o r r t o ,  nod for general 
Sarwfield to join riia nmp, that tiic h t k r  liad givcn up his com- 
mñnd t o  Rome colonel nt ~ b o u t  hive. o'~loc1~, r h o  WRR, by bis 
onn eonfca~ion, totally unfit For it, md thnt gcncrd V r l m  ody 
arrived in time to see tlie Spqninisli troops f l y i n ~  in confusionfrorn 
t l ~ e  amt of being preprly uorntnztnded m d  tlie Ir'rench assaulting 
the p!uce.' 
Captain C o & ~ ~ t o a  to s F  3. Pcl-sli, 
' Mattnm, Xoumbm 1, 1811. 
' H d n g  stabd in a letter +a sir CharIes Cotton, un flie 22nd 
,Jme l a ~ t ,  thilt 1 nndersttnd genoral Sarslield hnd quitted the 
Puerto I I U ~  cmbarkprl wjtlioul tlie knuwlcd~e a[ generd Con- 
treras, (nluch indeed wna thc sulistmce of a incsRqe sent me by 
gencrd Contrcrns liimself,) I owe i t to  an olficcr of generd 
Sarsfield's high m i l i t q  cl~ñrilcter to declme my conviction that 
tlie stxtement tliere mnde by generiti Coltrcrna is ali11~olnkly 
fahe ancl unfoundcrl, and 1  he^ Fcnvc to cnclosc in jnstirication of 
my prcsrnt opinion; 1st. A pnsxpnrt acnt by gwernl Contmra 
t o  gcncrd Snrsficld in mn~c  ucncc, na hc aUqcd, of i ~ n  orclcr fmm 
thc mm* uis of C q o  verlo. 2nd. An ortrnct fmm t i io  mnni- 
fcsta olh &e marquir, in a h i h  lo <lissrow~ iiaving nny knoaledp 
of ilic nssporis. 3rd. A 1eltwTroni general Coiit~eras to pnci-al 
~nrsficfci u rnswcr to one wriltrn by tlie lalter roquerLiug to 
sce tke order by tliich he m directed to qnit the Puerto at  ~ i i c h  
is mitical moment, in rrhich he aays. ' thna he erinnot ~ c n d  him a 
wpy of t h 3  I~ttEr~ '.bi?cnu~c it i~ mddential, but that hispresenrx! 
is ntimsary nt t l ~ o  had-giulrtcm t o  m ~ k t  in the operntions aboot 
to  take placo Eor the rdicf' o f  the garrison, and th:it hc Laa not a 
moment to lose.' 4,111. Th~i copy of anotlier letter writtcrn on 
the Reme day by general Contreras to tlie superior junta, in wliich 
be saya thnt general Sarsfield quitkd the Pnwto without his 
knowledge ! ! !' 
Gmmk Royk to co lw l  Roc&e. 
' J m  23, 1811. 
'k it ~ o s ~ i b l ~  tn C O ~ C C ~ T C  anything so ~ b ~ n r d ,  and codd  
almost sny wkfierl, ns tlic condnct of thc junta or cn tnin g c n o d  
of Ca~tliyona in fnking s w q  the firclocks fmm Qc r&imenta 
flasy sewt taicih m h  pwade of blm'~pafrio1i.m t o  wlioo Tatnpona. 
TRO Ihousilnd men are alrcilr!y in this city ~ i t h o u t  heloeke, such 
is the daily destrucliou o f  tarina by tfie enemy's hirli and the geb 
ting out of repair from conshnt use.' 
Capiaia Padkjlola fo dr ChOrcaa Catton. 
' OJ Ta'aragma, Jum 23,1811. 
' Another rcgrncnt awivcd from Gnrthngcn~ ycsterdq nnder 
convoy oF thr! Co~snck, Iiiit, ne on a formar occwion, thtlir m s  
wiiri: hkcn from tlicm hp coIoncI Rmhc, n on thcir pino; to 
cmbark, md thcroforc, a. boiog of oo uso t o  & pnrrison, I havo 
by dcñiro of tlio gcncral scnt tlicm to Yilln, Kueva, land as tlicro 
are airendy 2000 men in the place withviuut ama, I have cent the 
Termagant to Csrlli:vena, to  endravour to rucure tliose which 
lime liecn tlius incousiderskly taken from 1 e troops belongm:: 
to tba1 place.' 
 
Cuptain Co'odrs'ngtm to C. Co-. 
Ftrtickl J m  29,1881, 
' The RegnIns Wt11 fivc transporta inclnding s victualler 
amived witli colonel Skemtt  nnd his detachmcnta on the 26th. 
The sud maa so p n t  on that day thal wc h d  no 0 t h  commu- 
nication in the forenoon than by a, man sffimming on &ore ~6th 
a Idter, and upon colonel SIcr& putting qnestions to general 
DovTc nnd mytzrlf ripon tha conduct he shoulrl purwe acmrding 
to iiis ordrra, wr wficrl in mir opinion tlint altliongJi thc nrrivril 
of tlie trcop hrforc tlic Pomtn (lowcr tom) rrriti t&en woitld 
probahly havc sn~cd tho gnrrison, it wna nom ton Iatc, and that 
t h e i ~  Iieinn Ianded, if practicnhlc, would onty scmc to prolong 
tlie f,~,ilo E tho place for s, vcry short tima at tho ceiitain ~ : i r r i l i c o  
ofthe wfiole e~rcntually. Tliis opinion p u n d e d  on u nuni- 
ber of direercnt circiunshnccs, nnd was in. e r f ~ c t  coiwidence 
6th tbat of ra tnins r l h m  and Wlrite. e n  the men* tho 
mE abated adicniig for general Doyle, uiionel Skerreti, u i d  
some of h i ~  oEcers, aa m11 as the captnins of t1ie squadron and 
m~self, to toñuil upon general Contrerxs, d o  repeeted Lis detcr- 
rnrnntion to vut his w;ly out nnd juin Iliu maquis cif Camp 
l T e d u  th iwbslanl Ilne enzmy'a Irewcki*g brsllm-y, sbuvdd qm, and 
wliiuh lie expectcd wodd tike place tlie Colloii.iiip nioriling, and 
who agreed the Englisli ought not to land witli any view of de- 
fendinq the tonn, altliough he wished tliem t o  join in Lis medi. 
tatcd sortie.' 
Extracls- g-al Contram' r e p l d ,  
~ m s l a t e d  ] 
' I iaw myself reduced to my o m  gmison.-' I considered 
if m+y forre q a b l a  of this effort (defeiirling the breach), 
one olthe most heroic thnt war furnislias, :md to whicli few =en 
can bring tliemsclves. T rml lec t~d ,  Iiowever, that 1 hnd dill 
?A$ tlwmumd uf tb Iiest nnd mosl exp~r!sncetE trnopa P'n Sp41.'- 
All conapircd rrgainst this peor gmi~nn. Cnmpc Vcrda in 
quitting tlic phce pmmiscd to como bnclc nickly tn ita tiucconr, 
hut iie did nat, nliliough lio dnily rcneno! hir pmmiscs. SIie 
kingdom of Tnlcncin ttcnt Miranda witli n diviaion whicIi diicm- 
bnrkcd. and tho dav fullowin~ re-embnrlrod and weot t o  ioin 
oornmmtndd thsm, cama in tho evening to conI'er with rnc &¿l 10 
denialid s l i a t  1 wished him t o  do. L veplied that he woick! 
disernbavk und mter ihe place$ /M shmld be 9-cmi~1ed wild g q  
a d  treated as Le fnwiled; Ihat he ILad only lo cSmuse ik p i n f  
ti'iat he qoisfied to  &faid and 1 ~uo~i ld  +ve it to  Rim, baf thot 
al; w m  nt Bis claaiee, sixm Iicawld m'tJia commmd nor mwel 
Iiim. Ths 97th the Rndish eornmanrlants uf ar t i l lq  and 
engineer~ cnme to examina iho front, attrieked, md being ton- 
rinccd t>hat thc plnct: wna not in R sFnte to resiat, rekirned to 
thcir rcsscls, mci thcn d wwent awuy from thc plaec tliep cmo 
to sitwonr. 
' This abamdonnacnt m thc wt # tJdoue w&o c m c  to gave 1ba8 
t h  w a s t  gfaEl; i t mndo sucf an impro~ion on tlic soIdicrs,tlint 
ihey Lieqari to nee i l ~ ~ t  thc,v were lunl, became low-~pmitcd. md 
onlj* r e s ~ s l e d  from m w~iiinual exhortiilions, and Iirct~use theg 
Ratr rny eoolneaa uod tk cosíidenw T h d .  Lhat iE Ilicy orecuted 
rny orders tlic Prencli would Ed. ljut t h i a  only lrasted a few 
kours. She notion of bepg aliandoncd q a i n  seized them and 
overcame all 0 t h  ideas. 
' July 12, 1811. 
' The vaeillding conduct of general Contraras r e ~ r d l l i ~  the
defence oí' Tawqonli is a principal futiatwbei in the loas oí' b t  
important. forlrotis.' 
Crupt;n Codri~bola k  si^ E. PeEh, 
' Julgr 12,1811. 
' The marquis lilamea gmernla Caro and Mirnnds, whilqt the 
lattw rctnrt t h s  nocusniion; and 1 am jndincd to think that in 
giving fiiI1 crerlit t o  wlint endi s n ~ ~  oT tlie otlrcr, ncither will 
siifflhr ignominy beyond tliat to wliicli Gis conduct lins ontitIcd 
Km.' 
L.- ---- A 
a Ju7y 20, ISli. 
' Tha dianstem whieh hava bcfdlcn the princi ulity mil1 pro- P duco material accusations neainst the retlcrn s vho lntelv 
eommandcd in it, witEiout, rfcar, any 2 them meeting t1k 
yutii~limciil ivliicli is lbcir  due. 801110 of tlie enclosod ptlpcra 
rnay h l p  you to form a just opinion of their conduct and tliat o l  
tlte Spariisli inltrine; nnd Iliose rea e c t k  the arma Eor wliich 1 
.enk to Czrtbgena d siiow lioa 8w colonel Pwehe i s  entitled 
to  the merit rrliich he so largely rrssumea on that occasion.' 
'So enriblc van to form a correct ouinion of ~eenerd Gontreraa 
I must rc fcr ;cm to g e n d  Dode, & from liiaignorance of our 
service, thc various requests aria proposds which arose from tho 
vacillations in what he cdled Lis determinations, wera significa 
t o  me tlirot~gh him. Tt cdocri not n p a r  tO me t,hhnt lis ever 
visited tlio works liimsolf, or it rcoaldlnit h a ~ e  Mlcn to the lat 
of eriptnin hdam annd inysclF to rcmove two boats, two largo 
stagcs, sixtccn pn-carringcs, nnd a m o r w  from thc mole, lona 
nftrr thc Frcnch wcrc acl~nnccd bcyond thc Ymncoli bnttcry, 
and two ni@ previons to thir gaining the I'ucrto; an acci- 
dental v i ~ i t  b the mole ono ni$, just after plnchg the gnn- 
l~oale and luunches, discovered lo mo thi8 morlar with no lcsa 
than twelvo [runs in renclinms for forming za battery; md upon 
gencral noyTc, by m regucst, representing tliis to tke general 
0f ai-iiiiery, ac t d e J o f  inyuinng MO it  lo-momm.' 
' It would be a waste of irords te describe furfhcr the conduct 
of tlle gencrd of artillcty, or 1 mighG h d  auflcicnt subject in 
the events of c ~ e r y  prissing &%y from the fimt iniwstment of  the 
place.'-* I a l d l  be rerr r e a y  to como forward peraonally in 
aid oF that justice wl~ic  r ia  ne to tho nurnlierless brave meii 
wlio fcll a sacrificc to tho criminality of tilo persoas dlurled to 
who b m  so g~ossly misconduetcd thornsclvc~.' 
Cla-ptuin Codi%m$on to air E. Pelh .  
' J,tg 29,1811. 
'Had wionol Grstin, the militar agont appointod to sucmed 
general DagIe. adopted tl ie plan of H s  predeoessora af oontiuuiog 
at ttL hoail-quarters of tlie a m y  and in personal communicaliou 
~ a l k  the captain-general, imtcad of rcliriug to Teniscola witli 
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tho moncy nnd m s  remnining, wo ~honld not he lcft as we are 
to thc prccnrioirs soiirco of mcre nccidcntd oommunimtiom for 
recciving intclligoncc.' 
Captmik Codre'ngfma to Don P. S a v a d ~ ,  aoeal qf t h  dwnta. 
' cTacfy 28,1811, 
g- Coloncl. Gcen, the Briti8h military agent, being at 
Pcniscola, 1 hars opened tlie lctter from tbe jiintn to hirn.'- 
' 31d 1 not in thia instance opencd Ilie lettcrs to thc admira1 md 
t1ie militnry agent, the juntn would have rcwivctl no nnsmr to 
them unta it wodd  havc hecn too lnte to rxccute tlieir object.' 
Cap fain 17iontus to q i a i m  QoÜKmgtoa. 
F r n c t . ]  
' X  M. S. Wndnunkd, ofArew, &f. ?, 1811. 
'EaPing observed, in the Catalotiiu Gaeotts of tho  %th of 
Sepkmlie~, the co y of  a lelkr sud to Eie wriittcn by colune1 
Grecn to hir ercelYenop general h y ,  relative to  oiw aperations 
on lhe Medaa islands, from tha ~urrender of tlic cnstlo ta the 
periocl of our quitiing thoin, 1 beg leave to  siate to yon n y  
aurprise and as~onislunent at seeing fmta BU grossl~ misrepre- 
sented, and regvest youwill be pleñsed to contradict iin tlie moxt 
positive m m e r  tlie nssertions tliei-e mnde acre of. To prove how 
inconaiatrnt tFiia Tcttcr i s  witli rrnl fncls, it mnp he nccrssnry for 
me onlv to R R ~  tlmt colonel Gi-cen, in tlie prcsence nnd Iiettring 
af al1 i he  7Sngli~1i oficrm, on mg ariking him n qncation rrlntive 
to the practicltbility of líccping thc islmd, did dccltirc that Iiis 
had notliing t o  do wíth tho cxpeditjon; ihat m7 instructiona 
puinted liim out as a voluntaor only. Uut imrnedialciy aftcr, in 
the Iieu;riiig of all, did declare it to 'he liis opinion l h t  ihe i b d  
vnri not tenable. 
*As 1 understmd it r a s  intended to f m  an establishment on 
the larger island, 1 judged i t pro er to retire fmm it for a short 
time and dastmy t h o  rirnnins a?the cmtle, whirh miglit intiiiee 
%he enemy to withdrxw from the wmks he had t h w n  up, and 
tliereliy aflord oiir d l y  nn apportnnity ~ h e n e ~ ~ r  he eliesce to 
occupy thcm +n, tn fortify Ium~clf withont rnolcstntion; and 
this R U ~ ~ O S ~ ~ ~ O U  it hna appcared wns rrcll grmded.  Uut while 
tlic ruins of tlio cnstlc stoud, it wns an obj!jctít of jcdous~ to the 
Frendi; nor wodd they in my o iinion Lirtvu quiSlcd Llic gmiirrd 
ilicy uecupied, nor llie ~~siiaic!s h a ~ e  leen eiialiid to sctilo 
tlieinaelves, liad this mcasure not becn adopted. I tlerefore 
gme ordma for embarkiiig tlie guns md dores. 
* Xf neeessary, X could sa mucli more on the mbject of this E most extraordinmy letkr; t o fevi remarks X Lave mnde will, I 
tliink, he auílicicnt. AB~ mi art of courtesy to mlonel Green, on 
Iundinp tlie mñrines, 31 direcbd the marine oficers to receive thejr 
orrlers from him; but militnry nid wns not ncecasarg, for y a  
mny rceollcet bc fm thc cxpcdiíion sailcd, on your jnformin me 
thnt general Lncy had oflcrod Borne Spznish troops, nnd a s k g  
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how many I thought would bo necessaq, my answer waa, ' about 
forty;' and 1 h v c  no iieiitu~inn in dcclar'in:: Iliat witllout tlic 
s~aiatanm o€ eron a single aoldicr tlie cxstle would ~ Y B  fallen 
into our h d a  m speerlily as it did on this occrasion. 
Capitaim Co&mgfm*g wdcrs fo croptuim ddam of th.e Inwim'file. 
' Juyi 1,1811. 
' You are hmby directed, in consequence of a re~ircseutation 
made ki me I3y gcneral Doylo, to procecd h~vnrcIs Mzjoren iu 
aearch of tlie Bpaiiisti frigates Pmeba, Diana, nnd dstrca, wrliicli 
the gcncrnl reporta to Iir v i n f :  to thnt ielnnd (conir;- to odcrs) 
with t h ~  trea~lire, archives of thc pro~ince.  nnrl tlie vesscls Iden 
vith  torea and ammunition destined for the jnlnnd fort;ressca of 
Cntnlonin, togcthcr a i t l i  tlie nlliccr~i nnd soldiera rliicli were 
~aved  fmm Tara onn, rtnd wliirli nrc rcqiiired tn join tlie ñrmy 
hmadintcly. ~{on mrating tliorn yoii nrc to doiiror dic mrom- 
pmying ordcr for tlicm to rcturn hcre, and you m, if necesriary, 
1,o cnforeo obcdicnoe.' 
* E1l~ flwua, Játfy 3, 1811. 
' 1 should feel tlie more h t  b being dríven to adopt snch a 
rneeasure l i d  not tlie wholc conhct of tLc Prncba m d  Diana 
mado tbeir captñins n disgracc to the situation they hcld. 
Shcse trro friqates remaiiied guiet spectntors of the British 
sqnadron engnging the Iintteries of tl ie enemy on the 22nd of 
lnst month, nnd never attcmpted to g i ~ e  .eny assigtance to tha 
gnlrison, exrrpt by now anrl tlien rrri~ding R en-bont to join 
tho~e  mnnncd b~ f,hc ffnglidi. Tl icy  d i r l  not asf i int  in tha 
emlinrkntion of tlic ni~tnTicrlrsa womrn, cliildrcn, nnd wnnndcd 
eoldicrs, until gondcd i n b  it Iiy thc o~drre of enr ra l  Contrcraa, 
after 1 hnd nlrcady irenl abiliove two tliouannd to thie pliwe; tind 
evcil whm 3. Iixd uo loagcr auy lmsports f'or their receplion, (11s 
capt,ain oT thc Prueba rufuaed to rewive iiorne woruided olIicers.' 
i%f£o i% ditto. 
' &rPy 18,1811. 
' 1 cannot de~cribc to p u  the cWCciillies whicli I Lave been 
pnt to by tlic misconduct d aII tho Sliltiiish sKips and vesseis OS 
war whicli I harc h d  to ~ulmninnicalc m i t l ~  upon thc coaot, w i t l  
exception o f  the Aetrea frigate .tea tthe Paloma corvette. In 
the  atliers 1 Iinre seen neithrr c m q e  to oppase the enemy nor 
h n m n n i ~  to dlevintc thc dintresses of tlirir co i i i imen . ' -*I  
Eaye lictird also that thc Al ~sirns, m,liicli lntcl nrrived at Arens, 
bna londcd the Rf*rrc~ m% iimmonition, ñit% ahich 6l1o sns 
char ed, at tlic risk of aicir fdIing into thc hands of  thc cncmy, 
aod $ quittcd thu atntion l' 
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' GpnomI Milrins is collecting n miKture of t rooi~ ,  mnsisting 
of tilose wlio liava escaped tlie eiicmy.' 
' He spcnks loucllp o1 his iocliirerence to e command, while he 
boasts that if lie wcre captain-geiierd he would raise forty tlion- 
sand men and clear tlie country of  the enemv ? But in the midst 
of t l i is disgusting rodornontndc i t is not di&cdt to see thnt wlf- 
intcrcst is thr rnain-spring of  al1 bis actions, and that ins ted of 
r a i e i n ~  an nrmy lie ia more liicely, h~ the gstcm he has ~dopted, 
to shñke tlie ~tabiliky of tliat- wheh ia still Ieft for &e defenee o£ 
the principdity.' 
Cup€aa'u COa&~ogtos to k v  P. Tellesley. 
' Sqtmlier 1,1811. 
' The &ir of cncrd MiInne' (namcly, thc scnding of corn to 
Baroelonr undcr k s  pnssport) ' wliich I mcnlionod to you ui my 
lnst prir-ab lettcr, ir: ctill involved in mgstvry, whicli I ho o 
Uomrer to penetrato upon my return t o  drciis do Mar. d o  
Mntm pnperci rcported tlrnt tira soldiera were sliol tuid a ser- 
ed at Arena for suirering c m  to ass their guiird ut % i o .  Thafad ottho punidirnmt ia 
3: bclicve t d y  shted, but the mwe no lens falsely, entircly as I 
suspcct with tho v i e e  of tcrmiunting my invcstigation into this 
nefnrious traflc. General Lnry, inateptcl of nnsrrering mv Iett~r, 
refcru me by rord of mot~t.h tf;o 1.h~ jiinta, nnd i,Tir: dcp~itntion 
from tho jimtn, who wcnt to Mntnro (m thcy nssnrcil mc) pnr- 
poscly to inrcatignto thc business, now te11 mc tbnt it is m aff& 
purely mili*, and refm mo to general Milans liimaclf.' 
ESCTION V. 
Zstractfmm a minate .naacGe By c q t a i n  Codp'Mtgton. 
Jfattaro, &Jy 6,1811. 
' Colooel O'Ronan, aid-du-cmp ta «io mnrquia o£ Campo 
Verde, arrived, nnd informed me t iat ho carne rronr tLe marquis, 
wlio Ras on h a  rnarch to this town or b ~ e i i s ,  for tIie purpose of 
embarking al1 thc infrtiitry not Gñ.hhns, md the whole of the 
m a i n i n g  cnvslq-, lleaving the liorscs on thc bench. Colonel 
O'Ronnn snid tliis dctcrmination rrns the resiilt o€ a junta, com- 
oscd of tlie mrirqiiis, general St. Jnnn, general Caro, encral F R/n*ndn, tlio gcnrrnl of wtil~my, brigadier ~ m t a  Cmr, T rla~m, 
and Sarsficld: tlint nficr tlir thing IintI h c n  pmpowd and diri- 
msticd n long timo, SarsGdd w a ~  tho first to givc 3iis votc, thnt 
bc r o ~ c  from his wat and snid, ' any oííiccr wha conld givo ~ u c h  
xn opinion miist ba a traitor to hi3 COUTI*, and thnt ha and iis 
divisiun ir-ould stand or fiiU wiih 1he priii~:ipali~y.' E v e ~  ollier 
ofiwr was of a c o n t r q  upinion, except tlie rnarquis (it aficr- 
wards appeared thut Srrnta C m  &o supported Sarsíield), nrho 

of et confcrence beimkt enerals Caro and Miranda 
nith grneral Doyle mfmyself thia day. 
' J7tk 9, 18U. 
'About eirht o7eiook gcnords Coro snd 31i~aodia camc on 
board tlie Ulthe. NLer licíiig sentod *n thc caliin u ilh  ene eral 
Doy!! and niyseV, kcneral Caro Iiegged gencrnl Uoyle would 
explaui ta me, ihat tlit were come iu couseqilcnce of my pro- 
miso, to request ~aouldyembark the division of Vaienoisn traopa 
which 1 liad brouglit tiom Peniscola. 1 deilircd to know wIint 
prornisc general Caro undcratood mc to have madc? IIe 
riiiawcred, tliat 1 wonld tnke tlie aliove kmopa Linck tu 'Iídencin. 
T denied po~itively that 1 Id made xny pramise to re-crnli.irk 
tlicm if, lliey elionld ever joiu tlie mmguis of G ~ m p o  verde, 
dthotigh I Iind drcplv ledgrd rnyaeIf t o  restoir: them to grnrrnl 
O'Donnci if iho joincgin n soiiic fmm tlio pmiron, abiiicii I 
ans vorg oonfiLnt woiild bc dorisivo of its sucocsa. thon 
~ f e m c d  general Nirasda to a similnr explanation, w h i d  4: g a ~ e  
tu liim, tlirough general Do le, on tLo day attatler our quilting 
Pen.co~+ w h n  ~ii Iind asid He m s  ordwoii, botii by Lis sriiien 
instniclions and by verbal cxplmation irom general O'Doui1c4, 
not to land within the garrison. G c n e d  Miranda instnntly 
repcaled t h k  so he wns; upon ~vl i ich general 1 )oyle, to whom he 
hnd sho~m those ínstructions jointly with myaelf, aftw lcariiig 
Taracona for Vjlln Nucvn, whcn u d c r  a d i c u I t y  aa te how he 
shoidri pmceed, refcrred Iiim to them again, d e n  il appenring 
that Iie waa tllcrejn positively orrlerrd ' desembnrenr en lle plazu 
de T:~i.ngonk' gcncrnl noylo titoypcd. 
Omeru.l Mirandu. ' Ah ! hut rcnd on.' 
' General D y k .  ' No: sir, tliere i~ the positivo proof of pour 
rceciving sncli an orrler. 
Genwd 17f;ra~da. 'Well, but rcad on.' 
' Genmal Uoyle. ' No, sir. Tliis ko infhg  fo thspapm) is t h e  
po~il ive proul of your receiving sud1 a r k  orticr, nliich we wmhd 
to euts-lilish, Secñuse ou posilively dciiied ii.' 
Upm ti& pnern f  Caro, slirug:ing u his shoulders, a d ,  
' I l e  a7ns not mnre of tiiore bcing ony m& ordcr.' A d  general 
Miranda ajiain rcquested general DoyIc would r e d  on. 
' Gmwul Doyk. 'Por wliat purpose?' 
Gmeral Jfjrnnda. ' 'So prore thnt 1 a a E  not to &ut myself 
up aith t11r division in tlie plaza dc 3'nmgonn.' 
' GemrrZ I14le. ' n c r e  i s  no occriaion,  ir, for nny 
of tliat, for it aos a pnrt nf t l ~ o  rrrv at i  iilation m n P Í g f  
ea tain CoWnptan whon he ahonglg pledgod gimaelf to gcnerd 
~ % o n n c l . '  
C+cncrnl Doy10 continued,-%nd now, ~,oncral C m ,  that r e  
have proved t o  you t l i a t  general K i n n d a  Iiad odcrs to lnnd in 
Tzrqonit, and that ccfiain Codrhgton i u  buurld by rio s ~ ~ c l i  pro- 
niise iis you iiad imagimd, 1 tnusl d o r m  you tlitlt hc liiis been 
ei ht dap upon the coast wilh ail tho shipa of wnr nnd transport~ 
wfioli are n-nnted for other s e ~ i c o a ,  For tho solo purpoao of 
embwking thca~ tm s; and he desires rno to add tliat tt con- 
aideration of aht is &le to the l i b d  m d  exompluy sssirtanoe 
aff'orrled by eneral O'Donncl sntl 'lrallcncia in nid of Ta 
but ndi a t  n 3 on nemunt oi nop pieclgs hc hna bcon raid xtvi 
given, thnt he will use thc @ame exrrtion in rr-amlinrking nnd 
rrstoring the troups aliiel~ 110 woulrI Iinve donc i f  so houiid Iiy 
his word of honoiir.' ' 
MF. TPelLsh to lord WelIeslev. iI 
' Ju ly 28, 1811. 
The r n o r n i n ~  of thc 30th of Trine. ri. few liours uftrr t t ~ e  arrival 
o f  tlic 13ritish &queclron nnd Spanis1i rcsscls in tlic ronrlstfind of 
Villa Nucva, fivc tl-ioiisnntl Frcnrli infnnt nnd fivc Iiundrcd 
m u riwd thc p1.c~ by rt nigl~t marea, anU soilorl nll ilio 
p?pcr$ 2 ~ n r q o n n .  whieh lvd beon scnt tlicre Iiciaro tiic 
siezo. Twcntyiiue tlioiisand dollnre for each of tho next throo 
rnoriths w a ~  dc.maniled, but nu vjoIcnco or plundcr aliowcd. 
Eroles narcon-ly cscaped. Lacy, np ointed to cornmnntE in 
Catdonin, arrivcd 1 s t  3ul  at Villa Sueun, the tiih weilt to 7 IngunI~da to join Crunpo I crde.' 
' Dcsrrtion in thc ariny at -%ttaro has bcen crirried to n most 
ahrmii i~  eñtcnt since trie fall ol Tñrsgona; the f i r ~ t  nigit fifteen 
hundred mcn Risxppcnrcd, ncarly tlirrc hundrcd cn\dry hnd 
lilrewisc set off ton-nrds ~Ltiicon ; 11nd tl~est! d~er t iona  rc to Iw 
icttriliutacl t o  tTio 'POSR n c ~ I ( ~ r t  nnd wiint nf ncbivity on thc pnrt 
of thr &ccra.'-'fPlin 01i1~y diriaion tlint kirlis f o g o t h  in nnp 
tolcraislc ordcr is tlint of  gcnernl Snmficld, o€ &out trro thousand 
mcn.'-' Hc liad 1.io~cver disputcs 11 iih Emlcs, aud Lhe p~0ple 
cdcd for the latter t~ l e d  Uicm.' 
POLmCAXi STATE OF KING JOSEPEF. 
Frm tAs coec7acEllor qfefatc, Hariano L i s  Orpi jo ,  to  iFinng 
J o s ~ k ,  
'Madrid ,  22 Jxillet, 1810. 
' SI~K,-TR mmmia~;nire ropl  de Oordoi~e me mande, que le 
duc de Dnlmatie Iiii a fnit 61iw ofi~iclIemcnt de ne mrnettre 
anenne fiommr d'nrgrnt R ln cripitalr lora mCme que Ie ministre 
des financrs In dcmnndrrnit;. jiiaqir'i, ec iic Ira dipanscq do 
l.nmic dca r r ~ i m r n a  qii'an 1Cri. c t  drr *mp?oy~* dc In pro"n~c. 
&c., frrrrnt plrincmcnt, coiivrrts, ct  qnc lc dnc prmdrriit Ira 
mcanrca, convcnnblcs, dans le ea8 que ccfte d6kmination xie fut 
pns suivie.' 
f DL. 111. D D 
602 APPENDIX. 
Muddd, 3 A r / ~ t o  de 1810. 
'IR g6n13Eml Bcbastiani a fait vojr au cornmissrtiro royale h 
Grcnndc, nn ordrc dn duc dc Dnlmntic, qiii Itii cnjoint rlc In 
maniare la pliw exprehse, de lu mcltre Pn é h l  dlarrcsbtion si 
pour le k" doat lui ct le pr6fel: de Malriga iic meltenl nu pouvoir 
de Sebastiani yuatre millioris do &a.m. L'exorliitnnce do cctle 
EOmm?, pour une proviuce qui a d6jh payE son contingent, ct  le 
murl terme de huil joum (Icuign6 ~iuur le pnyernenl, rlontient B 
mire qiie cetb somme une fois Iivr6c on en dcmandcrn iinc plils 
forte. Selon toutcs les apparenccs et d'aprss les conversxtions 
plticnlihrer. ii s'agit dc rofitcr de I'absmee (lo roi pour rncttre 
cr Andnlouiies sur le m'c yied qno Ica provinecs <le Bisea~e, 
Bur~oñ, h. Jl so peut n6anmoina u'on ait voulu in ircr ccs 
craink# dans <les idéca toubj-fait &Arentes. s o i s d  en soit 
il scrait ~ccnndaleux de voir un commissaire qui rcpri'-ecnfe h 
. personne di1 roi ~rretd drins une de ses provinaes.' 
From fl.7m'amo J& OrpjjO t n  7cirn-q Jo~epJ,. 
' ,.M(zdrid, 7 Ao$t, 1810. 
'Monsieur $Aranea rn'ccrit en &te ilu 22 doiit dans une 
lettrc pP;rticdibre les pamlcs auivantes, en k a  soulipunt ponr 
mieux k m  I'attttention: ' I.e ~ r & c ? i r i  So~ilf e$t t& conte,it, mais 
il me jbra waye de ,son u1i1w'IB pmpoDour Ie b k :  il aim b roi et 
Za natim: ce pays Eui plait heae~cowp." 
Da'tto to  dn'tfo. 
' MaM, 13 AoW, 1810. 
'Parmi les Icthcs que m" orth la courricr rl"Anddousie 
tmia6 hier, j'cn remarque une %e Monsiew hranza &rito dans 
un ~tylc  &tudi& e t  quo jc soupvnne r ~ l i g c e  d'aceord avec le duc 
de Dalmatie. C'est un panbgyriquc R la lonruigc clc ce mm6chd 
dans leqnd ~ ~ ~ e i i r  d'ilrnnxa arte anu nora i'int,dli~cnce ~t le 
.&le dii diic do Dnlrnatie h s  l>o pnhc ndministrntka; in eongi- 
dcration qu'i7 donnc aux auto~ti:s Es qnolrw; son extfimc 
adrcrao h manier lcs esprita, ct i'liiiliilii6 i c  sea dihpositions mili- 
tnirca, h n s  un p q ~  couvert il'in~urfi.6~. -W. d'Ariiranze termine 
En formnnt lc vrcv quc le rnnrLw11nl nc soit nnmcmcnt  tmulild 
dan8 l'cxdcution de se8 plans, ct quo lo sort de i'hdalousie soit 
mis entiureiment; & sa discretion.' 
Ditb to  ditto. 
MfliZea, le 23 AOZ~, 1810. 
'Par ma coaespclance arec T'Andalousic j'ai appis; de 
Corclone: que M. An,plo o, requ les lettrcs qni l'appcllent R 
Marlrid, et qu'il se d i s p ~ e  h m i m e  le p n n d  convoi sorti de 
Sevillc Ee II. dii conrnnt. Dc Scville: qu'un coranire Franqais 
s'fknt empnr6 d'nn pyiirhot qui nllait de Fruii?: ib AIicnnte, on y 
avnit trouv6 entr'antrc~ dPpCclirs iinc lrttm dr Cnmlirnun~, pmd 
pnrtiann den hnclnis, ct  iIn rlr~ C n ~ l i l c s  dc ln reroTtition. 11 
~vnnnit  A ~ o n  mi, don Aiisrlmo Rotlrigiicz dn Rihns, intrndnnt 
u c  l'armic di1 ccnhr, qui s'dtait plnint H, lui dcs cxci:s quc com- 

qoivcnt ns dn mal qu'ila produigcnt cn falsnnt croii-c qnr: le 
scrviee 2 l'ernpcrcur. c t  se. int8ri.t~ ponront btrc en oontrndie 
t ion avec eeur; dc votrr: majcsto. 
' Si  le giCnErd l)ufreiir~ s'itait hornli A ne risn fiiirc paur 
hciliier niwn voyage, j'uurui moim do niotih da y11uiit.e contrti 
lui, inais il a ruturiu i'escorle de cuviiIeria que le gFnGral Tilly 
m'nvait dulirii-e. De loiites les münicrrs, sire, j e  fcriii tout  ee 
qui sera en mon p u ~ o i r  pour aecd8rcr mon voyagc, et rCponclre 
R la coufinnce avec lnquclle votre majestd a d+C me dk- 
tinfiiier. 
' LE XARQCIS ALME~AEA.' 
' Je  Ici dis de s'adresser a u r  ces deax pinte au ministro  de^ 
relations extfiriewes, il me r6pondit qu'nn désavémcnt gu'on 
eprourait nvec lui O t a i t  I'obli~ztion de lni donner :?, tout boiit de 
chnmp des notcs beritrs. qu'k Vittoria il l'nvait compromis en 
pfirntnnt A votrc mnjcst4 COCR notes comme oiriciclIrii, qiic Ir. hm 
vti?i?x. diic (co  sont RCR proprcg C X L ) ~ C S S ~ O ~ X I B )  dtonrdi~s~it  dans 
l'inatnnt, u'il n'cntcndait point, ou iia voidait point cntcndrc ce 
qu'oniui  j i s r i t ,  pt qu'ii dornznilait qupun lui dunuut pur LariL ce 
qiri n'fk~it pau n<ccssiirc d'ccriru. Je lui r6pbbis iou,jours qu'il 
ucvnii s':irlrcssw au due puisrlus c'blrriL le scul canal par lcqud 
il rlekait dirigcr sea dciaxrirlcs. quc jc ise mc ni6lais point de ces 
afaiirs, c t  que jc n'cn cntrctiendrais votre rna , j t s t  k moins que 
votre mnjesté na m'en parlnt la xemiEre, m i s  comme simple 
pa?iwlier ,'a Ymaiirai dn ~.inviol&litf de3 pramcsiea de vatw 
mrqr~i6 ct d. 8.. i d d ~ s  iiiimnics. L.iinilinsaidi:ur d n u i n  que dnns 
ln niatinEc du 'onr clu St. Ntipolcon, ct  Ics jours suivnnh, lo 
g b l i - d  ~ol l inra ,  Rorrlli, et lours d o t o o r s  nrniont par16 fort 
mnl dcs cxprcssions du votro mqjcstE eur sea prcmic1.s 
e t  qu'il ne douinil paa qu'ila n'en cusacnt Ecrit h l'aris; 
n'avuil pns pu se dispenser dr: btrarismeitre L sa 
mnis qu'il 1~3 av.aiL prhentees comme une, 
prcrnier discours tenn par votrc m?jcstU ct  une nuance nécessaire r adoucir la maurnis en*t qu'at-ait oduit ici I'&icle du F Imitcnr sur les mots (le l'rmpurcur au ue de I3crg. Jc k l i~i  
avnis pi+senté de cette manihe en sortant de l'trppartement de 
votrs rnajcstd, et je  hi montrai en mdme ternps nn xnpport vena 
ilr I R  Kmame dms legurl on d4p:pci~nit Ic C9diritx 6iAt de ce 
mynrimr: cn roie 5nx exds drs himdcs dc hrignnds ct eux 
dili~~idntions $os gouvorncmons militniros. Si I.ambmmdcur n 
Ecrit d m s  ccn termcs comme il mc I'a dit, autant par Eiomcur 
que par ir:iltnclien~cti. rh ~ o l r e  maje~l8, k son pays et  au nolre, il a 
bien rempli sea devom. lkuoiqu'il en aoil, j e  roe 8uis cm oMr 6 
dc donucr coiinaiasni,co i~ roim miijostf de ves faik ainsi que b 
b surphe que, sebn l'ambassadew, ¿a ~ 8 ~ 1 3 6  I'cmpereur et au 
mini&a h n p n i s  Ie ñilence du duc de Sante F6 qai nc s 'q l iqne  
siu rien. L'ambttssadeur se plaint d'a~oi r  6ké compromis par 
lui, car A nn drmnndo et  en nonwqurnce dea coiir~wntitrn~ 
fvEqnentcs qii'il ctit arce lui pcndnnt l c ~  troia joura qu'il pwaa h 
Madrid, il 6erivit h sa cour que l u  duo do Santa FE Etnit clinrge 
de n6gaeicr RUF ln situation dc vatro majcski. et celle de notre 
cadeur lui-memo disait ne ouvoir pas duwr. y., que l'ambns. 
"ost b la lottro ce que c'esG dil entre l'am assadeur et mol,' 
&a. &c. 
! 
OrpGo lo  J o q R .  
' MdTa'd, B 13 Novmáre, 1810. 
' Monaicnr Pcreyra ia r q u  di1 rnnr6clid Soolt une &ponse 
cdrtr8rnemcnt: a i p .  Ce .~ommisaairc 10 al crsiste dnna pon 
oyinion qiic Ics mosnrcs indiqiiics par lc &o dl" nnimntio p i i r  
l'approvisioiincrncnt dc l'arrnfio nc rcmpliront M 11c but qu'd se 
prupm" i a i o  lc mar6chd rent Btre obhi. 8 'un  antro r€itO la 
~ 4 n 4 n l  Behastimi I'a contrnint L lui donner onae cont mille xdaux. 
PIiir6 entre ces deur; bcueils, ITonsieur Perevra a pcrdu corirngo 
et demando ?L votre mnjcst8 de lc rappeller i kadrid. Le gCn6ral 
Dufonr a, plis le comrnandement dr Grenade. 
' h.Tnnrarro Lms nE Ongurso.' 
Ditto l o  ditto. 
"Tfadn'd, 11 9 Dccem8re, 1810. 
'Monsicur Ic comto dc Montnrco itait lc 11 courant. R Mm- 
aanmes, il mYcrit rluo les habittras dc In ATmclic so plaipcnt 
de ce qno les i,roups qui rabouvcnt dans Jn pror,inco no les 
protEgciit paa slutniit qiie leur uonilire le lcur permcl, que les 
brigwds vienneut leur enlever lmws grains pour les transporler 
dans les royames de Vdence et  de Murcie, ou dans I'Xstrema- 
doure. Ile craignent unc disette c t  disiren* ardernmcment qu'il 
se forme de p a n d s  d C p h  de grains claos des places E. l'nbri des 
inmions  des pnrtis d'insurg4s. TJrs commnndanb des troupea 
Pranpiscs sont d'une exi~cnee ct, d'iinc: Iinutciir insnpportnhlcs, 
c t  ICR rnpports fniB au corn1.r: dc Monontarco par tontcti Irs niitorit6s 
Idgdcs du paya confirmcnt complcttcment coux quo l'intcndant 
de le MmcIio no cosso do fikiru iiux dii<c~,fi mhshrcs  depuia 
pluaieura mois,' 
Xadrs'rk, lo 15 F&L~'W, 1811. 
' Sxnxt,-Le priifct de Santander mc rcmt.t, cn dzte du 16 Jan- 
Ger, copie dcs ofices qu'L1 a rcpis poiir ln r6imion dc cette pro- 
vino~ ni] goioiivcrn~rn~nt militaire dr Eiscny~. S'ni T'honneur de 
Ics mcttrr pous IPS yciix dc V O ~ P O  m n j ~ t l :  CII li~i oliarrvnnt r p e  
cctte mcsurr: a 4th pris Rar In prnpciriitinn rln gfiiErd Cnffnrrlli. 
'On a dcmandh au prfifct clc 8:mtnndcr rui 4tat des cmploybs 
civils et milihirea, des moiucs, du clcrg6, ct  des appoiiiti~mcns 
dont ils jouissent. n croít en conaéqiience que (les attriliutions 
ainsi que cellcs des ernplogfs s c m t  nulles di.8 quc la provinco 
sera gou~eni&e i I'instar de celle de Biscaye. 11 ajonte que lui 
et les clrefs pprineipaux do l'administration ~ o n t  GcidEs ii ne 
trtlvalIler que aons les orclre~ de votre mnjesi& et demandent 
avec instance que votre mrijsst8 ne les abandonne as. 
'Le 8011s-pr6fet de L o ~ o g n e  me di$ en dhte !u 2% Jnn*ier 
que l'opinion iuMiqne s'est nmdlior4e depuis qu'on z appris lss 
naiiaclles du koriuglil, et  qu'on g eonnnit lo peu H rnoycn. de 
defe'ense qu'offre Vxlence dana la ddwrdrr cxtrfime qui y r>ge .  
L n  Riofa ne renfermc pltis dc bandes e o r n ~ l e t t ~ a  d'intiurgk, ninia 
on y troute encorc quelgue~ bfignnds 6pnra e f  deti vaiwra dc 
graiids chemins. 
'HARTAFO Zrrs nE OEQ~IJO.' 
SECTION IL
(EELATINU TO JOSCPB'S ABDICATION.) 
EndicaZim @ th RBng. 
JR rntni~fre d d ~ & a h e  $&M a monsieicr b dacc rle Sawta Pi, et  m 
sos adsence b mm'w b rnargzk d'dllrnenara. 
Palais de. Nu&d, le 12 St-ptmbre, 1810, Pws. 
Excs~~acrr,-l;o coimicr de ccabiiiet, Don 1Xaxlin Eatcnoz, 
ni artit da Paris le PS Juillet, a remia 1 ~ s  Iettres 6crites par 8.9 ie mAme jow ct les oopics de cellos que vous enropiten Le 
19 Juin pnr le courricr bl~~nrcz, qni fiirent interceptécs. Le mi 
les a lues arec la plus grande atteniion, ct apriis s'ztre bien 
pénbb.4 des commnnications f,li tcs B T. E. an nom rle i'rmpcreur, 
nr monsieur le dnc de Gnclore, et  les otscr~ntions pxriiculi&rerr 
$e ce miiiistre, 5.X. dcsimnt dctrnire d'un soul t.rait, les cmintes 
et In. dcfiance ve: dea personncs, toiit ait moine mal instniitcs, 
%o sont cffurc6cs d'ins ircr, m'n ordonni: a'cntrm cn cxplicntion 
~ u r  tum loa puhts i u l  elles tmikni. Wria je dois nvnnt iout 
fiiro wnnlG~rt: h Y. E. $ue le roi s'est rnontrú adisfait de la jiiste 
iulcrpr6htion doiinie a scs idees, et L sea sscnlimcns dunv lu 
&polise quu P. E. u faite au duc de Cadore, rcl:itii.emtrit B la 
protectiori doni S. M. 1. desire que lc IriniIiinrce lirmcai8 jouíssu 
dan3 les Mgleincns des douaiics, cn offraub zitmsurcr uilo Savenr 
xéciproque dans ses Gtats axx productions d'Espngns. L'cmpereur 
i i e  pent i ~ u r c r  les mes liberales de son ñngiiste frhe, et si 
S. N. 1. II 6th exaetement infomEe sur c6 point, eUe sxniit que, 
dhs son avi.ncmcnt au trbne, le roi a 6cnrti. bien des olistnc2s 
oppos6s h l'induatric Frmqaisc qu'il s'apit de favoriser encoro par 
de nouvelles dispositions. 
11 est bien doiiloureux pour l e  mi d'arois b se jus6er do 
plusiezirs impntations nuxqiielles on a dfi croire pniaqil'on Ies a 
mmmitniqu6cs a Ir. E. Eune d'elles est que le roi a rendu k 
lcurs propBfínircs, ou dispos6 B aon gr;, d'une pnrlio des bicns 
coniipquCs pnr I'cmpcrcur. Ccla supposcrnit dc In pnrt dc S. M. 
un oubli dc Ia parole doniiCc ii l'cniprrcur dc ne ao m @ I c ~  cn
aucuno manibrc d o  ces coníiscatiom: inais c'eet un infamc impoa- 
ture, et son ankur rn6itc un clintiment cxcmplnirc. Qu'on cih 
m e  proprihb un pouce do tcrrain confisqr16 par l'cmporcur, er; 
dnnt on tlit ¿íiñpcisE: on na le p o m a  point si dans une pure 
qur~tion de fait on en impose ainsi B i'smpemiir, que sera ce 
lumqu'on ne parle que par conjectures et pr&omption? Le mi 
portc h un si Iiaiit dcgrb son re~pect  our lcs d6crrts de confisca- 
iions da S. M. 1. quii.qant bproin {un dea édiCeea qui y aont 
compris poiir y placcr des &tñ.blissem~ns publies. il n'a meme pm 
voulii deii servir provisoirernent. S. M. da-t-ellc pas, en consé- 
qnenco, Ir? droit de r;clarner, poitr Bon lionnenr, ln pnnition cle 
ara dctrnct~~1r.s P S. -M. T. s > h  txpliqiida qlir la dircetion donnce 
b gucrrc c t  la mnnibro dont cllc a Ctb faik. 
L'empereur ecrivit au rri pour lui roprisenter la lenteur des 
opcralions, et l'inliution des armdes. ,4ussitGt 8. M. entrcp~il a 
conquStae de I'Mxlousie.  Le duc de Cadoro a dit R ir. E. que 
la soumission rle celte provinca Btail: 1 1  lusoire, puisqu'elle se 
troni7c inond6o de pnrtis d'insurafs et de lianbs de Iirigands. Qu'on considme ln vaste 6teiiduc de l'rinrlalousie: Ic petit 
nombre de tronpes Franpaises que l'obstination de C d i z  e r d t  
$y repnndre: Iri piigea {Ic tonti? rsphoe qne tenrlcnt lea Rnciri. 
et Ieui-.s cnntinrirllcs athtqiiss: qu'nn parcoure I'hiatoire d s  toiiti:s 
1t.s p~crres cont.i.0 IXnnrteme et 1'0n Term qil'ind~pcndnmment 
des rin$ millc Espqnnls  wnritnmmcnt atatinnCa h St. lLoc il 
h i t ;  cncow nficwsi~irr: d'cntrctcnir sur cotte P ~ M  un nom 1 m 
wnsid6rahlc de troupcs pour les opyorier nux cntrepris~s partidlea 
de l'ennemi. Si netr prccautions Ctaient indiapenuabtes dms un 
b m s  dc calme ut de lrsn uillilS, qu'eEles doivcnl Etre lea etipij- 
rnnces c t  los moycns do <jAiigletorrc dnnl IF+t,-?trtion actuoils de 
1'EspFLgn~ c t  la nature de la guerre dont rlle est le tl16t~tre P Le 
mi peut dire nvec verith, que 1z couqptZte militaire et mora1e da 
I'AndaIousie est son ouvrage, e t  qiie Res panles, sa conduitz, et 
les s q e s  mmures qu'il a prises, ont p g m &  la trnnquillit6 dont 
elle j oiiit. S. M. j* II arganis6 gawFe4 eiviquea chnrg4es de 
dfifcndre 1enr.s forcr~ ,  et mnlge lo voisinqc de cette l i ro~ince  
arw YEatremnrltir*: et IPA insti~ntions continiiellra de ln. jnnts de 
Czdiz ct  dcs Anylnis, I'Anrlnloiisir renfcrmr: Iieaiirniipa moina 
d~ partis ou dc Iiaridra d'insiirgfs qur In C:~stille. la Bisca e. et  
1. h ararre, qui ant C t6 plnvés suus ia r6*n e rnilitairo. $&E 
l'on trowr; en dnhlousie une orpanisatiun completle de com- 
pa~mies do ruirfuclcllcs ui veiiienl L lu tmnquillil6  de^ villes et  
s la riireti. <Ira slit*rnins. %ura amives sost kiirinenl uaiel que 
le rnsr6clial d ~ i c  di: nalmatio a dome le plus do d6ve1.oppment 
po~sible oettc institution. 
Si I'iindalousie n'est pñs entierement pacifi&e, si l a  junte de 
C d i e  existe eneore, et ui IM dnglicia j- exeroent lcur fatale 
inflripnce, on doit I'tittriliiter cn p ~ ~ i d c  partie nux mnchinations 
et a i ~ x  trainas ourdir.9 p ~ r  la juntc et I'hnclcterre au moment o& 
pnmint it Iciir connniaanncr: Ir cli.crct dn 8 'I%rricr qiii fitnhlit cice 
gouvrrnmncnu rniiitairr.~. d n n ~  ln, Nn~nrre, In Risrrt~c~ l'~irrnynn, 
et ln Cntxlognc. Qiicl ncs gon~rrneiir.r Frnnqnis n rint trnit6 era 
'$ J pro~nccli commc si c lca 4taiont ahvolnrncnt dctnchdcs da Itb 
manarchic, lcs memhcs dc Is junte de Gndiz et les Anglrtis on 
profitercnt ponr soumcr de nouvoaa l e  fau de la discordo et 
rcfuter les expressions clu mi gui dpb tu i t  m n s  cesso, Quo la 
nation conserverait son in t6gi td  e l  nari i~rl6~enrlanoe: que sea 
iustitutions s'm6liorerüient sous la protcdion d'un t r h e  soutoiiu 
par les relutions intimes $u roi aTec l'emperciir; qu'elle n'aurait 
a coombattre que i'ariiiemi qui voulnit e'lwroger l'einpiro cxc~usif 
des mera.' Voila le senv qii'on a ~ ~ i j o u r s  Clonne en E ~ p n p e  aux 
mots jnd6 endance ct int6qrid. Cc langagc est ccliii doiit s'est 
s a m i  S. 1. non aoulcrncnk n ~ ~ o c  lo3 Rsi>qpoio, miis i In fnca 
de ~ ' U U ~ T C ~ S :  il no peut donc Qtre odicux ni rzirnincl dune la 
bonclic du roi. Mnis combion n'cst-il pas cibrncnti par L con- 
duitt! de eertaina gouvcriicurn qui parniwent x'olistiiior B pro- 
loiiger l'insurrection d'Espuge, ñ i'annihlcr m la dútixire pIut6t 
qn'd~ti. soilntcttre ? clr  ~ U U P  plusi~um eudroits 0n ne BC COnmnCB 
pas d'cxclure toute id6c 110 l'iiuloriG du rol cn faisnnt a r h i n i a t r )  
la Justice au n o n  (le l ' s rnpcrc~r~ mnis ce ui cst pirc, un exKn 
que tribunaux ciiils do Valladolid et %P vulcncir piitzssent 
w~r.mcnt (le fiildlit8 et d'oL4issnnce S. M. T. comme si ln, ni~tion 
Es ago lo  nhitruit pus de mi. 
Rivnsioar lo duo do Cndoro so plniot de l'indulyenco dont on 
en U un6 en Aud~luuai~; Y. M. U 111umr4 conkm *es euernis, dms 
IBR eharni)~ de T d n v w n  pt 01:aü.lia l uub Ia i-ermet8 du ciun mrm- 
t k e ;  main sernil-il juete, coiivieudraiGil ?a seA intii~lts et nux 
vurs de l'ernpereur, yire S. M. dcploj--Bf; de la rigucur ooutre des 
vninciis, des prisonnlcrri pui doivant atrc srs nijcls? Si le mar& 
&al piey e.ut suivi ce gbncrcux escmylt. dauins les riUco de Gdice 
o-ii i1 f u i  r e p  Ilirns oiiverts, et n'rrrt p:is an contrzirr! opprimé e t  
snccrrg6 cctte prurince, plle ~crni t  Eie~ireiise et ~orimi.se, et non 
lirr6c aux maux di! I'insuiarcdion cornmr: tlant: d'nirlrcs ?L qui I'on 
a fail tprouvcr lc mOmc sart. Ccttc condiiitc de S. 31. dnns dee 
j iap soumis est vraismblnlil~ment cc qiie Iri 3uc Cndorc rrppelre 
des grnccw wcord4es aax iuriurr6s de pr4f6reiieo nu\ personurs 
nllncli6es b, la calii;~ du roi. k u x  iiisurgda ii'oiit olrtuiiu iI;~ulraa 
graces que eeIles gui l eur  ffirent offertcs duni; ltza pi.oclainations 
pour dissiper l'cireur dms 1:rqiielle Irs bnghis les raraient iiiduits. 
Si le scqiicabc mis Riir Ics bicno itivendiis [le qiic~lquea liabitxitans 
ou d$ugiFs, a &t6 levi. potikrieurerncnt, rrt eitemplc rl'iuclulgence 
a en (Tlic~ircus ~C~~il t t t ts ,  ili~qti'il a nltirC iin gn~nd nombre da 
pc-cy<:sk h'oiiiiasnnco r t ~  roi: ct qiihon nr oroyr pna TIC m 9  
individm n'uicnt p i n t  subi lc cliatirncnt qni lcur dtnit dil pour lo 
retnril qu'ils ont niio R e  ~oumc the ,  car s7ls pusscdaicnt deu 
billels ruyaux, il les vnt perdues liour nu lm uvoir piis prEscnt4 k 
lcms au tinibro sec; e l  s'ils ~ o o l  parleurs d'xiilres tilres de 
crcances sur l'itat, i l s  doivrnl, pour Ics i,nlidcr, solliciler uu 
décret park~uiier. 
Les rrvantqes de 1% formation d ~ s  rorps EspnpoIs ~ o n t  2 la 
port&c de toiit lc moiide: lcur rbsencr ~b i1itln8 pltie qbon ne 
pcnse aurl.lienr~iire iiruo iio In gnhille d .0cnha  r t  de I'crpidition 
cl'Andnloiisie. En y ndmcttmrit un piarid noinlirr: d'oili~i~ra, o? 
r%st parvenn * 6loigner rlí: l'insurrrrtzun dca Iioiiimcs inlliiiots qiii 
!craicnt dcvcniis chcfe dc brigand~, ct tont en avoulint quo la 
~iéscrtion n au licu parmi loe ~oIduts, et qu'il en cst result6 quai- 
ques mam, on peut hnrriiment narmer que la gomme Je5 biens 
est infiniment ~lus granrlc, et qu'il n'g a pns dc moycns rp'oii nc 
doivr crnyilo~rr poitr fnirc revenir de Ren Cgnrcmcnt t inp  nntion 
de dome rnillions d'hmes qnT1 n'est pus fnrilc rl'ns~iijcttir par ln 
form des linyonnettcs, ct dwt w vcut d'aillcurs fairc unc nmic 
ct une nlliEc. 
On a parli! du mmnuvais ernyloi des ressourocs de l'Espqne, ct  
du d8nucnient dms lequel onl618 IaiasCcs lcs troupes Frniicaiaes, 
Les soldalu unl eu cti 1Sspino dcs vlr-rca cn diondmce: les 
LSpitaux Francrtis out ft6 lcs mieux pourvus, il a fuIlu pour cela 
evipr des contribiitions extraorilinaires e t  des emprunts forch, 
ct  vnincrc le granrl olistaclc dc l'intcrccptation des cornm~inica- 
tions de pro16nce province, et aour7cnt de vjllc b ville. 
L'lrs ngnc se trouve clivirrf cn gouwrncmens milikairea [le sorte 
guo J. N. ost h y c k i  rnniho do la eupitnlc ct  do nn bntiliouc: 
n'cst cc riint -poiut par une espEco dc niirnclc qu'cllc y fait sut- 
sisler dra iruupcs, e t  rlu'elle y aouticnt des Iibpitmx. Len 
gouv~rncurs 17riiriqzis iniposcilt, il c s l  vrai, des coriIributious 
exbnordiiiuircs sur lcurs provincca, mais ils les vcxcnl et les 
niinent, et certes cc n'rst p u  13 le moyen dc ICR mniiite~iir dan8 
IhobEissmee, ni un exen1pIe bien zttra~ant pour Ies provinces 
wiilcr6cs: cctto rcssriiircr cat d'riillrurs prcciiirc ct insiifianntc 
mmme le prouvem Liicntbt i'expfriencc. S. hf. sc flntte de ce 
qiir.  le^ intcntinn~ dr! I'emppreiir en fnvriir (1s lit natinn srrnicnt 
miriix rrmlilira r f  ñrs froilp~a mict~x rlirigfrs, ai toiilrs crl lr~ qiii 
#out en Espnpc 6taicnt sous sra ordrrs, ct ~i les propositions 
a fnitcs ?i, E O n  m p s t e  1Pi.r~ 6taicnt rrcceptdc~ Lc d i ~ c  d v  
Cadore 3 Cvaluú :L pIrisícurs mUions lcs confisr.alions dcs mar- 
cIiaiidiscs hrigl:iiscs, cl l'enlbverncrit do I'argculi\ric dcs enlisea ct 
dcs cou~cnts qu'ou aurait d i  faire e: Bndalousie. Lcs coiifisca- 
tions e w n t  lieu pnr ordrc dcs p$nerx~~x Prnnvais 2 leur entrCe 
dalia clinq~ic ville, et si lcur valcur Tut cx>qci.Ce, dan8 le principe, 
pour don~icr pIup d'fclnt nux cntrcprises militnirrs, on reconnut 
&a rp'on ~n vint L I'examen T'crreiir dans InqiieIFe on 6hCt 
tambil; et dnnri le fnit commrnt nr? p1s npyicqevoir qu'nprha In 
bntnillc! d'ocnñn I'ii~vnsinn rl'i\ndntoaaic dct-nnt ?trc prbvuc, 
rhlneiin nmit grnnd soin dc fnire rcilucr lcs marcliniidiscs confis- 
crihles BnT lca pointe ICR plus c~pzblcs  dc rcsistrince, xün de les 
rnetlre hora de 111 porl4e (tu viiiIiylicur. L'urgenZerie ri'6gliee a 
beazicoup d*rilipi.eilcti e l  Fort pcii dc vdcur. 011 a, pris darla les 
cou~~ents, oii 1 1  CII rrstait l rCs peu, ninsi r p e  dans Ics Eglkes toute 
ccile yii n ' ~ .  pns Mi. jug6c n6ccssnirc poiw la dcwnce clu cnlte, et 
c m r  le roi nc vniilait ni rniwg-cr ni dbtniirc, mas bicn pacificr 
et eonaerver, il a rlU rigler sn co~iduite sus cc priucipe. 
Mtinnicur le diic dc Cndorc pmlc dc dCpciiars, c'cst wsiment 
nnc f i ~ f  ti1it.c: qu'il soit si mnl iiirurm6 de faits g4n6rlilement connue. 
Lc trbaor pililic cst oiirrrt k qiiicoiiqnn vailrirn s'ns~;iiwr da la 
vérili.. On p vcmn quc S. M, a rrpi h pcini: chnqur: m n i ~  lc 
cirirluibme dc i'sssijin~r~ion de la ligtc cirjlo: qu'il a d.i~ sc reduire 
5 la  pliis stricl Ccoriurriic, sl que non ~ e u l ~ m v i i l  iI s ' r ~ t  vu hub 
de pouvoir doiiner aux lrcteura una I6pCre avance, dans l'oLlig8- 
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tion de supprirner )8 th6Atre Itdien qui Ctnit Eion uniqne délasse. 
ment, m i s  encore ds renrlre sa ~aiunello plalte, e t  (le se d4fUire 
des ehoacs lea plus nkcessnires b l'orriemrnl du Be cour. hiisni 
duna le rbpas que 8. M. doma, L l'occasion de la %te de l'ernpe- 
reur, b ses mirustres, aux grands oficiera de la eouronnc, et B 
l'ambaefiadeur de I;'rance, la tilble fut cllc scr~ie  n fqence sem- 
blatilo wlle qu'avait S. M. au camp de Boulogne. Gcrtaine- 
mcnt Yemliamas et  l:a confirsion ue cette excessive simplicitd 
causait nn roi nhura paa érhnpp6 k 4 'nmliassndeur. b u  milieii de 
tant de pivations, et dans une ~ituation aus~i contraire ii se 
dignit6 S. M. a ln, doalcur dc roir quc scs minictrca, Ir conscil 
d'itat, Ics tribnnnnx do la cnpitalc, ct  lcs mployis civih, qui 
sont en petit nombra, no porqoironb pas lcnr traitcmcnt dcpiiis 
plus da sept moia. Co ~ o n t  I:b les fhwtirs ?u? S. M. a dispcnsb 
avec tant de rodiplité. Lo roi rn daiinc, 11 oat vraí, quPlquas 
d c l d e ~  am ogicrs do ssmrison, ct k qurlquca individus d t ~ r h h  
h 8 8  personne, pour les aidcr i a c h t e r  des bien3 riationaux: on 
donne R ces bicnfaits le nom cle prodiplitf, et #un autre cate 
l'on se glaint de l'ahandon dnns Iequel 6. M. laiase d"autres indi- 
vidus, ce qui eerait incompatible avee la f n p n  de penSeF d11 roi 
et la conn&ñanccs dc RCS demira comrnc homme et comme 
monnrquc. C'cst I'nniqur: chose dont Ic roi piiiasa di~poser dnns 
l a  situniion 0% il nao t,rouvr rt outre le biit poliiiqiio dc cm dorin- 
tionn. S. Tif. n cm qne c'btrtit Ic t i c ~ d  mmoycn ~'IPC~RUTCP jli CCR 
individ~is iinc mbdimrc cxisknce, ct rnroi-r: sn pdroynncc iL cct 
C p r d  a-t-cilo 6tF tromp6e, car Ies mvenucs dcs terres el des 
Liíins qui-su* tmuvenl h u s  les personnes aorimiues nu gouverne- 
rricnt ruilitaii.e dont les limilea s'hlentlcnt jusqu'itux poibtes de 
Madrid, oL ne se payent pas, tanl es l  rrmide la. niishre de9 
firmiers, oU los hiena ne s*rff~rmcnt pas ke wrintc d'irtorsions 
, de la pnrt des gowenieurs, oii, enfin, Ic-s revenils se tronvmt 
alisnrhrs RF les contrib~itions cxitaordinairca. Les faits soiit 
caideni, irs pnrlent d'eor-mdmea, e t  touto parsonne imparenlo 
pent cn fnlre l'cxamen. 
Maia i1 faut ii'rllo aoit dc rn&lIeure fni quc ccllo qui a VQIIIU 
mi utrr h S. $ l'hifnotion des bicn~ eonfiaquca pnr I'emporcuia, 
et qicfs aunpiiili on "ent dr ré pondro. S. M. poiirrnit, h 
l i i ~ n  plus justo titru, BO plaintlro do IQ conduita des govverneum 
Fraugaia : de cellu du gdnbral Dufour, par exeemple, qui n oxi$ 
des dir mmbres dont í1 c.omposa, :l sa rn:tuii.re co conseil de 
Ravnrre qu'on s'est vu IiienGt obligk de disaeudre, qu'ili r8di- 
geasrcnt une adressc h l'ernpereur dan8 kqucllo ils demnndaient 
ii Y. N. 1. un c d e  dcs I o ~ R ,  et se mctlaicnt hsa  discr6tion. sois 
de ccs rncrnbres r6fuabrcot dc signcr, lea ñntrcs cirlbrent ?t la 
violencr.. S. M. poirrrait citer encore nne fmle d'mtes qui ont 
exnsplré PCR cspmtr9, fourni d e s  armes b i'insume~ion, et donnd 
aux Anglai~ drs prbtextcs pour siipporier d c ~  prnjeta qui n'exis- 
t r n t  pas. c t  rendrc In, pcrrc intcrminnblc. Qii'on mmpta lo 
nombrc d ~ s  handes de briaands c t  d'insurg6s cn Espwc, ct  Ibn 
v m  cambien í1 s'csk nccm d c p i s  l'inshtution des ~ O U T P ~ C =  
rnena rnltaireti. S. Jd. rie pcut ello se pluindw arce nutmt de 

rcpouasmit, ct  qui ne pourrrait avoir d'aiiieurs u'une ex~wnlion 
irssngEio; car c o m o  le mil tris bicii ~onn icuryo  duc do Codore, 
les notions Iiumiiibea diwimulent lear haine en attendaril le 
momcnt favorable de venncr leurs outrages. Une semlilable 
contluite acrait inconp~tible w e c  le facon de penser du mi, avec 
aon noMe camcthc et celui de la mtion que S. M. golaveme. 
Elle est: rlinmétrdemcnt en opposition avec les nssiimncea don- 
nirs liar S. M. T. B IR nation Ti]spngnolr: 'qu'il 6tait nkrea~aire 
ponr son honlirnr qu'rllc rtr: ri:$nfrnt wus sa dpast,iio c t  uoris lt? 
prince qu'cllc lui donnnit 6 rn l  cn tout k son nu ustc pcrsonne.' 
A oelte ooorsion lo duu do badurt. parlo du pru $'rvrotagos que 
rapporte la Franco la guerre ~Wspegna en proporticiii dcs sacri- 
rices imnicnsee qu'elle ii hits. Cerlw le mi ue les ignore pus, e t  
sa rcconnaissanro 6clntei.a cjuand S. M. se tronvera cri Mlat de Ice 
recom enser. D a  ce momcnt cela lui est impossillc; maw 
S. AL.! pourrait mettre le comble h ses bons offices en r*ofi+;mt 
poiir pmnt do i'rmprunt ouycrt en Bollande sons Ies m h c s  
conditions rluc cclui de PPIISPC, on dn rnoins cn lui donnnnt son 
n ~ ~ r n t i m c n t  eornme h ccliii d'Aiitrklic. S. M, 1. sc convnincrn 
fnc~ilrrncilt quc ICR liens du pnnn, Ics riliitions lca plus intinlc~ 
ct Ica plus sUres d'unc 6troitc amiti6 cntm Ice dciix nations, ct 
cnfin la posiiion m&mc de ces annfie~ seront lcs mcillcurs garant~ 
de I'exactitudc des rernboursemetib qudquea ~-ncr&cea qu'118 
exigent. 
Qunnt anx avmtntages futm que promettant les sacrificcs actuds 
de la Frmcc, cc scmt faire injure anx luIllj$re~ du duc de Cadore 
qnr cle la fatihmer cii les lui clcvcloppant. Lorsquc S. M. 1. crut 
n6ccssaire I'CtuMissemcnt en Espagne de sntfynauiie, i'espbrienm 
I~ii nvnit d6montaI. qiip ai iwei ia i i t  drbs trouliles 3 m s  lo nnd, i l  na 
yonrnit +jnmnis mmptcr s m e  cc r*linngcmcnt, sur la sdrct4 d'unc 
clc plus importmt~s frontibrcs do son cmpiro. Ln sibclc d'amitib 
presque non intcrrompue depuia le rrgno en Espnpc ct en 
Prluirci dc b rnaísou dc D~urboii, le paclc! clu famille e l  ln tournm 
diíiiircnte que prircnt les rclalioris enlrc le8 di~ux p n p  ayrh I'ex- 
c:ueion de la ~naison cl'butriclic, aont les Grnoign 
suilientiques do lbutilitO des eliorts et des sacRhc,~~!a?~?," 
pendant six nn., au commeneemcnt dn sihele dernier. La 
rdsiskince opiniAtrc de pregquc toute 1'Ei~rope ct ~wiout eclle de 
I'~'ln$rtcnr, qii'cllc rcnoii~ellr: dnna cettr: pcrrii nwr un plna 
p n n d  dcv~lqliilmrnt de movcns dlrnonfrcnt 15mportnnm de cet 
Cvlncrncnt priiir ln Iirnncc. mirf11~11:irr.9 hrivnins politiqnes ont 
jndiqu6 nvec In plus grnndc cliirt4 Ira nrnntngca qlii cn ont rcsultE 
pour le commcrcc Frm nis et Ics riclicsscs qu'il a promir4cs b le 
nution. Q~iiiu ne duih dlo as uttondro nujoiird'iiui de Iii riunion 
<les dcux cuuromes daus E niime iiirnillo. de l'il~11~10gic de 1~~1118 
rvdes poliliqucr c t  de lriira inslilulioii~, drs qiidit6s d'un roi tiuge 
el eulairC qiii nimo tcndrrmcnt son aukw~tc JFCPC ci ln IJrmice, ct  
clni cst. pbiCtrí: de la n6ccssiti. d'abntirc l'orgueil de 1'Angletcrre? 
n'est ce pns Ic plus grai~rl fiwit qu'clle ptiisse rctirer (le cette 
rrsoliition et clc trls r4siiltnts ne vdcnt ils pas les sacrifieeri 
J-omcritnn6cs qn'cllc s'impoac? 

tolrrnhlr pcndnnf; la guc.rre: il ~ n i t  rnienx qno penonnc ca qu'ii 
doit fniro p u r  ccln. 
U faut un chnn~~rnnnt  rnmqud dnns tont, nvunccr ou rcculcr, 
VOUA connoisscz I'itnt netucl; j'iznorc commcnt ja pourrai gapncr 
le moia nf cesszirs ponr wnnoPtro la dchrrmiaatian do I'oinparcur. 
following aMimtion, hy J ~ h ,  m s  dmwn up hut never 
pul> 1c.) 
L'q4rienm dc tmi~  nnnc'c-4 nons n p n t  cnnvainmi qnel'ordre 
mocid ne peat &tm rorompoa6 en Esp~pe  q~i'en mmrrlnnt dnna 
l r ~  mhrnca mnins lea h i t 8  do soiivcrointi dont naiia RommcR 
invwtda, ct  ICR rnnycnfl dr: forre ct  dc pui~snncc rnilitnirc dont 
dispn~o notrc niiwstc fdrc l'cmpercar &c Frnnpia,  dc qui noue 
tciions lru droits quc noue exrrqons nujoiird'liiri sur In monarchio 
Espngnole, noiis avons rdaolu do notrc plcino at  libre volont4 do 
ri.troci.dor B notro fri:rc i'empercur dct; Franqais lcs droits qu'il 
nciiis a rcmis et en vcrtu des quels now sommea enir6 dans ce 
royaume en 1808 ?I la tiuilc rlc lu conslitulion que nous avonii 
si&e a Bayonno dan# la m h s  mnh. 
C'eal poiwquoi par lea prcsenia aignEes do notre main nms 
declarona ceder, trannporter, et rrmrttre notre dit frbro ]km- 
pmur des fianpia, tous les droits di1 nous tra:~~.ismls en 1848 
sur la rnonarohie d.Rrpape et  dea 1n&s c i m a  tmt ieui inteprité 
et  tels qu'il les re@ lui-meme du roi Clwles Quatre. 
Kons entendona que la prbsente r6trocession n'ait de force e t  
vñlcur que l'époque oii nons aurons plpiire et ent.ii.re connoia- 
smce de Ynccepti~tion de 1% pdsente rfihocepsion de la part de 
notrr: frbrc i'cmpcreiu~ dca Frtinpis: ct commc nona no soinmcs 
ortEs iL cet nctc par aucunc conai(1driltion pnrticuli&rc, mnis pnr 
runiqua consid4ratian quo nous arons orprirnlc plua hiut. et 
qu'cn qaittant le tdne BEirp~no noue n'wons on mio que Jc 
plus grmd bicn du peuple E ~ ~ i a ~ n o l  que nom nc pourmris pas 
rcndre aussi liewem que noiis vondrions, ct quo nous n'auona 
d'antre smliilion giie cclle de reutrer dane la vio privdc c t  dans 
la retraitc Ia plna absoJuc. Noas nous abandonnons cntikrement 
h lajustice de natre f&re l'ernpereus des Franqais pour le sart 
des personnes qui nous sont atkh6ca au scntimcns de la gloire 
qui gmantit ses efforts pour le badwur de 1'Ispagne et k ses 
arntirnens pnternels pour nos enfans, p o ~ u  la rcinc, nohe [youse, 
et ponr nons. 
Pi o~is  noiis engagemns b fnire revit,ir de tontes lea formrs qui 
pniirroicnt pnmit rr. plus xiitlirntiqueri le pri'scnt nctc dcrit, rldigr', 
ct signE do notm pro rc muin. h p n t  j u ~ 6  que lc plus p i i d  
soorrt i h i t  i n l r  onanllo iiisqa'h co qoo nous ayons eonnois~aneo 
do l'noccptntion l e  S. M. ~cmporciir dcs Fran~nis, roi d.Ihiii.. 
Yart b AZiulrid, etc. olc. 
Pu&, 1811. 
Dcpnis la convererition qw ,j'~i eu aavec  mis sur mn position. 
ellc nc s'pst pñs nrnClini-6c cllr rst telle niijniird'h~ii qnc jc  mo 
voir forc8 d'embrmser b ncul pratique qui rno resta ii, prendrc, 
celni de la x 6 h i t p  la pliis alisohe en France. Se aerois dbj'a p d  
s i  j s  no venois d'btre instruit que S. 31, l'empcreur qui a ~il que 
j's%-ois dannC ordre rl'acb~ter ou de loucr . r e  terre a cent lieuea 
de Paris7 avoit disapyroucé cette demarche, et  qu'd trnnvait ilus 
oonrinable, si je penistois daos ms resolntion, que je me rendigse 
iL ma teme de hhrfontaine n1iri.s POUB avok prGveiln de ma dé- 
termination, et avoir a s a d  ici l'ordre pnliliqite n 6 s  mon d4part. 
Je dkai en pmtant cine j e  vais rnlenteniire nvco vc~npercur paiir 
les aff,~irrs d ' R . q i , ~ i i ~ ,  e t jc frroi~ les rnEmcs dispnsitiana pnr 
rnppnrt atix provinrca iii mtourcnt illadrid qiie ji: t i c  Inrsqu'il y 
a un nn j~ parti3 pom?'crprdition d.Andnlouaio ; mt Otat dura 
R ~ T  moia fin118 nul d6sord~c, et j e  ne doutc pas que Ies choccs 
n'aillcnt dc 1% mamo mmiErc ct no donncnt le temti k l'cmpcreiir 
do rcnrlrc lcs dispositions dktinitives. E m i 8  prOt ii mndre l'eiii craur les droits qdii me r6rnit.L 
hyoiino sur La moiiarolue dYErpqne et des Iides s i  ma 
tion i o i  ni changa p r a ;  yaroeque i e  dois moiro yur cTast le 8::: 
dr l1emPereur puisqu'il es: irnpossible qu'il ~mrillc queje reetc roi 
d%spngnc. e t  qii'il mS8te toas les moyens d'existence. 11 en peut 
8 1 .  rnnIIicureux que Yempereur ait voulu me reconnoitre roi de 
JSa;plcs, il y a siK a n u  lox~ u';$ la tGte de scs troupcs j o  íis In con- 
qncte <le er myaiirne; M. ?ut utrnai~e moi, et mes insianora pour 
r~stcr aii comm:tntlernent de son a r d e  wec la  simple qiinlit6 dc 
son lieutenant furent le sujet d'me iettre dont j c  me ritppdle 
trh-bien. 
hrsqu'cn 1868 je  fus qrodam6 roi d'Eapngnc, jc I'ignorois 
encorc; ccpcndnnt arrir6 n Uayonno j o  fis tout cc qna voiilns 
l'empcreu~, j c  sipormis une canstitittion, j o  lo sinmi appnpCo par 
sa g~rantie. Lcs 6v6ncmens n'nyant pus r$wldu 3 nus CBPC- 
runms eat ce ma fade P Est celxi qui en e ~ l  lu plus victim yiii 
doil en p~rtcr  Itl pcina P Cepcnriant tanl que ln gucm duE je 
me FUIS soumis X tanl ce quc l'on a voulu, mnis jo ne puis lins 
l'im~msilile; j o  ne puia pan reatcr ici plus longtems si i'einporcur 
ne vient D 113011 BCCO~~PS.  En orrlonnant qn'il soit verse dana rnon 
trésor U Madrid un miIlion de fr~ncs par mois, les autrcs 
riooes doiurnt conhibiior nur besoin, de In mpitnle. 
trwips Pranqoi~cs qni sont rlans lea proFincea clii c ~ n t r e  (elles 
snnt pcu nombrenscs) doivent btrc soIddes pnr Ic trt:sor do 
hiince.  
A ln ncifieation g6nEmlc l'crn~cren~ Wgm des indcmnitée ; 
~ 'cn tcn~rcr  8 1 0 ~ 9  il 08~6d0 do fiit pres no toutns los groinoes 
su,jourd'hui, iI ~ o r > i  {ion la rnzlLrc du ncyes firmcr pt;, rn,m,re 
qu'd croira que 1'Espwe aura salisfait arix oliligatiuns qu'il liii 
aura imposúes. 3311 r6sume ;e auia prkl 2 fairs b u-olont¿. de 
l'crnpmeur pourvu queje la connoisee. 
lC. Veut-d que je  reste mi d'Espzqme, je reste des qn'il m'en 
dome la porsibilitd, e t  j e  sripporte tous 1 ~ s  courcrnemens 
militairea qii'il n. Ctablis puisqn'il les croit indispensables pcarlant 
la mwrrc; , 
ZO. 3'wfcremit-il qnú 'c rcnt,mse dnns la sein dc rna fnmillo R- 
n f ~ d ~ n h i n ~  rl'atiord e t  i'lr~vm dans Jc mi(h. Je unig prcV k pmbtir 
&S que je oomollrai se wlont4. SlrtJoute de plus que le pwti de 
la retrrsile nic conviendra Iiaaucoup plus que l'autrc dEa ue je 9 sanrui qii'il lui convien t. Jc mis sur alors qu'il aura que qucu 
hontCs p o y  lea Frsn~uis qui se sont atfarh6s ff mon aorg ct que 
j e  ne scrm pm 5 mCmc dc rendre aussi Iicureur qu'ils Ie ncritent. 
Qmnt B moj, It la rcine, e t  b mcs erifans, l'empereur me fñiaant 
payer mon trnitcment de princc Franqnia, nous en aurons nsser, 
mon intention d t m t  de Vim dans In, retraik en mbecupnnt de 
I'rdiirntion des mps cnfmn, Inissnnt ii Yempcreiit. le soin (le Icrir 
fB1dissemena; car j c  nc doutc pns si ee pmjct ao vcrifie quc j c  ne 
rctroiivc lc cmur dc mon frbrc, ct  qnc dunalca intcrv~llcs oh iI BE 
rnppc:Ilrrn qu'il cst liommo, il nc trouvo cneoro quclguc consolntion 
en retroiivant rnan cmur pour lui aussi jcuno qu'il a trento 
.m. Enfin j u m e  m i c u ~ ~ i v r c  si~jcct du l'ninpcraur en Lance qiie 
de rester en Espagne roi nornin~l, parceqiic j e  serni bon sujet en 
France, e t  mnuvais roi enEspape, et quc je  veus reehr digne de 
I'cmperenr, de la Prmcc, et  de moi-&me. 
' Frnhini.7ih-t~~ +iKo?:crn&ep. 4,1810. 
' n i s  government ia vcry uncasy aliout the nilitwy operationa 
in Portucal, from irhcnce tliey ~ece jve  no ncconnt$ exwpt tlmugh 
Engtanrl, describcd therdore factitiously and with thc strongecit 
hopcs of rcsisting tht! Fwnch forces tlixt opposc tlleir mnv. 'l'hia 
prohlem nill prohnlily !ir: di-cnrly ~otvcd i ~ n d  its conc1iifi;on will 
dccidr: what i~ intcrcfitlng to Ppnin. It is thmforc vcrV impor- 
tant  thnt our govcmcnt  should mitc xll jt Icnom, nnd wlinf; 
ñ111 p m ~ o  that i t tnkcs p w t  in irhrat belongs to hoth oouritrics. 
bscauso hcro I am oftcn nslcccl whni is snld in Mndrid on t l i i a  
sul<cct, zrid licoplc nrc ~iirpriscd lhnt wc liniit ourselves eulircIy 
t o  I)IC urgeni poinls of our iiogolidian. Tliis expl;iiiix b o  liraoii 
of affection wliich the prince r g a l  of Sm-eden dcsired thxt fic 
king slionld gfve to tlie emprror, bcinn convinced thnt tlie 
Iettera of liia majesty, antten in bis own familias style slicn he 
explaks hh sentimcnts, produce a pezt. aemation with Bie 
cmperor.' 
Park, 28 dantk-, LRf f .  
GI*IE,-S~~ l'houneur dc privenir volre majjeztg que l'cmperour 
p- sa dócísian du d l  Janiricr a GxC les trilitemeiis extraordi- 
mires qui liourirint Q l i e  p:iybs en Espsgnt! b dale du 1" de 
I'annCe 1811. d~ns l'arrondirseinent dcs arm6es du midi, &A 
nord, de I'Amgon, &o. Cea traitemens aont d6hrminPs aim 
qu'il s u t t -  
Sauoip. : 
Fr. par molir. 
LB gfinEmnx g011vernenm dana les qaatre gonvemernena 
enmpriws dnns l'arrondiasemcnt de Varm6c du noril . . 4000 
Lr: gEn6rnl chef de l'6tat major gEnEd do l'arm6o . . .  3000 
GEn6ranx do division. . . . . . . . . . . . .  1800 
Gbnéraus do brigndo, impcctours aux revuaa et commis- 
. . . . . . . . . . . .  miras ordonnatciirs 1200 
Adjiidms cominaudms, mlonels, et ~ons-irrspecteurs aux 
rcvuea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5'50 
Oficiera de srsntd principaux . . . . . . . . . .  500 
Chck {le riatxillms, d'escadmns, commissaires de guerre. 
ct  chef8 d'administrrttion des diffgrens servims . . .  &O 
Commaiidana de lace occiipant dnns . . .  400 
l'ann6ióo u grafic infórieiir 6i ceux 
ei-dessus rlbsignCeu, snvoir . . . .  aous-licuts. $ . 300 
An rnoFcn dc cca indcmnitEs il no acra rien al10116 an-deuaus 
dea sommcs fixEa ni pour dCpcnsc~ do burcaux ou do tnblc, ni 
POUF fr& oxtrnordinnircs, qucilqne naturo qu'ils ~oicnt c t  soua 
quelguo pr6lexte qua ce puisso Btre, et cette d6cision n'a aumn 
e r e t  rétroaclif, J'ceris B UM. les martchliu~ e t  g6nérnuic 
uommandanl en Espapa, pour lem fahe cannoilre qglie, d'aprbs 
les inlclilions de i'em[iereur, tout mililaire Fra~icaia qtii 2 l'avenir 
auraib cxiq6 ou rcqu d a  trnitcrnena extraordina.ircs plw forta y ecnr firés par 1s décision do 21 Januier, e t  ui asen aerait 
a ~ t  paper SGnB une ordomanes r$uliorc des iaten%ana gEnOraux 
on eornmissnires ordonnaburs, sera snspendu de aes fonctions c t  
qu'il cn scrn rendu compte dnns le vingkqnatre liciircs poirr 
prenrlrc Ira orrlrcs do l'empereirr. Patrc rnnjcst4 jiigcra sana 
doutc convennhlr: de donnar ~ i c s  ordres nu g h n 6 d  Bcllinrd pour 
uc ccttc di8 oriition soit suivio dnns l'mondiaaemcnt dc l'armbo 
u t .  !o pie  otro mnjcid d'sgrdor i'hornmage de mon 
reapoct. 
P a ~ b ,  14 FmKerS 1811. 
SIEX,-L'empercur ne m's encore don& aucun ordre rclatif B 
l'abjet ds 1s lcttre a poe4e par trotra aide-de-camp le colonel 
Clcirnont Tonncre. e n  pen.ro quo  Ynlenoe nn so aoiimetbn que 
par l'approelia ditnc arin6c, e t  a~rba In riso de Tnrrwone la 
mrpa dii p6nirni S~irltet sera dir onih1o.-&S afiiirca pnroiasont 
s'nrn&iiorer cn Portu$, le ano B~rt i i c  P<L dtablir Yordro dan. Ic 
nord do YXspnpo. J'envoyo man aidc-de-cnmp le ~oIoncl Ic 
deune voir l'6tat des clioaes h Or6nd8, Mnlaga, Cadiz e t  Udajoz. 
Je prie votre ~nnjestd d'aroir des liontEa pour lui. Ii'einpereur 
est en lionno aaeté, l'imperatrice est LienlGt S tome, ct  nous 
esperons un roi des Xomaingi. L'emperenr affcrmit cle plus en 
p!ua le grand empim. Trotro majcstó lo  sewnde, maísnous a pr6- 
clms BCS poinor et les primtions. Uns nonveUe armk de %our- 
c~nt-milles hommes se forme dans le nord de la, Fiance, et  
l'empereur est ea position d'w jmposer A qui tenbroit de con- 
trarier ses grandes mneepiiona; tout ese bien et va bien. en Frmce. 
VOL. III. S E  
418 APPENDIX. 
Srnx,-J'nl en l'honneur de mander votre majestc, que l'empe- 
renr a~oit  don& de6 wdres pour qdil lui fut cnwy6 eltaque 
mois cent millo francp, e t  je lui ai fmt wnoaitro cambien il éioit 
importñnt que les troapea rlestinBea pour I'hnddusie y ariivm- 
aent sans retard. 
L'emaereiw Dense ou'il umit ntile de chercher it tirer mrti de 
bons ~ i ~ n ~ n o l i  p iir'r&unir de vrais corten iii ponrroieht avoir 
dc i'influcnec iur lea raprits: i'intdqrit0 do ~ ' l ! f i ~ ~ n c  prut encoro 
Phc mnintcnuc s i  ~ C B  cortez opmicnt uno rEaction dans l'opinion: 
le Peroou el lo Mcxiquo ao sont d4jh declaris inílcpendmt, et 
toutcg les autres colonies vont Eclinliper B i'Xspwne: les m i s  
Enpaqnols doivent savoir cambien les h g l a i s  les inullraitent, O n  
ro i t  par lcs gmettes An$aiñes que les cortez rassemhl6s dans 
I'lle de Leon ne furent qii'une miserable canitillc et des gens 
obscum, qui n'ont nutre projat qiie d'nllcr vt:$kr dnns lee 
bverne~  dc Londres ; il ne pcut y avoir rien faire awc de pareils 
bommes. Sa majest4 irniirre qu'il y auroit un p ~ n d  avnntnge B 
former dm corti.~ tirer do toi iks IRA provinrea de l ' R ~ a g n o  
ncm~pées p r  les nrmf es Frnnqnises. Une discrrssion f elnirrk q ~ i i  
s'(.tnlilimil: anroit beniicoiip d'iuiluenm Rur lea cspritbi. L'cm i e  
rcur cnt abli:E d'nb~ndanncr lc projst qu'il nvoir do s'ontoner. 
w e o  16s C O T ~ C Z  de I'ljc de h o n ,  P I I ~ B ~ I E B  ce n'cst qii'un composE 
de genu sans aviven: co rie geroit dunc qu'avec des cortex i'orrnE 
d l ~ o m m e s  iirEs de touks les pilriíce de I'.Espagmc qu'on pourruit 
&claírcr I'opinion des Espngnola qui aiment leur 
L'zmbasrrdcar de I'empercur a trrnsmir dcs m v o h  
mxjor-général. 'I'otre mzjeet4 commande l'armcc du centre. 
Par conséquent 1aliiCi.archie rnilituire ne peut gas pcmettre qu'jl 
~ ' 6 ~ a r t a  dc SPR devoir~. Si .je corrrarond soiivent wcc lo $ni !d  
Belliard, a'cst que votre mftlcstd m t  nn Enbrrd roi, et  que je  doi~  
iui h i t m  des diiails qnhn mnjor-géniri lui ~oiimot. 
Aucun vil1age d'E~pagne n':~ &tú rhn i  la Frunce, c t  i'empe- 
rc111" tiont h ce quo ~ o t r c  majibstó ait cn Espqno totiix la cwsi- 
deration qui loi est dne. Toul drpeiid ciicore Ju parti qu'on peut 
tirer de la nation. Ce gu'jl y a, de cerlaiu, c'cst gne Ics bnglais 
n'ont gu'un Iiut; celui de ruiner la, peninsnle, dc la dhtruire, 
~rcequ'ih acntent $en r ' c i l e  doit h i r  p r  appartmY b la 
jranee, ou L un nce c la maison de I'rmpcrcnr, ct qn'ils 
bouvent un gaoknrantnge L diriser no p n p  qu'il Rayeni na 
~ O U F O ~ P  gn~der. 
J e  prdscnte it votrr: majedd I'hommragc nvco mon rcspcct, 
Lc prince Ycufchatcl, mujor-ghfral, 
ALXXANDRE. 
Paria, ce 6 Mai, 1811. 
S~ns,-J'ai montrd k Pempereur la letlre de votre mnjesit:, en 
date du 21 Avril prtr lagnells elle fait connoitre qu'elle se mct en 
rouke pour Paris: l'empereur ne s'attendoit pas B cette resoliitioa; 
votre majesté liii nyant promia de ne pas quitter 1'Eqagne sana 
8tm convenu B l'avance dea mesarerr ii, prendre et qu'exige m e  
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convennblc nu bien dn servicc, A l'am6o du aord de l'Ecip$ln~, 
l'empcrcur a besoin d'un mardcha1 ui soit cliargb du mmmandc- 
ment Uis lroupes slationfca d m q e s  pmvinoa~ formant. t'amn- 
dissemeiit de celto a r d e .  Le mar4clial duc d'Islrie exertw 
maiulimant cw coinmandemenl; clans le ras, sire, oii cv marbcl~d 
ne conviendroit pas ii V. M. l'cmpcrciir ae wrait paa doi~nt! de 
le wrnplwer par le man5clial Jourdun, si cettc disposition Ctoit 
agrhble k voti'e rnajeetk et 5 ce marCchd. Mais l'empereiir ne 
juge paa qu'nn puiqsr rien clianger k l'orgtinicaiion de l'ñrmCi~ dii 
norcl; i r  est csacntirl qirc cct.tc orgnniantian r c s t ~  tsllc qu'cllc 
cst, a i  cc n'cst dc: mctbrc rct,t.ta nrrnJr ROUR IPA ordrc~ d'tin 
mnrlfchd Frnnpia qui possEdo d'arantngc la confiancr de votse 
maj cstrS. Dona lcs g-ouvcrncmrna qui formcnt l'nrrondissemcnt 
dc celta ormbc, c'cst un nom do votrc rnajcstd, ~ i r c ,  qnc In juaticc 
dojt se rendre; le comrnandant doit enruyer des rupipport~ jour- 
ndie1-s is Ir\'. M., l'iutendanl g&.¿.n&i-al M. Dudon dwil snvWer ii. 
T. M. l'dta1 dc la perccytion [les contibiitiom et  de leur emploi. 
L'empsreur penso que V. M. cloit avoir aupxks du gdnfral-en-chef 
do l'nrrnde du nord un cmmissairc Españnol our veiller ii ce 
que lo qiiart du rcyeiiu des pm~i:iiea de igu~oribscment  di oette 
r~rmde, soit rcrsE i Madrid pow l c  service dc ~ o t r e  rnajestd, ct 
poiir strourir I'armEc ílu centre. L'empcreur aonseut L ce que 
touks Irs fois que lcs provinccs nurnicnt le8 moyciifi n6mssalrca 
poiir sc prtlcr ct  sc garantir dcs iiicursiona dcs crillaa, cllcs 
puis.~rit rcnh.er cntibornent sous I'ndminiatiiltionfes ilgnolo cn 
nc fournissmt ~ U O  co qiii eora canrcnii. Quant b ! aihm60 rlu 
mi& de i'lIsy~grie, I'cnipen.ur approu~-o gu'ainsi yu'k Yarrn6e 
du nord, lo mar&cI.ml qul commaiide envoie des rupports V. M. 
et  I'instruire de tout cc qui 8 8  pasee; les budgets en recettes e t  
en d6penees des diKCrentCs provincca do I'armSc du midi, doivcnt 
~ U S F ~  btro cnvogds & votre mrtjesf;, rlui g tiendra un commissaire 
poiir prrcrvoir 1i: iinrt dea rcvrniira. 
1.n. mimo m ~ g i o d o  aern pnrrillcmcnt nppliq~iEo R l'arrnk 
d"lkrr on. L'rmycreur, sirr, st~ti~lalt anñsi ai,ir?t dicslrri exprimh Y pnr V. .I. Quant i r  cc qui conecrnr lc commiindcmcnt gPnCrnl 
do sea amEes cn Xspdgne, sa majestl. ne croit pas poiivoir 
dorincr un tcl cclrnniarirli.incni qiii doit Otre siinjiio et un; rolre 
M. wntira qir'il cst d:tiis la ndum dea L~USPB qu'uu mdclinl 
Lrjirlctit ,:t 1Cludrid ct Jirigeanl I r a  opirahiaua voudrnit cn avoir Ia. 
gloiro nvcc I:L rc~.pou~ibilit&, e l  que diina ce CM, Ics commmrl;Lns 
des amCcs du inidi e t  de Portiipil se croyant moins fielleinrnt 
so- les ordres de ~otr( :  M. que solis de son chef d'6tat mrtjor, 
oiirraient ne pus &(ir, ou cs:sicutcr ee qui leur s m i t  prescrit. 
h a i a  indipeudammont do eoi~iuinndrrncnt dc I'rmiEa dn eontrq 
V. N. sirr, nizrnit lo ctirnmnnrl~ment rIcs troupeu qui cntrcmicnt; 
dans i'nrronrlisscmcnt di: crHe t~smfic. Si 1'aml:e rlii mirli Re 
rrplinit uur I'nmEc dir ccntrc, clli: scrnit di:a.Iorti sons  le^ ordms 
de Y. M. c t  il cn scrait (lo mi?mr: poiir l'arin6o du ccntsc. 
Dnns celles dcs arm6rs uh V. M. ese renbeit, clle ami t  les 
hoiincurs du conima~idcmcnt; mais, sire, i'empereur jugo trb! 
mportanl do ne ricn chünger au commmdemunt mililaire ni :I 
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Z 'mEe du nord, ni ib i'nrmEe rIIArr~on, ni uiix nrmdua du midi 
ct  dc I'oortupl, cxccpid cc gn'il cst nicc~qnirr: d'htnlilir pour qtie 
V. M. ait dcs mpportu de tuut cu qui sc passe, connnissc tout ct 
puissu be scrvir do ccs rel:~iioria, dans s:r pouitiun oriitrale, pour 
inslruire les autulreu g61it:ruux: aa iriaj~sC6 pcnre que cello cum- 
nltitlicalion dc rciiseigncmriis, ii'oli~cri.atioii~, de conscila 
rninic a ~ o i r  lieu par le cuna1 clu rniiiistre Uc la. gucrre de 
L'cmperenr dL.sire, sire, que T. M. veuille bien correspondre 
direckmcnt rrvec moi par rles lcttres signis dc sn main; j'aurai 
l'l~onneiir &dres~cr  dircctement lcs micnucs BY. M. L'emperrur 
dCiiirr* Cgalement qii'cllc s'cn rcacrra l'oiii~crturc e t  riissc conn;irtre 
cnaiiitc it son rhef'd'6mt-mnjor qii'ellc jii  rcra conveaabililc. Je 
p i e  votro L. <le rouloir bicn danner aps ortkcs pour quc bus les 
c:ornpks rcnd~is en Ctats dc aitunt,ion me soicnt adr~s.sfa, que lea 
rnpporf8 wicnt trbs cxnetñ ct q i i c  jc aoia instruib dc iorit ar! qui 
pc~ib inikrcescr lc ~ m r i c c  do l'c~npcrcur eommc ccla csb d'rrsagc 
dans uric wmL:o. D'aprCs les orclrcs do i'cmycrcur uno aomma 
de ein cenia mille fra~~rlrs piir niuis nera envoycc 3 V. 11. jtiaqu'üu 
1.. ~ u l l e t ,  e l  i eomyler du 1.' Juillol, ccL cnvoi sera d.uu 
million par mois penditiil lo re& de l'annóo. 
L'empereur, sire, me prescrit d'avoir l'lionnear {le concertcr 
mee votre mzjesté les mesnrea qdelIe jugera mni-ennliles ii 
l'orgmiaation da l'arrnie d ~ i  centre, ninsi quc pour cn rctircr les 
g!nimux yoi ne con-ricndriiont pns b r o k e  mgerté, hire de# 
examples c e ceiix giii aiiraient commic drs diliipiclñtiona, lerir 
fnirc rcsfitiirr l c ~  sornrncs qii'ils nurnient clilnpidPcri; en fin, sire, 
l'crnpcrciir RC rcpofir c~scnticI1cmcnt eur ~ o t r ~  majeet6 ciu soin 
do rnaintenir lcs afficirrs de son am6u dws la disci line con- 
rcnrlilr e l  da fa& der exiimyles. el il cli'sir~. que Y. $1. envoie 
'ournellemcnE de. rapports rli:li~illUs ur tDut cc qiii csl iirkporlant. $aire rnajcdd, sirc, reconnaitrr dans ees dispori~ioos que le 
d6sjr de l'cmpcrcnr est de fnire tout ce qui peut donncr m 
nouvcl Eclnt a l 'enGe do P. M. en Espagne, en mnintcnant 
d'aillenm dan8 lcnr inGnrih5, ainsi quc ss rnajcst6 le gage 
inrlispensa!,lc, l'organis~tion de I'armee d'hdalousie ct  rlcs 
nutre# nrm6es dqspagne, &c. 
Obsemiatimfas'tespar Te mi d'Bapayne mr b &fe Ju major 
g&&a¿, du l e r  Juin, 1811. 
lie roi dcmaade: 
1'. Qnc Mc~srs. Ica mnriclianx cemmmdant-en-chef les 
aiam6rs dc I'ernpercur, :L l'nrnicc du noríl, du porCyal, dc midi, 
ct du I'Arrqon, no puissciit nii,umcnlcr loa iiilpbte cxistunt ia cu 
jow, ni levcr autucunc mnlriliution extraordiako saris l'aulorisa- 
n .  t ~ m  d u  roi, ou de I'ornpereur. 
2". I;c mi d6sire qnc lo  inar6chal Jourdm rem Iacc lc msrCd~al 
duc d'Tstrje d n n ~  le cornrnandcmcat de I'arrnfc 8~ iiord. 
so. Que lea rn~rCchaux commanrlant les am6es de l'empcreur 
at les intcndiina g&n4rikl no prii~sent venrlro auciinc bien niilional 
o11 communnl sana I'aritorizntion du roi; 9u'iI en soit de mimo 
pour les plombs et vif srgcnt nppnricnnnt n, I'iht. 
P. Q i ~ e  Ica dniinistrlatiom Esprignolea dms I'mndissemcnt 
dm armees du nord, du midi, de l'Arragon, restwont tcllrti 
qn'elles ~ o n t ,  ct~~que si des chngemwa-pnmiss~nt utiles, ils semnt 
dcmand6s &u mi. 
6'. Qu'il soit vcei f ib  qno lo qnnrt dcs rwcnuca dcs provineca 
occupFos pBr les nm6ea de I'empereir, en Rspamnc, sora vw~4 
nct dans Ic trésor du roi B Madrid, ot  qiic Ls trois ~ u t r a  
quartcs ~eront  employ4s aux Iicaoin de I'n~rnAe dans 10s ditcs 
rovinces. ct en puycxricnrit des iruitcin~cna dcs adrriii~islriitions 
%spngudcs. 
6'. Le roi se tmnvant gvoir llionncur dn commnndcment p ~ E s  
des armees oh il so trouve, Vnse qii'il est dnns les jntentions de 
votre mnjeoti. qu'il pnisse voir et rEunir les autorités Jhpagnoler 
commc bon lui scmblcra poiir leur pnrlcr d m  I'intirbt clcs 
afkirrs rl'l%pn_ne: cc qiic kroi  troiiveiiti~c de faire d ~ n s  Ics Iieux 
oii il ~ R ~ ~ P T R  pour .SE rendrc Ib Rfndrid, 
7'. U pnroit cntrndn pr: lo inar4slinl commnndnnt l'nrmbr: dr: 
Porhiga1 rcndra comptc au roi dca t o n t a  lca op6rntionsj nnssi 
que doivent lo h i r o  les wtres marficlranx. 
S3. Le rui litouvu ulile poiir Ics i ~ ~ l h - h h  des iifraircs d'Et;pagne 
de pouvoir s'allaclicr d c ~  olficicrei JSspng~~ols oti autrcs yui se 
troureroicnt paniii les prisunniers, c l  yui par des motirv parlicu- 
lima il 'ugcroil, ccirivcnnlilv d'cmliloyer. 
9'. 1. roi de Wert~ilinlie qui ne peiit p s  recruter les rcdmena 
gn'il a en Xspngnc eatrlispos6 kmcttre le petit noml>rc d'honmce 
qui restent xux &apean h ln disposition (111 roi d 'Espnpc pour 
Bim k In aoldo c t  pon acrvice: lc roi d'Ranmc lcs tilnccroit , 
utilrment  dan^ In prde. 
1W. Le roi dEsirc qnn lo g&nErnl Mauicr, Mnthien ~ m p l a c r !  le 
ghihnl h q e .  
llfl. Bu11 ne r e a l e  tb Madrid o110 l'xdniinisiralioii ndcefi~air~ 
pour l'm7m60 cln centre. ct que ceitr grande quantili. I I ' L ~ ~ I I I ~ I I I B -  
trateun appai-tennnt it l'arlministration ~6nfixale qui n'ruutc plus 
ii Mndrid aoit rn~oyfr: X.Riir~os ou en h z n c e .  
PP. Que lasolde des troiipcs Fr'rnnwiises thisrant piirtie del'nrmfc 
dn rcntrii continnc :I Mrc liny6r par la trtqtior clr Iirlincr. 
Izo. SR rnnjrñti:. conacrvcrn Ic gthCrnl ltclliard commc rhrf do 
Ron dtnf; mrijnr. 
14'- Lc roi dEsirt: ponvoir prendrc toutcs Ics mcsurcs politiquos 
r'jl jtigcra conven:~Llc, CL hiw toutP8 UU~PCS dispmitioii~ i~Yogt~rd 
u cortcx. en su conl'urnnuril aux vucs coiilenues IIWS Itl letlru que j'& Ecrilc d'aprbs I'urdrc rIo V. M. Iiotir cct ohjel. 
15'. Sur les úOD,l)OO fr.uics qiie 7i, M. met h la dispogition dn 
roi :L Madrid on rn rcticnt lOO,C100 fraiics ponr l'arrii,re. Le roi 
dcmndc que ectte sommc- soit pour lo scrvice courant. 
SIRE,-L'cmpewm m'urrlonne dc voiis envoycr In copic de la 
lettrc qiic j 'drcsat :  nn duc rl'lstric: j'Ccria ibpcu-prbx  dan^ lcz 
mhmcs trrmcs a ~ i s  aiitrcs commandante. Jc n'ni pus cncorc vn 
lo mardekül Jonrdnn ; i e lo vcrrai dcmain et irnm6diutcmcnt aprbs 
il partira pour Madrid, oii l'cmpereur apprendrx nvcc pl&ir qn'il 
eaL emplopi. coiiiinc gouvcnieur. 
Le duc de Rnqusc mande qdil cnt en ninrcl~e sur le Tnv. 
L'empereur dbsire gne V. M. donno ses orhes pour qu'on yui 
procure toiis lcs secoiim dont il peut nvoir beeoiii : il a w c c  Ini 
vingt-fiiiit millc bnyonnettas, trois millo homme3 dc m\*slcrje, et  
trent-riis piibcm dc canon. ~ J ' c M ~ ~ ~ c I I ~  dki ro qne V. M. puisac 
I'nppiiyrr nvrr: dixhiiit rtnt ~Iici-nux, qiiiiixr d r ~ h u i t  piEccs dc 
canon, c t  dcux h t,mis rnil!o hommrs d'infnntrric: oc c o ~ p s  
oiwoit Utrc placi. it proximit6 afin do pouvoir rcjoindrc ct  aidcr E duo do ilaguse. di1 dwoit donncr bat.%iii~ aux Anglnia. 
L'empercur vcrroit avoc pliaisir, ~ire ,  qii'apri.~ rotra orrivb tt 
31aclrid vous vous rendissifs h l'nrmCr do Portuyal, pour lapnsser 
cn reruc, I'aniiner, et prendrc L n s  vStre re\-ue l'i:fat des emplois A 
vacans. 
J'Ccris nu duc de Itaguse que s i  i'on puvoit rctranchcr Al- 
cantara et  fairc unc U t e  rlc unt sur la rive diboite, ce scroit une 
b o n n ~  op6rnti.n. Si 13~rn& do P o ~ t u p i  h v o i t  trms pour 
stcoiirir I'nrmét? di1 mirli devnnt Rndnjoz, le  petit eoryik d r  ms~rro 
dont jc vicna dr! pnrlcr t i - r lcssi la ?I VOLPE rnnjcst.4 no pourroit btro 
g ~ i o  dc ln plitrr pnnrlc iitilit6. 
Le sibgc dc  Tnrrqonc a dbjii, xttirb uno partie des b n n h  qui 
ftoient diins I'rirrontlissmnen~ de i'arrn6e du ccntre. h i ~ x  divi- 
sio~is dc IhrmCe de reserve que fomio Yemlicreur ~rriveivnt I'une 
U, Pimipcliinc, l'autre H Vil~i)rLo, vcra lo 14 duillcl : cclri mctlra h 
m h c  d'envoycr encore aiix arm6c.s dii inidi et de Portiieal 
~ n v i r o n  douae milles hommcei qui sont en h'nvarre, e% qui passe- 
ront par Mncl~id. 
T,'rmprciir nc pent q u ' e n g ~ ~ r  robe mrqje~té 'n, Pnvoper ib 
l'mmFr di1 midi toutj cr qiii Eiii np zrticnt, cnr e'est l A  qiic sc 




2'0 "be d u h  oflsliia- 
Pam, A~in, 1811. 
J'ai prev6nn, Monrrieur le mar&ciid, le g6~6r:il Mo~~tllion, 1m
$116rniix Cr~TTiirrllE ct Do~ocritic dirccLemciit des diol~oai l ioi is doiit jo vais vous ni t r~lenir ,  et  qui  onl rnppori aux intcntioiis dc 
'crnperenr r6l;ttivement au rCtour dn roi íl*Espape d m ~  scs 
Etnts. 
Lc roi commmrle cn clicf l'armfe cIn centrr, mais I'intcntion 
de l'crnperriir cst rliie voue correslion iiicz avcc S. M. C. cn liii 
fiiissant Ic rnpport dc ce qui se passi: d i 1 1  dc 1s mett,re di mbmc de 
connoitro l'cnscmblo clcs 6 ~ d r i c r n c n ~  cn Espapa commc Ice 
:tiitrrs gfnErL~ux en rlicf ont l'ordrc rl'cn ngir dc inOinc, lc rui scro 
dzntna lc c:is dc yourwir commc puint c e n t d  ~ o u s  hirc E~irc'des 
vuiiimunieialions qui oorilriliut:rotit au succhs des a rmes  de l'crn- 
pcreur. 
S. M. 1. m'ordoanc mssi de vons faire connaitre, M. le diic. 
que son intcntion cat puo pendant le vopnge du roi dans aon 
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&toar h Madrid, tons les honncura lai coicnt rendns d ~ n n  lee 
gonverncmcns et  dnns l"mnndissement dc i'armbo du nord 
comme si  S. R.T. commandnit cctte armte. Le roi Jonncrn I'ordre 
et reccvra les I~oiinciirs du commandcment. Les goiivcrnciirs 
l'accompagneroat ilnna lcur goiivcrncmcnt c t  lui feront fournir 
toutcs lrs ~ s c o r t c ~  qui lui scront n6ccssiiircs. 11 csb h prdsaumer 
qut! lc roi s4journerri rlnclque tcms h 'lrittorin c t  b ~ I E I ' R O R ,  et 
qiiil proíitcra do son atmiour pour rnsscmlilcrlcs notnlilcs tlu paya, 
Ics dclaircr snr la sitriatioii &a affilirco, et am6liorcr Ycsprit 
publia. Vous sccondcrcx, Mons. lc mrdchd, lo mcsurcs quc lo 
roi pourrrs preridre puur renilce les villes et les villagrli respvrisilbles 
des U ~ U S  qui se C O I ~ I I I I ~ L L L ' I I ~  sur leur terribire. YOUS uglrcü de 
ni&inc si le mi accordc lo ~iarrlori ?L quellqiies httndca dc guerillns qui 
se rontlrnicnt. Vous devcr, aihr (le tous vos moyem les nicsures 
quc S. 3T. prcndra pour le s<hblisrement dc I'ordrc et dc la 
trrtnqiiillité pnbliquc. Du rcete lcs troupcs composant l'armea 
du nord doi~ent  rester aons le commnndemcnt rcspcclif de leurs 
chefs et vos odrcs  cloivcnt continucr i rtrc cxdcutCs snnfi qu'aum 
ordrc de qui qur: cc soit puisse Ics clinn~er. Quant h l'nclmiiiis- 
trntion du uvs, clle doit coniiniicr :L inarchcr rInns la clircction 
donnie par in,tni,tions et  ira oniror de il~mprrriir ; Ira imds 
dnircnt Strc d e a t i n h s  nilr braoirls de l'ni-m4c, i~l'cntrcticn rles 
lifipitnux, ct rous dcvce di.fcntli.c ct omp8chcr toutc cri h c  d'nlim. 
Lo mi n p n t  ius artisiiii8rcmcnt ooi:oro quc vons, 110s rnoycas 
dc comuitrc ~s nlus qu'ont licu, I.ornpcrour ordonnc quc vous 
proíiteries des IuuiiCrcs yuri lo  roi pourr:t voiis dwnncr i~ ccL4gnrrE 
pour le8 rhprimer. 11 est a6ccssuirc, Jlo~isicur le rluc, yun vuw 
iiic Bssicz conridtm le liuiljcl dca rcssourccs ct clcs rlipciiscs, aEn 
de sa~oii- la pwtie des reircniics qiii pourront 8lrc vcrs6s 
Madrid dans Ja caissc du gouvernemcnt pour l e  service du roi et 
poiir l'armke dn centre. 
,Te n'ai ppaa liesoin de vona r6pEter que la iiistice doit se rcnrlrs 
au nom du mi; cda IL ~ O I I ~ O U P R  d i  avoii l i ~ t i  ; le droit dc Eaire 
yme nc vous nppnrticot yas pour los indiriclus ondnmni 's  par 
cs tribtmux; toua n'0tcs zutoris& qu'U suspcndrc I'cx4cution 
dms Ics cm qno TWU jugcrce gracialilca. Lo droit de fairc ~ r a a e  
n'apparticni qu'w mi. VOUH n'avt~e~ pas non plus le droit de 
iiornrncr ?t. ancurie pl:rce riu c l egb  ; b mi g n o m s  dsns toulcs 
les parLies de aon royuume. 
Si le roi juge Lpropos de tenir pr&s de vous el dcs gouverneura 
m commisaaire Xipugnol pour coniiaftre les rcrxtte~ et  les 
d6penacs, vous de~eí: douner B cc wrnmissaire lcs renscigncmens 
dan t  ii nura besoin paur remplir sa rnianion. T'ara au.uvez soin, 
Monsienz. le markhal, de me rendrc comptc jonrncllement de ce 
qiii se sera fait p~ndmit lo aéjo~ir dn roi afii que j'cu informe 
I'empereur. &c. Sc. 
Pa&, b 24 Amt, 1811. 
Srm,-J'ai l'lionneiir d'informer votre majesi6 que d'a rbs 
ie. ortimg de 13empercur, j e  ,en. de fair. cm~naitrc ii $ 10 
maréclrnl duc de Ilagmse, que I'arin6e de Portug-al doit prendm 
désormais sa Lgne de communication sar Nadrid; je  lui mande 
qnc c'est 1% que doit &re aon centre do dépBt, et qne touta O$- 
~ñtion qiie l'ennemi fcrnit riiir la Coa ne peut déranger cette ligne; $o ai l 'cnnmi rcut prcndm l'offensiva il ne pcut la. prendrc ue 
fin. i . , l n d ~ i ~ ~ ~ i ~  pnrerqiio da oa oBt6 il n un oiijct h rcm lir. 
qui s't dr iiirc levci. Ir aiPgo do Ccdix. tnndis ua scl offorts rfrns 
lc n o d  a*avongn-t-il memo jusqii3Y ~a l l adu l ia  n'nboutirricnt ii 
riun, piiisquc les lroupes que nou~  avoris dans ces provinueü en 
se repliaril lui opposcraient une mmEe considErablc, et qu'dors 
I'armt!e dc Porlagal devrnit faire pour I'armCo dn non3 ce qu'clle 
fcrait poiir I'armée du rnicii. J e  Ic pr6viens que l'oljrt bportant 
est que su ligni, d"op6rations soit eur Talavera et  KCadrid, pmceqae 
son zm6c cst spEcidcment destinée k prot8ger ml1e clu midi. Ja 
liii fais observcr qiic l'arrnEe dr Portugal 6tant attqucro rle front 
son monvement de retrnik est encorc sur Madrid, pnmeque drina 
tous lea cas poasiblca ce doit dtre so, lignc d'op6rnticins; ,qu'ilfnut 
danc qiic tous lcs d6pbts uclconquca a pnrtcnnnt ii 1 a r m h  do 
Portus1 ~oiont dir ids  sur Bo~ovorr et d d r i d .  Jo donno l.ardra 
imp6ratif itu g6nEral Dorsennu do Yaim partir dans les 24 heures 
tous les dCp81s el dbbchmens qu'il n aplir~rLenlinl Z l'armhe de 
Portiigd;   out co qui est cii Ctnt Se servir scm &ri$ cn gros d6- 
taclicmeiis par A d a  sur Placentia; et quant aux Iiommcs qui 110 
sont pas our le rnomant cn 8ta.t de servir, b g6n6rul Dorscnno 
les fci.a dfriner sur ~a<lric~, et aura ~ o i n  $en iniorrnor 17asrnce 
~ & e  m,jeatE; de mtlnikre qu'il ne lui restera plus un ecirl homme 
R partenant; kl'nrmde de I'ortupl, sniif IR gnrni~on d~ Ciudad 
3odri:o qnod fcm r c l o ~ c ~  t rrjoindrc russiMt aprbs I.mrivCo des 
renforts yui yont so r w h  l'arm6e du nord. 
&a. &o. 
BoaZope,  re 20 Sept., 181 1. 
Srn~,-L'cmpcrcur m'a dcmandd si "avois r6ponso b In lcttro 
jTai cu fimncnr ~ a d r ~ m c r  L V. d. cn lui wn,mt. c m p t o  
e la rcdciition dt. Figucrribi. L'empereur m'ordonno d'wnrionwr 
k V. M. que son inteulion est d'blcndre B ioule 1ii rive gaucho 
de l'nbrp la mesure qu'ells b juFfó dccroir ado kr pour la Cala- 
logne. Ecmpercur pense que \T. 35. temoio Se ia reoiatame qiii 
4 rouvent Ics arm&es e t  des sacrifices dcs touks e s~bccs  quo la 
&mce cst o h l i ~ 4  de fniro, est trop juste pour ne point appreoirr 
les rnotifs de 1s condiiite de I'ernpercur, e t  ja suis autoris6 h 
asaurcr V. M. des ~cntimens d'intirbt c t  d3arn;tik qui continiirnt 
iL tznimcr l'cm crcur our V. M., mais il nc pouvcnt pm faire 
n e ~ l i ~ o r  S. 2.1. ct & co ~ U I D U O  doit G la e w c t f  de ~mpire 
st B la g l o h  [lo son rEpo. 
&c. &c. 
Annmswn TO MARSHAL M A R M O ~  RT PRTXCR R R R ~ ,  DATED commam, 
X ~ T H  G ~ T R J I B Z I I ,  1811. 
[Fixh.acted from nclrnw's ' Feninniiln Siega,l  
MAR#HAL,-%%II yoii ~Eutli have eighty piecc~ 01" dil Iery well 
inrnished; irlien general Pandcimaescn anintl di your d e p h  leiF 
i i i  the nortli alizll Iinve joinctI you; and nlicn you liave receivetl 
al1 equipments and clotliing deslincd For Tour army, the cmpomr 
counis oii your ha&g forty-oiic tlioirannd seven Iinndred mcii. 
and nfe slinll then be near tlie first of 0c:~olirr. TVliesi yoii are 
Rure tlizi Citidncl Xodrigo has bern re-victu:illcd f o ~  tlirrc montlis, 
i,tir rrnprrnr lravtrrs yoii free to mzmh on Bdnjon, inrest Rlcas, 
nnd in~ indn tc  tlir Alimhjo. In tFint enac P. ni. rlirernta thnt tEie 
Sfth corps sliiill be iintlrr yoiir risdcrs, wjtli tltree thoi~sand 
cm-nlrg ~vliicli thc duko of Di~lniatin will furnish. Tou will thus 
Iiava filtv-scven tEiou~:tnrl tlircc liundrcd iiicn Iiaricd on Eetrcin:i- 
tlum xnd Ilie forlrcss r i l  ljudajos, urid y«u cari Lesirge JZIraa, (:,te 
tlie lown md ouc of  tlle (UC~S, \I l i l ~ 1 1  i j  ill not bc diliicul& diatiirli 
tlie Eng!isL t o a d a  h h n t e s  aiicl Lisbon, and in a jiood osiLion 
rntch to soe ii tliej- aill givc I>attle to relieve Blras. fi. tliey 
let you licsicge that place, yon ntill liave gmnerl arealadvantage. 
~ O U  ñill have relicved tlie nortli, and by t h ñ t  s i n ~ e  a a & a  lirivo 
thiumi tiie cnrmy into Lisbnn. Rl rn~  migli t, lie tnlicn hr tjrc thr:  
15th of November with tlie csmption of onc fiirt wliirli is of 
little import~ncr: tliia will f o r m a d  iiE~i:zirs o, tlixt hefore tlic 
month ot Fchru~ry tho carnpnign ai l l  be activo in tlic intcrior of 
Yortugnl. 
IC t t o  enem shauld then tnke tlie oKensivo mid inovo on 
SaImnnce an~?~aLldohd, he wilI h d  Snlainnnca 1iii.f ilicd and 
provisioncd for tn.0 inontha; and general Borseiino will lir~ve to 
idl ba~k upon Talladolid, ox cven on 13urgos, vhere lic will llnd 
himsclf nt tlie lieñd of Iifty thonsand men, cdus ive  of ri dirision 
in thc Asturias and nf tlie tmops in tlie 3rd, doth, and 5th 
governrncnts. nuh e h i ~  movement of tnr Rn~lish is not at 1111 
proliable; t h l  will inorr! Iikrly linstcn t o  tlic drfcnco oF Li~inbori, 
nnd will be pitrm~rd by twriity-five tliousnnd mrn drtachcd fmm 
tlir nrmg of tlic rinrtdi. So thnt two divisiona wi11 Lnld tlirm in 
clicrk. Tlio o rrntion wluch 1 Iinvc explniricd h yon, inaralinl, is 
thc oniy o n c ~ k c h  oun do honour to our nma, draw us out of tho 
defcnsii-e etate we miro in, mdro tlie E n ~ I i s h  trenihlc, and dx-mco 
ns torvards great evenh. The twenly-firo thoii~nnd incn wtio 
shdl be on Ilie Coa, ivill follow lile ICngIish army; and iC Ilie 
Intler conccni~at-etes entirely oii t l ie Tagus, thc army of ilic nortli 
tvi11 dchclr fifteen tlousand men to join jou, wLicll will give you 
x foree of  se~ent tmo thouañnd tlmc liundred men. 
Tbe tnking o& fortress undir tiir eTis o! &e Cnglish army; 
the oonqnest of a part of Portugal whicic will coTer the army of 
the 8011th; and the junction witll yonr force of twentp-&e thon- 
sana mcn from tliat army of the sontli, will be for poii motives of 
glory and of suemsa. Qn rnotller aide rnarshal Suchet will 
march upon Valencia, and crervthing tonds to R Iiclief that 
Valencia Taill be taken by tlie time p m  hnve redacerl Elvas, 
2nd tliat yon rnn he thus reinforced with nnothcr good division. 
Yoii Iiarc, miar~liril, ivcI1 oliscrvcd that to  exceiitc thc opcrntion 
proposcd, zuo mnwl6r: atire thnl ihc cmny k a . ~  ml got any Latlcwng- 
t m z m  to attoek Ci&d Rodrt+qo; liecaiise if the ~ ingc  oí' ihat, plrico 
i~ cornmeured, il will be neceasnry a t  iirst t o  m~rc l i  iind clisenaqa 
tlie rortresa. seeing lhe arrnj. ol tlie nortli is nol stron:: e n o u ~ h  
alon~ to do so, anrl its busincss is to fa11 Iiack rf tlie Engtisli, 
w11ic:i is not likely, attempted to fa11 upon tliat army ~ l i e n  you 
mnrch on tlre aoul h. 33iit ff you are pirpnrrd, and that Ciudad 
ILodrigo is not Lesieged, you can, with h e  aid of tlio ii~'Fh corps, 
att:vek and overllimw di f h ~  pf l~ i t i~ns  of thr linr of  flngli~h 
plii ccd on tlic lcft banlr of  the Tn,niis. Tlint 611  caiiso AUCJI almm 
aiid will PO dEsquiet lord Wollington, thst h o d l  p1iably rctiun 
long mardies to Lisbon. 
In caso o¡" your junclíon ivill i  t l~e nrnl-y oT thc norili lo inareh 
for the succmu o€ Ciudad Borlrigo, if ilie eneiny besiege il, you 
mil1 by hiia ma~esty's orders Iiarc tho commaud of botli amies. 
You wiII 6nd joined to ihis letter it duplicate ordrr pplacing the 
likh eorpci under your command when you iihall have renolvcd k 
mnrch nn Rlvna; d ~ e  ra diiplicntc ordcr to gcncral nomenne if' 
.a mnrcli on Ciiithd Itodrigo. (Sigied) h i , ~ ~ h # ~ l ~ , n .  





